The American Gas Ass’n panel latched on to this apparent caveat in Loper Bright to conclude that Congress gave DOE “‘a degree of discretion’ to decide what constitutes a “performance characteristic” or “feature” under EPCA. The majority noted those terms were quite broad as a matter of plain meaning, and their practical significance—for example, as applied to condensing and non-condensing appliances—was necessarily case-specific. That much seemed to be supported by the legislative history, too. The Circuit ultimately concluded there was “no reason to second-guess DOE’s view, ‘especially since it “rest[ed] on the agency’s evaluations of scientific data within its area of expertise.”’” The statutory terms at issue were capacious enough to accommodate some interpretive flexibility, and the plaintiffs had not shown, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” that DOE stepped outside the bounds of that discretion.
Judge Noemi Rao dissented from the majority’s conclusions and criticized the panel’s application of Loper Bright. In her mind, this case presented a relatively simple question of whether non-condensing appliances’ venting mechanisms qualified as a “performance characteristic” under EPCA—an issue that could be resolved by a judge with traditional tools of statutory interpretation that evaluate “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” and the “overall statutory scheme.” The majority’s special solicitude for DOE’s interpretation—one that troublingly “flip-flopped across administrations”—under the guise of “respecting” DOE’s supposed “expertise” amounted to “Loper Bright avoidance.”