The Rangel-Fuentes decision reflects many of the trends developing in the lower courts in the wake of Loper Bright. Without Chevron deference, courts must now interpret statutes independently. Statutory text—as read through the lenses of the canons of interpretation—will be the most important focus of that effort. Yet more than anything, Rangel-Fuentes shows how courts must carefully examine claimed delegations of regulatory discretion, ensuring they are grounded in express statutory text rather than mere implication.
Here, the BIA tried to sidestep Loper Bright by claiming Congress gave it authority to “fill out” “gaps” in the INA. The Tenth Circuit rejected that interpretation because Congress had not expressly delegated such power to BIA. And general “housekeeping” statutes provide no alternative basis for shielding the agency’s position from meaningful judicial review. As courts across the country grapple with similarly contested statutes and delegations, the lessons of Rangel-Fuentes case will likely resonate far beyond immigration law.