From xxxxxx <[email protected]>
Subject King of Cannibal Island
Date January 5, 2026 2:35 AM
  Links have been removed from this email. Learn more in the FAQ.
  Links have been removed from this email. Learn more in the FAQ.
[[link removed]]

KING OF CANNIBAL ISLAND  
[[link removed]]


 

John Lanchester
December 25, 2025
London Review of Books
[[link removed]]


*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ Today, each of the ten biggest companies in the world is worth more
than $1 trillion. Only one of them, the Saudi oil monopoly, Aramco,
has nothing to do with the future value of AI. Is it a bubble? Of
course it’s a bubble. What happens next? _

Motherboard of an NVIDIA DGX Spark, a compact AI supercomputer. ,
Mike Kai Chen for the New York Times

 

The Thinking Machine: Jensen Huang, Nvidia and the World’s Most
Coveted Microchip by Stephen Witt
[[link removed]].__Bodley
Head, 248 pp., £25, April, 978 1 84792 827 6__
The Nvidia Way: Jensen Huang and the Making of a Tech Giant by Tae
Kim [[link removed]].__Norton,
261 pp., £25, December 2024, 978 1 324 08671 0__
Empire of AI: Inside the Reckless Race for Total Domination by Karen
Hao [[link removed]].__Allen
Lane, 482 pp., £25, May, 978 0 241 67892 3__

Supremacy: AI, ChatGPT and the Race that Will Change the World by
Parmy Olson
[[link removed]].__Pan
Macmillan, 319 pp., £10.99, July, 978 1 0350 3824 4__
 

The tulip bubble​ is the most famous financial bubble in history,
but as historical examples go it is also, in one crucial respect,
misleading. That’s because anyone can see the flagrant irrationality
which was at work. At peak tulip madness in 1637, rare bulbs were so
expensive that a single one was worth as much as a fancy canalside
house in Amsterdam. You don’t have to be Warren Buffett to see that
the disconnect between price and value was based on delusional
thinking.

Most bubbles aren’t like that. Even the South Sea Bubble, the event
which gave its name to financial bubbles, had an underlying rationale:
who can deny that the expansion of global networks of trade and
capital turned out to be a vitally important and vastly lucrative
event? Even if all the investors in the original bubble – including
Isaac Newton, who realised it was a bubble, but got caught up in the
excitement anyway – lost their shirts. The historical pattern is
typically that a big, genuine innovation is spotted on the horizon.
Money floods in to take advantage. Too much money. The flow of capital
is so great that it is impossible to allocate it correctly, and
distinctions disappear between what is likely and what is impossible,
what is prudent and what is reckless, what might happen and what never
could. After the flood of money, the doubts; after the doubts, the
crash; and after the crash, the gradual emergence of the phenomenon
that got all the speculators so excited in the first place. It
happened with the South Sea Bubble, with the many railway manias of
the mid-19th century, with the electrification mania of fifty years
later and with the dot-com bubble at the turn of this century.

That is where we are now with AI. In the deep historical past of 2018,
Apple became the first public company in the world to have a market
capitalisation of more than a trillion dollars. Today, each of the ten
biggest companies in the world is worth more than $1 trillion. Only
one of them, the Saudi oil monopoly, Aramco, has nothing to do with
the future value of AI. The top company, Nvidia, is worth $4.45
trillion. Not by coincidence, Nvidia shares are the purest bet you can
make on the impact of AI. The leading firms are lending money to one
another in circular patterns, propping up turnover and valuations.
Colossal amounts of money are pouring in. Is it a bubble? Of course
it’s a bubble. The salient questions are how we got here, and what
happens next.

How did we get here? That story is among other things a narrative
about two men, who gratifyingly correspond to the two main character
types of the tech age: academically overachieving immigrant (Elon
Musk, Sergey Brin, Sundar Pichai, Satya Nadella) and US-born college
dropout (Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg). Companies founded
or run by such men are the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and
seventh most valuable in the world. Their combined value is $20.94
trillion – one sixth of the entire world economy.

Let’s begin in medias res. In the spring of 1993, three nerds
visited a lawyer in Silicon Valley with the intention of setting up a
company to make computer chips. The men were Curtis Priem, Chris
Malachowsky and the person they had chosen to be their CEO, Jensen
Huang, a Taiwanese-born electrical engineer with a talent for
management and business. Malachowsky and Priem, according to Stephen
Witt’s _Thinking Machine_, had complementary skills – they were,
respectively, an architect and a chip mechanic. They wanted to make a
new kind of chip, optimised for a rapidly growing sector: video games.
Their employer, the large chip company LSI Logic, didn’t like the
idea, so the three men cooked up a business plan, working mainly in a
branch of the 24-hour chain restaurant Denny’s that was accessorised
with bullet holes from drive-by shootings. Huang didn’t think the
new company was worth launching until they had a credible chance of
making $50 million a year in revenue. Fiddling with spreadsheets over
long sessions at Denny’s, he eventually made the numbers add up. The
three amigos went to see Jim Gaither, a lawyer well known in the
Valley. Gaither filled out the paperwork, with the company’s name
left as NV, for New Venture. Malachowsky and Priem were entertained by
that: they had been playing around with company names that suggested
their chip would leave competitors sick with envy. The coincidence was
too good to resist. They decided to call their company Nvision. When
the lawyer checked, it turned out that Nvision was already taken. They
chose a backup: Nvidia.

Good choice of CEO, good choice of name. A third of a century later,
Huang is the longest-serving CEO in the industry and Nvidia is the
most valuable company in the world. Nvidia’s share of global stock
market value is historically unprecedented: its shares make up a
greater part of global indices than the entire UK stock market.

Huang had a hard start in life. He arrived in the US in 1973 aged
nine, small for his age and not speaking much English. His parents,
Hokkien-speakers from Tainan who had emigrated to Bangkok, had
attempted to teach him and his brothers English by making them learn
ten words a day, chosen at random from the dictionary. They sent Huang
to the Oneida Baptist Institute in Kentucky under the mistaken
impression it was a posh boarding school. In fact, it was a reform
school for unruly boys whom the regular US education system couldn’t
handle. Huang’s academic abilities meant that he was put in a class
with boys a year older. If you were designing a formula to make a
child a target for bullying, you couldn’t do much better. On his
first night, Huang’s roommate pulled up his shirt to show him the
scars he had accumulated from knife wounds. The newcomer, who stayed
at school during the holidays because he had nowhere else to go, was
given the job of cleaning the toilets.

This might sound like a deprivation narrative. Huang doesn’t tell it
that way. He taught his roommate to read, and his roommate taught him
to do push-ups – a hundred a day. The bullies stopped trying to tip
him off the rope bridge he had to cross on the way to school. Huang
says it toughened him up and, according to Witt, in a commencement
speech in 2020 he ‘said that his time at the school was one of the
best things ever to happen to him’. After two years in Kentucky,
Huang moved to Oregon, where his parents had immigrated. He went to
school and university and married there, before starting his career at
the Silicon Valley microchip design company AMD. Many promotions and
one job move later he met Malachowsky and Priem through LSI.

The trio’s new venture was far from an overnight success. There were
at least 35 companies competing to build a specialised chip for video
games, and it was evident that most of them were going to fail. When
Nvidia’s first chip, the NV1, bombed, it looked as if their company
was going to be one of them. ‘We missed everything,’ Huang later
said. ‘Every single decision we made was wrong.’ He laid off most
of the company’s employees and bet the shop on the successful design
of their next chip, the NV3. (The NV2 was cancelled before launch.)
Rather than build the chip the traditional way – they couldn’t do
that, because they would have run out of money before it was finished
– they used an emulator, a machine designed to mimic chip designs in
software rather than silicon, to test it virtually. When the first
real NV3 chip arrived, there was a crucial test. If even one of the
3.5 million transistors on the chip was flawed, it would be dead on
arrival and Nvidia would disappear. It wasn’t and it didn’t. ‘To
this day we are the largest user of emulators in the world,’ Huang
says.

By this point, in 1997, Huang had made two big bets: one on video
games’ insatiable demand for better graphics, and one on the
emulator. Those successful bets kept Nvidia alive, and growing. He
would make three more. The first was on a type of computing known as
parallel processing. A traditional computer chip, such as the one
inside the laptop I’m using, runs with a Central Processing Unit, a
CPU, which works through computations in sequence. As chips have grown
in power, the length and complexity of the computations have too. But
chips had become so small that they were starting to run up against
the laws of physics.

Parallel processing instead performs calculations not in sequence, but
simultaneously. Rather than working through one huge calculation, it
works through lots of small calculations at the same time. On YouTube,
you can find the MythBusters, an excitable duo of American
science-explainers, demonstrating the difference at an Nvidia
conference in 2008 (Huang commissioned the demo). The MythBusters set
up a robot gun to fire paintballs at a canvas. The first run works
like a CPU: the robot fires a rapid sequence of blue paintballs,
adjusting its aim after every shot to paint a smiley face. It takes
about thirty seconds. Then they set up another robot gun, this time
shooting 1100 paintballs simultaneously. The guns cough and in a
fraction of a second – eighty milliseconds, to be precise – on the
canvas appears a paintball copy of the Mona Lisa. The instant Mona
Lisa is a visual metaphor for the way the new chips worked: instead of
huge calculations done in sequence, a vast number of short
calculations done at the same time. Parallel processing.

The video games industry loved the new chips, and demanded an update
every six months, to render the ever more complex visual environments
inside their games. Keeping up with that appetite was demanding and
expensive, but it took Nvidia to a leading position in the chip
industry. In _The Nvidia Way_, Tae Kim describes Huang’s
relentlessness in keeping ahead of the competition. ‘The number one
feature of any product is the schedule,’ Huang said, marking a
difference between engineering elegance and Nvidia’s emphasis on
getting-it-done, getting-it-shipped. The company’s chips were by
this point so powerful that it began to seem bizarre that their only
use was in allowing people to go online and shoot one another in
increasingly complex and well-rendered sci-fi settings. At this point,
Huang made another of his bets. He set Nvidia to develop a new kind of
chip architecture, which he gave the deliberately obscure name CUDA,
an acronym of Compute Unified Device Architecture.

The term doesn’t really mean anything, which was part of the point
– Huang didn’t want the competition to realise what Nvidia was
doing. Its engineers were developing a new kind of architecture for a
new kind of customer: ‘doctors, astronomers, geologists and other
scientists – highly educated academic specialists who were skilled
in specific domains, but who maybe didn’t know how to code at
all’. In Witt’s metaphor, the CPU is like a kitchen knife, ‘a
beautiful multipurpose tool that can make any kind of cut. It can
julienne, batonnet, chop, slice, dice, or hack ... but the knife can
only ever chop one vegetable at a time.’ Nvidia’s processor, which
the company was now calling a GPU, or Graphics Processing Unit, was
more like a food processor: ‘loud, indelicate and power-intensive.
It cannot chiffonade tarragon or score a crosshatch on a tube of
calamari. But to mince a bunch of vegetables quickly, the GPU is the
tool.’ The CUDA architecture took this tool and repurposed it for a
new audience. In effect, gamers were paying for the chip development
costs of the scientific users who Huang believed would show up. It was
a version of ‘if you build it, they will come.’

They didn’t, or not in sufficient numbers to make CUDA a success.
Demand failed to surge, and so did the company’s share price. There
are many examples in the history of technology of an invention waiting
for a ‘killer app’ – an application or function that suddenly
gives the invention an irresistibly compelling purpose. The killer app
for the PC, for instance, was the spreadsheet: overnight, a new
technology that allowed a user to experiment with numbers and
parameters and see what would happen if you tweaked a and b with the
intention of arriving at z. It’s no exaggeration to say that
spreadsheets remade capitalism in the 1980s by making it easy to run
multiple alternative business scenarios and continue until you’d
come up with something that made sense. Nvidia’s amazing new chips
and their CUDA architecture were waiting for a killer app.

Salvation arrived in the form of an unfashionable branch of computing
called neural networks. This was a field dedicated to the idea that
computers could copy the structure of the brain by creating artificial
neurons and connecting them in networks. Early neural networks were
trained on labelled datasets, where the answer for each image was
known in advance. The network made a prediction, compared it with the
correct label, and adjusted itself using an algorithm called
backpropagation. The major breakthrough came when researchers learned
how to train networks with many layers of artificial neurons –
‘deep learning’. These deep networks could detect increasingly
complex patterns in data, which led to dramatic progress in image
recognition and many other areas. A computer scientist at Google, for
instance,

fed their deep learning net a random sampling of ten million still
images taken from YouTube and let it decide which patterns occurred
frequently enough for the net to ‘remember’ them. The model was
exposed to so many videos of cats that it independently developed a
composite image of a cat’s face without human intervention. From
then on, it could reliably identify cats in images that were not part
of its training set.

Three things came together: algorithms, datasets and hardware.
Computer scientists had developed the first two. It was Nvidia’s
chips that brought the third – because, as it happened, the parallel
processing of these chips was perfectly adapted for the new El Dorado
of deep learning. Multiple calculations happening at the same time was
exactly what constituted neural nets. These neural nets are the
foundational technology for what was once called machine learning and
is now generally referred to as AI. (Machine learning is a more
accurate and helpful term, in my view, but that’s a topic for
another day.)

The head scientist at Nvidia was a man called David Kirk. As he told
Witt,

‘with parallel computing, it really took us a fair amount of
convincing to talk Jensen into it ... Same with CUDA. We really had
to make the business case.’ But with AI, Huang experienced a
Damascene epiphany. ‘He got it immediately, before anybody ... He
was the first to see what it could be. He really was the first.’

Huang reasoned that if neural nets could solve visual learning, they
had the potential to solve everything else too. He sent out a
company-wide email one Friday saying that Nvidia were no longer a
graphics company. One colleague recalled: ‘By Monday morning, we
were an AI company. Literally, it was that fast.’ That was in 2014.
It was the fifth and most successful of Huang’s five bets, and the
one that has made Nvidia the planet-bestriding colossus it is today.

Soon after this, if you were a nerd or nerd-adjacent, you started to
hear about AI. Talking to people who knew more than I did about
technology and economics, I would often ask questions along the lines
of ‘What’s next?’ or ‘What’s the next big thing?’ and
increasingly the answer that came back would involve AI. I have a
particular memory of talking to an astute tech investor a few days
after the Brexit vote, and asking him what he thought was going to
happen. I’ve forgotten the details of his answer – we were
drinking martinis – but the gist was AI advances in China. What
struck me most was that I was asking about Brexit, but he regarded AI
as so much more important that it didn’t even occur to him that was
what I meant.

There was, however, a frustrating aspect to these conversations, and
to pretty much everything I read about AI. People seemed convinced it
was going to be a huge deal. But they were short on details. It was
easier to feel the heat than to see the fire. That remained the case
even after the high-profile triumph of an AI, AlphaGo, over the world
Go champion, Lee Sedol. Games happen within a fixed set of parameters.
Because of that, the idea of solving them through algorithms is not
astonishing a priori_._ The closest glimpse I had of the new
possibilities came in the unlikely setting of a hotel room in Kobe in
November 2016. I was woken up by a text in Japanese. I opened Google
Translate, hoping that I would get at least a rough and ready version
of the message, and instead found a complete and clear warning that a
powerful tsunami had occurred just off the Hyogo coast, right next to
Kobe. The good news came at the bottom of the text: ‘This is a
training message.’ That was my introduction to Google’s new
neural-net-based translation, which by bizarre coincidence had
launched in Japan that very day. It was the neural net that took my
screenshot of the message and turned it from incomprehensible katakana
characters into panic-inducing English. That was a vivid lesson in
what neural nets could do – but it was also, for me at any rate, an
isolated lesson. Daily life did not suddenly fill with new evidence
for the power of AI.

What made me, and much of the rest of the world, wake up to the power
and potential of the new technology was the launch, in November 2022,
of ChatGPT. The people at OpenAI, the company that created ChatGPT,
saw it as a low-key rollout of a new customer interface. Instead, it
was the fastest growing tech launch of all time. AI went from a niche
interest to the top of the news. It has stayed there. This
paradigm-shifting event brings us to our second protagonist, the
co-founder and head of OpenAI, Sam Altman.

If Huang is​ modern tech overlord type one, the academically
overachieving immigrant, Altman is type two, the American college
dropout. He was born in 1985, the son of a dermatologist and a
real-estate broker. Altman had a conventional clever kid’s childhood
at the local posh school in St Louis, with the distinguishing feature
that he came out as gay in his teens and spoke to a school assembly on
the subject. He went from there to Stanford and caught the start-up
bug, dropping out in his second year to found a location-based social
app, Loopt. The name doesn’t mean anything but at that point
successful start-ups tended to have two Os in their name: Google,
Yahoo, Facebook. (They still do: witness Goop, Noom, Zoopla, and my
personal favourite, the ‘technology platform that connects the faith
ecosystem’, Gloo. One day soon I plan to launch a nonsense-detecting
start-up called Booloocks.)

More important than Loopt was the world to which it introduced Altman.
His mentor was a British-American software mage called Paul Graham,
who had written a famous programming textbook and then made his
fortune selling a web company to Yahoo. In 2005, he and his wife,
Jessica Livingston, set up a project called Y Combinator, based where
they lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The idea was to offer funding,
mentorship and support to start-ups. The target audience was
superbright college kids, and the idea was that instead of doing some
boring, CV-polishing internship over the summer, they could come to Y
Combinator, which would pay them $6000 and put them through a start-up
boot camp, with Graham and his circle of contacts giving them
education, advice and networking opportunities.

Y Combinator has been a huge success, and many of the companies it
launched are internet-age household names: Airbnb, Reddit, Stripe,
Dropbox. The central lesson of the ‘incubator’, as Y Combinator
called itself, was that the character and talent of the founder were
more important than the specific idea they were working on. Example
number one: Sam Altman. He applied to join the first batch of Y
Combinator recruits. Graham tried to put him off for a year, on the
grounds that, at nineteen, he was too young. Altman didn’t take no
for an answer – a key personality trait. In that and in other
respects, he made a big impact on Graham. ‘Within about three
minutes of meeting him, I remember thinking, “Ah, so this is what
Bill Gates must have been like when he was nineteen.”’ He once
said: ‘Sam is extremely good at becoming powerful.’ In case that
doesn’t make his view of Altman clear: ‘You could parachute him
into an island full of cannibals and come back in five years and
he’d be the king.’

Parmy Olson’s lively _Supremacy_ is essentially positive about
Altman, whereas Keach Hagey’s thorough and clear-headed _The
Optimist_ is more equivocal. She makes Graham’s remark sound
light-hearted, joshing and essentially complimentary. Karen Hao’s
much more sceptical _Empire of AI_ makes Graham’s words illustrative
of an unprincipled ambition so intense it has a tinge of sociopathy.
This duality of perspectives runs through Altman’s story. At almost
every point, it is possible to see his actions as benign, if sometimes
‘conflict averse’ in a manner that causes misunderstandings. It is
also possible to see him as a much darker figure. In the case of that
apparently ordinary childhood, there is his version, and then there is
the version of his sister, Annie, who in 2021, under the influence of
memories recovered through therapy, said on Twitter that she had
‘experienced sexual, physical, emotional, verbal, financial and
technological abuse from my biological siblings, mostly Sam Altman and
some from Jack Altman’. Altman’s mother told Hao that the
allegations were ‘horrible, deeply heartbreaking and untrue’. No
outsider can adjudicate that sad story. But the existence of radically
different versions of the same events is a recurrent theme in
Altman’s life.

This is true even of the founding of OpenAI. By 2014, Altman was king
of the cannibal island. Loopt hadn’t taken off, but when Graham
stepped down as head of Y Combinator he chose, to general shock, the
unknown 28-year-old as his successor. Altman was already unfathomably
rich, thanks to a venture capital fund he had set up, Hydrazine, which
invested in the star graduates from the start-up incubator. To take
just one example, he owned 2 per cent of the payment company Stripe,
which at the time of writing is worth roughly $107 billion. He was on
his own account no longer motivated by money, but by a longstanding
ambition to make an impact in the non-digital world – and to be
fair, that was what he demonstrated at Y Combinator during his
leadership.

Altman’s interest in technologies with consequences in the physical
world led him to the subject of AI. Specifically, it led him to the
idea that a rogue AI could prove an existential threat to humanity.
This anxiety is widely held in certain tech circles. ‘Doomers’, as
they’re known, talk about ‘p(doom)’, or the probability of
humanity being destroyed by an AI superintelligence not aligned with
human interests. Altman, influenced by these worries, emailed Elon
Musk, a Doomer with ‘a more paranoid, pessimistic’ view than
others in the industry (says Olson). The idea was that ‘someone
other than Google’ should develop the technology, so that it
‘belongs to the world’. Musk thought it was ‘probably worth a
conversation’. The result was a meeting at a Silicon Valley hotel,
with attendees including Musk (who turned up an hour late), Altman,
the prominent AI researchers Ilya Sutskever and Dario Amodei, and the
star Stripe programmer Greg Brockman, who was in search of a new
challenge. As a result of that meeting, Musk funded, and Altman helped
to set up, OpenAI, whose purpose was to develop a safe version of
superintelligent AI. The new company was to be a non-profit; its only
function was ‘to advance digital intelligence in a way that is most
likely to benefit humanity as a whole, unconstrained by the need to
generate financial return’. The company would publish its research
discoveries – hence the ‘open’.

That seems clear. It turned out not to be. Musk’s overriding
obsession was the need to beat Google in the race to develop AI. He
had developed one of his hyperfixations on Demis Hassabis, the British
founder of the AI company DeepMind, which was bought by Google in
2014. To Musk, Hassabis was, as Hao puts it, ‘a supervillain who
needed to be stopped’. (Hassabis won the Nobel Prize for chemistry
last year, for solving the question of how proteins fold. But wait –
maybe that’s exactly what a supervillain would do?) The way to stop
Hassabis was to develop AI before he could, and the first stage of
doing that was to attract talent. Altman was good at that, and OpenAI
soon had several star researchers and programmers, including Sutskever
– he was an especially important figure because the image
recognition software he had helped to develop, AlexNet, had been one
of the breakthroughs in the field of neural nets.

So far so good. The problem was that all this was expensive. Musk had
thought that OpenAI needed $1 billion to play with to have a fighting
chance of competing with Google. That turned out to be a big
underestimate. Computer scientists were starting to find that size was
fundamental in the training stage of creating AI – the point at
which the data were fed into the algorithms and the neural net went to
work. In civilian life, ‘compute’ is a verb. In AI, it is a noun,
denoting the size of your computing power. Some AI programs have
proved to be, once trained, relatively compact – the Chinese company
DeepSeek, for instance, has a cutting-edge model that will work on an
ordinary personal computer. I know a couple of people who run it on
their laptops. But getting to that point, training the program, is
another story, one in which the scale of your compute is
all-important. In the tech world, it’s the ultimate example of a
contest in which men fight for the right to say, ‘mine’s
bigger.’

Google’s was bigger. OpenAI needed to scale up. Altman’s method
for doing so was to cut a deal with Microsoft, in which the unloved
software giant would give OpenAI $1 billion in funding in return for
the exclusive use of OpenAI’s products in its own software and a
share in any profits. To ensure that investors didn’t make an
exploitative amount of money from the arrangement, returns were capped
at a hundred times the initial investment. Microsoft stood to make a
paltry $100 billion. Also, the deal would end if and when OpenAI
developed Artificial General Intelligence, on the basis that existing
forms of money would no longer have any value.

The deal was to be contained within a new, for-profit subsidiary of
the parent non-profit. That might sound odd, but the set-up in which a
for-profit company is owned by a non-profit entity isn’t unique.
Denmark’s Novo Nordisk, for instance, maker of the magic weight loss
drugs Ozempic and Wegovy, is majority owned by a non-profit
foundation. There are other examples. What is bizarre about the OpenAI
arrangement is that the non-profit and the for-profit have
contradictory premises. What’s more important: developing
‘aligned’, benign AI, for the benefit of all humanity? Or making
enormous amounts of money as quickly as possible by commercially
exploiting your new technology? As for the ‘open’ bit, forget it
– that aspect of the company’s mission was quietly forgotten. Any
discoveries OpenAI might make were now proprietary.

Musk was livid. He saw the Microsoft deal as a betrayal of the
company’s vision and purpose. Not long afterwards, at the end of
2018, he rage-quit (as gamers call it); later, he announced that he
was setting up a competitor, xAI. That company now owns what used to
be Twitter and is training on its data. Musk’s alternative to
Altman’s company is an AI trained on pornbots, Nazis and spam, with
a heavy emphasis on parroting his own worldview. Lovely.

AI had turned into a race. One of the key components in the race was
talent, where the company’s position was strong, and another was
funding, which was a permanent struggle. To attract attention and
therefore funding, the company needed stunts – high profile events
like DeepMind’s development of AlphaGo. Altman turned to multiplayer
online video games, which, because of their fluidity, complexity and
the unpredictability of human behaviour, are significantly harder for
computers than finite rule-based games such as chess and Go. The
chosen game was a multiplayer online contest called Defence of the
Ancients 2, universally abbreviated to Dota 2. By 2017, OpenAI had
developed a program that could beat a professional Dota player in a
one-on-one contest. By 2019, it could play as a full team of five
players and beat teams of five professionals. A remarkable
achievement, with one catch: hardly anybody noticed or cared. The
company’s next stunt, in 2019, was to announce that the second
version of its showcase product, GPT-2, had such powerful potential
for harm that the company had to put restrictions on its release. The
software’s ability to generate text attracted a decent amount of
attention in the tech world, without making a real dent in public
attention.

That came on 30 November 2022, with the launch of a consumer interface
to a recent version of the company’s software. The underlying
software was GPT-3, a model trained with five hundred times more
compute than GPT-2. The interface – basically a wrapper, or shop
window, for the underlying model – was called ChatGPT. There was
nothing about the program that existing models could not already do,
which is the reason nobody inside OpenAI was expecting what happened
next. Within hours of what was supposed to be a low-key trial, the
comments on Altman’s launch tweet were, in Hagey’s words,
‘increasingly rapturous screenshots of people asking the bot to do
their homework, locate the clitoris and tell them the meaning of
life’. In two months, ChatGPT reached a hundred million users,
‘making it the fastest-growing consumer tech product in history’.

This was the point at which everything blew up. The value of the
world’s top ten companies is $25.6 trillion. Of that, $15.1 trillion
has accumulated since 30 November 2022 and is directly linked to the
AI boom. Nvidia’s technology was the first factor driving the
explosion – its most powerful chip, the H200, is a must-have for
‘frontier’ AI developers. A single H200 retails for between
$30,000 and $40,000, depending on the configuration. The company is
worth over eleven times more than it was on the day ChatGPT launched.

After Nvidia’s chips, the second big factor driving the boom was the
hype created by Sam Altman and OpenAI. Hang on, though – isn’t
this the guy who was worried that AI might destroy humanity? The same
guy who said, ‘AI will probably, most likely, lead to the end of the
world’ and ‘the bad case is, like, lights-out for all of us.’
You know, the Doomer? Well, yes, and it’s not as if people didn’t
notice. It was part of a pattern whereby Altman said different things
to different people. On Friday, 17 November 2023, the board of OpenAI,
accusing Altman of not being ‘consistently candid’ in his
communications, but not giving any further detail, sacked him. It came
as a shock. When an employee said that Altman’s departure might mean
the death of the company, Helen Toner, a member of the board, said:
‘That would actually be consistent with the mission.’ True –
though that’s not what OpenAI’s employees, many of whom stood to
make an enormous amount of money from the commercialisation of their
work, wanted to hear.

The pushback was immediate. Microsoft offered to hire Altman and
anyone else from OpenAI who wanted to join him. More than seven
hundred of the 770 OpenAI staff signed a petition calling for
Altman’s reinstatement. On Tuesday, 21 November, four days after
being sacked, Altman was reinstated and the board members who wanted
to sack him were forced out. A new chairman was appointed, the
well-known ethical titan Larry Summers. Sutskever, the lead researcher
at OpenAI and a board member, went on to resign and started a new
company, Safe Superintelligence. Amodei, another lead researcher, had
already left, questioning Altman’s commitment to AI safety: he
founded the company Anthropic, also dedicated to safe AI. This means
that three of the principals at the Silicon Valley meeting that led to
the creation of OpenAI – Musk, Sutskever and Amodei – had fallen
out with Altman. For each of them, the issue was whether he believed
the things he had said about the importance of safety in developing
AI. In the lawsuit that Musk eventually brought, he accused Altman of
having mirrored his views in an attempt to gain his trust and his
funding.

There’s that duality again. Good Sam, bad Sam. We keep encountering
these moments in Altman’s story. In 2023, OpenAI approached Scarlett
Johansson to provide the voice for a ChatGPT interface (she had played
the voice of the intelligent android in Spike Jonze’s movie _Her_).
She said no. When the software launched, its voice sounded a lot like
Johansson’s. Altman celebrated the launch with a one-word tweet:
‘her’. (He is too advanced to use capital letters.) When Johansson
objected, OpenAI put out a statement: ‘We cast the voice actor
behind Sky’s voice before any outreach to Ms Johansson.’ But ...
according to Johansson, you were approaching her agent two days before
the launch. Goofy or sinister? When the company launched an image
creation app that would make images in the style of the great Japanese
anime house Studio Ghibli, Altman talked about ‘the breadth of
creative use cases’ made possible by the AI generation of images.
But the maestro of Ghibli, Hayao Miyazaki, who in many people’s
opinion (including mine) is the greatest living exponent of animation,
has said that AI art is ‘an insult to life itself’ and added that
‘I would never wish to incorporate this technology into my work at
all.’ Altman can’t possibly think that typing a few words into an
image generator – ‘J.D. Vance kissing a frog in the style of
Studio Ghibli’ – is a form of creativity. His advisers would
certainly have told him Miyazaki’s views, if he didn’t already
know them. In saying what he did, was Altman displaying the boyish
enthusiasm of a 40-year-old multi-billionaire – or were his remarks
smirking, taunting trollery?

As for Altman’s embrace of Doomerism, there are two ways you can
look at that, too. He might have believed it, once upon a time. But
talking about the existential risk to humanity posed by AI is also,
let’s face it, a wonderful marketing tool. This stuff is powerful
– so powerful – too powerful – it might even kill us all! Roll
up, roll up, and ask it to design a poster of the world’s cheeses in
ascending order of strength – before it kills everybody! Our tech
overlords like the idea of being Thomas Edison, genius
inventor-businessman, but they often have more in common with P.T.
Barnum, genius of marketing and hype. Altman could go toe-to-toe with
Barnum, and I wouldn’t want to pick a winner.

In addition to being a superb marketing tool, Doomerism is also an
excellent distraction from the real-world harm being done by AI right
here, right now. One of Altman’s signature moves is to loudly and
frequently call for the regulation of AI. But there is a distinction
between AI safety, which is hypothetical, and AI harm, which is
happening now. For one thing, much of the data on which AI models have
been trained is stolen – including, as it happens, from me. The only
reason I know that is because my books are on a list of works that
have been illegally used in training data. Many more people’s work
has been stolen without any evidentiary trail to show it.

And then there is the tendency of AI models to, in Hagey’s words,
‘make things up, discriminate against women and minorities and
produce toxic content’. A model trained on datasets that incorporate
historic patterns of discrimination and bias will inevitably replicate
those same patterns. The process of using human feedback to adjust and
improve the models’ output is vividly described by Hao: it involves
the extensive use of poorly paid foreign labour and is both
exploitative on its own terms, and prone to introducing other forms of
bias. (The over-correction to bias in AI output is what led to
Google’s Gemini model serving users images of black women when asked
to show typical popes or Vikings.) AI consumes unconscionable amounts
of energy, much of it in the pursuit of obviously trivial output, and
it’s not clear when this demand will slow. Sutskever has said: ‘I
think that it’s fairly likely that it will not take too long for the
entire surface of the Earth to become covered with data centres and
power stations.’ That’s not an opponent of AI talking – it’s
someone who is working as hard as he can to create the AI future.

So​ what happens next? The next big question is what happens when
the bubble pops, and what it means for the future of AI and, for that
matter, humanity. Jeff Bezos has spoken of AI being an ‘industrial
bubble’, resembling the huge capital investment soaked up in the
creation of the railways, rather than a financial bubble, based on
pure speculation, which leaves nothing behind it when it pops. That
seems reasonable to me.

There are four main possibilities. The first is that AI is a giant
nothingburger. Large Language Models – the current market leader,
thanks to OpenAI and its competitors – turn out to have insuperable
limitations. People have noticed that the models don’t learn from
input and have a tendency to ‘hallucinate’. (That word, by the
way, is another piece of disguised salesmanship. Talk of
‘hallucinations’ distracts us from the fact that AIs get things
wrong all the time. The implication is that the mistakes are a side
effect of being sentient – because only sentient beings can
hallucinate. AIs aren’t sentient, and can’t hallucinate, any more
than a fridge or a toaster can. They also can’t lie, because that
involves intention. What they can do is get things wrong.) Everyone
gives up on AI and the whole story goes away. This seems to me to be
the least likely scenario, because of the various impacts AI is
already having.

Scenario number two: somebody builds a rogue superintelligence, which
destroys humanity. Preventing this was, let’s not forget, the motive
behind the creation of OpenAI. The apocalyptic scenario seems to me
unlikely, for reasons linked to the issue of sentience. AIs can mimic
intent, but they can’t possess it. So why would they bother to kill
us? Again – a fridge can kill you (there’s a memorable
death-by-fridge in a novel by A.S. Byatt) but it can’t do it on
purpose.

Third scenario: AI leads to the ‘singularity’, the point at which
computers become more intelligent than human beings; learn to
self-program and self-improve; do so at speed and at scale; and lead
humanity to a new era of, to use the latest hot term, abundance.
Artificial general intelligence, or artificial superintelligence,
creates a new era of cheap energy, drug discovery, desalination, an
end to hunger, you name it. ‘Although it will happen incrementally,
astounding triumphs – fixing the climate, establishing a space
colony and the discovery of all of physics – will eventually become
commonplace.’ That’s from an essay by Altman published last year,
titled ‘The Intelligence Age’:

Here is one narrow way to look at human history: after thousands of
years of compounding scientific discovery and technological progress,
we have figured out how to melt sand, add some impurities, arrange it
with astonishing precision at extraordinarily tiny scale into computer
chips, run energy through it and end up with systems capable of
creating increasingly capable artificial intelligence. This may turn
out to be the most consequential fact about all of history so far.

Fourth scenario: AI turns out to be what Arvind Narayanan and Sayash
Kapoor call a ‘normal technology’. It is an important invention,
just as electricity or the internet are important, but it is not a
radical discontinuity in the story of mankind. This is partly because
computer intelligence is inherently limited and partly because of
‘bottlenecks’, human obstacles to the adoption of technology. Some
things stay the same, and some change radically. Some jobs, especially
entry-level white-collar jobs, are automated away. Back-end processes
in logistics and suchlike become more efficient. Some forms of labour
become more valuable and some less. There are breakthroughs in some
fields, such as drug discovery. Other areas are largely untouched, and
there are many areas in which AI is a strange combination of
surprisingly useful and profoundly unreliable.

The last of those options – ‘normal technology’ – seems to me
to be the most likely, not least because it is the version that is
already, to some extent, here. Some forms of inequality are already
being magnified by AI – the one between capital and labour, for a
start. Young people are already noticing the impact of automation on
starter-level employment. Freelance wages in some areas of the economy
are already down. If you had to pick a single text to sum up the last
few decades in political economy, it would be ‘for he that hath, to
him shall be given.’ If I had to bet, it would be on the
continuation of that trend. You know what, though? One of the fun
things about AI is that, unlike pretty much every other area of
politics and economics, we’re going to get a clear answer. ‘It’s
hard to even imagine today what we will have discovered by 2035,’
Altman has written. By 2035, we’ll either be extinct, on the verge
of unimaginable prosperity for all humanity or kind of the same, but
more so. Pass the popcorn. Or wait until your robot butler can do it
for you.

_JOHN LANCHESTER is the author of six novels – The Debt to
Pleasure, Mr Phillips, Fragrant Harbour, Capital, The Wall and Look
What You Made Me Do, due in March 2026 – and a collection of ghost
stories, Reality, and Other Stories. He has also written a memoir,
Family Romance, and two books about the financial system, Whoops!, and
How to Speak Money._

_THE LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS is Europe’s leading magazine of
culture and ideas. Published twice a month, it provides a space for
some of the world’s best __writers_
[[link removed]]_ to explore a wide variety of
subjects in exhilarating detail – from __art_
[[link removed]]_ and __politics_
[[link removed]]_ to __science
and technology_
[[link removed]]_ via
__history_ [[link removed]]_ and
__philosophy_ [[link removed]]_,
not to mention __fiction and poetry_
[[link removed]]_. In the age
of the long read, the LRB remains the pre-eminent exponent of the
intellectual essay, admired around the world for its fearlessness, its
range and its elegance._

_Subscribe to the London Review of Books_

* artificial intelligence
[[link removed]]
* financial bubble
[[link removed]]
* video games
[[link removed]]
* super computers
[[link removed]]
* Neural networks
[[link removed]]
* Non profits
[[link removed]]
* Technology
[[link removed]]
* Book Review
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

INTERPRET THE WORLD AND CHANGE IT

 

 

Submit via web
[[link removed]]

Submit via email
Frequently asked questions
[[link removed]]
Manage subscription
[[link removed]]
Visit xxxxxx.org
[[link removed]]

Bluesky [[link removed]]

Facebook [[link removed]]

 




[link removed]

To unsubscribe, click the following link:
[link removed]
Screenshot of the email generated on import

Message Analysis