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In preparation for the publication of my annual predictions on January 7th, I asked Notion AI (a blend of ChatGPT and Claude) to tell me how well I’ve done over the past 11 years. Here’s its response — unedited, and complete with links to its sources.
Here’s a concise, “synthesized” view of your annual predictions over roughly the last decade, with an emphasis on what actually played out.
1. What the annual predictions are
Across LinkedIn, your site, and now Substack, you’ve been publishing “X Global Developments To Watch Over the Next Five Years” each year since at least 2015.[1] [ [link removed] ][2] [ [link removed] ][3] [ [link removed] ][4] [ [link removed] ][5] [ [link removed] ][6] [ [link removed] ]
Each list is framed as a five‑year look‑ahead, not a one‑year forecast, which matters when judging “hits.”
Broadly, the lists consistently emphasized:
Geopolitical realignment (US–China, Russia, Europe’s cohesion, NATO, populism)
Debt, monetary policy, and asset bubbles
Technological shifts (AI, cyber, telecoms bifurcation)
Supply chains and de‑globalization
Pandemics and global health risk
Climate and resource constraints (energy, water, food)
2. Major themes that clearly did materialize
Below I group the clearest “hits” by theme rather than by year; in most cases you flagged these dynamics before they were mainstream.
A. US–China tension and bifurcation of the global system
In the 2019–2023 prediction cycles you repeatedly highlighted a de facto “Cold War II” dynamic and the emergence of two economic/technology blocs led by the US and China.[1] [ [link removed] ][6] [ [link removed] ][3] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
Systematic US export controls on advanced chips and manufacturing equipment.
Growing restrictions and scrutiny on Chinese apps and investments in the US and allied countries.
“Friend‑shoring” and “de‑risking” supply chains away from China by US, EU, Japan, etc.
Explicit language from policymakers and strategists that now openly frames US–China as the central strategic rivalry.
This is one of the strongest, clearly vindicated themes.
B. Resurgence of great‑power / Cold War‑style rivalry
Earlier lists also projected a renewed great‑power competition involving Russia, China, and the US, with nuclear and military buildups noted as likely.[1] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO expansion, and re‑militarization in Europe.
Accelerated modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals by US, Russia, and China.
Broader talk in policy circles of “Cold War II” – almost exactly your phrasing in earlier pieces.[1] [ [link removed] ]
C. Populism, nationalism, and political volatility
Your 2016–2024 pieces consistently emphasized populist/nationalist waves and anti‑establishment politics as a structural force.[1] [ [link removed] ][2] [ [link removed] ][4] [ [link removed] ][5] [ [link removed] ][7] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
Brexit, Trump’s rise (and later Trump 2.0/MAGA persistence), Bolsonaro, Modi, Meloni, Le Pen’s National Rally strengthening, and parallel trends across Latin America and Europe.
Persistent “anti‑incumbent” sentiment highlighted in your 2025 “25 Global Developments…” review of the ultimate election year, with many ruling parties punished at the polls.[7] [ [link removed] ]
While you were hardly alone in seeing populism, you were early in treating it as a continuing global development rather than a one‑off shock.
D. Pandemics and global health shocks
In the 2015 list you speculated that Ebola would be contained but that another, potentially airborne epidemic could emerge.[1] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
COVID‑19, an airborne respiratory disease, arrived within that five‑year forecast window (2015–2020).
COVID then catalyzed exactly the kind of global economic, political, and social disruption you had been flagging in the broader lists.
This looks, with hindsight, like one of the more striking “on‑theme” calls, even if it was framed as a possibility rather than a precise prediction.
E. Cyber conflict and state cyber‑armies
As far back as the mid‑2010s you flagged the rise of state‑backed “military‑like cyber teams” and warned that such forces might not be able to prevent a destabilizing attack on critical infrastructure.[1] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
Rapid growth in US, Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean offensive and defensive cyber units.
Major cyber incidents affecting pipelines, hospitals, energy grids, government agencies, and corporations around the world.
Cyber operations now routinely described by governments as a primary domain of conflict.
The broad contours of that scenario clearly materialized, even if no single “Lights Out”‑style event fully matched Ted Koppel’s nightmare.
F. Inflation, then the risk of deflation and financial instability
You discussed debt, easy money, and the risk of monetary missteps for many years. Later, in 2023, you wrote explicitly about the risk that deflation could become a bigger concern than inflation once the post‑COVID surge faded.[8] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
A vicious post‑COVID inflation spike, followed by aggressive global tightening.
Bank stresses and failures (e.g., regional banks in the US) tied in part to rate‑shock in bond portfolios.
Now, widespread concern about disinflation/deflation risks in some major economies, with markets oscillating between inflation and deflation fears, very much in line with your “don’t fixate only on inflation” warning.
More broadly, you were consistently right that monetary policy and debt dynamics would be central to the decade’s macro story.
G. De‑globalization and supply‑chain rewiring
From early on you flagged that globalization could go into reverse, with supply chains re‑routed and trade blocs re‑forming.[4] [ [link removed] ][3] [ [link removed] ][1] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
Tariffs and trade wars between US and China.
COVID‑era supply shocks leading to “resilience” and “security” becoming central in supply‑chain strategy.
Active re‑shoring, near‑shoring, and friend‑shoring by multinationals and governments.
Your framing of “retreat of globalization” and emergence of regional blocs has held up well.
H. Technology platforms, AI, and telecoms bifurcation
You highlighted telecom platforms and tech infrastructure as likely drivers of a split global economy, and more recently devoted major space to AI and its geopolitical/economic implications.[1] [ [link removed] ][9] [ [link removed] ]
What transpired:
5G and network equipment suppliers became strategic issues (Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, etc.) with explicit security concerns baked into policy.
Export controls on AI chips and foundational models, and debates over who controls cloud and compute.
AI became a front‑page global issue, with exactly the kind of “uncertainty plus opportunity” framing you applied in your 2023–2025 writing.[9] [ [link removed] ]
I. Climate, energy, and resource politics
Over multiple years you flagged:
Energy and commodity volatility
Tension between climate policy and energy security
The political and economic implications of those swings[1] [ [link removed] ][6]... [ [link removed] ]

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