From Mises Institute <[email protected]>
Subject The Failure of Constitutionalism Through the Ages: Emergencies and the Administrative State
Date January 26, 2026 4:01 PM
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Mises Institute
Monday, January 26, 2026



The classical liberals rightly opposed state power. But their professed methods for controlling state power—such as democracy—have clearly failed. Among the ideas that have come up short is constitutionalism. It was imagined that written constitutions could keep state power in check, but the reality has been something else ([link removed]) entirely.

And Finn Andreen today explains how both markets and government redistribute wealth. But only market redistribution ([link removed]) and efficient and in accordance with what people actually want.

Ryan McMaken, Editor-in-Chief

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On the Failure of Constitutionalism Through the Ages: Norms, Emergencies, and the Administrative State
Joseph Solis-Mullen
What happens if those that govern exempt themselves from the rules?

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Virtuous Market Distribution vs. Nefarious State Redistribution
Finn Andreen
Progressives sell state intervention into economic affairs as “protecting” consumers and workers. In all cases, free markets do a better job of protecting all participants.

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The Declaration of Independence Created 13 New Sovereign Countries

How Americans imagined a union of sovereign states.

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Trading with the Enemy: An American Tradition

Rothbard reveals how Americans traded with the enemy during the French and Indian War.

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