Abed Abou Shhadeh

+972 Magazine
Beyond electoral arithmetic, the reunification of Arab parties is a step toward rebuilding political infrastructure and combating social fragmentation.

Palestinian citizens of Israel, including Hadash party head Ayman Odeh, hold a mass demonstration against the epidemic of criminal violence and state neglect, Sakhnin, northern Israel, January 22, 2026, photo: Michael Giladi/Flash90

 

For Palestinians inside Israel, last week proved to be a collective breaking point. It began when Ali Zbeedat, the owner of a grocery store chain in the northern city of Sakhnin, shut down his businesses last Monday to protest an extortion attempt by criminal gangs. Over the following days, Zbeedat’s defiant act sparked coordinated strikes across dozens of Arab localities, where residents are similarly fed up with their abandonment by the state in the face of an epidemic of organized crime. 

The escalation culminated in a mass demonstration in Sakhnin last Thursday, with an estimated 50,000 people taking to the streets in what was the largest mobilization of Palestinian citizens in years. 

This sequence of events generated exceptional political momentum. Just hours after the demonstration, amid sustained public pressure, the leaders of Israel’s four major Arab-led parties — Hadash, Balad, Ta’al, and Ra’am — met with the heads of local authorities and signed a brief, symbolic document bearing the logo of the Sakhnin Municipality. In it, they expressed their intention to revive the Joint List ahead of this year’s election, the historic electoral alliance formed 10 years ago that aimed to overcome the ideological divides and interpersonal rivalries among the community’s fragmented leadership, but broke down in 2022.

This is a historic event in a volatile political moment. Even before the publication of polls gauging the Joint List’s electoral strength — predicting that it could secure 15-16 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, making it the third largest force in Israeli politics — the popular demand for unity suggests the possibility for unprecedented voter turnout in Arab society. 

Israeli news outlets described the renewal of the Joint List as “drama in the political system,” and rightly so. Such a scenario would alter the balance between opposing blocs and force Zionist parties across the spectrum — from Yair Golan’s center-left Democrats to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud — to recalibrate their strategies.

 

As expected, the images of Arab party leaders standing hand-in-hand triggered a wave of incitement from right-wing politicians and talking heads. When the election comes around, Netanyahu will no doubt rally his base by reviving the racist rhetoric he used in the 2015 campaign, warning that “the Arabs are coming out to the polls in droves.”

Yet the return of the Joint List should not be understood exclusively through the prism of electoral arithmetic. Today, Israel’s Palestinian citizens increasingly find themselves isolated, caught between criminal organizations and the messianic right. As such, the announcement should be seen as part of a broader campaign to rebuild Palestinian political infrastructure and organizing potential, as the only antidote to deepening social disintegration and state persecution.

Full-scale state disintegration

On the day that tens of thousands of Arab demonstrators filled the streets of Sakhnin, two news stories offered a revealing snapshot of where Israel’s state institutions — and above all, the police — are heading.

One concerned the prolonged delay in the investigation into Social Equality and Women’s Empowerment Minister May Golan, a Likud MK, despite substantial evidence of corruption. The other was the report that Meir Suissa, a police officer who was found guilty of throwing stun grenades at protesters opposing the judicial overhaul in 2023, had his conviction overturned; Ben Gvir had denounced the original ruling, and has since sought to promote Suissa to the rank of chief superintendent.

Recent months have witnessed countless similar developments. The simultaneity of crises and wars makes it difficult for the public to register the depths of the changes unfolding at the highest levels of power. Netanyahu’s government has effectively succeeded in capturing state institutions through political appointments, direct intervention by ministers, and systematic intimidation of senior officials. 

From Likud to Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit, the ruling parties have worked consistently to embed loyalists within these institutions and across government ministries — Justice, Transportation, Education — as well as within the army and the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service. The open displays of affection between police officers and Ben Gvir, be it applause, hugs, or public gestures of allegiance at police conferences, are part of a trend that preceded his appointment as minister, but has only grown since.

During the tenure of former police commissioner Kobi Shabtai, and especially since Ben Gvir entered the government, there has been a wave of early retirements, including of experienced superintendents and police chiefs who had developed institutional expertise over a number of years. These departures were perceived by the public as marginal, but their significance was great.

It is true, of course, that the police never excelled in addressing crime within Palestinian communities in Israel, and they have long suppressed our freedoms. Yet there was at least a residual commitment to procedural norms and administrative standards; now, that minimal framework has disappeared.

Earlier this month, using the pretext of a stolen horse, police turned the Bedouin village of Tarabin Al-Sana into a war zone, and ultimately killed a father of six in front of his family. This, too, was an expression of institutional weakness: a police force unable to solve crime, and therefore increasingly reliant on excessive force and collective punishment — practices familiar from the decades of occupation in the West Bank and Gaza.

The deaths of two ultra-Orthodox Jewish infants in a daycare center last week offered yet more evidence of the breakdown of a functioning state. The incident should have shaken the country; instead, the story disappeared from the public eye within two days. 

But perhaps the surge of murder cases in Arab society is the clearest indicator of the state’s unraveling. And into this vacuum enters the Israeli messianic right. 

Palestinian citizens of Israel hold a mass demonstration against the epidemic of criminal violence and state neglect, Sakhnin, northern Israel, January 22, 2026. (Michael Giladi/Flash90)
Palestinian citizens of Israel hold a mass demonstration against the epidemic of criminal violence and state neglect, Sakhnin, northern Israel, January 22, 2026. (Michael Giladi/Flash90)
Palestinian citizens of Israel hold a mass demonstration against the epidemic of criminal violence and state neglect, Sakhnin, northern Israel, January 22, 2026. (Michael Giladi/Flash90)

In a recent video posted to his social media, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich argued that the response to organized crime in Arab communities in Israel is to expand Jewish settlement, drawing direct parallels to the West Bank. “In the Negev, the Bedouins are trying to rule, go crazy, collect protection … delinquency, crime, and illegal weapons,” he warned. “We understand that the key to security is settlement. Like in Judea and Samaria, today the government established five new Jewish settlements in the Negev which join six others. That’s how we’re restoring security to the residents of the Negev.”

Smotrich’s 2017 “Decisive Plan” — a blueprint for “ending” the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by forcing Palestinians to give up their national aspirations or emigrate abroad — increasingly appears to be shaping our reality, its logic is no longer confined to the West Bank and Gaza but now also directed inward. It marks another step toward a consolidated regime of apartheid.

Building power from below

It is against this backdrop that calls to revive the Joint List became overwhelming. Originally formed in 2015, it was a reaction to both the raising of the electoral threshold (a move intended deliberately to threaten the survival of smaller parties) and growing public pressure among Palestinians in Israel for political unity. The Joint List brought together forces that had long stood apart, including communists, nationalists, and Islamists.

That experiment proved fragile. The list fractured in 2019, during the first of five election cycles held between 2019 and 2022. Although it was reconstituted in the subsequent two elections and peaked at an unprecedented 15 Knesset seats, the momentum stalled when Ra’am split off in the fourth and fifth rounds, leading to a prolonged crisis within Arab political leadership. 

Against this history of fragmentation and the current grim political circumstances, the reunification of the Joint List gestures toward a latent potential in Palestinian society inside Israel.

Palestinian citizens of Israel hold a mass demonstration against the epidemic of criminal violence and state neglect, Sakhnin, northern Israel, January 22, 2026. (Michael Giladi/Flash90)
Palestinian citizens of Israel hold a mass demonstration against the epidemic of criminal violence and state neglect, Sakhnin, northern Israel, January 22, 2026. (Michael Giladi/Flash90)
Palestinian citizens of Israel hold a mass demonstration against the epidemic of criminal violence and state neglect, Sakhnin, northern Israel, January 22, 2026. (Michael Giladi/Flash90)

Even if Netanyahu’s current coalition loses power and is replaced by another, reversing the decline towards fascism will be difficult. The structural changes — including the systematic weakening of Israel’s judiciary and the status of the legal advisor to the government — have been implemented too deeply. 

Yet if Palestinians in Israel succeed in organizing politically and socially, they may be better equipped to cope with the harsh consequences of institutional collapse and the deliberate production of chaos in their streets as a tool to control them. And in the wake of the historic demonstration in Sakhnin, there is hope that Arab society will find ways to bridge internal disputes and build broad coalitions, including partnerships with left-wing Jewish organizations and activists.

Such alliances could begin at the most basic levels of social life — from parents’ committees and neighborhood groups to workers’ organizations, doctors, lawyers, and business owners.

Importantly, models of this kind already exist within the Palestinian civic sphere in Israel. They range from popular committees in Arab towns to Orthodox associations that have served Christian communities since the 1920s. In Jaffa, for example, the Islamic Council, established in 1988, operates on a principle of broad community participation: Residents elect representatives who work across social, political, and educational arenas. These initiatives foster forms of civic engagement that do not depend on state institutions.

A Joint List reconstituted from the bottom up, anchored in community-building and new forms of political organization, could draw many more people into politics. It might also offer a model for Israeli society as a whole, which itself is undergoing a parallel process of social fragmentation. The list’s reunification presents us with a historic opportunity to translate symbolic unity into material transformation — and it cannot be missed.

A version of this article was first published in Hebrew on Local Call. Read it here

Abed Abou Shhadeh is a political activist from Jaffa. He served as a city council representative of the Palestinian community in Jaffa-Tel Aviv from 2018 to 2024, and currently hosts the Al-Midan (الميدان) podcast at Arab48.

+972 Magazine is an independent, online, nonprofit magazine run by a group of Palestinian and Israeli journalists. Founded in 2010, our mission is to provide in-depth reporting, analysis, and opinions from the ground in Israel-Palestine. The name of the site is derived from the telephone country code that can be used to dial throughout Israel-Palestine.

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