From xxxxxx <[email protected]>
Subject How Jared Kushner’s Secret Testing Plan “Went Poof Into Thin Air”
Date August 2, 2020 12:05 AM
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[ This spring, a team working under the presidents son-in-law
produced a plan for an aggressive, coordinated national COVID-19
response that could have brought the pandemic under control. ]
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HOW JARED KUSHNER’S SECRET TESTING PLAN “WENT POOF INTO THIN
AIR”  
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Katherine Eban
July 30, 2020
Vanity Fair
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_ This spring, a team working under the president's son-in-law
produced a plan for an aggressive, coordinated national COVID-19
response that could have brought the pandemic under control. _

Jared Kushner, Getty Images

 

On March 31, three weeks after the World Health Organization
designated the coronavirus outbreak a global pandemic, a DHL truck
rattled up to the gray stone embassy of the United Arab Emirates in
Washington, D.C., delivering precious cargo: 1 million Chinese-made
diagnostic tests for COVID-19, ordered at the behest of the Trump
administration.

Normally, federal government purchases come with detailed contracts,
replete with acronyms and identifying codes. They require sign-off
from an authorized contract officer and are typically made public in a
U.S. government procurement database, under a system intended as a
hedge against waste, fraud, and abuse.

This purchase did not appear in any government database. Nor was there
any contract officer involved. Instead, it was documented in an
invoice obtained by _Vanity Fair,_ from a company, Cogna Technology
Solutions (its own name misspelled as “Tecnology” on the bill),
which noted a total order of 3.5 million tests for an amount owed of
$52 million. The “client name” simply noted “WH.”

Over the next three months, the tests’ mysterious provenance would
spark confusion and finger-pointing. An Abu Dhabi–based artificial
intelligence company, Group 42, with close ties to the UAE’s ruling
family, identified itself as the seller of 3.5 million tests and
demanded payment. Its requests were routed through various divisions
within Health and Human Services, whose lawyers sought in vain for a
bona fide contracting officer.

During that period, more than 2.4 million Americans contracted
COVID-19 and 123,331 of them died of the illness. First in New York,
and then in states around the country, governors, public health
experts, and frightened citizens sounded the alarm that a critical
shortage of tests, and the ballooning time to get results, were
crippling the U.S. pandemic response.

But the million tests, some of which were distributed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to several states, were of no help.
According to documents obtained by _Vanity Fair,_ they were examined
in two separate government laboratories and found to be
“contaminated and unusable.”

Group 42 representatives did not respond to repeated requests for
comment.

[Image may contain Text Page Menu and Label]
The invoice for 3.5 million COVID-19 tests listed the client name as
"WH."
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TEAM JARED

The secret, and legally dubious, acquisition of those test kits was
the work of a task force at the White House, where JARED KUSHNER,
President DONALD TRUMP’s son-in-law and special adviser, has assumed
a sprawling role in the pandemic response. That explains the “WH”
on the invoice. While it’s unclear whether Kushner himself played a
role in the acquisition, improper procurement of supplies “is a
serious deal,” said a former White House staffer. “That is
appropriations 101. That would be _not good_.”

Though Kushner’s outsized role has been widely reported, the
procurement of Chinese-made test kits is being disclosed here for the
first time. So is an even more extraordinary effort that Kushner
oversaw: a secret project to devise a comprehensive plan that would
have massively ramped up and coordinated testing for COVID-19 at the
federal level.

Six months into the pandemic, the United States continues to suffer
the worst outbreak of COVID-19 in the developed world. Considerable
blame belongs to a federal response that offloaded responsibility for
the crucial task of testing to the states. The irony is that, after
assembling the team that came up with an aggressive and ambitious
national testing plan, Kushner then appears to have decided, for
reasons that remain murky, to scrap its proposal. Today, as governors
and mayors scramble to stamp out epidemics plaguing their populations,
philanthropists at the Rockefeller Foundation are working to fill the
void and organize enough testing to bring the nationwide epidemic
under control.

Inside the White House, over much of March and early April,
Kushner’s handpicked group of young business associates, which
included a former college roommate, teamed up with several top experts
from the diagnostic-testing industry. Together, they hammered out the
outline of a national testing strategy. The group—working night and
day, using the encrypted platform WhatsApp—emerged with a detailed
plan obtained by _Vanity Fair._

Rather than have states fight each other for scarce diagnostic tests
and limited lab capacity, the plan would have set up a system of
national oversight and coordination to surge supplies, allocate test
kits, lift regulatory and contractual roadblocks, and establish a
widespread virus surveillance system by the fall, to help pinpoint
subsequent outbreaks.

The solutions it proposed weren’t rocket science—or even
comparable to the dauntingly complex undertaking of developing a new
vaccine. Any national plan to address testing deficits would likely be
more on the level of “replicating UPS for an industry,” said Dr.
MIKE PELLINI, the managing partner of Section 32, a technology and
health care venture capital fund. “Imagine if UPS or FedEx didn’t
have infrastructure to connect all the dots. It would be complete
chaos.”

The plan crafted at the White House, then, set out to connect the
dots. Some of those who worked on the plan were told that it would be
presented to President Trump and likely announced in the Rose Garden
in early April. “I was beyond optimistic,” said one participant.
“My understanding was that the final document would make its way to
the president over that weekend” and would result in a
“significant announcement.”

But no nationally coordinated testing strategy was ever announced. The
plan, according to the participant, “just went poof into thin
air.”

In a statement, White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany said,
“The premise of this article is completely false.”

This summer has illustrated in devastating detail the human and
economic cost of not launching a system of national testing, which
most every other industrialized nation has done. South Korea serves as
the gold standard, with innovative “phone booth” and drive-through
testing sites, results that get returned within 24 hours, and
supportive isolation for those who test positive, including food
drop-offs.

In the U.S., by contrast, cable news and front pages have been
dominated by images of miles-long lines of cars in scorching Arizona
and Texas heat, their drivers waiting hours for scarce diagnostic
tests, and desperate Sunbelt mayors pleading in vain for federal help
to expand testing capacity. In short, a “freaking debacle,” as one
top public health expert put it.

We are just weeks away from dangerous and controversial school
reopenings and the looming fall flu season, which the aborted plan had
accounted for as a critical deadline for establishing a national
system for quickly identifying new outbreaks and hot spots.

Without systematic testing, “We might as well put duct tape over our
eyes, cotton in our ears, and hide under the bed,” said Dr. MARGARET
BOURDEAUX, research director for the Harvard Medical School Program in
Global Public Policy.

Though President Trump likes to trumpet America’s sheer number of
tests, that metric does not account for the speed of results or the
response to them, said Dr. JUNE-HO KIM, a public health researcher at
Ariadne Labs, a collaboration between Harvard’s T.H. Chan School of
Public Health and Brigham and Women’s Hospital, who leads a team
studying outlier countries with successful COVID-19 responses. “If
you’re pedaling really hard and not going anywhere, it’s all for
naught.”

With no bankable national plan, the effort to create one has fallen to
a network of high-level civilians and nongovernmental organizations.
The most visible effort is led by the Rockefeller Foundation and its
soft-spoken president, Dr. RAJIV SHAH. Focused and determinedly
apolitical, Shah, 47, is now steering a widening and bipartisan
coalition that includes three former FDA commissioners, a Nobel
Prize–winning economist, a movie star, and 27 American cities,
states, and tribal nations, all toward the far-reaching goal of
getting to 30 million COVID-19 tests a week by autumn, up from the
current rate of roughly 5.5 million a week.

“We know what has to be done: broad and ubiquitous testing tied to
broad and effective contact tracing,” until a vaccine can be widely
administered, Shah told _Vanity Fair._ “It takes about five minutes
for anyone to understand that is the only path forward to reopening
and recovering.” Without that, he said, “Our country is going to
be stuck facing a series of rebound epidemics that are highly
consequential in a really deleterious way.”

AN ABORTED PLAN

Countries that have successfully contained their outbreaks have
empowered scientists to lead the response. But when Jared Kushner set
out in March to solve the diagnostic-testing crisis, his efforts began
not with public health experts but with bankers and billionaires. They
saw themselves as the “A-team of people who get shit done,” as one
participant proclaimed in a March _Politico_ article.

Kushner’s brain trust included ADAM BOEHLER, his summer college
roommate who now serves as chief executive officer of the newly
created U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, a
government development bank that makes loans overseas. Other group
members included NAT TURNER, the cofounder and CEO of Flatiron Health,
which works to improve cancer treatment and research.

A Morgan Stanley banker with no notable health care experience, JASON
YEUNG took a leave of absence to join the task force. Along the way,
the group reached out for advice to billionaires, such as Silicon
Valley investor MARC ANDREESSEN.

The group’s collective lack of relevant experience was far from the
only challenge it faced. The obstacles arrayed against any effective
national testing effort included: limited laboratory capacity, supply
shortages, huge discrepancies in employers’ abilities to cover
testing costs for their employees, an enormous number of uninsured
Americans, and a fragmented diagnostic-testing marketplace.

According to one participant, the group did not coordinate its work
with a diagnostic-testing team at Health and Human Services, working
under Admiral BRETT GIROIR, who was appointed as the nation’s
“testing czar” on March 12. Kushner’s group was “in their own
bubble,” said the participant. “Other agencies were in their own
bubbles. The circles never overlapped.”

In the White House statement, McEnany responded, “Jared and his team
worked hand-in-hand with Admiral Giroir. The public-private teams were
embedded with Giroir and represented a single and united
administration effort that succeeded in rapidly expanding our robust
testing regime and making America number one in testing.”

As it evolved, Kushner’s group called on the help of several top
diagnostic-testing experts. Together, they worked around the clock,
and through a forest of WhatsApp messages. The effort of the White
House team was “apolitical,” said the participant, and undertaken
“with the nation’s best interests in mind.”

Kushner’s team hammered out a detailed plan, which _Vanity Fair_
obtained. It stated, “Current challenges that need to be resolved
include uneven testing capacity and supplies throughout the US, both
between and within regions, significant delays in reporting results
(4-11 days), and national supply chain constraints, such as PPE,
swabs, and certain testing reagents.”

The plan called for the federal government to coordinate distribution
of test kits, so they could be surged to heavily affected areas, and
oversee a national contact-tracing infrastructure. It also proposed
lifting contract restrictions on where doctors and hospitals send
tests, allowing any laboratory with capacity to test any sample. It
proposed a massive scale-up of antibody testing to facilitate a return
to work. It called for mandating that all COVID-19 test results from
any kind of testing, taken anywhere, be reported to a national
repository as well as to state and local health departments.

And it proposed establishing “a national Sentinel Surveillance
System” with “real-time intelligence capabilities to understand
leading indicators where hot spots are arising and where the risks are
high vs. where people can get back to work.”

By early April, some who worked on the plan were given the strong
impression that it would soon be shared with President Trump and
announced by the White House. The plan, though imperfect, was a
starting point. Simply working together as a nation on it “would
have put us in a fundamentally different place,” said the
participant.

But the effort ran headlong into shifting sentiment at the White
House. Trusting his vaunted political instincts, President Trump had
been downplaying concerns about the virus and spreading misinformation
about it—efforts that were soon amplified by Republican elected
officials and right-wing media figures. Worried about the stock market
and his reelection prospects, Trump also feared that more testing
would only lead to higher case counts and more bad publicity.
Meanwhile, Dr. DEBORAH BIRX, the White House’s coronavirus response
coordinator, was reportedly sharing models with senior staff that
optimistically—and erroneously, it would turn out—predicted the
virus would soon fade away.

Against that background, the prospect of launching a large-scale
national plan was losing favor, said one public health expert in
frequent contact with the White House’s official coronavirus task
force.

Most troubling of all, perhaps, was a sentiment the expert said a
member of Kushner’s team expressed: that because the virus had hit
blue states hardest, a national plan was unnecessary and would not
make sense politically. “The political folks believed that because
it was going to be relegated to Democratic states, that they could
blame those governors, and that would be an effective political
strategy,” said the expert.

That logic may have swayed Kushner. “It was very clear that Jared
was ultimately the decision maker as to what [plan] was going to come
out,” the expert said.

In her statement, McEnany said, “The article is completely incorrect
in its assertion that any plan was stopped for political or other
reasons. Our testing strategy has one goal in mind—delivering for
the American people—and is being executed and modified daily to
incorporate new facts on the ground.”

On April 27, Trump stepped to a podium in the Rose Garden, flanked by
members of his coronavirus task force and leaders of America’s big
commercial testing laboratories, Quest Diagnostics and LabCorp, and
finally announced a testing plan: It bore almost no resemblance to the
one that had been forged in late March, and shifted the problem of
diagnostic testing almost entirely to individual states.

Under the plan released that day, the federal government would act as
a facilitator to help increase needed supplies and rapidly approve new
versions of diagnostic-testing kits. But the bulk of the effort to
operate testing sites and find available labs fell to the states.

“I had this naive optimism: This is too important to be caught in a
partisan filter of how we view truth and the world,” said RICK
KLAUSNER, a Rockefeller Foundation adviser and former director of the
National Cancer Institute. “But the federal government has decided
to abrogate responsibility, and basically throw 50 states onto their
own.”

THE SUMMER OF DISASTER

It soon became clear that ceding testing responsibility to the states
was a recipe for disaster, not just in Democratic-governed areas but
across the country.

In April, Phoenix, Arizona, was struggling just to provide tests to
its health care workers and patients with severe symptoms of COVID-19.
When Mayor KATE GALLEGO reached out to the federal government for
help, she got an unmistakable message back: America’s fifth-largest
city was on its own. “We didn’t have a sufficient number of cases
to warrant” the help, Gallego told _Vanity Fair._

Phoenix found itself in a catch-22, which the city’s government
relations manager explained to lawyers in an April 21 email obtained
by _Vanity Fair_ through a public records request: “On a call with
the county last week the Mayor was told that the region has [not]
received FEMA funds related to testing because we don’t have bad
numbers. The problem with that logic is that the Mayor believes we
don’t have bad numbers because [of] a lack of testing.”

In June, Phoenix’s case counts began to rise dramatically. At a
drive-through testing site near her house, Gallego saw miles-long
lines of cars waiting in temperatures above 100 degrees. “We had
people waiting 13 hours to get a test,” said Gallego. “These are
people who are struggling to breathe, whose bodies ache, who have to
sit in a car for hours. One man, his car had run out of gas and he had
to refill while struggling to breathe.”

Gallego’s own staff members were waiting two weeks to get back test
results, a period in which they could have been unwittingly
transmitting the virus. “The turnaround times are way beyond
what’s clinically relevant,” said Dr. JAMES LAWLER, executive
director of international programs and innovation at the Global Center
for Health Security at the University of Nebraska Medical Center.

By July 5, Gallego was out of patience. She went on ABC News, wearing
a neon-pink blouse, and politely blasted the federal response:
“We’ve asked FEMA if they could come and do community-based
testing here. We were told they’re moving away from that, which
feels like they’re declaring victory while we’re still in crisis
mode.”

Three days later, at a press conference, the White House’s testing
czar, Admiral Giroir, blasted her back by name. Claiming that the
federal government was already operating or contributing support for
41 Phoenix testing sites, he said: “Now, two days ago, I heard that
Mayor Gallego was unhappy because there was no federal support…. It
was clear to me that Phoenix was not in tune with all the things that
the state were doing.”

Gallego recounted how her mother “just happened to catch this on
CNN. She sent me a text message saying, ‘I don’t think they like
you at the White House.’”

Despite Giroir’s defensiveness, however, Gallego ultimately
prevailed in her public demand for help: Health and Human Services
agreed to set up a surge testing site in Phoenix. “The effect was,
we had to be in a massive crisis before they would help,” said
Gallego.

And that is where the U.S. finds itself today—in a massive testing
crisis. States have been forced to go their own way, amid rising case
counts, skyrocketing demand for tests, and dwindling laboratory
capacity. By mid-July, Quest Diagnostics announced that the average
time to turn around test results was seven days.

It is obvious to experts that 50 individual states cannot effectively
deploy testing resources amid vast regulatory, financial, and
supply-chain obstacles. The diagnostic-testing industry is a
“loosely constructed web,” said Dr. Pellini of Section 32, “and
COVID-19 is a stage five hurricane.”

Dr. Lawler likened the nation’s balkanized testing infrastructure to
the “early 20th century, when each city had its own electrical grid
and they weren’t connected.” If one area lost power, “you
couldn’t support it by diverting power from another grid.”

Experts are now warning that the U.S. testing system is on the brink
of collapse. “We are at a very bad moment here,” said Margaret
Bourdeaux. “We are about to lose visibility on this monster and
it’s going to rampage through our whole country. This is a massive
emergency.”

THE PLOT TO SAVE AMERICA

In late January, Rajiv Shah, president of the Rockefeller Foundation,
went to Davos, Switzerland, and served on a panel at the World
Economic Forum with climate activist GRETA THUNBERG. There, he had
coffee with WHO Director-General Dr. TEDROS ADHANOM GHEBREYESUS, whom
he’d known from his years working in global public health, first at
the Gates Foundation and then as director of USAID, an international
development agency within the U.S. government.

Shah returned to New York, and to the Rockefeller Foundation
headquarters, with a clear understanding: _SARS-CoV-2_ was going to be
the big one.

The Rockefeller Foundation, which aims to address global inequality
with a $4.4 billion endowment, helped create America’s modern public
health system through the early work of the Rockefeller Sanitary
Commission to eradicate hookworm disease. Shah immediately began to
refocus the foundation on the coming pandemic, and hired a worldwide
expert, Dr. JONATHAN QUICK, to guide its response.

Meanwhile, he kept watching and waiting for what he assumed would be a
massive federal mobilization. “The normal [strong] federal emergency
response, protocols, guidance, materials, organization, and leadership
were not immediately taking form,” he said. “It was pretty obvious
the right things weren’t happening.”

As director of USAID from 2009 to 2015, Shah led the U.S. response to
both the Haiti earthquake and the West African Ebola outbreak, and
knew that the “relentless” collection of real-time metrics in a
disaster was essential.

During the Ebola outbreak, which he managed from West Africa, he
brought in a world-famous European epidemiologist, HANS ROSLING, and
President BARACK OBAMA’s chief information officer to develop a
detailed set of metrics, update them continuously in a spreadsheet,
and send them daily to 25 top U.S. government officials. When it comes
to outbreaks, said Shah, “If you don’t get this thing early,
you’re chasing an exponentially steep curve.”

On April 21, the Rockefeller Foundation released a detailed plan for
what it described as the “largest public health testing program in
American history,” a massive scale-up from roughly 1 million tests a
week at the time to 3 million a week by June and 30 million by the
fall.

Estimating the cost at $100 billion, it proposed an all-hands-on-deck
approach that would unite federal, state, and local governments;
academic institutions; and the private and nonprofit sectors.
Together, they would rapidly optimize laboratory capacity, create an
emergency supply chain, build a 300,000-strong contact-tracing health
corps, and create a real-time public data platform to guide the
response and prevent reemergence.

The Rockefeller plan sought to do exactly what the federal government
had chosen not to: create a national infrastructure in a record-short
period of time. “Raj doesn’t do non-huge things,” said ANDREW
SWEET, the Rockefeller Foundation’s managing director for COVID-19
response and recovery. In a discussion with coalition members, Dr.
ANTHONY FAUCI called the Rockefeller plan “music to my ears.”

Reaching out to state and local governments, the foundation and its
advisers soon became flooded with calls for help from school
districts, hospital systems, and workplaces, all desperate for
guidance. In regular video calls, a core advisory team that includes
Shah, former FDA commissioner MARK MCCLELLAN, former National Cancer
Institute director Rick Klausner, and Section 32’s Mike Pellini
worked through how best to support members of its growing coalition.

Schools “keep hitting refresh on the CDC website and nothing’s
changed in the last two months,” Shah told his colleagues in a video
meeting in June. In the absence of trustworthy federal guidance, the
Rockefeller team hashed out an array of issues: How should schools
handle symptomatic and asymptomatic students? What about legal
liability? What about public schools that were too poor to even afford
a nurse?

(Last week, the CDC issued new guidelines that enthusiastically
endorsed reopening schools and downplayed the risks, after coming
under heavy pressure from President Trump to revise guidelines that he
said were “very tough and expensive.”)

Through a testing-solutions group, the foundation is collaborating
with city, state, and other testing programs, including those on
Native American reservations, and helping to bolster them.

“They came on board and turbocharged us,” said ANN LEE, CEO of the
humanitarian organization CORE (Community Organized Relief Effort),
cofounded by Lee and the actor SEAN PENN. CORE now operates 44 testing
sites throughout the U.S., including Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles and
mobile units within the Navajo Nation, which also offer food and
essential supplies.

It may seem impossible for anyone but the federal government to scale
up diagnostic testing one hundred-fold through a painstaking and
piecemeal approach. But in private conversations, dispirited members
of the White House task force urged members of the Rockefeller
coalition to persist in their efforts. “Despite what we might be
hearing, there is nothing being done in the administration on
testing,” one of them was told on a phone call.

“It was a scary and telling moment,” the participant recounted.

A BAD GAMBLE

Despite the Rockefeller Foundation’s round-the-clock work to guide
the U.S. to a nationwide testing system essential to reopening, the
foundation has not yet been able to bend the most important curve of
all: the Trump administration’s determined disinterest in big
federal action.

On July 15, in a video call with journalists, Dr. Shah looked visibly
frustrated. The next day, the Rockefeller Foundation would be
releasing a follow-up report: It called on the federal government to
commit $75 billion more to testing and contact tracing, work to break
through the testing bottlenecks that had led to days-long delays in
the delivery of test results, and vastly increase more rapid
point-of-care tests.

Though speaking in a typically mild-mannered tone, Shah delivered a
stark warning: “We fear the fall will be worse than the spring.”
He added, putting it bluntly: “America is not near the top of
countries who have handled COVID-19 effectively.”

Just three days later, news reports revealed that the Trump
administration was trying to block any new funding for testing and
contact tracing in the new coronavirus relief package being hammered
out in Congress. As one member of the Rockefeller coalition said of
the administration’s response, “We’re dealing with a
schizophrenic organization. Who the hell knows what’s going on?
It’s just insanity.”

On Friday, July 31, the U.S. House Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus, which is investigating the federal response, will hold a
hearing to examine the “urgent need” for a comprehensive national
plan, at which Dr. Fauci, CDC director ROBERT REDFIELD, and Admiral
Brett Giroir will testify. Among other things, the subcommittee is
probing whether the Trump administration sought to suppress testing,
in part due to Trump’s claim at his Tulsa, Oklahoma, rally in June
that he ordered staff to “slow the testing down.”

The gamble that son-in-law real estate developers, or Morgan Stanley
bankers liaising with billionaires, could effectively stand in for a
well-coordinated federal response has proven to be dead wrong. Even
the smallest of Jared Kushner’s solutions to the pandemic have
entangled government agencies in confusion and raised concerns about
illegality.

In the three months after the mysterious test kits arrived at the UAE
embassy, diplomats there had been prodding the U.S. government to make
good on the $52 million shipment. Finally, on June 26, lawyers for the
Department of Health and Human Services sent a cable to the embassy,
directed to the company which had misspelled its own name on the
original invoice: Cogna Technology Solutions LLC.

The cable stated, “HHS is unable to remit payment for the test kits
in question, as the Department has not identified any warranted United
States contracting officer” or any contract documents involved in
the procurement. The cable cited relevant federal contract laws that
would make it “unlawful for the Government to pay for the test kits
in question.”

But perhaps most relevant for Americans counting on the federal
government to mount an effective response to the pandemic and
safeguard their health, the test kits didn’t work. As the Health and
Human Services cable to the UAE embassy noted: “When the kits were
delivered they were tested in accordance with standard procedures and
were found to be contaminated and unusable.”

An FDA spokesperson told _Vanity Fair_ the tests may have been
rendered ineffective because of how they were stored when they were
shipped from the Middle East. “The reagents should be kept cold,”
the spokesperson said.

Although officials with FEMA and Health and Human Services would not
acknowledge that the tests even exist, stating only that there was no
official government contract for them, the UAE’s records are clear
enough. As a spokesperson for the UAE embassy confirmed, “the US
Government made an urgent request for additional COVID-19 test kits
from the UAE government. One million test kits were delivered to the
US government by April 1. An additional 2.5 million test kits were
delivered to the US government by April 20.”

The tests may not have worked, in other words, but Donald Trump would
have been pleased at the sheer number of them.

_This article has been updated to include a statement from the White
House._

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