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Week of January 5, 2026 – Special Edition [[link removed]] | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

Editor’s Note: given the pace of events on the ground in Iran, we are sharing this special edition of the Iran Unfiltered Newsletter. Please subscribe [[link removed]] to our Substack to get real-time updates. You can also see NIAC’s statement condemning violence against protesters and rejecting foreign interference in the protest wave here [[link removed]] . We will continue to update as the situation develops.

* From Currency Collapse to Street Confrontation: Iran’s Protests Enter a High-Risk Phase [[link removed]]
* Iran’s New Protest Wave Escalates as Economic Shock Turns Into Nationwide Unrest [[link removed]]
* Iran Moves to End Preferential Exchange Rates Amid Inflation, Protests, and Competing Economic Assessments [[link removed]]

From Currency Collapse to Street Confrontation: Iran’s Protests Enter a High-Risk Phase [[link removed]]
Iran’s protest movement entered its tenth consecutive day on Tuesday amid expanding street demonstrations, renewed unrest in Tehran’s bazaars, deepening economic anxiety, and increasingly hardened security signaling from the state . What began as an economically driven protest wave rooted in currency collapse, inflation, and fear of major economic restructuring has now evolved into a multifaceted national crisis, combining livelihood grievances, political dissent, labor unrest, and social exhaustion.

President Masoud Pezeshkian offered one of his most explicit acknowledgments of systemic responsibility since the unrest began, stating publicly that “the parliament and the government together have brought the country to this point .” He pointed to structural failures in banking, inflation management and governance, stressing that blame cannot be placed on a single individual or institution. While the remarks marked a rare moment of candor from the executive, they did not include concrete mechanisms for easing public pressure, reinforcing skepticism among many Iranians who see acknowledgment without relief as insufficient.

On the ground, protests continued across multiple provinces, with Ilam Province remaining a central flashpoint . In Abdanan, demonstrators again gathered in large numbers, pouring into the streets, marking several consecutive days of mobilization. Videos from the city show a few protesters vandalizing a branch of the Kourosh retail chain and bringing bags of rice from the store into the street, where they were scattered as a symbolic act of protest against rising prices, food insecurity, and the collapse of purchasing power. Other footage from Abdanan captured an unusual moment in which some police officers waved at protesters from atop a local police station, while demonstrators called on them to support the protest, chanting “Law enforcement, support, support.” The video highlights the uneven and sometimes contradictory behavior of security forces, particularly at the local level.

Tehran witnessed a significant escalation centered on the bazaar and surrounding commercial districts, pushing the crisis into a new phase . Shops were closed across large sections of the Grand Bazaar, as well as areas near Molavi, Hafez Street, Jomhouri, and Yaftabad. Protesters chanted openly political slogans, including “Death to the dictator” and “Death to Khamenei,” while security forces deployed tear gas to disperse crowds. Tear gas was also reported near Sina Hospital, causing distress among patients and staff and intensifying public sensitivity following the earlier incident at Imam Khomeini Hospital [[link removed]] in Ilam, where security forces allegedly attempted to detain wounded protesters – an incident apparently under investigation from the President’s office.

Protests and confrontations were also reported in Mashhad, Borujerd, Shahrekord, Kermanshah, and parts of western Tehran, including Tehransar, where videos showed detainees being beaten and taken away by security forces . In Mashhad, demonstrators chanted “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran,” reflecting the continued blending of economic hardship, nationalist messaging, and direct political opposition.

Funerals and mourning ceremonies have increasingly become focal points of protest and collective anger . In Kermanshah, burial and mourning ceremonies were held for two brothers, Rasoul and Reza Kadivarian (aged 17 and 20), who were reportedly shot during protests. Such ceremonies have repeatedly functioned as spaces for solidarity and mobilization, particularly in areas where direct street protest carries heightened risk.

According to HRANA, at least 35 people have been killed since the protests began ten days ago, including four children and two members of the security forces, while more than 1,200 people have been arrested nationwide . These figures underscore the mounting human cost of the unrest, even as verification remains difficult due to internet disruptions, restricted access, and competing official narratives. At the same time, state-affiliated media reported the death of a police officer in Malekshahi, Ilam Province, a development likely to be used to reinforce official claims that elements of the protest wave are violent and to justify harsher security responses.

Violence has both been deployed by security forces and been evident in the actions of individuals in the demonstrations. While security forces have deployed tear gas, batons, and in some cases live ammunition, multiple videos circulating online appear to show individuals amid the demonstration that are armed, including with firearms. In certain localized confrontations, individuals have used violence against the police. This has contributed to a more volatile and uneven protest environment, increasing the risk of deadly escalation without addressing the underlying, largely non-violent economic and political grievances driving the vast majority of participation in the protests.

The economic dimension of the crisis worsened sharply on Tuesday . The U.S. dollar rose above 147,000 tomans on the open market, setting a new historical record, while gold prices surged in parallel. These developments came despite repeated government assurances that economic reforms and currency restructuring would stabilize prices and reduce corruption. Instead, the pace and volatility of the rial’s collapse have amplified public fear that essential goods will become increasingly unaffordable, particularly for households already operating at the margins.

At the heart of the unrest lies a large, unavoidable, and deeply painful economic reform process, centered on efforts to eliminate multiple exchange rates and restructure subsidy mechanisms . While many economists and policymakers acknowledge that currency unification is structurally necessary to curb corruption, rent-seeking, and systemic inefficiencies, its short-term social impact has been severe and remains highly uncertain. Millions of people—particularly small business owners, shopkeepers, and informal workers—are absorbing the shock without adequate buffers or targeted protection. The reforms amount to a major economic surgery conducted under conditions of extreme social vulnerability, declining real incomes, and eroded trust, making even policies that may be technically sound politically explosive.

The renewed mobilization of Tehran’s bazaar is especially significant in this context . Iran has approximately three million small business units, which, when accounting for family members, encompass at least ten million people—a massive social layer rather than a narrow economic interest group. Contrary to long-standing assumptions that the “bazaar” is uniformly affluent and resilient, the vast majority of these businesses are now struggling to meet basic expenses, with revenues barely covering rent and wages. Years of market saturation, intense competition, the expansion of chain stores and malls, and the rise of online commerce have hollowed out profit margins, transforming many shops from sources of stability into sites of debt, waiting, and psychological exhaustion. It is therefore not coincidental that on 16 Dey, nearly every area of Tehran identified as a “market” became a site of protest or strike.

This erosion has also transformed the identity of this social group . Today’s market actors are less defined by ideological loyalty or historical memory and more by acute livelihood anxiety. As income and expenses drift further apart, symbolic affiliations give way to immediate survival demands—a shift that has been largely absent from policy design and political decision-making. This layer of society has been effectively invisible in major reform plans, tax restructuring, and transition strategies—an omission that now carries direct consequences for social stability.

The external environment has further intensified uncertainty . Escalating rhetoric from U.S. political figures and continued tension with Israel have deepened the psychological shadow of war, feeding panic in currency markets and reinforcing a sense of national vulnerability. Even absent direct military action, such signaling contributes to volatility that quickly translates into higher prices and renewed public anger.

Against this backdrop, the state’s security posture has visibly hardened . A statement from Iran’s Defense Council, affiliated with the Supreme National Security Council – in a message ostensibly aimed at potential threats from Israel and the U.S. – declared that the Islamic Republic “does not limit itself to responding after an action” and considers “objective signs of threat” as part of its security equation. This language signals a shift toward preemptive security logic, raising concerns that protest activity, foreign rhetoric, and economic instability are increasingly being folded into a single threat framework.

At the same time, dissent within religious and cultural spheres has become more pronounced . Molavi Abdolhamid warned that lethal violence against protesters constitutes both an international crime and a religiously forbidden act, while prominent cultural figures postponed or canceled performances in solidarity with the public, reinforcing the sense that normal public life cannot continue amid killings, injuries, and mass arrests.

Ten days into the unrest, Iran faces a compound crisis: nationwide protests; bazaar strikes disrupting key economic arteries; funerals functioning as mobilizing events; a rapidly deteriorating currency environment; and a political system oscillating between acknowledgment of failure, coercion, and securitized threat framing . While economic reform may be structurally necessary, its unmanaged human cost is now colliding with a severely eroded social safety net, placing extraordinary pressure on millions of households. Whether this protest wave stabilizes, fragments, or escalates into a broader national rupture appears to depend not only on security responses, but on whether the state can reduce immediate economic pressure and restore a minimum level of social trust before cumulative strain overwhelms what remains of Iran’s social capital.

Iran’s New Protest Wave Escalates as Economic Shock Turns Into Nationwide Unrest [[link removed]]
Published January 5, 2026

Iran is witnessing a new and intensifying wave of protests that began with economic grievances linked to the collapse of the rial and rising prices, but has rapidly expanded into open anti-government demonstrations across dozens of cities. What started around nine days ago with market closures and protests by Tehran’s bazaar merchants, particularly around Pasazh-e Alaaeddin and Jomhouri and Enghelab streets, has evolved into nightly street protests, university demonstrations, labor unrest, and confrontations with security forces in many cities and towns.

At the core of the unrest lies the sharp depreciation of the rial, persistent high inflation, and public anxiety over recent economic policy changes, including efforts to eliminate multiple exchange rates and reduce preferential currency mechanisms. While officials frame these reforms as necessary to curb corruption and rent-seeking, many Iranians fear the immediate consequences will be higher prices for food and essential goods, with limited protection for households and producers. Years of sanctions, mismanagement, and declining real incomes have left society extremely vulnerable to price shocks, turning economic policy into a political trigger.

Although the protests began with economic demands, reporting from across the country indicates that slogans have increasingly shifted toward explicitly political and anti-government messages, including chants directed at Iran’s leadership and the political system as a whole. Demonstrations have been reported in Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Ilam, Kermanshah, Ahvaz, Rasht, Sari, Amol, Arak, Sanandaj, Yasuj, Khorramabad, Nurabad Mamasani, Mahdishahr (Sangsar), Marvdasht, Karaj, Yazd, and several smaller towns, with particularly intense unrest in western and southwestern provinces. The reaction of security forces appears uneven, with security forces in some localities largely abstaining from lethal force while escalating severely at times in other locations, including against demonstrators near government facilities.

One of the deadliest flashpoints of this protest wave has been Malekshahi in Ilam Province. According to local witnesses and medical sources, protesters initially gathered to demonstrate against rising prices and deteriorating living conditions, marching toward the governor’s office, located next to a local IRGC facility. Multiple accounts state that security forces opened fire, resulting in numerous gunshot wounds and severe injuries. While details are not yet clear, approximately four individuals were killed with others in critical condition and more recovering from their wounds. Because Malekshahi lacks a hospital, the wounded were transferred to Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam, where several reportedly died en route due to the severity of their injuries.

Medical sources have described critical conditions, including patients with extremely low brain activity, others requiring intensive care, and at least one individual transferred to Ahvaz for advanced treatment. While officials have issued conflicting explanations regarding the type of weapons used, videos, eyewitness testimony, and medical accounts suggest the use of live ammunition, contradicting assertions that only non-lethal crowd-control measures were employed.

Tensions escalated further when security forces reportedly attempted to enter the hospital, leading to confrontations with patients’ families, civilians, and medical staff. Videos circulating online show chaotic scenes and physical clashes, deepening public anger and distrust. Similar incidents—attempts to detain wounded protesters from medical facilities—have been reported in other cities as well.

Following the escalation of protests into violence in parts of Ilam Province and the reported attack by security forces on Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam, Masoud Pezeshkian instructed the Minister of Interior to dispatch a team to investigate “the dimensions of the incidents in Ilam, the causes of the unrest, and the manner in which it was handled,” and to submit the findings to the President’s office.

Across the country, arrests have intensified, particularly targeting young protesters, students, activists, teachers, and administrators of social media channels accused of organizing or “inciting unrest.” Police and judicial officials have announced detentions in Hamadan, Yazd, Lorestan, Tehran, and other provinces, emphasizing online surveillance. Families of detainees have begun to protest publicly, including a notable gathering of parents outside the Najafabad courthouse, where families demanded the release of detained children under the age of 20 within 24 hours, warning that they would no longer remain silent.

Universities have once again emerged as key protest centers. Demonstrations have been reported at Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran, Birjand University, and other campuses. In response, authorities approved a shift to online classes for multiple major universities in Tehran, officially citing weather and energy imbalances, though many students view the move as an effort to disrupt campus mobilization.

The official response has grown increasingly hardline at the top. Ali Khamenei, in his first direct reaction to the unrest, stated that “protest is legitimate, but protest is different from riot,” adding that officials should talk to protesters but that “rioters must be put in their place.” He also attributed currency instability to “enemy interference,” reinforcing a narrative that frames the protests as both a security threat and a foreign-driven project. Senior judicial, parliamentary, and security officials echoed this stance, warning that those accused of turning protests into unrest would face decisive and uncompromising punishment, with some security bodies declaring that “the era of tolerance is over.”

At the same time, the executive branch has adopted a more cautious tone. President Masoud Pezeshkian has publicly stated that society cannot be calmed through coercive methods, warning that violent approaches risk deepening the crisis. Reformist political groups have echoed this view, arguing that mass arrests, securitized language, and repression will not resolve underlying grievances, while also rejecting foreign intervention or exploitation of the protests.

Support for the protests has broadened across civil society. Teachers’ unions and educators’ associations have issued statements backing the right to protest, condemning violence, and linking the unrest to chronic inequality, unpaid wages, and the erosion of public education. Labor and professional groups have also reported pressure, summonses, and arrests tied to protest-related activity. Civil society responses have been unusually prominent. Seventeen well-known political and civil activists, including Mostafa Tajzadeh, Narges Mohammadi, Saeed Madani, Ghorban Behzadian Nejad, Jafar Panahi and other human rights defenders, intellectuals, filmmakers, issued a joint statement declaring a peaceful transition from the Islamic Republic a “non-suppressible necessity for Iran’s future.”

The statement explicitly called on security and law enforcement forces to stand with the people, refrain from violence, and recognize their historic responsibility. Independent organizations such as the Iranian Writers’ Association and professional and student groups have also condemned the crackdown, describing the protests as an expression of deep-rooted anger over corruption, inequality, and systemic injustice.

The cultural sphere has reacted strongly. Homayoun Shajarian, one of Iran’s most prominent musicians, announced that he had canceled his European concert tour in solidarity with protesters, stating that the pain and suffering of the Iranian people made performing impossible under current conditions. Other artists and public figures have issued statements condemning violence and expressing solidarity with those killed, injured, or detained. Iranian communities abroad have staged large solidarity demonstrations, framing the unrest as a decisive moment in Iran’s contemporary history.

Human rights organizations and independent monitors report a rising death toll, with some sources indicating that more than 20 people may have been killed, alongside hundreds of injuries and widespread detentions. Internet monitoring groups and domestic media have reported deliberate slowdowns, regional disruptions, and VPN interference, particularly during peak protest hours. Due to restricted access, internet disruptions, and competing official narratives, exact figures remain difficult to independently verify, but the human toll is clearly significant and growing.

What remains uncertain is whether this protest wave will coalesce into a sustained nationwide uprising or be contained through repression and fatigue. While the movement lacks centralized leadership, its geographic spread, social diversity, and increasingly political language mark a clear escalation beyond a purely economic protest. As Iran enters a period of economic restructuring under extreme social pressure, the widening gap between public expectations and state response raises the risk that further economic shocks or deadly confrontations could trigger an even broader national crisis in the weeks ahead.

Iran Moves to End Preferential Exchange Rates Amid Inflation, Protests, and Competing Economic Assessments [[link removed]]
Published January 5, 2026

Iran’s government has begun implementing one of the most far-reaching economic policy shifts of recent years, moving to dismantle the country’s long-standing multi-exchange-rate system and replace subsidized import dollars with direct payments to households. Officials say the reform is intended to eliminate rent-seeking, reduce price distortions, and ensure subsidies reach ordinary citizens, rather than intermediaries. The shift, however, is unfolding amid high inflation, currency volatility, and significant protests, and has sparked a growing debate among economists over whether the policy sufficiently protects domestic production.

For years, Iran operated under a fragmented foreign exchange regime that included a preferential dollar rate of 28,500 tomans for select imports, alongside semi-official and open-market rates. The system was originally designed to keep essential goods affordable, but over time it became widely associated with corruption, arbitrage opportunities, and weak transmission of subsidies to consumers. President Masoud Pezeshkian has argued that recipients of both the preferential and semi-official rates were effectively benefiting from state-created rent, stressing that his government does not intend to remove subsidies but rather transfer them from the beginning of the supply chain to the end consumer.

Under the new framework, the government plans to remove preferential exchange rates for most imports and compensate households directly. The core of the policy is a monthly commodity credit equivalent to 1 million tomans per person, delivered through an electronic voucher system usable at more than 268,000 retail outlets nationwide. Authorities say an initial lump-sum payment of 4 million tomans per person will be deposited to household heads’ cards, with unused credit rolling over to subsequent months. Existing cash subsidies, the Yasna program, and malnutrition assistance schemes are to remain in place, while around 20 million additional people are being added to subsidy coverage. Prices under the voucher system are to be regulated by the state, though officials acknowledge that price increases are unavoidable.

Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani said on state television that following the liberalization of exchange rates, cooking oil, chicken, and eggs are expected to experience sharper price increases than other goods, while most remaining items could rise by 20 to 30 percent. These increases come on top of an already severe inflationary environment. According to the Central Bank, point-to-point inflation reached 49.9 percent, while annual inflation stood at 42.4 percent. Price pressures have been especially acute in goods, with goods inflation reaching 65.7 percent year-on-year, compared to lower—but still elevated—inflation in services. Food and beverage prices rose 5.2 percent in a single month, intensifying concerns over household purchasing power.

The policy shift has coincided with renewed currency volatility. After briefly retreating, the dollar in the open market rose again to around 142,000 tomans, while gold prices surged, with the Emami coin reaching about 159 million tomans. At the same time, localized protests have been reported in recent days, initially triggered by shopkeepers in Tehran objecting to rising costs and the rapid depreciation of the rial. While demonstrations have so far remained limited compared to past nationwide protest movements, they underscore the sensitivity of economic reform amid prolonged inflation and declining real incomes.

Market reactions have been mixed. While households face higher prices, the Tehran Stock Exchange has rallied sharply, driven largely by export-oriented companies expected to benefit from more realistic exchange rates. Analysts say the shift reduces losses associated with forced currency conversion at artificial rates and improves transparency in corporate earnings, making export-heavy sectors more attractive to investors.

Despite the government’s emphasis on protecting consumers, a number of economists warn that the reform risks undermining production if working capital constraints are not addressed. Economic analyst Seyed Abbas Abbaspour has cautioned that current policies lack a concrete mechanism to support producers, particularly in agriculture and livestock. He notes that the price of key inputs has surged from 15–20 thousand tomans per kilogram to 40, 50, and even 70 thousand tomans, leaving poultry and livestock producers without the liquidity needed to continue production. According to this assessment, when producers lack working capital they are forced to reduce output, a dynamic that mirrors the experience of 1401, when similar shocks led to mass culling of productive livestock, sharp declines in supply, and lasting damage to the sector.

Critics argue that direct payments to households do not flow directly to producers, who must purchase inputs upfront and wait months before recovering costs through sales. Abbaspour and others estimate that 50 to 60 trillion tomans in targeted financing—through preferential credit lines, temporary easing of reserve requirements, or directed lending via state support companies—could help stabilize production during the transition. Without such measures, they warn, higher household subsidies alone may fail to prevent supply shortages and renewed price increases.

Alongside these warnings, the Ministry of Welfare and some economists have offered a more optimistic assessment. They argue that replacing indirect subsidies with direct, per-capita transfers improves targeting, reduces leakage, and gives households greater control over consumption. According to these estimates, direct subsidy payments could reduce poverty by around 20 percent among lower-income deciles, at least in the short term. Supporters of the policy acknowledge production-side risks but contend that poverty reduction and consumption smoothing are critical priorities in an economy grappling with sustained inflation and uncertainty.

Iran’s attempt to dismantle its multi-rate exchange-rate system reflects long-standing critiques of the preferential currency regime and represents a structural correction long demanded by economists. Yet the reform also exposes a central tension in Iran’s political economy: how to protect consumers while sustaining production under conditions of high inflation and financial constraint. Without parallel measures to support producers and manage inflation expectations, the policy risks shifting the burden of adjustment onto households already under pressure. At the same time, failure to reform the exchange-rate system would likely perpetuate the distortions that have undermined economic governance for years. As inflation remains high and protests simmer, the coming weeks will test whether the government can balance consumer protection, production stability, and social trust, or whether the reform will add to the pressures already weighing on Iran’s fragile economy.
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