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Week of November 24, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
A new update on the X platform has triggered a nationwide controversy in Iran by displaying the country of connection for each user—fueling accusations that certain political figures, influencers, and public personalities are using “white internet,” or uncensored SIM cards, while millions of ordinary citizens continue to face harsh filtering and digital restrictions. This incident has reopened the debate on Iran’s emerging dual-tier “class-based internet,” sparking widespread anger, mockery, and political tension across Persian social media.
The uproar began when users noticed that many political figures were listed as connecting directly from Iran, despite the fact that major platforms like X (formerly Twitter) are blocked and require VPNs to access. Many Iranian users argued that if someone were truly using a VPN, their country label should reflect the VPN server’s location—not Iran—leading to the widespread assumption that these individuals must be using white internet SIM cards.
White internet (or “white SIM”) refers to unfiltered mobile lines that bypass national filtering systems, granting access to blocked platforms such as X, Instagram, Telegram, WhatsApp, and global app stores without any limitation. These SIM cards are not publicly available and are typically issued to government officials, security institutions, high-ranking bureaucrats, select journalists, foreign visitors, and technical personnel requiring global connectivity. The existence of this privileged internet infrastructure—which allows unrestricted access for a small elite—has long been a source of public anger, but the latest X update made the inequality visible in real time and to a much wider audience.
Over the past 48 hours, numerous Iranian users attacked public figures whose profiles displayed “Connected from Iran,” accusing them of hypocrisy, elitism, and benefiting from a restricted internet system that ordinary people cannot access. Targets included current and former members of parliament, such as Rasoul Rashidi-Koochi and Amirhossein Sabeti, who have publicly spoken against privileges and inequality. Users wrote that those who defend filtering publicly seem to enjoy uncensored internet privately, calling it a clear example of “do as I say, not as I do.”
However, as the controversy grew, many other users posted screenshots showing that despite using VPNs, their own X profiles also appeared as connected from Iran. This introduced technical uncertainty into the debate: it remains unclear whether X’s new labeling system accurately reflects the country of connection, or whether it sometimes displays the user’s SIM-registered country regardless of VPN usage. Some network analysts argue that depending on X’s detection protocol, certain VPN configurations may still reveal the original country. Others suggest that X’s rollout of this feature may be inconsistent or malfunctioning for users in heavily filtered environments.
Despite these technical ambiguities, the political and social message resonated widely. The explosive reaction across Persian social media reflects a deeper frustration: Iranians live under one of the world’s most restrictive internet regimes—forcing them to rely on unstable VPNs, blocked platforms, throttled speeds, and continuous risks of surveillance—while a privileged minority enjoys fast, unfiltered connectivity.
This anger is magnified by the memory of government promises. During the presidential campaign, Masoud Pezeshkian repeatedly promised to ease digital restrictions, and his administration has so far only delivered partial unblocking of WhatsApp and Google Play. Broader reforms remain stalled, while filtering of major platforms—Instagram, X, Telegram, YouTube, Discord, and others—continues to dominate the digital landscape.
The sudden visibility of who is “connected from Iran” on X has therefore functioned as a political flashpoint. It highlighted the existence of a two-tier internet system: one for officials, institutions, and select groups with white internet access, and one for the rest of the population, who must navigate censorship, degraded performance, and constant uncertainty.
This incident underscores a broader truth: the debate over white internet is not just technical—it is deeply political and symbolic. It reflects the public’s accumulated anger over digital inequality, government control, and the widening gap between the lives of citizens and the privileges enjoyed by state-connected actors. The “white internet” controversy is therefore more than a disagreement over VPN detection; it is a window into a society struggling with censorship, unequal access to information, and a growing sense that digital rights have become another form of social and political discrimination.
Unless transparent policies, universal access frameworks, and meaningful reforms are implemented, such controversies will continue to erupt—because what is at stake is not a label on X, but the right of millions of Iranians to participate in the global digital world on equal terms.
Iran is facing one of its most dangerous air pollution episodes in recent years, as toxic smog spreads across major cities including Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tabriz, Arak, and others—triggering mass school closures, remote work directives, and escalating health risks for millions. The pollution, driven by atmospheric stagnation, industrial emissions, vehicle exhaust, dust storms, and the seasonal surge in mazut burning, is unfolding at a moment when the country is already grappling with prolonged drought, declining rainfall, and chronic water shortages that further weaken environmental resilience.
According to Sadegh Ziaeyan, head of Iran’s National Weather Forecasting Center, from December 21 to 24 (1–4 Azar), Iran’s large and industrialized cities will face steady atmospheric stability, causing a dangerous rise in pollutant concentrations. This official warning coincided with sweeping announcements by provincial authorities: all kindergartens and preschools across Tehran Province (except Firouzkouh) will remain closed from Saturday to Wednesday, traffic restrictions have tightened, and the daily traffic permit system has been suspended. The odd-even license plate rule limiting which cars can leave their homes in the city is now enforced, and vulnerable groups—including people with respiratory or cardiac conditions, pregnant women, and parents with young children—have been urged to work remotely.
In parallel, Khuzestan Province announced that schools and universities in Ahvaz, Karun, Hamidiyeh, and Shushtar will operate online due to severe pollution. East Azerbaijan declared schools in Tabriz, Oskoo, and Bonab non-attendance for Saturday and Sunday. Similar closures rolled out in Qazvin, Zanjan, West Azerbaijan, Isfahan, Yazd, Alborz, and Khorasan Razavi—where the education ministry cited both pollution and a spike in respiratory illnesses such as influenza. These simultaneous shutdowns reflect the national scale of the environmental emergency.
Tehran’s AQI reached 140 yesterday and is expected to climb as high as 160, placing the capital in a “red” category that is dangerous for all groups. On Monday, November 24, Tehran’s Air Quality Index officially entered the “hazardous” range for the entire population, prompting the crisis headquarters to enforce expanded closures: all kindergartens, preschools, special-needs centers, schools, and universities will function remotely; private and public employees may work from home; and businesses must close by 8:30 PM. Heavy trucks are banned from entering the city until the end of the week, and compliance is monitored by police and CCTV cameras.
In other regions, similar emergency directives have been issued. Isfahan, Tabriz, Karaj, Ahvaz, and Mashhad are all under orange-level pollution alerts, while many cities are preparing for multi-day disruptions. The Meteorological Organization reports no meaningful rainfall until at least Wednesday, exacerbating pollution buildup. Shahr-e Kord reached –9°C, while Bandar Abbas recorded 32°C, illustrating how Iran’s climate extremes can worsen smog dynamics.
These acute pollution events are occurring against a background of extraordinary health and human losses. According to Iran’s Deputy Minister of Health, air pollution caused nearly 59,000 deaths in 2024 (1403), equivalent to 161 deaths per day or seven deaths per hour, with economic damage estimated at $17.2 billion, or 47 million dollars per day. The ministry’s National Air Pollution Report notes that pollutants such as PM2.5, PM10, ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and sulfur dioxide reached levels far beyond WHO guidelines in most metropolitan centers. Last year, Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj, Mashhad, Ahvaz, Tabriz, Arak, Kermanshah, Qom, and Yazd all recorded hundreds of days exceeding the WHO’s 24-hour PM2.5 limit of 15 µg/m³, with some districts—such as Ramhormoz, Behbahan, Hendijan, and parts of southern Tehran—reaching 4 to 9 times the WHO limit.
One of the major structural drivers of Iran’s winter smog is massive mazut burning. On November 13, mazut consumption in Iranian power plants exceeded 21 million liters per day, enough to fill a 14-kilometer line of tanker trucks. Iran traditionally relies on natural gas for energy, but winter demand spikes force power plants to burn mazut—one of the dirtiest fuels in the world—producing dense particulate emissions that quickly blanket valleys and industrial corridors. Last winter, Iran set a record for mazut consumption due to severe gas shortages. The administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian attempted to limit mazut use but ultimately could not risk widespread blackouts, leaving environmental regulations sidelined.
These atmospheric crises are further aggravated by Iran’s intensifying drought and water scarcity, especially in Tehran. Severely reduced rainfall over the last decade has left the capital’s reservoirs—Latian, Lar, Mamloo, and Taleghan—dangerously low. Low rainfall means no atmospheric cleansing, causing pollutants to remain suspended for longer and accumulate in the urban canopy. At the same time, reduced hydropower output forces greater reliance on thermal power plants, which in turn burn mazut, reinforcing the pollution cycle. Dry soils, desiccated wetlands, and parched farmlands across Iran generate enormous dust emissions, contributing to particulate pollution in cities hundreds of kilometers away.
Other structural contributors—aging vehicle fleets, millions of carbureted motorcycles, deteriorating public transport systems, outdated refineries, and uncontrolled industrial emissions—compound the crisis. In cities such as Ahvaz and Karaj, the combination of industrial output and dust storms creates persistent pollution layers. In Isfahan, the drying of the Zayandeh Rud has created new dust sources. In Tehran, topographic inversion traps pollutants under a dome of stagnant cold air.
Iran’s environmental emergency is no longer confined to seasonal smog—it is part of a multi-system breakdown driven by climate change, water scarcity, outdated infrastructure, and acute energy shortages. Toxic winter air is only the most visible symptom of deeper structural vulnerabilities that threaten public health, economic productivity, and long-term urban sustainability.
With air pollution now causing tens of thousands of deaths annually, billions in economic losses, nationwide school closures, and unprecedented disruptions to daily life, Iran faces an escalating crisis that requires structural, long-term solutions: cleaner energy sources, strict anti-mazut policies, modernized public transport, refinery upgrades, strengthened environmental governance, and climate-resilient water management. Unless decisive action is taken, Iran’s winter skies will remain toxic—and the country’s intertwined air, water, and climate crises will continue to deepen.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met his French counterpart Jean-Noël Barrot on November 26 in Paris. This renewed contact comes only days after the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution demanding full cooperation from Tehran, which triggered protests from Iranian officials.
Araghchi traveled to Paris following his participation in the annual meeting of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. France announced that the discussions will focus on regional developments, Iran’s nuclear program, and bilateral relations, while Iran added that the fate of Iranian citizen Mahdieh Esfandiari in France will also be addressed. At the same time, France has stated that the situation of its two nationals released from Evin Prison but barred from leaving Iran will also be on the agenda, indicating that prisoner-related issues remain deeply intertwined with broader negotiations.
The meeting follows weeks of continued friction. After the IAEA resolution was adopted last Friday, Iran reacted strongly, with Araghchi accusing the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany of “escalating tensions.” The resolution demands that Iran immediately restore comprehensive cooperation with the IAEA, clarify the status of its enriched uranium stockpile, and grant inspectors access to nuclear sites that were attacked by Israel and the United States during the June 12-day conflict. Iran has refused access to these sites since the attacks, arguing that the facilities remain damaged and claiming that enrichment activities are currently halted.
This deterioration has effectively nullified the Cairo Agreement, a cooperation protocol negotiated on September 9 between Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, under Egyptian mediation. Iran declared the Cairo arrangement “void and terminated” following both the wartime attacks and the activation of the “snapback” mechanism on September 14. Araghchi stated repeatedly that the Cairo agreement “no longer has functionality or relevance under the current conditions.” Grossi, speaking in Manila on Tuesday, stressed that the IAEA nevertheless intends to “re-enter full engagement with Iran and restore inspection activities,” highlighting a widening gap between the two sides.
In this environment, Iran’s decision to reopen dialogue with Europe appears cautious but deliberate. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, emphasized that Iran will only participate in ‘real, not artificial’ negotiations, warning that diplomacy must not be predetermined or imposed. His comments reflect internal debates in Tehran about whether meaningful progress is possible with Western powers, particularly after the 12-day war and the attacks on nuclear facilities.
Iran insists that it is not pursuing a nuclear weapon and rejects U.S. demands for zero enrichment, calling them “absolutely unacceptable.” Meanwhile, Western governments and the IAEA remain concerned about over 400 kilograms of Iran’s high-enriched uranium, the status of which has become a central issue. Many have suggested that the stockpile was buried by the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, though some uncertainty remains. Reports suggest that enrichment activities at damaged facilities have paused, a claim echoed by Iranian government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, who stated that “due to the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear processes, the country is currently unable to conduct enrichment.” Western officials, however, continue to demand clarity regarding Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
The Paris meeting marks one of the first instances in months in which Iran is engaging in public and direct nuclear-related discussions with a Western government. In recent months, Qatar and Oman attempted to revive back-channel contacts between Iran and the United States, but those efforts stalled following the latest IAEA resolution.
Despite Araghchi’s harsh criticism of France and other Western powers after the resolution, Iranian officials appear to recognize that engagement with Europe may be unavoidable. President Macron and Iranian leaders have maintained periodic contact in recent months, discussing nuclear issues and potential mechanisms for prisoner exchanges. A broader diplomatic calculation may also be at play: as the U.S. election cycle accelerates and uncertainty grows around Washington’s future Iran policy, Tehran may see value in maintaining open channels with European governments in case they can help prevent unwanted escalation.
At the same time, Iran’s approach remains defensive and cautious. The government continues to deny IAEA access to attacked sites and insists that cooperation with the agency now requires explicit authorization from the Supreme National Security Council under a newly passed parliamentary law titled “Obligation of the Iranian Government to Suspend Cooperation with the IAEA.” This legal constraint complicates any technical negotiations and positions Iran’s nuclear transparency firmly within the national security domain rather than diplomatic channels.
In parallel, domestic messaging in Tehran reflects frustration with the West’s perceived pressure tactics. Speaking to students at Bu-Ali Sina University, Araghchi reiterated that Iran “is ready for equal and honorable negotiations” but emphasized that “Iran has not had a good experience negotiating with the United States.” Former attempts by third-party mediators have yielded little momentum, and the latest IAEA decision further narrowed the diplomatic space.
This new phase of EU–Iran engagement is therefore fragile, high-stakes, and fraught with unresolved disputes. The Paris meeting could either open a narrow channel for de-escalation or reinforce the perception that Europe has aligned fully with U.S. pressure strategies. With the future of Iran’s nuclear program under unprecedented scrutiny, and with unresolved questions over uranium stockpiles, facility damage, prisoner issues, and the suspended Cairo framework, diplomacy faces significant obstacles.
Yet despite the sharp rhetoric and mutual distrust, both sides appear aware of the risks of further escalation. Iran faces mounting international pressure and potential economic repercussions if cooperation with the IAEA continues to decline. Europe, for its part, is concerned about regional security following the June conflict and seeks to prevent a broader nuclear crisis. Whether the Paris talks can move beyond symbolic engagement will depend on both parties’ willingness to balance pressure with diplomacy and to rebuild the basic trust required for any meaningful agreement.
Iran is preparing to relaunch a nationwide electronic coupon system aimed at guaranteeing stable access to essential food items for low-income households amid persistent inflation, sanctions pressure, and declining purchasing power. After months of debate, both the government and parliament have intensified efforts to revive and expand the coupon mechanism, positioning it as a core pillar of social protection policy for 1404 and beyond.
Shahrukh Ramin, a member of the Parliament’s Social Commission, stated that “there is no obstacle” to implementing the coupon program for at least the first three income deciles, emphasizing that the government has pledged to begin the rollout “next week” for the lowest deciles and extend it to higher deciles as soon as financing becomes available. Ramin described the coupon initiative as “necessary, strategic, and essential”, framing it as the primary mechanism through which the state intends to preserve access to basic food goods for economically vulnerable families.
A central feature of the new design is a dynamic inflation-compensation mechanism. Ramin explained that the price of 11 core food items, defined by the Iranian Nutrition Institute, will be fully offset by the Ministry of Welfare: “Whatever increase in price occurs due to inflation, the coupon value will rise accordingly so that people do not feel hardship securing these items.” In other words, prices will rise, but coupon credit will increase in parallel, keeping real access stable for the target population. This marks a significant shift from past programs, which failed to keep pace with inflation and eroded quickly as costs surged.
Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf reinforced this message, thanking the government for preparing the “infrastructure” for the new coupon system and announcing that in the first phase, three of the seven eligible deciles will receive benefits, with the goal of preventing price shocks for essential goods. “In the new model,” he stated, “the price of goods will remain stable throughout the year.” Despite these assurances, the executive branch has not yet provided a firm implementation date, reflecting ongoing uncertainty around financing and logistical capacity.
The shift toward couponization reflects a broader economic and political reality. Since the return of UN Security Council sanctions, Iran has faced intensified inflation and growing pressure on household incomes. Policymakers see the new coupon program as a stabilizing mechanism that can cushion the poorest deciles from food insecurity while the government pursues other structural reforms. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has repeatedly endorsed coupon policy, calling it one of the most effective tools for ensuring access to critical goods.
The upcoming coupon design differs significantly from the version tested between Khordad 1402 and Ordibehesht 1403 under the previous administration. That earlier system was halted when the new government took office, largely due to concerns over its cost, inflationary impact, and administrative weaknesses. The revived program introduces several key changes:
- Initial rollout limited to the first three income deciles, expanding to the remaining seven deciles once fiscal resources are secured.
- Stronger multi-ministry involvement, with Welfare and Agricultural Jihad Ministries all participating.
- Expanded coverage of essential items, increasing from 11 to 15 goods. In addition to milk, yogurt, cheese, eggs, rice, pasta, cooking oil, sugar, beans, red meat, and poultry, the list will now include turkey, quail, fish, and shrimp.
- Commitment to price stability, meaning the consumer price for these 15 items remains fixed for the target population throughout the year.
The list expansion reflects an attempt to offer more protein diversity while preventing nutritional decline among low-income families. Officials stress that the addition of items like turkey, fish, and shrimp is meant to strengthen food security rather than luxury consumption.
However, the program faces significant challenges. Financing remains the most serious obstacle. Economists warn that if not carefully designed, the coupon system—especially with inflation-indexing—could deepen the budget deficit or fuel additional inflation. Parliamentarians have acknowledged these risks but argue that targeted support is still preferable to broad subsidies, which disproportionately benefit higher-income households and generate waste.
There is also lingering skepticism about whether the government can maintain stable supply chains for all 15 items. Past experience with rationing and coupons in Iran, particularly during the Iran–Iraq War, showed that while coupons can stabilize minimal consumption, they often produce black markets, shortages, and uneven access. Critics fear that unless distribution networks are modernized and oversight strengthened, the electronic coupon system could replicate these past problems in digital form.
Nonetheless, the program represents Iran’s most ambitious attempt in years to create a targeted, inflation-resistant safety net for vulnerable families. With food prices rising faster than wages, and purchasing power eroding across the lower deciles, policymakers hope that indexed coupons will prevent the poorest from falling into deeper nutritional insecurity. The coming months will test whether the state can secure sufficient funding, ensure stable distribution, and deliver on its promise to keep core food prices steady despite broader economic volatility.
In sum, Iran’s revived coupon system is both a social necessity and a political gamble: if implemented effectively, it may shield millions of families from inflation and restore some public confidence; if mismanaged, it risks repeating past failures, exacerbating shortages, and placing additional pressure on an already strained fiscal system.
Iran faces a deepening paradox in its energy sector: it holds some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves and historically cheap fuel prices, yet is increasingly unable to supply its own people with reliable energy. Chronic under-investment, sanctions, rapid consumption growth, and heavy subsidies have generated a widening gap between supply and demand. This imbalance now affects every part of the energy ecosystem—from winter gas shortages to summer blackouts, from rising fuel imports to expanding flaring. Against this backdrop, the government of President Masoud Pezeshkian has taken one of the most controversial and politically sensitive steps of his administration: the formal introduction of a three-tier gasoline pricing system starting in mid-Azar 1404.
For weeks, officials issued mixed and contradictory statements. While the president and several senior spokespeople repeatedly denied any imminent price change, Mohammad-Jafar Qaem-Panah, the Executive Vice President, insisted that raising energy prices were “inevitable” regardless of which administration did it. The publication of the cabinet decree—signed by Mohammad-Reza Aref—revealed that the plan had actually been approved nearly a month earlier, confirming the government’s quiet decision to restructure fuel pricing even as public denials continued.
Under the new measure, gasoline in Iran officially becomes three-tiered: 1,500 tomans per liter (subsidized), 3,000 tomans (regular), and 5,000 tomans (new “rate three”). The government has determined that the 5,000-toman rate corresponds to roughly 10% of the refinery purchase price, a figure that will be updated every season based on market fluctuations. According to the decree, from mid-Azar onward, fuel purchased using station emergency cards will be priced at 5,000 tomans per liter, while the 1,500 and 3,000-toman rates will remain unchanged for cardholders—up to a combined total of 160 liters per month.
Owners of more than one vehicle will now receive subsidized rates for only one car, a direct attempt to prevent wealthier households from accumulating multiple subsidized quotas. Even more controversial is the government’s decision to eliminate subsidized quotas (rates one and two) for new domestic cars, imported vehicles, government-license plates (except ambulances), and cars in free-trade zones, forcing all of them to use the 5,000-toman rate. Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad stated that “new-numbered” cars are those freshly released from the factory, a justification that triggered widespread criticism on social media due to the lack of transparent economic logic behind the choice. Even government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani acknowledged live on national TV that “there were both supporters and opponents”, and could not provide a clearer rationale when pressed.
The policy also authorizes the Ministry of Oil to recalculate and announce gasoline prices at the end of every season, a clause that drew sharp reactions—including from the spokesperson of the previous administration, who argued that if fuel prices adjust seasonally, “workers’ wages must also be increased every season.”
Meanwhile, another significant change is expected in the coming week: imported super gasoline, priced between 68,000 and 75,000 tomans per liter, will enter the market. This reflects Iran’s widening supply gap. Members of parliament have recently warned that Iran’s domestic refineries will produce only around 107 million liters per day this year, while average station sales have exceeded 127 million liters per day, creating a shortfall of at least 20 million liters—requiring roughly $4 billion in imports. Lawmakers urged the government to pursue “non-price measures” instead of what they described as a “shock-based price hike.”
The political sensitivity surrounding gasoline pricing cannot be understood without recalling the November 2019 gasoline price increase, when the government abruptly tripled the price overnight and imposed strict monthly quotas. The sudden announcement—made without public debate, consultation, or gradual implementation—triggered one of the largest waves of nationwide protests in decades, spreading to more than 100 cities within hours. The unrest was fueled not only by the economic shock but also by the perception that the government had acted secretly and imposed the decision without transparency.
The state’s crackdown on protests resulted in hundreds of deaths, thousands of arrests, and a long-term erosion of public trust, leaving a deep political scar that continues to shape the government’s behavior today. Since then, every administration—including the current one—has approached gasoline pricing with extreme caution, aware that even modest adjustments risk reawakening the public trauma of 2019. It is within this historical memory that the Pezeshkian administration’s three-tier pricing policy will now be judged.
Despite this sensitivity, pressure for reform has intensified since the 12-day war and repeated winter energy crises. Pezeshkian himself recently stated that gasoline prices must eventually rise, but emphasized that it “cannot be a one-night decision.” In reality, the plan appears to have been quietly prepared and approved well before being publicly acknowledged.
The government argues that the three-tier system is designed to protect low-income households while discouraging smuggling. Mohajerani stated that Iran needed a system that both reduces environmental and livelihood harm and raises the cost of smuggling, given the enormous gap between domestic and regional fuel prices. But critics note that the structure still heavily subsidizes consumption and does not address Iran’s deeper structural issues: inefficient vehicles, aging refineries, outdated distribution networks, and consumption volumes far higher than global averages.
These fuel-pricing reforms unfold amid a broader energy crisis. Despite massive gas fields like South Pars and recent discoveries such as the Pazan field, Iran faces winter gas deficits estimated at 250–300 million cubic meters per day, forcing rolling blackouts, pressure drops, and closure of offices and schools. Gas flaring has surged to around 63 million cubic meters per day, placing Iran among the top global emitters. Power plants burn heavy fuel oil (mazut) during shortages, triggering toxic smog in Tehran, Isfahan, and Ahvaz, repeatedly pushing schools to close.
At the same time, Iran’s regional energy leverage is weakening. Gas exports to Turkey and Iraq—roughly 9–13 billion cubic meters per year—remain significant but vulnerable, while domestic consumption grows unchecked. New swap arrangements with Turkmenistan, Russia, and Azerbaijan may help balance seasonal shortages but do not resolve the fundamental supply-demand gap. Subsidies exceeding $50 billion annually, widespread leakage, and inefficient buildings continue to undermine the system.
In this environment, the three-tier gasoline pricing plan marks the government’s most substantial—yet controversial—attempt to impose order on a rapidly deteriorating energy landscape. By raising the cost of “extra” consumption and restricting subsidized quotas to a single vehicle per household, the administration hopes to manage demand without triggering the type of public anger seen in 2019. Yet the political risk remains significant: lawmakers openly oppose price increases, public trust is low, and the economic logic behind some elements—especially the exclusion of newly manufactured cars from subsidized rates—remains unclear.
Iran’s energy crisis is no longer a problem of geology but of governance. Massive reserves have not translated into stable supply due to structural distortions, outdated infrastructure, and inconsistent policy making. The new gasoline pricing system may slow the rise in consumption, but without deeper reforms—investment in efficiency, modernization of refineries, reduction of flaring, and rationalization of subsidies—Iran risks facing even more severe shortages in the years ahead.
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