Just past Yom Kippur, Tuesday will mark two years since the deadly attack on October 7, when thousands of Hamas fighters launched a deadly coordinated assault killing more than one thousand Israelis and taking hundreds hostage.

Since then, the security landscape of the region has been fundamentally upended: Iran’s proxy network of militias and allies—including Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis—has been significantly weakened; President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was toppled; and Iran’s nuclear program, air defense network, and missile forces have been severely compromised. At the same time, the war between the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas militants has exacted a devastating toll on Palestinian lives and livelihoods in Gaza.

With the balance of power now decisively in favor of Israel (and the United States), President Donald Trump is focused on bringing peace to the region—prodding Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to apologize for his unilateral strike in Qatar, and more importantly, unveiling a twenty-step plan to end the war in Gaza. That plan notably calls for an immediate ceasefire upon the acceptance of the deal; the return of all hostages living and deceased within seventy-two hours; the disarmament and dismantlement of Hamas; a surge of humanitarian aid into Gaza; the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF); the eventual withdrawal of Israeli troops; and governance by an “apolitical Palestinian committee” overseen by Trump’s “Board for Peace,” chaired by the president himself, that includes the likes of former United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Backed by Israel, the proposal has been widely welcomed by leaders across the Middle East and Europe.

But if you’re anything like me, you may be experiencing a degree of déjà vu. This is hardly the first time that a peace plan has been put forward and government officials, mediators, and experts have announced that we were close to a deal. How many times have we heard, “We’re on the ten-yard line”? Those past plans ultimately were rejected by the Israeli government or Hamas. So what’s different this time? The biggest differentiator is that Hamas is now under mounting pressure from Arab states.

The Gulf countries—chief among them Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as their neighbors Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey have a strong interest in seeing an end to the war. A little more than five years ago, the UAE normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, and just before October 7, Saudi Arabia was on a path to normalization. Further normalization is on hold so long as this war continues. At the same time, each of these countries face a new set of domestic political dynamics around a young generation that is more energized about the plight of the Palestinians than their parents.

Israel got most of what it wanted in the deal. There is no specific deadline for a pull-out, but one that is performance-based and, hence, open to interpretation. Similarly, there is no specific path toward a two-state solution, but rather an amorphous commitment to new Palestinian leadership under the direction of “the Board.” Despite these relatively vague commitments, the Palestinian Authority endorsed the deal, although their support is unlikely to move the needle.

The question now is whether Hamas will agree to and implement the full terms of the deal. Just this afternoon, Hamas announced that it was willing to release the hostages but stopped short of agreeing to the entire proposal. As Axios’ Barak Ravid noted, Hamas’ response was essentially “yes but.” We’ll see if Trump and Netanyahu can stomach the prospect of Hamas attempting to negotiate the terms of the overarching plan–namely their disarmament and dissolution, while prisoners are exchanged and hostages are released amid a cessation of hostilities.

There wasn’t much wiggle room in Trump’s initial proposal, which demanded complete acceptance by Sunday, backed up with the threat that if Hamas rejected the deal, “all HELL, like no one has ever seen before, will break out.” Trump has made similar threats before, only to negotiate further, and it is hard to imagine how Gaza could get more hellish.

In my eyes, three scenarios are likely to play out, each with their own accompanying costs and consequences.

In the first (and least likely) scenario, Hamas not only agrees to release the hostages in accordance with Trump’s plan but accedes, somewhat swiftly, to the remaining points in the proposal. Hamas might just be under enough pressure to consider abandoning the revolutionary, fighting ethos of their founding charter and lay down their arms—but I’m not holding my breath. Accepting the plan as is would essentially bring an end to the group as a military and political entity. It would be Hamas agreeing not to be Hamas: stripped of their remaining leverage over Israel—the hostages and their arms—and disempowered from playing a role in Gaza’s future governance. It is hard to imagine them just giving up at this stage unless pressure from the rest of the Arab world, now that Iran has been largely neutered, makes it impossible for them to operate. At the start of the week, I thought it wasn’t worth considering a scenario where Hamas agrees to unilateral disarmament and political dissolution just for an exchange of prisoners and a cessation of hostilities. Today’s announcement changed the calculus, albeit modestly.

That brings me to my second scenario. Hamas could accept the proposal but, in reality, pursue partial implementation: agreeing to release the hostages while using the cessation of hostilities to regroup, re-arm (to the extent possible), and lobby Arab states to walk back their endorsements of the proposal to push for further concessions. If Hamas employs this approach, or walks back their commitment to releasing the remaining hostages, Israel could respond by following through on Trump’s invitation to “finish the job,” redoubling its operations in Gaza City and escalating the tempo and severity of its strikes throughout the territory. Such actions would be sure to bring even more devastation to Gaza, not to mention greater international uproar, to say nothing of what might befall the remaining hostages in Hamas custody. It is a deeply unattractive scenario, particularly for the Palestinian civilians caught in the middle in Gaza.

The third scenario falls between the first two: a more limited continuation of the war coupled with partial implementation of Trump’s proposal. Under Trump’s plan, should Hamas delay or reject the agreement, the plan would ostensibly proceed in those parts of Gaza already cleared of militants, with aid operations and reconstruction efforts launched under ISF supervision. But this path, while laudable, is fraught. It would require international forces to deploy into an environment where fighting still rages in Gaza City and other contested areas—potentially demanding an unprecedented and risky commitment of forces from Arab and potentially other countries. Moreover, it is difficult to envisage large-scale redevelopment or meaningful capital investment taking root so long as the war continues next door to zones under ISF control

Indeed, it is highly possible that Israel and Hamas make progress on the first points of the plan—a cessation in fighting and the exchange of hostages and prisoners—only to see the long-term components crumble and the war resume, once again.

Hamas has remained staunch in the face of immense casualties and dwindling prospects for a resumption of the pre-October 7 status quo. We have little reason to doubt their resolve and should hesitate to assume their leadership will act rationally or in the best interests of Gaza’s civilian population.

Let’s hope that I’m proven wrong, and that this next year is one that brings lasting peace.

Let me know what you think about the future of peace in the Middle East and what this column should cover next by replying to [email protected].

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What I’m reading this week:

CFR’s tribute to Jerome A. Cohen, a legal pioneer, China expert, mentor, and friend
Mike Horowitz and Lauren Kahn’s latest essay for Foreign Affairs, on “The Cost of AGI Delusion” and the risk of America falling behind in the real AI race
Nathaniel Taplin’s analysis in The Wire China on, “Taiwan’s Achilles’ Heel”
CFR’s ongoing series on “How I Got My Career in Foreign Policy” featuring Ebenezer Obadare and Michael Werz
Heidi Crebo-Rediker and Douglas Rediker’s Financial Times editorial on “preparing for politicized dollar liquidity”