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Subject Trump, Big Oil and China – Three Articles
Date January 5, 2026 1:00 AM
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TRUMP, BIG OIL AND CHINA – THREE ARTICLES  
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Ben Lefebvre, Zack Colman, James Bikales (Politico) Guney Yildiz
(Forbes) Sarah Rumpf (Yahoo!News)!
January 3, 2026
Politico
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_ Three articles discuss Trump's outreach to Big Oil before and after
kidnapping Venezuelan President Maduro, the special place of
Venezuelan oil in the world oil market, and the economic and political
role of Venezuelan oil trade with China. _

US President Donald Trump, alongside (L/R) Deputy Chief of Staff
Stephen Miller, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US Secretary of
Defense Pete Hegseth, speaks to the press following US military
actions in Venezuela, at his Mar-a-Lago residence in Palm , Jim Watson
/ AFP via Getty Images

 

TRUMP ADMIN SENDS TOUGH PRIVATE MESSAGE TO OIL COMPANIES ON
VENEZUELABY BEN LEFEBVRE, ZACK COLMAN AND JAMES BIKALESPOLITICOJANUARY
3, 2026 

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The White House has told companies they must rebuild Venezuela's
crude-pumping infrastructure if they want compensation for assets
seized by Caracas.

American oil companies have long hoped to recover the assets that
Venezuela’s authoritarian regime ripped from them decades ago.

Now the Trump administration is offering to help them achieve that aim
— with one major condition.

Administration officials have told oil executives in recent weeks that
if they want compensation for their rigs, pipelines and other seized
property, then they must be prepared to go back into Venezuela now and
invest heavily in reviving its shattered petroleum industry, two
people familiar with the administration’s outreach told POLITICO on
Saturday. The outlook for Venezuela’s shattered oil infrastructure
is one of the major questions following the U.S. military action that
captured leader Nicolás Maduro.

But people in the industry said the administration’s message has
left them still leery about the difficulty of rebuilding decayed oil
fields in a country where it’s not even clear who will lead the
country for the foreseeable future.

“They’re saying, ‘you gotta go in if you want to play and get
reimbursed,’” said one industry official familiar with the
conversations.

The offer has been on the table for the last 10 days, the person said.
“But the infrastructure currently there is so dilapidated that no
one at these companies can adequately assess what is needed to make it
operable.”

President Donald Trump suggested in a televised address Saturday
morning that he fully expects U.S. oil companies to pour big money
into Venezuela.

“We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies,
the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars,
fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure and start
making money for the country,” Trump said as he celebrated
Maduro’s capture.

It’s been five decades since the Venezuelan government first
nationalized the oil industry and nearly 20 years since former
President Hugo Chávez expanded the asset seizures. The country has
some of the largest oil reserves in the world, but its petroleum
infrastructure has decayed amid years of mismanagement and meager
investment.

Initial thoughts among U.S. oil industry officials and market analysts
who spoke to POLITICO regarding a post-Maduro Venezuela focused more
on questions than answers.

The administration has so far not laid out what its long-term plan
looks like, or even if it has one, said Bob McNally, a former national
security and energy adviser to President George W. Bush who now leads
the energy and geopolitics consulting firm Rapidan Energy Group.

“It’s not clear there’s been a specific plan beyond the
principal decision that in a post-Maduro, Trump-compliant regime that
the U.S. companies — energy and others — will be at the top of the
list” to reenter the country, McNally said. He added: “What the
regime looks like, what the plans are for getting there, that has not
been fully fleshed out yet.”

A central concern for U.S. industry executives is whether the
administration can guarantee the safety of the employees and equipment
that companies would need to send to Venezuela, how the companies
would be paid, whether oil prices will rise enough to make Venezuelan
crude profitable and the status of Venezuela’s membership in the
OPEC oil exporters cartel. U.S. benchmark oil prices were at $57 a
barrel, the lowest since the end of the pandemic, as of the market’s
close on Friday.

The White House did not immediately reply to questions about its plan
for the oil industry, but Trump said during Saturday’s appearance at
his Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida that he expected oil companies to put
up the initial investments.

“We’re going to rebuild the oil infrastructure, which requires
billions of dollars that will be paid for by the oil companies
directly,” Trump said. “They will be reimbursed for what they’re
doing, but it’s going to be paid, and we’re going to get the oil
flowing.”

However, the administration’s outreach to U.S. oil company
executives remains “at its best in the infancy stage,” said one
industry executive familiar with the discussions, who was granted
anonymity to describe conversations with the president’s team.

“In preparation for regime change, there had been engagement. But
it’s been sporadic and relatively flatly received by the
industry,” this person said. “It feels very much a shoot-ready-aim
exercise.”

Venezuela’s oil output has fallen to less than a third of the 3.5
million barrels per day that it produced in the 1970s, and the
infrastructure that is used to tap into its 300 billion barrels of
reserves has deteriorated in the past two decades.

“Will the U.S. be able to attract U.S. oilfield services to go to
Venezuela?” the executive asked. “Maybe. It would have to involve
the services companies being able to contract directly with the U.S.
government.”

Talks with administration officials over the past several days also
involved the fate of the state oil company, which is known as PdVSA,
this person added.

“PdVSA will not be denationalized in some way and broken,” this
person said. “Definitely it’s going to be wholesale remaking of
PdVSA leadership, but at least at this point, there is no plan for
denationalization or auctioning it off. It’s in the best position to
keep production flowing.”

Chevron, the sole major oil company still working in Venezuela under a
special license from the U.S. government, said in a statement Saturday
that it “remains focused on the safety and wellbeing of our
employees, as well as the integrity of our assets.

“We continue to operate in full compliance with all relevant laws
and regulations,” Chevron spokesperson Bill Turenne said in a
statement.

Evanan Romero, a Houston-based oil consultant involved in the effort
to bring U.S. oil producers back to Venezuela, said in a text message
that Saturday’s events laid the groundwork for American oil
companies to return “very soon.”

Romero is part of a roughly 400-person committee, mostly made up of
former employees of the Venezuelan state oil company Petróleos de
Venezuela, that formed about a year ago to strategize about how to
revive the country’s oil industry under a new government.

The committee, which is not directly affiliated with opposition leader
María Corina Machado’s camp, is debating the role any new
government should have in the oil sector. Some members favor keeping
the industry under the control of the government while others contend
that international oil majors would return only under a free market
system, Romero said.

Ultimately, the “orderliness” in any transition will determine
U.S. investment and reentry in Venezuela, said Carrie Filipetti, who
was deputy assistant secretary for Cuba and Venezuela and the deputy
special representative for Venezuela at the State Department in
Trump’s first administration.

“If you were to see a disorderly transition, obviously I think that
would make it very challenging for American companies to enter
Venezuela,” said Filipetti, who is now executive director of
nonpartisan foreign policy group The Vandenberg Coalition. “It’s
not just about getting rid of Maduro. It’s also about making sure
that the legitimate opposition comes into power. ”

Richard Goldberg, who led the White House’s National Energy
Dominance Council until August, said the Trump administration could
offer financial incentives to coax companies back into Venezuela. That
could include the Export-Import Bank and the U.S. International
Development Finance Corp., whose remit Congress expanded in December,
underwriting investments to account for political and security risks.

Promoting U.S. investment in Venezuela would keep China — a major
consumer of Venezuela’s oil — out of the nation and cut off the
flow of the discounted crude that China buys from Venezuela’s ghost
fleets of tankers that skirt U.S. sanctions.

“There’s an incentive for the Americans to get there first and to
ensure it’s American companies at the forefront, and not anybody
else’s,” said Goldberg.

It’s unclear how much the Trump administration could accelerate
investment in Venezuela, said Landon Derentz, an energy analyst at the
Atlantic Council who worked in the Obama, Trump and Biden
administrations.

Many consider Venezuela a longer-term play given current low prices of
$50 per barrel oil and the huge capital investments needed to
modernize the infrastructure, Derentz said. But as U.S. shale oil
regions that have made the country the world’s leading oil producer
peter out over time, he said, it would become increasingly economical
to export Venezuelan heavy crude to the Gulf Coast refineries built
specifically to process it.

“Venezuela would be a crown jewel if the above-ground risk is
removed. I have companies saying let’s see where this lands,” said
Derentz, who served in Trump’s National Security Council during his
first term. “I don’t see anything that gives me the sense that
this is a ripe opportunity.”

MADURO, VENEZUELA, THE U.S.—AND THE OIL SHOCK CHINA CAN’T PRICE
INGÜNEY YILDIZFORBESJANUARY 3, 2026

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Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was captured by U.S. special
forces in Caracas early on January 3 following airstrikes and
explosions around the capital, according to multiple news outlets.
Within hours, tankers in the Caribbean started altering course. By
midday, the diesel crack looked like it was widening. This suggests
the market isn't pricing a global supply shock, but the specific risk
of a heavy sour crude squeeze.

That spread tells the whole story. Venezuela represents less than 1%
of global oil consumption, but its Merey 16 grade feeds refineries
with coking capacity that can't easily switch to light sweet barrels.

This operation raises profound questions about international law and
U.S. unilateralism. Critics point to potential violations of the UN
Charter's prohibition on force, echoing debates over the 2003 Iraq
invasion. Repercussions could include strained U.S.-Latin America
ties, accelerated migration from Venezuela, and tests of alliances for
Russia and China. These broader geopolitical shifts may reshape global
norms for years, overshadowing short-term market moves. Yet the energy
dimensions remain vital, as disrupted flows expose dependencies in an
already volatile crude landscape.

CHINA’S EXPOSURE HITS THREE SPECIFIC AREAS.

The first is financial: an estimated $17-19 billion in outstanding
principal from China Development Bank's oil-for-loans program, per
AidData research. That's the largest single-country commodity-backed
position in Beijing's portfolio out of the $60 billion extended since
2007.

The second is operational. Shandong’s independent refiners
configured coking units specifically for Venezuelan heavy crude, a
grade trading at deep discounts because Western buyers can’t touch
it. The third is strategic. Washington just showed it's willing to use
kinetic force to disrupt Chinese commodity supply chains in the
Americas.

Chevron’s joint ventures keep running under a renewed specific
license from Treasury, according to NPR. Data indicates U.S.-bound
exports of roughly 150,000 bpd in November 2025, per Reuters data.
Valero and Marathon have first call on those barrels. The downstream
risk for China is simple: Every Venezuelan barrel reaching American
shores is one Beijing must replace from a tighter market at full
price.

THE FEEDSTOCK CLIFF

Position managers at Shandong’s teapots face an immediate question:
Where do replacement barrels come from?

Venezuela's exports hit roughly 921,000 bpd in November 2025,
according to Reuters, with China taking about 80% of the total (some
746,000 bpd). These barrels often arrived via Malaysia’s
ship-to-ship transshipment hubs or through rebranding practices
designed to hide their origin. Reuters previously described traders
rebranding Venezuelan cargoes as “Brazilian” to bypass
transshipment steps.

That channel looks tighter and higher-friction than it did in late
2025. Treasury’s entity-specific designations, which name vessels by
IMO number, reduce plausible deniability. The threat environment alone
is enough to deter loadings and prompt diversions at the margin.

Substitutes exist, but none replicate the economics. It’s not
because Venezuela is unique, but because the replacement set is
limited by crude quality, freight and pipeline/tanker logistics.

Merey is genuinely heavy. Crude-profile data sources put it around the
mid-teens API (often cited around ~16.6). Merey crude profile Western
Canadian Select is also heavy and sour, widely described around the
low-20s API band (typically ~19–22 API). WCS crude profile Mexican
Maya similarly sits in a heavy-sour range; PMI describes Maya as heavy
at ~21–22 API. PMI on Maya

The price problem is that discount numbers are moving targets.
Differentials swing quickly based on freight, refinery runs and
sanctions friction. It’s safer to think in regimes: sanctioned
Venezuelan barrels have often cleared at meaningful discounts to
benchmarks, but any attempt to pin a tight range (like “$10–13
below Brent”) should be read as time-stamped rather than a stable
attribute.

Canadian heavy via the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion is a
plausible swing barrel since TMX adds 590,000 bpd of Pacific-facing
capacity from Alberta, per Reuters. But if Shandong refiners bid more
aggressively for Canadian cargoes, the WCS differential could narrow,
which raises feedstock costs and tightens supply for US Gulf Coast
competitors who also need heavy crude.

Put differently, Valero and Dongming Petrochemical are now competing
for the same Canadian molecules. Someone pays more.

THE CREDIT EXPOSURE

China Development Bank's Venezuela position looks more like a
structural write-down risk than a trading loss.

CDB extended over $60 billion since 2007, according to CSIS analysis,
secured by future oil shipments rather than sovereign guarantees. The
model worked when Venezuela produced 2.4 million bpd, but it broke
when output collapsed, falling to as low as 350,000 bpd in 2020 before
recovering to roughly 900,000-1.1 million bpd by late 2025, per OPEC
and PDVSA data.

CDB granted grace periods, accepted delayed shipments, and rolled over
principal. The outstanding balance stabilized at $17-19 billion under
assumptions that no longer hold. The Stimson Center notes that China
agreed to defer payments repeatedly as Venezuela's repayment capacity
eroded.

The collateral is underground, locked behind degraded upgraders, an
elevated maritime risk environment, and a transitional government that
may invoke odious debt doctrine to subordinate Chinese claims.

RECOVERY SCENARIOS:

Scenario A (45%): Pragmatic accommodation. Beijing quietly engages
transitional government, negotiates 40-50 cents on the dollar,
redirects teapot demand to Canadian and Iraqi grades. Financial loss
absorbed to preserve broader trading relationships.

Scenario B (35%): Extended standoff. Beijing refuses recognition,
teapots attempt continued sourcing despite vessel designations. U.S.
escalates to secondary sanctions on Chinese banks processing
Venezuelan-origin payments. Teapot margins collapse within six to nine
months.

Scenario C (20%): Venezuelan collapse. Transitional government fails,
military factions fragment, production drops below 600,000 bpd.
Neither Chinese debt recovery nor American reconstruction succeeds.
Heavy sour exits global market for years.

ACTOR CALCULUS

Shandong independents built their margin on sanctions arbitrage by
purchasing Venezuelan crude at deep discounts. That model is finished.
Dongming, Hengli and peers face margin compression until feedstock
slates reconfigure. Some won't survive the transition.

State majors Sinopec and CNPC maintained a deliberate distance from
Venezuelan exposure; scholars describe this as a "lender's trap" China
created for itself. They now face political pressure to absorb teapot
shortfalls, meaning state balance sheets essentially subsidize private
operators' stranded positions.

CDB must choose between marking down the portfolio (signaling to
Ecuador, Pakistan, and other BRI borrowers that commodity-backed loans
can't survive regime change) or extending indefinitely (carrying
non-performing assets). Neither option looks attractive.

Beijing leadership condemned the "hegemonic" intervention but needs
economic stability. Escalating with Washington over Venezuelan
principle invites secondary sanctions targeting Chinese banks' dollar
clearing. Pragmatism suggests quiet accommodation, even if it
contradicts public rhetoric.

CHINESE DIPLOMATS ARRIVED IN VENEZUELA FOR TALKS WITH MADURO HOURS
BEFORE US STRIKES — AND ARE STILL THERE: REPORTSARAH
RUMPFMEDIAITEJANUARY 3, 2026

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Hours before Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was captured during
a U.S. military operation, he met with Chinese diplomats, who are
reportedly still in Caracas.

News broke in the wee hours of Saturday morning that President Donald
Trump’s administration had conducted air strikes in Caracas,
Venezuela’s capital city, captured Maduro and his wife, Cilia
Flores, and brought them to the U.S.

The strikes sparked loud criticism for multiple reasons, chiefly
because Trump had not sought authorization from Congress beforehand
and because of his pardon in December for Juan Orlando Hernandez, the
former president of Honduras who was convicted of drug trafficking.
Others have cited Maduro’s brutal oppression of his own people and
how he seized power for a third term in July 2024 despite election
results showing opposition leader Edmundo González had won.

Friday evening, Maduro met with several Chinese officials, including
Qiu Xiaoqi, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy for Latin
America and the Caribbean; Lan Hu, China’s ambassador to Venezuela;
Liu Bo, Director of the Latin America and Caribbean Department of the
Chinese Foreign Ministry; Wang Hao, Deputy Director-General of the
same department; Liu Zhen, regional attaché; and several other top
diplomats and CCP officials.

 

Maduro shared several photos and videos from his meeting with the
Chinese officials on his Instagram page.

“Had a pleasant meeting with Qui Xiaoqi, Special Envoy of President
Xi Jinping,” the caption read (Spanish translation to English by
Instagram). “We reaffirm our commitment to the strategic
relationship that advances and strengthens in various areas for the
construction of the world #Multipolar of development and peace. China
and Venezuela! United!”

“Received President Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy for Latin America
and the Caribbean, Qiu Xiaoqi,” read the caption on the second post
(again, translation by Instagram). “A fraternal encounter that
reaffirms the strong ties of brotherhood and friendship between China
and Venezuela. Every Test and Every Time!”

In a social media post, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
condemned the “U.S.’s blatant use of force against a sovereign
state and action against its president.”

“Such hegemonic acts of the U.S. seriously violate international law
and Venezuela’s sovereignty, and threaten peace and security in
Latin America and the Caribbean region. China firmly opposes it,”
the post continued. “We call on the U.S. to abide by international
law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and stop
violating other countries’ sovereignty and security.”

Because of the timing of the meeting and the early morning U.S.
strikes, it is widely believed that the Chinese diplomats were still
in Caracas during the strike and capture of Maduro, as multiple
reporters following the region reported. Thus far, no reports have
said the Chinese diplomats were known to have left before the strikes.

Laura Loomer, the far-right activist and staunch Trump ally who
recently became a member of the Pentagon Press corps, was among those
who posted reports that the Chinese delegation was “still in
Venezuela” during the strikes. Loomer has garnered more than her
share of controversy over the years but has managed to cling to her
spot in Trump’s inner circle and is known frequently speak with the
president.

 

🚨 TRUMP SENDS STRONG MESSAGE TO CHINA’S XI JINPING AS CHINESE
DELEGATION IS STILL IN VENEZUELA AFTER MEETINGS WITH MADURO TODAY
🚨 Just hours before US Airstrikes in Venezuela past midnight today
, @NicolasMaduro
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Chinese delegation led by Qiu Xiaoqi, China's Special…
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— Laura Loomer (@LauraLoomer) January 3, 2026
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The post Chinese Diplomats Arrived in Venezuela for Talks with Maduro
Hours Before US Strikes — And Are Still There: Report first appeared
on Mediaite.

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