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A note from the editor, Ryan Costello: Thank you, Iran Unfiltered and Human Rights Tracker readers, for your continued interest in our efforts to shine a light on Iranian politics, society, and human rights issues. If you have found this newsletter to be helpful and informative, please consider making a donation today so that we can continue our work to provide this critical resource. Every week, my colleagues on the NIAC team closely track events in Iran, translating important developments into English and sharing them with you, free of bias. Any support you can provide would be greatly appreciated and help us prepare for the important year to come.
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Please also see our latest Human Rights Tracker below on Kurdish Activist Varisheh Moradi.
Week of December 8, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
In a significant development within Iran’s economic policy landscape, 180 of the country’s most prominent economists, academics, and social science researchers have issued an open letter to President Masoud Pezeshkian, urging the government to pursue deep, transparent, and equitable economic reforms. Signed by leading figures such as Masoud Nili, Seyed Mohammad Tabibian, Mousse Ghaneinejad, Masoud Roghani Zanjani, Mohammad Satarifar, Tahmasb Mazaheri, Valiollah Seif, Hossein Abdeh-Tabrizi, Pirouz Hanachi, Abbas Akhoundi, Alinaghi Mashayekhi, Farhad Nili, and Akbar Komijani, the letter argues that Iran has reached a point where fiscal justice, budget transparency, and the elimination of inefficient expenditures are no longer optional but essential.
The signatories emphasize that price reforms—especially the adjustment of gasoline and energy prices—can only be considered just if they are accompanied by simultaneous cuts in wasteful state spending and a clear restructuring of government budget priorities. They warn that the burden of economic reforms must not fall solely on low-income households, insisting that support mechanisms and compensatory structures must be designed to minimize pressure on vulnerable groups without returning to costly and ineffective policies of the past.
In a pointed message to the administration, the letter states that the public has the right to know exactly how new revenues from price reforms will be spent. The authors argue that if citizens are expected to endure higher costs, then the government must demonstrate—clearly and transparently—which expenditures are being reduced, which budget lines are being eliminated, and how saved resources will be redirected toward essential public goods such as education, healthcare, and public transportation.
The economists also underscore that budget reform is not only an economic demand but a moral and national obligation, recalling the constitutional vision of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, which sought fairness and rationality in public finance. They stress that Iran’s current budget structure is weighed down by non-essential institutions that consume public resources without providing meaningful services to society, and that eliminating these costs is both justified and necessary.
While the letter has sparked widespread discussion, some analysts argue that its focus on cultural and non-essential institutions addresses only a small share of public expenditures. Critics note that Iran’s main fiscal burdens lie in massive pension fund deficits, opaque quasi-state companies, and extensive tax exemptions—issues largely absent from the letter. According to recent parliamentary research, tax exemptions alone amount to nearly 2,200 trillion tomans, almost equaling the government’s total projected tax revenues for 2025. Additionally, around one-fifth of Iran’s public budget is absorbed by financially troubled pension funds, many of which rely heavily on state support due to decades of mismanagement and poor investment performance.
The report also highlights that more than 3,000 state-controlled or quasi-state companies operate with little transparency, contributing to structural imbalances in the economy. Despite their enormous financial footprint, the performance and efficiency of these companies remain largely unexamined, with many consistently reporting losses far beyond what is indicated in official budget drafts. Experts argue that the continued lack of oversight in these sectors significantly undermines fiscal stability, economic productivity, and public trust.
Nevertheless, the letter’s central message remains clear: Iran’s economic difficulties cannot be resolved through price hikes alone. The authors call on the government to demonstrate its commitment to fairness by cutting its own unnecessary costs before asking citizens to absorb more financial pressure. They frame this as a test of political will, stating that now is the moment for the state to prove that justice, efficiency, and transparency are not merely slogans but governing principles.
The open letter represents one of the most coordinated and high-profile interventions by Iranian economists in recent years, reflecting a broad professional consensus that the country stands at a critical juncture where structural reform is unavoidable. Whether the Pezeshkian administration will adopt these recommendations—and whether such reforms can overcome entrenched institutional resistance—remains to be seen. But the authors are unequivocal: Iran’s path out of its current economic crisis requires both courage and clarity, from the government as well as the public institutions that shape national policy.
The past week has sharply illustrated how deeply the Middle East’s geopolitical turbulence remains intertwined with Iran’s regional posture, diplomatic maneuvering, and strategic competition with the United States. Developments from Beirut to Washington, from trilateral talks with China and Saudi Arabia to hardening rhetoric from President Donald Trump, reveal an increasingly complex environment in which Iran simultaneously faces new pressures and fresh opportunities.
A striking diplomatic dispute unfolded between Tehran and Beirut after Lebanon’s foreign minister, Yousef Raji, publicly declined Abbas Araghchi’s invitation to visit Tehran, citing “current conditions” and suggesting the meeting be held in a neutral venue. Rajji insisted that deeper cooperation must be founded on respect for sovereignty and non-interference—remarks widely interpreted as an indirect reference to Hezbollah, Iran’s closest regional ally and the most powerful non-state armed actor in Lebanon. Araghchi expressed surprise at the refusal but later announced that he would accept Beirut’s invitation to visit Lebanon, underscoring Tehran’s openness to engagement while implicitly questioning the need for a neutral location between two states with full diplomatic ties. This exchange comes as Lebanon faces mounting pressure to disarm Hezbollah, with Lebanese officials acknowledging that such a process is impossible without Iran’s approval.
At the same time, Iran participated in the latest round of the China–Iran–Saudi trilateral committee, an initiative established after Beijing brokered the 2023 thaw between Riyadh and Tehran. All parties reaffirmed their commitment to expanding economic cooperation and maintaining channels for regional de-escalation. For Iran, the trilateral framework offers a platform to manage tensions with Saudi Arabia during overlapping crises in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, while strengthening Tehran’s eastward diplomatic alignment under China’s mediation. Despite positive public statements, deep mistrust persists, rooted in divergent security priorities, competition over regional influence, and unresolved questions regarding Iran’s network of aligned armed groups.
The Trump administration also issued a new National Security Strategy. The document marks a significant intent to reorient U.S. foreign policy, placing primary emphasis on China and the Western Hemisphere while relegating the Middle East to a secondary strategic priority. Yet despite this deprioritization, Iran is repeatedly identified in the document as the central destabilizing actor in the region. The strategy frames Iran not as a partner for diplomacy but as a challenge to be managed, deterred, and contained. In this, there is significant continuity with prior administrations, yet it stands in potential conflict with the apparent desire to deprioritize the Middle East.
President Donald Trump reinforced this message during an Oval Office briefing, declaring that Iran has been “severely weakened” following the U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June and is “no longer the country it once was.” He claimed that the attacks “created the conditions for peace” and argued that Iran now “wants to reach a deal.” Trump warned that if Tehran attempts to rebuild its destroyed nuclear infrastructure, the United States would “destroy it again.” His remarks came after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei condemned U.S. policy, portraying the United States and its allies as the center of a broad hostile front arrayed against Iran.
Tensions escalated further when Iran filed a formal protest at the United Nations after the United States blocked the continued employment of three staff members at Iran’s Permanent Mission in New York. The U.S. also announced the seizure of a ship near Venezuela that has reportedly carried both Iranian and Venezuelan oil. In Washington, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth praised the June attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure as a textbook demonstration of decisive American power under the Weinberger Doctrine—maximum force without prolonged entanglement—while warning that Iran “remains a threat in the Middle East.”
Meanwhile, Araghchi signaled conditional willingness to resume nuclear negotiations, stating that Iran is ready to reengage if the United States adopts a “balanced approach” that respects Iran’s right to uranium enrichment. He warned that nuclear sites struck by U.S. and Israeli attacks may now be contaminated with radioactive material, complicating IAEA inspections. Tehran continues to insist that uranium enrichment is its sovereign right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while Western governments demand immediate transparency regarding enriched uranium stockpiles and access to damaged facilities.
The Trump administration’s strategy document situates these tensions within a broader regional realignment. With rising U.S. energy independence, Washington no longer views the Middle East as a central arena for military or political engagement. Instead, the strategy envisions limited but targeted cooperation with regional partners on energy diversification, supply chain security, artificial intelligence, nuclear energy, and advanced defense technologies. It also explicitly rejects previous U.S. attempts to reshape the region’s political systems, calling instead for pragmatic partnerships that “accept Middle Eastern governments as they are.”
In this rapidly transforming environment, Iran finds itself navigating simultaneous pressures. In Lebanon, its influence is contested more publicly than at any time in recent years. In the Gulf, trilateral diplomacy with China and Saudi Arabia offers new opportunities but remains fragile. With the United States, Iran confronts a doctrine that minimizes the region’s strategic importance yet continues to cast Iran as the core security challenge requiring deterrence rather than diplomacy. At the same time, Iran faces ongoing nuclear oversight demands, maritime confrontations, and persistent economic constraints.
Taken together, the developments of the past week portray a Middle East in flux—an environment where traditional power structures are shifting but no new stabilizing framework has yet emerged. Iran remains positioned at the center of nearly every major regional fault line: Lebanon’s sovereignty crisis, nuclear negotiations, Gulf diplomacy, U.S. strategic planning, and broader Middle Eastern security dynamics. How Tehran manages these overlapping pressures will play a decisive role in shaping the future balance of power in the region.
The death of Mashhad-based human rights lawyer Khosro Alikordi continues to draw widespread attention as new developments leak out. Narges Mohammadi, the prominent Iranian human rights activist, along with several others were also arrested during the seventh-day memorial for Alikordi, adding a new dimension to the unfolding situation.
Alikordi, known for representing numerous political detainees—including families of Abolfazl Adinezadeh and Fatemeh Sepehri—was found deceased in his office last week. Limited early information led to extensive speculation online, including claims that surveillance cameras at his office had been confiscated by security forces. Police also imposed security restrictions at the location where his body was discovered.
Officials in Razavi Khorasan Province stated that the Forensic Medicine Organization determined the cause of death to be a heart attack. On December 12, the Prosecutor’s Office in Mashhad released CCTV footage said to be recorded inside Alikordi’s office, showing him reviewing his phone before collapsing from his chair. According to Deputy Prosecutor Mohammadreza Dashtban, the footage supports the conclusion of a sudden medical event. Dashtban also stated that Alikordi’s brother confirmed his history of heart disease and use of medication. The Alikordi family has not yet commented publicly on the released footage.
These official statements were issued after widespread discussion and skepticism on social media, where some users questioned earlier reports or referenced contradictory information. Following the release of the footage by the Prosecutor’s Office, reactions remained divided, with some considering the video clarifying, while others noted that requests for access to all security recordings were still unresolved.
During the seventh-day memorial ceremony in Mashhad, tensions escalated. Reports indicated that a large crowd had attended the ceremony and that some of the speakers, including Mohammadi and Sepideh Gholian, had made comments critical of the government. Security forces confronted participants, leading to several violent arrests. The family of Narges Mohammadi reported her arrest, stating that she had been detained along with several activists who were present at the ceremony. According to the Narges Mohammadi Foundation, those arrested included Gholian, Hasti Amiri, Pouran Nazemi, Alieh Motallebzadeh, and others.
Ghazal Abdollahi, daughter of Alieh Motallebzadeh, told BBC Persian that two men—Asadollah Fahimi and Akbar Amini—were also detained. Political analyst Taghi Rahmani, Mohammadi’s husband, confirmed her arrest and described it as “violent,” adding that Mohammadi’s brother, present at the ceremony, had witnessed the confrontation. Rahmani described the security forces’ handling of participants as “contrary to human rights standards” and characterized the arrests as a form of “retaliation.” It remains unclear which security agency carried out the detentions.
Alikordi, 46, was buried last week in Sabzevar under a heavy security presence, with a large crowd attending the funeral. His death prompted strong reactions from families seeking justice in previous cases as well as from civil society figures. Some questioned the official account of a heart attack, while others emphasized the need for transparency in light of earlier conflicting reports. With the release of the CCTV footage by the Prosecutor’s Office, alongside calls for full access to all available evidence and concerns raised over the arrests at the memorial ceremony, discussions surrounding both the cause of Alikordi’s death and the events that followed remain ongoing.
NIAC urges additional transparency surrounding the death of Alikordi, and calls for the immediate release of all those arrested at Alikordi’s memorial – including Mohammadi, Gholian, Amiri, Nazemi, Motallebzadeh, Fahimi and Amini. Accusations of violence against those detained must be fully investigated, and any perpetrators of brutality at a memorial service held fully accountable.
Iran has enacted a new law designed to ease travel and strengthen legal protections for Iranians living abroad, marking one of the most comprehensive policy shifts impacting the diaspora in recent years. The “Law for the Support of Iranians Abroad,, approved by Parliament and confirmed by the Guardian Council, is now fully binding across government institutions.
The legislation requires state agencies to streamline a wide range of services for expatriates, including passport facilitation, online judicial access, emergency support, investment assistance, and integration into the national smart-services platform. Officials describe the law as a structured effort to replace past security-based perceptions with an approach centered on opportunity and rights.
In recent years, the arrest of dual citizens—often on charges related to national security—has drawn international criticism and complicated Iran’s relations with Western governments. Several of these cases became matters of diplomatic negotiation or prisoner exchanges, creating deep uncertainty for Iranians abroad who contemplate travel back to the country. Multiple administrations have issued statements of welcome toward the diaspora returning, yet continued arrests have contributed to fears abroad. The U.S. State Department also publishes a travel guidance warning Iranians against travel to Iran under any circumstances due to the risks of political arrest. The underlying fears are seen as a driving force behind the adoption of this new law.
A key feature of the new framework is a pre-travel clearance system. Iranians abroad may now submit their information through a national platform to determine whether any legal obstacles—such as debts, financial disputes, inheritance claims, judicial cases, or security-related concerns—could lead to restrictions during their stay in Iran. A five-agency committee reviews each request, and if no issues are found, the applicant should receive an official “green light” certificate.
Crucially, if a traveler receives this clearance, no Iranian authority is supposed to be permitted to arrest, detain, or initiate proceedings against them at any point during their time inside Iran. The law goes further by introducing accountability measures: officials who violate a valid clearance certificate may be prosecuted under Grade 6 disciplinary penalties, which can include suspension, fines, and other judicial consequences.
Supporters argue that the law is designed to restore peace of mind for Iranians abroad—particularly dual nationals—who have avoided travel due to fears of unexpected legal or security complications. Iranian officials involved in drafting the law emphasize that over 98% of Iranians abroad have no security issues, and that negative perceptions were exacerbated by external political narratives.
The legislation also includes additional reforms, such as allowing individuals who left Iran illegally before the law’s enactment to return without facing punishment, and updating century-old provisions to protect the property rights of dual-national Iranians inside the country. Still, analysts caution that it is unclear how effectively this law will build confidence among Iranians abroad, given the history of politically sensitive arrests and the broad discretion previously exercised by various agencies. U.S. officials have condemned the arrest of New York-based Kamran Hekmati earlier this year, and reports indicate other American dual nationals may currently be held by Iran. Observers note that the law’s impact will depend largely on transparent implementation and consistent interagency compliance.
Nevertheless, Iranian officials present the law as part of a long-term strategy to rebuild trust with the diaspora. They argue that Iran’s global community of citizens represents a significant cultural, professional, and economic asset, and that this legal framework is meant to support their mobility, engagement, and contributions to the country’s future.
The Kish Marathon, one of Iran’s largest public sporting events, has become the center of a national controversy after authorities announced a judicial case against its organizers, citing the “widespread presence of women without mandatory hijab” during the race. What began as a festive mass-participation event has quickly transformed into a flashpoint exposing the growing divide between hardline judicial institutions pushing for stricter hijab enforcement and the Pezeshkian administration, which has openly resisted coercive approaches.
The marathon—held on Friday, December 5—included three race distances and separate groups of male and female runners. Organizers estimated 5,000 participants, and tourism officials reported that over 25,000 visitors traveled to Kish Island for the event. Images circulating online showing women running with looser or non-compliant clothing prompted swift criticism from conservative media and officials who described the event as a violation of Iran’s public decency rules.
Shortly after the event, the Prosecutor of Kish Island announced that a criminal case had been opened against all organizers, both government-affiliated and private. He declared that the marathon had “violated regulations” and “harmed public morality”, promising that judicial action would be “strict and without leniency.” Two individuals—one from the Kish Free Zone Organization and one from the private organizing company—were detained, though details of the charges remain undisclosed. Judicial restrictions now bar one detainee from public-sector employment and the other from sports management.
Iran’s Track and Field Federation distanced itself from the marathon. Federation President Ehsan Haddadi accused the Kish Free Zone of failing to coordinate with the federation “despite repeated warnings.” Conservative outlets such as Tasnim News Agency framed the event as “norm-breaking” and claimed that organizers ignored dress-code regulations.
Organizers disputed these claims. Payam Dibaj, the marathon director, insisted that all required permits had been issued by the Kish Security Council, the Free Zone Organization, and the Sports Department, and that the event complied with national procedures. He dismissed the federation’s objections as financially motivated, noting that every relevant authority except the federation had approved the event.
The marathon controversy comes at a moment when Iran’s political establishment is deeply divided over how the mandatory hijab law should be enforced. Hardline authorities—including Chief Justice Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei—have pushed for tougher measures, warning that the judiciary will act decisively against “promoters of unveiling and indecency.” Ejei recently ordered intelligence agencies to target “organized networks encouraging non-observance” and promised heavier penalties across the country.
Similarly, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized what he described as “Western cultural influence,” urging domestic media not to repeat Western narratives about women’s rights or mixed-gender activities.
In sharp contrast, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration has openly resisted the expansion of coercive hijab enforcement, framing the issue as cultural—not criminal—and warning that force will only deepen social divisions. In a December 7 Student Day speech, Pezeshkian stated: “The issue of hijab cannot be solved through force or command. It must be addressed, but through persuasion. Everything the Leader emphasizes also requires cultural and educational work.”
This resistance was reinforced by the President’s chief of staff, Mohsen Haji-Mirzaei, who said on December 10: “We are facing a cultural matter. Our families are religious, but compulsion and enforcement will not succeed in this domain.” Even a member of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution acknowledged that the emerging consensus is that police enforcement of hijab should not be physical or direct, underscoring the growing institutional divide.
This is not the first time a running event has triggered judicial intervention. In May 2023, after images of unveiled women appeared from a 10-kilometer race in Shiraz, authorities filed legal cases and the provincial Track and Field chief resigned—despite men and women running separately. The pattern now appears to be repeating on Kish Island.
The Kish Marathon—celebrated online as a rare moment of openness and communal joy—has become a powerful symbol of Iran’s wider struggle over public freedoms. It now sits squarely at the center of a broader confrontation: on one side, judicial hardliners urging intensified hijab enforcement, and on the other, Pezeshkian’s government attempting to shift the state’s approach toward cultural engagement and away from coercion.
As legal proceedings continue against the marathon organizers, the controversy is likely to remain a defining example of the ongoing conflict between Iran’s competing visions of governance, society, and personal freedoms.
Iran has inaugurated a large-scale water transfer project that carries desalinated water from the Sea of Oman to the country’s central plateau, marking one of the most ambitious infrastructure undertakings in recent years. The initiative, which became operational on December 6 by order of President Masoud Pezeshkian, transports water that is desalinated at the source and pumped through an 800-kilometer pipeline from Sirjan to Isfahan, with the primary aim of providing stable water supplies for Isfahan’s industrial sector, especially Mobarakeh Steel Company, one of the largest industrial complexes in Iran. The project was completed in just two years at a cost of 35 trillion tomans, with Mobarakeh Steel acting as the principal investor alongside financial support from the government.
Although the project is now being launched under President Pezeshkian, its origins trace back to the administration of Hassan Rouhani, continued under Ebrahim Raisi, and only now reached operational status. During the inauguration ceremony, executives of Mobarakeh Steel argued that their company used less than 1.5 percent of all Zayandeh-Rud water, highlighting this figure to counter public perceptions that the industry is a primary driver of the river basin’s depletion. Despite their claims of a small formal share, the company has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to secure water from hundreds of kilometers away, a decision that officials frame as essential for securing industrial continuity and reducing dependence on the over-stressed Zayandeh-Rud basin.
However, the project has generated considerable criticism from water experts and environmental specialists. Many argue that decisions about where water moves and how it is allocated are not grounded in principles of sustainable development, but in the economic interests of influential industries and contractors. Somayeh Rafiei, a member of parliament from Tehran, criticized Iran’s water governance structure, stating that “the number of true water strategists in Iran is fewer than the fingers on one hand, and these individuals never change,” pointing to a closed decision-making circle that resists accountability or reform. Others contend that Iran continues to prioritize supply-side megaprojects instead of confronting the root causes of its water crisis, including over-extraction of aquifers, inefficient water pricing, and the lack of serious restrictions on consumption.
A significant portion of the criticism focuses on Iran’s long-standing pattern of misaligned water planning. Zahra Saeedi, a representative from Mobarakeh, described the logic behind such transfers as fundamentally flawed: “We take water from a place that needs it, transfer it far away, and then return to the original region because it again lacks water. What kind of water management is this?” Her remarks reflect widespread frustration with a system in which water shortages are repeatedly addressed by physically moving water, rather than by reducing consumption in regions that have exceeded their ecological capacity. This imbalance is most visible in agriculture, which consumes nearly 90 percent of Iran’s total water, often through inefficient irrigation and high-waste crop patterns. Yet instead of cutting agricultural demand, officials have increasingly turned toward grand desalination-and-transfer schemes from the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, with planned projects extending to Isfahan, Kerman, Yazd, and Mashhad.
Iran’s turn to desalinated water echoes trends seen in Gulf countries, which rely on similar technologies but devote vast sums of oil revenue to power their desalination plants. These operations come with significant environmental costs, especially highly saline brine discharges that damage marine ecosystems. While Iran’s volume of desalinated water remains small compared to the southern Gulf states, the environmental, financial, and energy burdens remain substantial, raising questions about long-term sustainability.
In practice, the new Oman Sea–to–Isfahan pipeline represents a significant engineering accomplishment, demonstrating Iran’s capacity to complete large infrastructure despite sanctions and economic challenges. It may help reduce pressure on the Zayandeh-Rud basin and stabilize industrial production in Isfahan. Yet experts warn that the project does not resolve the deeper structural problems driving Iran’s water crisis. Without major reforms in agricultural consumption, groundwater governance, and demand management, the country risks trading a water-scarcity crisis for an energy, cost, and environmental crisis. The new pipeline, therefore, stands as both a technological milestone and a test of whether Iran is prepared to move beyond short-term solutions toward a more sustainable and equitable model of water management.
برای خواندن این مطلب به فارسی اینجا را کلیک کنید
The Supreme Court of Iran has overturned the death sentence of Varisheh (Wirishe) Moradi, a Kurdish political activist and women’s rights advocate, after identifying serious procedural violations and deficiencies in the investigation conducted by the Tehran Revolutionary Court. Her lawyer, Mostafa Nili, announced on X that the Supreme Court ruled the original death sentence invalid “due to incomplete investigations and failure to observe legal procedures, including failure to formally inform the defendant of the charge that formed the basis of the execution ruling.” The case has now been returned to Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court for retrial.
Moradi, a 41-year-old activist from Sanandaj, was sentenced to death on November 11, 2024, on the charge of “baghi” (armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic) under Article 287 of the Islamic Penal Code. However, the indictment had charged her under Article 288, which carries a sentence of 5 to 15 years in prison, not death. Article 288 states that if members of an alleged armed group are arrested before any armed confrontation, they are subject to imprisonment, not execution. Article 287, by contrast, allows the death penalty only if weapons were used in an armed uprising.
According to sources familiar with the case, the death sentence was issued by Judge Abolqasem Salavati, who — contrary to the indictment — changed the legal basis from Article 288 to Article 287 at the final moment, without notifying the defense and without allowing Moradi or her lawyers to review the file or present a defense. Human rights lawyer Saeed Dehghan described the trial as “illegal”, stating that the court ignored the discrepancies between the indictment and the final verdict, and that Judge Salavati relied on “his own knowledge at the last minute” to impose the death penalty.
Reports also indicate that Moradi was arrested violently on August 1, 2023, near Sanandaj Airport while traveling from Kermanshah. Her family had no information about her whereabouts for four months. She spent five months in solitary confinement in intelligence detention centers and Evin Prison’s Ward 209 before being transferred to the women’s ward.
Her first court session was held on June 16, 2024, without prior notice to her lawyers. The court did not allow her defense team to study the case file or speak during the session. In a letter written from prison in September 2024, Moradi described the Revolutionary Court as a “kangaroo court” and stated that she refused to attend one of the hearings in protest against unjust sentences issued against other Kurdish women activists, including Sharifeh Mohammadi and Pakhshan Azizi.
Moradi is known as a women’s rights and environmental activist and reportedly had a history of fighting ISIS alongside Kurdish women in Kobani, where she was also injured. According to Kurdish human rights groups, she was affiliated with KJAR (Kongreya Jinên Azad), the women’s wing of the Free and Democratic Society of Eastern Kurdistan (KODAR), which is linked to the PJAK (Free Life Party of Kurdistan). Iranian courts often treat such affiliations as evidence of “armed rebellion,” even when no weapons are used.
Her conviction and death sentence had been condemned by human rights advocates who argued that Moradi was subjected to torture, prolonged solitary confinement, and a deeply flawed judicial process. They emphasized that the legal basis of her sentence was altered unlawfully and that she was never informed of the charge that ultimately resulted in her death sentence — a violation that became central to the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the ruling.
While the Supreme Court’s decision halts the execution, it does not acquit Moradi. Her fate now rests with the same Revolutionary Court that issued the original sentence, raising concerns among rights organizations about whether the retrial will meet basic standards of due process.
NIAC welcomes the overturning of Varisheh Moradi’s death sentence, and notes its concern regarding the violation of her due process and accusations of torture and prolonged solitary confinement. The Iranian government must move in line with its international rights obligations, including by investigating and ending abuses directed at Moradi and other prisoners and ensuring fair trials. Ending arbitrary imprisonment, safeguarding detainees from torture and abuse, and ensuring meaningful due process are necessary steps toward addressing the broader crisis of repression in Iran.
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