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A CLOSER LOOK AT TRUMP’S PEACE DEALS  
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David J. Simon and Kathryn Hemmer
October 9, 2025
Just Security
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_ Trump's approach displays a flawed understanding of peace itself.
Given a paradigm that prioritizes economic access over reconciliation,
even a cautious form of optimism is hard to justify. _

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In his speech at the United Nations (U.N.), President Trump claimed
[[link removed]] (no fewer than four
times) that he has “ended seven unendable wars.” This assertion,
which he began repeating over the summer, is not only a gross
[[link removed]] exaggeration
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it also betrays
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flawed 
[[link removed]]understanding
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peace
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[[link removed]]Under
the Trump administration, peace deals have been treated as an
opportunity to secure resources and real estate. Recent agreements
between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, and between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, illustrate this “resources-for-peace”
approach. Both deals are fundamentally transactional. But by
prioritizing American economic interests and quick fixes over a
sustainable peace, they promise to yield fragile outcomes at best.

DRC-RWANDA PEACE AGREEMENT

Trump claims that his administration’s mediation between the DRC and
Rwanda “stopped”’
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conflict in DRC and yet, fighting continues unabated. The outcome was
predictable. The peace agreement
[[link removed]],
signed in June, had more to do with securing U.S. access to Congolese
minerals than finding a recipe for durable peace.

In DRC’s eastern provinces, more than 100 armed groups compete for
land, resources, and political influence. Regional powers ––
including Rwanda
[[link removed]], Uganda
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and Burundi
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have further fuel
[[link removed]]ed
[[link removed]] the
violence by backing rival forces to advance their own
interests. Illicit mineral
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(enabled by instability and conflict) generates billions, funding
militias
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enriching foreign 
[[link removed]]actors
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officials
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However, the complex factors driving the conflict ––
including ethnic
[[link removed]] marginalization
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disputes
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governance [[link removed]], and mass
displacement
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received little to no attention at all in the Washington agreement.

The supposed crown jewel of the Washington deal is a regional
economic framework
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to combat illegal trafficking, “de-risk
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mineral supply chains and secure opportunities for U.S. investors.
Trump hopes American involvement will generate revenue
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challenging China’s dominance
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the Congolese mining sector. To many people in DRC, however, American
involvement merely revives a pattern of exploitation that has
characterized the mining sector from pre-colonial
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to the infamously corrupt
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era. The latest version
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the extraction model has foreign powers offering feeble security
promises in exchange for resource access: a paradigm
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only “erode the sovereignty and bargaining power of mineral-rich
nations such as the DRC.”

Fulfilling the terms of the regional economic framework will prove
nearly impossible without an end to fighting
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Yet the Washington agreement offers no viable path to sustainable
peace. For one, Kinshasa has refused to move forward with the economic
agreement until 90 percent of Rwandan troops
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withdrawn from eastern DRC. Rwanda also provides significant backing
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most powerful
[[link removed]] rebel
group in eastern DRC, but the agreement introduces a major loophole to
de-escalation.  Both countries are barred from supporting non-state
armed groups “except as necessary” to implement the agreement.
Interpretation of what is “necessary” will no doubt weaken the
provision.

Meanwhile, the deal calls on DRC to disarm the Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a militia with historical links to
the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Rwanda frames the
disarmament of the FDLR as a matter of national security, but critics
argue that Rwanda exaggerates
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claim to justify its intervention.

Though disarmament is an essential step toward peace, the Washington
deal lacks
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enforcement mechanisms needed to make it happen. Much of the FDLR
operates within M23-held areas, and the Congolese army is notoriously
weak: so weak, in fact, that the army has repeatedly outsourced
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security operations to local militias known as _Wazalendo_. The
result is a stalemate
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for 
[[link removed]]Rwanda
insists that its withdrawal depends on DRC first neutralizing the
FDLR. At present, neither side seems prepared to move first.

Commitments from the DRC and Rwanda (which, under the Trump deal, are
nominal at best), account for only a small piece of the puzzle.
Both Burundi
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troops in the region, but they were absent from the negotiations.
What’s more concerning, none
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active in DRC were included in the peace deal, and Qatari-led talks
between the Congolese government and M23 have largely stalled
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Recent analysis suggests
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the narrow focus on M23 has allowed other armed groups to fill the
void.

Washington has made clear that funding peace is not a priority.
Trump’s dissolution of USAID has already wrought devastating
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eastern DRC. Meanwhile, the administration has moved to eliminate
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for U.N. peacekeeping, while offering no viable alternative to the
current mission in Congo.

The consequences of the poorly thought-out framework are already
apparent: since the signing of the Washington agreement, violence in
DRC has surged
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brutal attacks on civilians have continued
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and the M23 has further expanded
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territorial control.

ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN JOINT DECLARATION

On August 8, Trump celebrated what he described as a “peace treaty
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Azerbaijan. In reality, the Joint Declaration
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at the White House is neither a legally-binding treaty nor a credible
roadmap to peace. It is merely a political statement that commits the
two sides to “continue further actions” toward a stalled peace
agreement
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text was finalized 
[[link removed]]six
months ago
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That impasse remains unresolved, as Azerbaijan refuses to actually
sign
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peace treaty until Armenia adopts a new constitution. Armenia’s
constitutional process could take years
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And while this U.S. administration’s fleeting interest in the region
may temporarily stave off conflict, the deal lacks the security
guarantees
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buy-in
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and justice mechanisms
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long-term peace.

The centerpiece of the Joint Declaration is an investment deal. The
so-called “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”
(TRIPP) will grant Washington exclusive development rights
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an Armenian transit corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan
exclave. The route advances long-standing Azeri ambitions to connect
the Turkic world
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finalize a Middle Corridor
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China and Europe, and secure an outlet for Azeri 
[[link removed]]oil
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gas
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For its part, Armenia hopes that U.S. investment will provide
temporary security in an otherwise hostile neighborhood. That hope
rests on shaky ground. Since the 2020 ceasefire, Azerbaijan
has occupied
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215km of Armenian territory and terrorized border populations
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President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly labeled Armenia as “Western
Azerbaijan
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to seize
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force the TRIPP corridor (which Azerbaijan calls
[[link removed]] the “Zangezur”
corridor). With a modernized military backed by Israel and Türkiye,
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a demonstrated
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international law (see also here
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Azerbaijan remains well positioned to pursue its irredentist
ambitions
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Armenia, by contrast, holds little leverage
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the negotiations. The United States
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unwilling to intervene. And since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
Russia has abandoned
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former peacekeeping role in the Caucasus. The EU border monitoring
mission [[link removed]], tasked with
tracking ceasefire violations, remains the last external presence in
the region. And yet, Azerbaijan forced a provision in the peace
agreement that would require its withdrawal
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Absent international accountability, the risk of renewed aggression
remains acute. The Joint Declaration includes no security guarantees
from the United States or other actors. To the contrary, American
investment interests –– along with policy calculations vis-à-vis
Russia and Iran –– could lead the Trump administration to turn a
blind eye to future Azeri provocations. For the TRIPP corridor to live
up to its name, the United States would need to make credible
commitments to defend Armenia’s sovereign control over both the
transit route and broader Syunik region. 

The peace deal’s most glaring omission
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the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh
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a contested region which has been the epicenter of conflict for the
last three decades. In 2023, Azerbaijan forcibly displaced
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entire ethnic Armenian population through a brutal 10-month blockade
and subsequent military campaign. At the time, Trump
himself condemned
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Biden administration for doing “NOTHING as 120,000 Armenian
Christians were horrifically persecuted and forcibly displaced.”

Through a provision of the peace deal, Azerbaijan successfully
pressured Armenia to drop its international legal cases
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thereby depriving Nagorno-Karabakh’s 150,000 victims
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justice. Though Azerbaijan would also drop its countersuits, they
are significantly weaker
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unlikely to succeed at the merits stage.

The deal also ignores the efforts of displaced Armenians to  return
safely to Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been mandated
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Justice but effectively obstructed
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Azerbaijan policies. Since 2023, Azerbaijan has rushed to resettle
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region while continuing its demolition
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Armenian monasteries and cultural sites. Meanwhile, 23 Armenian
political prisoners remain in unlawful Azeri detention
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These fundamental omissions have the adverse effect of legitimizing
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military aggression and rights abuses. And without justice, long-term
reconciliation falls further from reach.

At the signing of the Joint Declaration, Trump proclaimed
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“Thirty-five years of death and hatred…now it’s going to be love
and success together.” But given a paradigm that prioritizes
economic access over reconciliation, even a cautious form of optimism
is hard to justify.

FUTURE ITERATIONS OF THE “RESOURCES-FOR-PEACE” APPROACH 

Looking forward, Trump may seek to replicate the
“resources-for-peace” approach in other contexts, namely, in Gaza
and Ukraine.

In February, Trump floated a plan
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the United States to “take over” and “level” the Gaza strip
and transform it into a “Riviera of the Middle East
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Experts quickly deemed the proposal a “straightforward crime against
humanity
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And while it is welcome news that the both sides appear set to agree
to a ceasefire as of October 9, it should not be lost on anyone that
central to the larger proposed 20-point peace plan
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economic development plan” based on the model of the “the thriving
modern miracle cities in the Middle East” (point 10), as well as
“a special economic zone . . . with preferred tariff and access
rates (point 11).”

A resolution to the war in Ukraine is no closer. Last month’s Alaska
and White House summits yielded no progress towards any agreement, and
Russia has since launched some of its most intense drone and 
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attacks
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civilian areas of the entire war. As the war rages on, the Trump
administration may revisit earlier proposa
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the United States to predicate
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continued military support on access to Ukrainian minerals. Such a
deal would smack of extortion rather than the fulfillment of
commitments to an ally.

While the Trump administration’s peace efforts are lacking in both
substance and durability, the goals of negotiating and building peace
are nevertheless laudable. Going forward, the administration should
recall that there is no simple formula for resolving protracted
conflicts. That one cannot buy peace with mineral and real estate
deals is just one instantiation of that very truth. As Peter J.
Quaranto and George A. Lopez recently spelled out
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Security_, future deals must include the participation of local
actors, third-party verification mechanisms, and solutions that
respond to the complex drivers of conflict. More predatory actors,
meanwhile, should be held accountable for past wrongs, not rewarded as
a resources-forward peace deal is likely to do. These are not easy or
straightforward tasks – if they were, peace would have taken hold
long ago. But they are necessary ones, and Trump’s summer of peace
theater has done little to advance them.

_David J. Simon [[link removed]] is
a Senior Lecturer at Yale University’s Jackson School of Global
Affairs, as well as the assistant dean for graduate education at the
school. David serves as director of Yale’s Genocide Studies Program
[[link removed]]. He directs the program’s Mass Atrocities
in the Digital Era
[[link removed]] project, which
addresses how digital technology influences all aspects of
contemporary mass atrocities._

_Kathryn Hemmer [[link removed]]
(LinkedIn [[link removed]]) is a Mass
Atrocities in the Digital Era (MADE) Fellow with the Yale Genocide
Studies Program and a Visiting Fellow at the Addis Ababa University
School of Law (International Humanitarian Law Clinic)._

_Just Security [[link removed]] is an online
forum for the rigorous analysis of security, democracy, foreign
policy, and rights. Founded in 2013, we aim to promote principled and
pragmatic solutions to problems confronting decision-makers in the
United States and abroad. Our expert authors are individuals with
significant government experience, academics, civil society
practitioners, individuals directly affected by national security
policies, and other leading voices. Our Board of Editors includes a
broad range of leading experts on domestic and international law and
policy. Just Security is based at the Reiss Center on Law and Security
[[link removed]] at New York University School of
Law._

* Donald Trump
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* Azerbaijan
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* Armenia
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* Democratic Republic of Congo
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* Rwanda
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* Gaza
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* Ukraine
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* Russia
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