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WHEN WAR CRIMES RHETORIC BECOMES BATTLEFIELD REALITY: THE SLIPPERY
SLOPE TO TOTAL WAR ON IRAN
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Margaret Donovan and Rachel VanLandingham, Lt Col, USAF (Ret.)
April 6, 2026
Just Security
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_ The law of war prohibits “acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.”
It is difficult to read Trump’s egregious threats of destruction as
anything but intending to spread terror. _
Donald Trump holds a press conference about Iran war aboard Air Force
One, screen grab
“Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in
one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!!” posted
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President Donald Trump on Easter Sunday. In case one thought that was
an impulsive utterance, it’s notable that the president in
apparently prepared remarks a few days earlier said
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no deal, we are going to hit each and every one of their electric
generating plants very hard and probably simultaneously.”
Such rhetorical statements – if followed through – would amount to
the most serious war crimes – and thus the president’s statements
place servicemembers in a profoundly challenging situation. As former
uniformed military lawyers who advised targeting operations, we know
the presidents’ words run counter to decades of legal training of
military personnel and risk placing our warfighters on a path of no
return.
Iranian power plants and other critical civilian infrastructure are
protected from attacks by the law of war the United States helped
craft after World War II. Such an object can lose its protection only
if it is used for military purposes by the enemy and its destruction
“offers a DEFINITE MILITARY advantage.” Even then, such an object
can be attacked only if, after a case-by-case rigorous analysis, the
“concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” outweighs the
civilian suffering that is expected to result. (Geneva Convention
Additional Protocol I art. 52
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art. 57
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DOD Law of War Manual
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§ 5.6, § 5.12).
Despite those well-settled legal parameters, President Trump has
repeatedly threatened to obliterate such infrastructure without regard
to the law’s high demands. His comments are blatant expressions that
he is willing to turn the United States into a rogue State like Iran
and Russia, one that rejects the fundamental legal restraints that
protect innocent non-combatants like children, and the Iranian
civilian population itself.
EFFECTS ON SERVICEMEMBERS
While our Commander-in-Chief threatens to “obliterate”
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“each and every one of their electric generating plants,” U.S.
military commanders have been approving strike packages, wrestling
with how to transform Trump’s dangerous bombast into lawful
targets.
Asking our military professionals—lawyers and commanders alike—to
grapple with the president’s erratic behavior is enormously
consequential. U.S. military commanders have sworn to obey the
Constitution and _only_ those orders from their superiors that are
lawful. Threats [[link removed]] to
bomb Iran “back to the Stone Ages
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and to show “no quarter, no mercy
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are plainly illegal. Trump’s outrageous statements gravely
threaten our military professionals’ bedrock moral and legal
principles, ones enshrined in the law of war that they’ve been
trained to follow their entire careers.
We write to highlight that the Commander-in-Chief’s dangerous
rhetoric places our service members in an intolerable position in
several respects.
* First, such threats undermine U.S. legitimacy and global standing,
as they demonstrate a rejection of binding international agreements
and core commitments to the laws of war. Indeed, the U.S. military
doubled down
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on its commitment to the law of war following Vietnam War-era
atrocities, requiring our Armed Forces to follow the law regardless
how any conflict is characterized. An operation that followed through
on Trump’s rhetoric would be one of infamy in the history of modern
warfare.
* Second, they pose a significant risk of moral and psychic injury
for servicemembers. National soul-searching regarding how Americans
fight followed the long U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which
both civilian casualties and detainee abuse undermined strategic
objectives and weighed heavily on soldiers’ consciences long after
the fighting stopped. This reflection led to initiatives
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such as the Pentagon’s civilian harm mitigation program and new laws
regarding detention and interrogation practices, strengthening U.S.
commitment to fighting honorably and effectively through adherence to
the law.
* Finally, the public record of intent to commit war crimes puts
soldiers at risk of later liability. In any future war crimes
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investigation—for which there may be no statute of
limitations—their actions will be judged based on the reasonably
available information at the time of the strikes. _See, e.g._,
Executive Summary of the Investigation of the Alleged Civilian
Casualty Incident in the al Jadidah District, Mosul
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May 8, 2017. Long after the Secretary of Defense receives his
anticipated pardon
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from the president, it is not unlikely that both his and Trump’s
_expressly stated intent_ to commit acts that amount to clear war
crimes and to dispense with “stupid rules of engagement” may be
considered evidence of notice and scienter on the part of
servicemembers’ during any future congressional or criminal
investigations.
The U.S. military trains to fight with precision and lethality
according to the law of war – precision meaning attacking only
lawful military objectives while doing our utmost to protect innocent
civilians caught up in the fight. The legal hurdle to convert a
civilian object such as a power plant into a lawful military objective
is a high one because the United States and its allies vigorously
rejected “total war” after the massive suffering endured by
millions during World War II. What President Trump threatens is
exactly that, from a civilian targeting perspective – total war
against Iran, a complete rejection of the legal limits the United
States has incorporated into the law governing U.S. military
operations for both pragmatic and moral reasons.
THE HEART OF TARGETING
U.S. military commanders translating Trump’s orders face a daunting
legal and operational task, one that focuses on impact on the Iranian
civilian population. Given the scope of his rhetoric, it appears
difficult to steer clear of war crimes
[[link removed],)%20replied%20favourably.%5B13%5D].
To be sure, civilian structures like power plants, roads, bridges, and
even water desalination plants can be targeted under particular
circumstances. For example, bridges are frequently engaged during
ground operations as a means of denying the enemy access to key
terrain or supply routes, and a water treatment plant being used as a
fighting position is easily targetable in self-defense. But this is
only true when the impact on civilians has been carefully considered
and expected not to be excessive compared to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated from the strike.
Indeed, the harm induced by striking a power plant is specifically
envisioned by the Department of Defense Law of War Manual. _See,
e.g._, DOD LOWM, Section 5.12.1.3, Foreseeable Harms Versus Remote
Harms (“For example, if the destruction of a power plant would be
expected to cause the loss of civilian life or injury to civilians
very soon after the attack due to the loss of power at a connected
hospital, then such harm should be considered in assessing whether an
attack is expected to cause excessive harm.”). And as a case in
point, the International Criminal Court is investigating Russia for
war crimes regarding their intentional targeting of the Ukrainian
civilian electrical grid during wintertime
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that plunged thousands of Ukrainians into life-threatening cold
conditions, thereby causing unnecessary civilian suffering that was
not outweighed by claims of military advantage. The United States also
made sure
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to “condemn, in the strongest possible terms” the Russian
operations against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. And the State
Department’s 2022 formal determination
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that Russia had committed war crimes included attacks on “critical
infrastructure.” (See also, United Nations Independent International
Commission on Inquiry on Ukraine
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para. 109 (“The Commission has also found that the Russian armed
forces’ waves of attacks, starting 10 October 2022, on Ukraine’s
energy-related infrastructure and the use of torture by Russian
authorities may amount to crimes against humanity.”))
Indeed, the United States has traditionally served as a leader in this
sphere, developing an entire methodology for determining the
collateral effects of munitions on various types of targets
(“Collateral Damage Estimation” or “CDE”); a process in which
we have both advised in real-time. _See _Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (“CJCSI”) 3160.01D, “No-Strike and
the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology,” last published May
2021 (2012 public version
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The United States maintains a database of facilities on a “No Strike
List,” or “NSL,” which divides civilian structures in two
protected categories. Notably, nuclear power plants appear on the
higher of those categories on the NSL, while nearly all other civilian
structures—including electric-generating power plants—are
recognized to hold standard no-strike protections. The methodology
also calculates a noncombatant civilian casualty cut-off value
(“NCV”), which serves as a guide to proportionality for certain
effects which might yield civilian casualties. Cold and clinical as
it may sound, employing CDE methodology and considering NCVs are a
perfect example of how the United States has operationalized the
concept of proportionality and distinction directly into its conduct
of war.
In other words, American military targeting processes have
institutionalized and operationalized principles such as distinction
and proportionality – to ensure a target qualifies as a lawful
military objective in the first place – and precautions in an
attack, which forces targeteers to ask whether we can temporarily
disable a power plant
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for example, versus destroying it.
DIMINISHING CIVILIAN MORALE IS NOT A MILITARY ADVANTAGE
In light of the president’s comments, it is important to highlight
that the DOD Law of War Manual’s note on targeting civilian
infrastructure states: “DIMINISHING THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT DOES NOT PROVIDE A
DEFINITE MILITARY ADVANTAGE. However, attacks that are otherwise
lawful are not rendered unlawful if they happen to result in
diminished civilian morale.” DOD Law of War Manual
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§ 5.6. Such “morale bombing” has been rejected for many
decades; it had gained support during World War II only to be roundly
rejected by Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and
customary international law
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of using civilian pain in order to effectuate political goals would
rightly stoke criticisms that the United States’s use of military
force against civilian targets equates to acts of sheer terrorism
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(_See_ Additional Protocol I art. 51(2)
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(“Acts OR THREATS of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”)
(emphasis added); DOD Law of War Manual, § 5.2.2 (“Measures of
intimidation or terrorism against the civilian population are
prohibited, including acts OR THREATS of violence, the primary purpose
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.”)
(emphasis added).
By all accounts then, the law of war prohibits “acts _OR THREATS OF_
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the
civilian population.” It is difficult to read President Trump’s
egregious threats of great destruction as anything but intending to
spread terror, making it even more incumbent on U.S. military
professionals to ensure strikes are limited in their impact on the
Iranian people.To be sure, as stated above, individual components of
Iranian civilian infrastructure may indeed
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constitute lawful military targets under specific circumstances in
which they contribute to the enemy’s military action and their
destruction would provide a definite military advantage. That said,
the damning public rhetoric surrounding these planned strikes against
ALL POWER PLANTS in an undifferentiated manner casts the legitimacy
and legality of such an operation in serious doubt, to say the
least. We urge military decisionmakers within the chain of command
to think long-term, trust their training, and remember their oaths.
American military professionals must remind their chain of command
that the United States is not like Iran or Russia: our country is
great because it adheres to the law of war and emerges victorious
because of such adherence, not in spite of it. That might be said of
all sorts of operations. Surely, here, the mass devastation on a
civilian population makes where to draw the line excruciatingly clear.
* Donald Trump
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* Iran war
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* law of war
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*
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