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U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper (L) greets Linda Reynolds, the Minister of Defense of Australia, after she arrived at the Pentagon for an Honor Cordon, in Washington, D.C. on July 27, 2020. (Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images)
This week in Washington, a set of quiet meetings took place with major implications, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper met with Australia’s Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defense Minister Linda Reynolds. While virtual meetings are the new norm, Ministers Payne and Reynolds made the trip knowing that a two-week quarantine awaited them upon their return.
"The decision to travel to the U.S. says something about how important America is to Australian security and prosperity—and about the threat China poses to both countries," writes Hudson Senior Fellow John Lee in the [[link removed]] The Wall Street Journal [[link removed]]. Once regional partners, Beijing's increasing attempts to annex the South China Sea and prevent Australia from investigating the origins of COVID-19 is causing a shift in how China is perceived Down Under.
See below for highlights from Lee's op-ed on the significance of the U.S.-Australia meetings, and keep an eye on our coronavirus timeline [[link removed]] for the latest on the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to exploit the pandemic.
Read the Op-Ed [[link removed]]
Key Takeaways [[link removed]]
Highlighted quotes from John Lee's op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, "Down Under Doubles Down on Checking China."
1. Australia is making good on promises to pull its own weight:
The Trump administration’s managing of allies, at least in Asia and the Pacific, has more to commend it than critics concede. It is true that staunch allies such as Japan and Australia find the president’s unpredictable style deeply unsettling. But if the objective is to persuade allies to step up and carry their weight, then that is exactly what Australia is doing.
Like many countries in the Indo-Pacific mugged by reality, Australia has been on a journey with China. The pandemic has focused minds on what must be done. The Communist Party under Xi Jinping is nothing if not a devotee of the Leninist precept: Probe with bayonets and if you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw.
2. The timing of the Washington trip by Ministers Payne and Reynolds is significant:
Canberra is choosing to do this when relations between Washington and Beijing are more hostile than at any point since before Richard Nixon went to China in 1972. China has also turned up the pressure by imposing trade sanctions on products such as Australian barley. Regardless, Australia and Japan under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have emerged as the southern and northern anchors of the American regional alliance system.
3. National defense spending plays a major role in Australia latest Strategic Defense Update:
It is in this spirit that Australia released its 2020 Strategic Defense Update earlier this month. The commitment to spend roughly $400 billion (in U.S. dollars) on national defense over the next decade, including almost $190 billion earmarked for capability enhancements, is eye-catching. But as important is what Australia plans to spend the money on: long-range and hypersonic missiles, unmanned combat vehicles and cyber capabilities. This can be explained only by a desire to counter the People’s Liberation Army. The goal is to make China think twice about expanding its martial reach and presence in the Indo-Pacific.
4. Australia is doubling down on its alliance with the U.S.:
Far from retreating into isolationism, Australia is reaching out of its comfort zone—defending the continent—and looking to help alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. But this is possible only if America takes the lead, from strategic posture to developing offensive capabilities and operating the military assets jointly. Australia can’t push back against China alone. In other words, Australia has doubled down on the alliance as its best option.
5. The pandemic is changing the nature of U.S. alliances:
Mr. Trump might lead an unpredictable administration, but his determination in this fight is not in question. There’s also a growing consensus among allies that the pandemic has changed the relationship between Washington and Beijing in ways that will last longer than any one administration.
Quotes have been edited for length and clarity
Read the Op-Ed [[link removed]]
(L-R) Australia's Minister for Defense Linda Reynolds, Australia's Foreign Minister Marise Payne and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo listen while U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper speaks during a press conference at the U.S. Department of State following the 30th AUSMIN on July 28, 2020, in Washington, D.C. (Brendan Smialowski/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
Go Deeper: Allies in the Indo-Pacific
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Australia: Everyone Knows We're Arming Up Because of China [[link removed]]
Hudson Senior Fellow John Lee dives in to the strategy behind Canberra's push to increase defense spending. Meanwhile, China objects to Canberra's increased spending, despite the fact that the CCP's own military spending exceeds all of the countries in East Asia, South Asia and Oceania combined.
Watch [[link removed]]
China Has "Politicised and Weaponised" Race [[link removed]]
In an interview on Sky News Australia, John Lee discusses increasing tensions between Australia and the CCP, as Australia announces new restrictions on critical infrastructure acquisitions and the CCP discourages Chinese citizens from traveling to Australia.
Read [[link removed]]
Congressional Testimony: Winning the U.S.-China Economic Competition [[link removed]]
In recent testimony before the Senate's Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Hudson Senior Fellow Tim Morrison outlines how the U.S. and allies can counter General Secretary Xi's promise to bring about the “eventual demise of capitalism,” through promoting U.S. exports, creating truer competitors to the China global market, and overhauling the U.S. approach to export controls.
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