When “John 3:16” Becomes a Crime

A retired Baptist pastor in Northern Ireland, Clive Johnston, just sat through a trial for preaching a brief Gospel message near Causeway Hospital in Coleraine. The judge didn’t rule. Instead, he asked for more written arguments and pushed the case to March, meaning a 76-year-old grandfather remains under criminal charge because he read Scripture in public within sight of a hospital. If that doesn’t raise your blood pressure about the state of speech and religion in the UK, it should. Christian Institute

What did he supposedly do wrong? Johnston is charged under Northern Ireland’s Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) Act 2023, which makes it an offense to *influence, directly or indirectly, anyone seeking or providing abortions inside a zone stretching roughly 100–250 meters around a facility. England and Wales implemented a similar nationwide ban last year under Public Order Act 2023, section 9, which imposes 150-meter “safe access zones.” Intent to influence, or even being reckless about whether your speech might influence, can be enough. Government guidance says mere presence in a zone isn’t a crime, but it’s the police and prosecutors who decide when “presence” turns into “influence.” That’s a hairline distinction with a chilling effect.

In short: the UK has written into law a crime of influence around certain topics and places. That’s not “protecting access.” That’s policing persuasion.

The constitutional divide: U.S. vs. U.K.

Here’s the difference most Americans don’t appreciate.

• United States. The First Amendment treats public sidewalks and streets as the classic venues for speech, including religious speech. Government can impose content-neutral time, place, and manner rules, but broad, speech-suppressing “buffers” rarely survive. In McCullen v. Coakley (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Massachusetts’ 35-foot fixed buffer around abortion clinics as not narrowly tailored to the state’s interests. The Court stressed that counseling and leafletting on public sidewalks are protected, and the state has to try less restrictive tools first. Earlier, in Hill v. Colorado (2000), the Court allowed a much narrower 8-foot “bubble” near clinics, but McCullen signaled that sweeping cordons are out of bounds. And the Court has been hostile to content-based rules (Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 2015) and to forced ideological scripts (NIFLA v. Becerra, 2018). Put plainly: preaching John 3:16 on a sidewalk would almost certainly be protected here.

• United Kingdom. There’s no First Amendment. Rights flow through the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 9 and 10), which expressly allow limitations “necessary in a democratic society” for things like public order or the protection of others’ rights. That balancing test invites Parliament to carve out entire zones where persuasive speech becomes a criminal offense, and invites police to decide when “influence” has occurred. Unsurprisingly, the UK now criminalizes a broad array of expression, offline and online, including “stirring up” offenses under the Public Order Act 1986 and a lattice of communications crimes updated by the Online Safety Act 2023.

That’s the core contrast: America’s default is “speech first.” Britain’s default is “balance it away.”

Why this case is a canary in the coal mine

Defenders of buffer-zone laws say they protect patients from harassment. But look at where the line is being drawn. Johnston’s sermon reportedly referenced John 3:16—no signage, no obstruction, no targeted harassment, yet prosecutors claim it could indirectly “influence” someone considering abortion. Once the government accepts “influence” as a harm, virtually any persuasive speech is suspect. Today it’s abortion; tomorrow it’s gender clinics, immigration offices, political rallies, or any other “sensitive” service. That’s not a slippery slope argument, it’s how government works once it’s licensed to outlaw persuasion in the name of order.

And this isn’t happening in a vacuum. The UK has been expanding the policing of expression for years, from “grossly offensive” posts to new Online Safety offenses. Police and prosecutors may promise restraint, but arrest statistics and charging guidance tell the real story: the state has both the tools and the appetite to patrol speech.

What Americans should learn from this

1. Never concede the concept of “crime by influence.” The entire purpose of speech is to influence. The moment we accept “influence” as harm, free speech becomes a privilege carved up by topic, zone, and mood of the day. McCullen is a reminder that even when conduct on sidewalks is messy or unpopular, the cure cannot be to outlaw normal persuasion.

2. Keep restrictions narrow, content-neutral, and tied to actual conduct. If someone blocks an entrance, threatens, or harasses, arrest them, for that. Don’t criminalize the quiet act of offering words on a public street. That’s the logic of the Court’s time-place-manner framework and why broad buffers keep failing here.

3. Resist the “public order” catch-all. In the UK, Articles 9 and 10’s limitation clauses empower lawmakers to trade liberty for a promise of tranquility. Americans should reject that bargain outright. The First Amendment is supposed to protect speech that “offends, shocks, or disturbs.” That’s the point.

4. Defend religious speech as speech. Courts don’t (and shouldn’t) give religion a gag order. If the state can force pregnancy centers to recite government lines or criminalize prayerful counseling as “interference,” there’s no limiting principle left.

Bottom line

Pastor Johnston’s ordeal shows how far a Western democracy will go once it normalizes zones where persuasion itself is forbidden. That is a categorical break from the American tradition. The U.S. has plenty of problems, but the First Amendment still draws a bright line on public sidewalks: you can speak, even about matters others find uncomfortable, and the government must meet the highest burden before it can push you back.

Britain chose a different path. Let’s not follow it.