[[link removed]]

HEGSETH DROPPED BIG VENEZUELA EASTER EGG IN QUANTICO SPEECH  
[[link removed]]


 

Jennifer Kavanagh
November 3, 2025
Responsible Statecraft
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ Though many wrote it off as a political stunt, it was clear the
gathering was much more important than many realized, offering the
clearest articulation yet of how the Trump administration thinks about
and hopes to use military power. _

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth delivers remarks during an address
at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va., Sept. 30, 2025. , Photo credit::
U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Aiko Bongolan

 

On September 30, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth summoned
[[link removed]]
nearly 800 of America’s military generals, admirals, and senior
enlisted officers to Quantico, Virginia on short notice. Though the
unprecedented event was written off by many as a political stunt, a
month later, it is clear the gathering was more important than many
realized.

Of particular note were the speeches delivered by Hegseth
[[link removed]]
and President Donald Trump
[[link removed]]
which offer the clearest articulation yet of how the Trump
administration
[[link removed]] thinks
about and hopes to use military power. What’s more, taken together,
the two sets of remarks appear to foreshadow both the current U.S.
military build-up underway in the Caribbean
[[link removed]]
and what might be on the horizon as U.S. operations there and
elsewhere continue.

The key moment in Hegseth’s talk came near the end
[[link removed]].
“The United States has not won a major theater war since the name
was changed to the Department of Defense in 1947,” he told the
assembled audience, repeating President Trump’s rationale for
jettisoning
[[link removed]]
the Department’s old moniker in favor of its new one: The Department
of War. “One conflict stands out in stark contrast, the Gulf War,”
he continued. “Why? Well, there's a number of reasons, but it was a
limited mission with overwhelming force and a clear end state.”

Many were puzzled at Hegseth’s call-up of this short-lived military
operation from 35 years ago. After all, the first Gulf War
[[link removed]], though
widely considered a success at the time, ushered in three decades of
heavy U.S. military involvement in the Middle East
[[link removed].]
and, in many ways, set the stage for the very “forever wars” in
Iraq and Afghanistan that Trump had campaigned against.

Hegseth’s point, however, was different. The Gulf War, he was
telling those listening in person and at home, was an example of how
the United States _should _be using military force going forward.
Overwhelming military power that quickly annihilates the adversary, in
pursuit of limited goals. Massive force, short duration, quick
victory, no long-term commitment.

This model, which Vice President J.D. Vance has called the Trump
Doctrine
[[link removed]],
was demonstrated earlier this year in the U.S. airstrikes on Iran’s
nuclear facilities and during Trump’s first term in his
assassination of Iranian military commander Qassem Soleimani.

Trump’s preferred approach to the use of force is on display again
in Latin America
[[link removed]], where the
U.S. military has increased the frequency and scope
[[link removed]] of its strikes on
alleged drug smuggling boats while a growing American armada
[[link removed]]
loiters off the coast of Venezuela. Today, over ten percent of U.S.
deployed naval power
[[link removed]],
including a carrier strike group and attack submarine armed with
Tomahawk missiles, dozens of fighter aircraft including F-35s, and at
least 10,000 military personnel are stationed in the Caribbean.

The ostensible purpose
[[link removed]] of this massive
accumulation of warships, aircraft, and military personnel is
interdicting drugs on their way to the United States (for now by sea
and maybe in the near future by land). However, many speculate that
the ultimate target is Venezuela’s leader, Nicolas Maduro, who Trump
may hope to drive from power.

Some observers have questioned whether the extraordinary amount of
military firepower involved in the operation is required, given the
relatively limited threat drug smugglers generally or Maduro himself
pose to the United States. But the excess is a feature of Trump’s
approach, not a bug. As the president said just last week in Japan,
under his command, the United States will “blast the hell out of
countries
[[link removed]]”
on its way to decisively winning wars.

In his own speech on September 30, Trump offered additional context
helpful to understanding expanding U.S. operations in Latin America.
At Quantico, he spoke of the “war on the enemy within
[[link removed]],”
which he described as the battle against the foreign drug smugglers
and criminal networks that pose a threat to the United States from the
inside.

In a sense, the U.S. military campaign in the Caribbean today is
simply the external manifestation of this inward-focused struggle and
a natural outgrowth of Trump’s militarized approach to his
immigration agenda, which has expanded over the course of his second
term. There is a certain logic to this. After all, the United States
should not waste time looking for adversaries abroad until threats
emanating from its backyard, often the root causes of domestic ills,
are neutralized.

Still, the military’s role in ongoing operations in the Western
Hemisphere should be scrutinized. It's not clear, for instance, that
blowing alleged drug smugglers out of the water one by one or even
threatening them on land will dry up the drug trafficking that
afflicts U.S. cities. Similarly, Maduro may not respond to the
military pressure by stepping down and if he does, military power
cannot guarantee [[link removed]]
what comes after the regime change
[[link removed]]
advances U.S. or the region’s long-term interests. Trump and his
advisors may be underestimating the capabilities of Venezuela’s
defense force or overestimating the ease
[[link removed]]
with which the U.S. military will achieve its larger political goals.

Moreover, the Trump administration’s apparent theory of military
force has limits. Large displays of firepower may awe voters or
restore pride in U.S. military power after the embarrassing losses of
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They may even scare small states
into bowing to U.S. dictates. But the “overwhelming force, limited
objectives” approach applies less well to near peer adversaries
capable of matching U.S. military power and unlikely to be so easily
dissuaded by U.S. military threats.

So how does the so-called “Trump doctrine” apply to competitors
like China [[link removed]] and Russia
[[link removed]]? One possibility is
that Trump is simply not willing to fight in major power wars given
the likely costs and demands of doing so, not to mention the immense
political risk and potential for enduring entanglements.

This reluctance would be good for U.S. interests even if it is a
change in U.S. foreign policy, and it would fit with Trump’s
distaste
[[link removed]]
for the long ground campaigns the United States fought in the Middle
East [[link removed]] after
September 11.

The other option is that Trump does hope or believe that ominous
threats and large displays of military force will work against China
or Russia in a future contingency. This is the more dangerous of the
two explanations, as this strategy could invite at retaliatory attacks
on the U.S. homeland and possibly even nuclear war — a catastrophic
outcome.

Important questions about how Trump plans to use military power,
therefore, remain. Still, we should not forget the gathering at
Quantico too quickly. We may look back on it as significant moment in
the evolution of the U.S. approach to the use of force.

_[DR. JENNIFER KAVANAGH is a senior fellow and director of military
analysis at Defense Priorities. Previously, Dr. Kavanagh was a senior
fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a senior
political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is also an adjunct
professor at Georgetown University.]_ 

* Venezuela
[[link removed]]
* Donald Trump
[[link removed]]
* Pete Hegseth
[[link removed]]
* U.S. Military
[[link removed]]
* military force
[[link removed]]
* Monroe Doctrine
[[link removed]]
* imperialism
[[link removed]]
* war powers resolution
[[link removed]]
* Latin America
[[link removed]]
* Nicolas Maduro
[[link removed]]
* Caribbean
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

INTERPRET THE WORLD AND CHANGE IT

 

 

Submit via web
[[link removed]]

Submit via email
Frequently asked questions
[[link removed]]
Manage subscription
[[link removed]]
Visit xxxxxx.org
[[link removed]]

Bluesky [[link removed]]

Facebook [[link removed]]

 




[link removed]

To unsubscribe, click the following link:
[link removed]