Previously this year, I wrote about Europe’s Trump dilemma: still formally treaty ally, the US is acting more often than not in a way that undermines European security. Especially given Ukraine’s need for US air defence systems (mainly Patriot), humouring Trump was distasteful but necessary. Europe was able to avert much worse outcomes and limit Trump’s ability to do harm by patiently manoeuvring him back in line after each outburst. However, the grovelling strategy always had an expiration date. That date has now definitively passed, with the latest peace plan shenanigans and the publication of the new US National Security Strategy (NSS) yesterday.
The US NSS is in its characteristic ugliness actually a useful document from a European perspective. It codifies in policy, in black and white, what has been evident all year long: Trump and his people are openly hostile to Europe. Once it is spelled out in the NSS, European leaders cannot ignore or explain the fact away anymore. Any hope to sit this out and for things to go back to the old normal looks increasingly ludicrous and politically unviable.
Furthermore, the Trump administration’s eagerness to interfere in European affairs in favour of the far right has promising potential to backfire. As I wrote in February, that was a likely outcome of the approach most fervently driven by JD Vance. Especially claims in the NSS such as “(a) large European majority wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy, in large measure because of those governments’ subversion of democratic processes” are just the kind of good stuff that may well trigger an anti-reaction among those “patriotic European parties” that this US administration seeks to support. Given Trump’s pretty uniform unpopularity in Europe - with the highest approval rating in Italy at 28 percent in a recent YouGov poll - any uninvited “(c)ultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations” may well end up damaging the European far right.
What comes to the hysteria about mass immigration, it is almost a bit amusing that the NSS mentions the following:
“Over the long term, it is more than plausible that within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the United States, in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.”
…because that is a longstanding European concern with regard to the US and its commitment to NATO. This is some Russian-style projection and of one’s own issues onto others.
Perhaps fourth time’s a charm: Europeans should by now have enough data on the Trump administration’s repeatedly failed efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine so that they can start crafting a more proactive strategy with the confidence that Trump will not be able to coerce Ukraine into just any kind of deal. The main issue is probably that Trump and his people are trying to end “the Ukraine war” without understanding that it is Russia’s war in Ukraine. On the other hand, it has become sufficiently clear that any amount of “Trump whispering” won’t fundamentally change the administration’s course on Ukraine or Europe more broadly. The forces pulling the other way within the administration are strong enough to withstand European efforts at good faith cooperation.
Europeans know that Russia hasn’t shown any signs of serious willingness to negotiate in good faith, so it is understandable that working on a peace (or even ceasefire) plan has not been the main priority in Europe. But the fact that the Trump administration at regular intervals throws a curveball at Ukraine and Europe, and every time Europe looks equally stupid, with only a crisis management strategy but nothing of substance of its own to offer. By the way, I was looking for sources with the search words “Russia rejects US peace plan/ ceasefire deal” and found media articles from December 2024, January 2025, March 2025, April 2025 (twice), May 2025, and August 2025. And that was just a quick Google search. So my faith in Russia’s continued efforts to thwart any efforts to end the war seems justified.
But the European counterproposals are every time a bit lazy, too. Europe keeps firmly rejecting territorial concessions, limitations to Ukraine’s defence forces, or any provisions on Ukraine’s future EU and/or NATO membership without consulting the organisations, as they should. All of these are obviously unacceptable conditions for Russia - because no one has so far made a real effort to make Russia accept them. It is therefore evident that when European leaders comment on the latest “peace plan” that is thrown at them, and talk about European red lines, they are signalling to the US – trying to remind Trump once again what goes and what doesn’t – not to Russia. Europeans know very well that their insistence on Ukraine’s rights will be rejected by Russia, until the situations becomes dire enough for the Kremlin to have to start making concessions. But just waiting for that to magically happen is not a strategy, and Ukrainians don’t have all the time in the world.
That is why Europe needs to finally seize the initiative and stop wasting time trying to manage Trump. If Europeans themselves drive the agenda, together with Ukraine, they will not constantly be caught off guard and need to manage yet another crisis. It is therefore time for Europe to formulate clear conditions under which real negotiations can take place. If Europeans made a concerted – and professional – diplomatic effort to communicate to Russia not only “as long as it takes” but what it really takes, it could actually lead somewhere.
And, even more importantly: start squeezing Russia to inspire greater interest in actual negotiations. Finally mobilizing the frozen Russian assets is crucial in this regard. The clock is ticking ahead of the European Council meeting on 18 December, which is expected to be the last possibility to solve the problem on time. Only that way Europeans can nip future US “peace plans” in the bud and force Russia to stop playing around.
Minna Ålander is Associate Fellow, Chatham House | Non-resident Fellow, CEPA | Senior Fellow, Frivärld. @minnalander
The Northern Flank features regularly irregular longer or shorter notes, from historic trivia to current issues concerning the Nordic-Baltic-Arctic region and wider European security. Occasional nukes may feature. Probably not the most uplifting content, given the general world wide vibes. If this didn’t deter you, subscribe to get full access to the newsletter and publication archives.
