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Much news today focuses on the government shutdown due to Congress’s failure to appropriate money for the approximately 25 to 30 percent of total spending that falls within the discretionary part of the budget. Yet less attention is being given to a larger, long-term budget failure: the Trump Administration refuses to adhere to 31 U.S. Code Section 1105 [ [link removed] ], which requires the President to submit a budget for all spending and taxes to Congress by the first Monday in February each year, and to another law [ [link removed] ] that requires a ten-year accounting for many budget items. While there is usually a delay in the first or transition year [ [link removed] ] budget submission by a new president, as of October 1, fiscal year 2026 began with the President having only provided a “skinny budget” [ [link removed] ] primarily covering appropriations and a “Mid-Session Review to the 2026 Budget [ [link removed] ]” that contained no revenue, outlay, deficit, or debt numbers.
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Despite numerous discussions about how strong the office of the President has become, the lack of a complete budget reflects a weak presidency with no clear long-term plan for guiding the country into the future. It’s easy to see from the President’s actions so far why he chose not to provide a complete presidential budget document this year and may not do so for the next three years as well.
First, it’s nearly impossible to estimate the budget impact of unknown, often large, whimsical presidential actions through loosely defined executive orders rather than purposeful and more clearly articulated Congressional legislation. Relatedly, the budget estimators in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) don’t know, and likely don’t want to predict, the Constitutionality of many of those executive actions and how that would further affect levels of spending and revenues.
Second, providing the traditional set of ten-year estimates would require specifying what spending cuts or tax increases will occur either automatically or through proposed legislative action when the trust fund assets are depleted [ [link removed] ] in the Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance and in the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) programs in about nine or seven years—that is, by 2034 and 2032, respectively.
During approximately 15 years at the Treasury Department, my office collaborated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to produce estimates for the revenue portion of the President’s budget submission to Congress. The President’s budget forecasts revenue and spending amounts based on the economic assumptions and policies that the President proposes.
Putting myself in the shoes of the OMB and Treasury staff, I would need to ask these questions to the top officials in the Executive Office of the President.
(1) Whimsical government. What should we assume will be the Administration’s revenue policy on items such as tariffs on furniture and bathroom vanities, increased government ownership of private firms, and the size of enforcement personnel, like IRS agents who raise money for the government? On the expenditure side, how much should we adjust spending for future cutbacks that the President argues he can implement by executive order, in addition to the spending cuts he proposes to be enacted by Congress?
Additionally, how should we adjust these estimates in light of Constitutional uncertainty, and, to the extent that courts find that executive actions violate the Constitution, for the reduced spending that occurs anyway due to judicial delays in settling these disputes?
(2) Social Security and Medicare. Under current law, benefits must be reduced for current beneficiaries once the trust funds are depleted, and spending continues to exceed incoming revenues. The President has promised not to touch Social Security and Medicare benefits and, excluding tariffs, not to increase taxes. However, to produce a traditional ten-year estimate that extends through 2035 in the fiscal year 2026 proposed budget, we must know which of the following options, alone or in combination, to include in the estimates near the end of those ten years:
The size of the benefit cut that people will face without reform.
The size of the benefit cut the Administration proposes to Congress as an alternative.
The level of tax increase that the Administration proposes to prevent benefit cuts in those years.
The structure of any amendment to the Social Security and Medicare laws that currently prevent those programs from spending general revenues, in defiance of the trust fund concept that the programs must pay their own way.
In fairness, every recent presidential budget document has avoided addressing some or all of the long-term imbalances in both Social Security and Medicare. The Biden Administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2024 [ [link removed] ] did suggest significantly increasing Medicare taxes on high earners, but this would only delay the depletion of one trust fund and effectively reinforce the unsustainable rate of growth in healthcare spending.
In summary, unpredictable government actions, such as the sudden imposition and sometimes quick lifting of tariffs, along with the failure to inform the public about how known budget shortfalls will be addressed, create significant uncertainty. A reliable budget is just one casualty.
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