[[link removed]]

THE GULF’S COLD WAR: SAUDI-UAE RIVALRY SPILLS INTO AFRICA  
[[link removed]]


 

Imran Khalid
January 3, 2026
Middle East Monitor
[[link removed]]


*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appeared to be the twin engines of a new Arab
order. That veneer of unity has now, not just cracked; it has been
replaced by a series of high-stakes disputes stretching from Southern
Yemen to the Horn of Africa. _

A demonstration titled the “million-man march of gratitude for
Saudi Arabia and the UAE”, in the centre of the second city of Aden
on September 5, 2019, SALEH AL-OBEIDI/AFP via Getty Images

 

In the sterile, high-altitude boardrooms of the Gulf, the mantra for
the last decade has been one of shared destiny. From the 2017 blockade
of Qatar to the initial intervention in Yemen, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi
appeared to be the twin engines of a new, assertive Arab order. Yet,
as 2026 begins, that veneer of unity has not just cracked; it has been
replaced by a series of high-stakes jurisdictional disputes stretching
from the mountains of southern Yemen to the ports of the Horn of
Africa.

The most dramatic evidence of this shift arrived in the closing days
of 2025. On December 30, the Saudi Air Force conducted a rare and
pointed strike on the Yemeni port of Mukalla. The target was not the
Houthi rebels, but a shipment of armored vehicles and weaponry
allegedly destined for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the
separatist movement backed by the United Arab Emirates. For Riyadh,
this was a “red line” moment. For Abu Dhabi, it was a “blatant
military assault” on a partner.

To understand this friction, one must look beyond mere personality
clashes between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Sheikh
Mohamed bin Zayed. The divergence is structural. Saudi Arabia, as the
traditional regional heavyweight with a long land border with Yemen,
remains committed to the principle of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Riyadh views a unified, stable Yemen as
essential to its national security. Conversely, the UAE has
increasingly adopted a “maritime empire” strategy. It favors a
decentralized Yemen where a friendly, independent southern state could
secure the vital shipping lanes of the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

AFTER OIL, BEFORE STABILITY: THE MIDDLE EAST’S ENERGY DILEMMA IN A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD
[[link removed]]

This “break-to-build” approach by Abu Dhabi is not limited to
Yemen. In Sudan, the two powers find themselves on opposite sides of a
grinding and catastrophic civil war. While Saudi Arabia has positioned
itself as the primary mediator, hosting talks in Jeddah and backing
the regular Sudanese Armed Forces to preserve the state’s
institutional shell, the UAE has been widely accused of supporting the
paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UAE denies these claims,
yet the geopolitical logic remains consistent: a preference for agile,
non-state partners who can secure specific economic and logistical
interests over the messy, often sclerotic structures of traditional
Arab capitals.

The rivalry has now spilled across the Red Sea into the Horn of
Africa, creating a complex web of “port-to-port” diplomacy. The
recent recognition of Somaliland’s independence by Israel – a move
notably not condemned by the UAE but fiercely criticized by Saudi
Arabia – has turned the region into a fresh theater of competition.
By backing Somaliland and its port at Berbera, the UAE gains a
strategic foothold that bypasses the central government in Mogadishu,
which is supported by Riyadh.

The unique angle of this friction lies in the “Trump Factor.”
Following a high-profile meeting between the Saudi Crown Prince and US
President Donald Trump in late 2025, Washington appears to have leaned
into the Saudi vision of regional stability. Analysts suggest the
STC’s recent advances in Yemen were a tactical “retaliation” by
Abu Dhabi for what it perceived as a Saudi-led effort to lobby the
White House against Emirati interests in Sudan.

Despite the heat of the rhetoric, this is not a prelude to war between
the two Gulf giants. Both nations are far too integrated economically,
and both are racing to diversify their economies away from oil. A
total rupture would be a “mutually assured destruction” for their
respective 2030 and 2031 economic visions. Tourism, aviation, and
technology hubs require the optics of stability.

READ: ARAB STATES GROW INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI POLICIES
[[link removed]]

However, the “Big Brother, Little Brother” dynamic that defined
the early 2010s is gone. The UAE, once the junior partner, now
possesses its own sophisticated network of proxies and maritime assets
that it is unwilling to subordinate to Saudi leadership. Saudi Arabia,
invigorated by its own domestic transformation and renewed ties with
Iran and Turkey, is no longer willing to look the other way when its
neighbor’s foreign policy experiments threaten the stability of its
borders.

The risk for the wider world is a “Sudanization” of regional
conflicts, where local actors in Yemen or Somalia play the two Gulf
powers against each other to secure better arms and funding. For the
Middle East in 2026, the greatest challenge to regional peace may no
longer be the old rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran, but the emerging,
cold competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

The two capitals are discovering that while they share a vision of a
post-oil future, they have very different ideas about the map of the
region that will get them there. Whether they can manage this
competition through quiet diplomacy or continue with public “red
line” warnings will determine the stability of the world’s most
critical trade routes for years to come.

_The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor._

_IMRAN KHALID is a geostrategic analyst and columnist on international
affairs based in Karachi, Pakistan. He qualified as a physician from
Dow Medical University in Karachi in 1991 and has a master’s degree
in international relations from Karachi University._

_The use or misuse of information is central to the conflict in the
Middle East. There has been a growing need for supporters of, in
particular, the Palestinian cause, to master the art of information
gathering, analysis and dissemination. This requires well organised,
focused and targeted operations. Such initiatives are virtually
non-existent in the West today._

_The MIDDLE EAST MONITOR (MEMO) was established to fill this gap._

_While there are several outstanding media monitoring networks online,
their main activity is invariably confined to exposing the flaws in
existing coverages. We go one step further; reaching out to
opinion-makers and decision-makers in a deliberate, organised and
sustained manner._

_So, what do we do at MEMO?__We provide a focused and comprehensive
coverage of Palestine, and its regional neighbours__We do so by
gathering news through our extensive networks of partner organisations
and correspondents on the ground__Not only do our readers enjoy
up-to-date reporting, through our network of contributors, we also
publish carefully reasoned commentaries rooted in factual evidence__We
are also an essential point of reference for journalists, researchers,
human rights organisations and NGOs__Here at MEMO, we recognise that
official policy is often informed and defined by the nature of media
coverage. As such, we regularly interface with politicians, editors,
lobby groups and various other stakeholders to facilitate a better
understanding and appreciation of the Palestine issue._

_Middle East Monitor is owned and operated by Ardi Associates Ltd._

_Subscribe to the Middle East Monitor_
[[link removed]]

* Saudi Arabia
[[link removed]]
* UAE
[[link removed]]
* Yemen
[[link removed]]
* Sudan
[[link removed]]
* Donald Trump
[[link removed]]
* Israel
[[link removed]]
* Oil
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

INTERPRET THE WORLD AND CHANGE IT

 

 

Submit via web
[[link removed]]

Submit via email
Frequently asked questions
[[link removed]]
Manage subscription
[[link removed]]
Visit xxxxxx.org
[[link removed]]

Bluesky [[link removed]]

Facebook [[link removed]]

 




[link removed]

To unsubscribe, click the following link:
[link removed]