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At The Intercept, Shawn Musgrave [ [link removed] ]revealed [ [link removed] ] that US immigration authorities used administrative subpoenas to obtain data from Google and Meta on international students who protested Israel’s ongoing war on the Gaza Strip.
Cornell graduates and student activists Momodou Taal and Amandla Thomas-Johnson fled their dorms fearing retaliation, and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the intelligence arm of ICE, pursued them using subpoenas which require no judge’s approval.
Meta notified Taal of a subpoena for his social media accounts, giving him time to challenge it. Google, however, handed over Thomas-Johnson’s Gmail data without prior notice. Critics warned that such subpoenas — requiring no probable cause — enable surveillance of protected speech.
Taal’s visa was revoked after State Department analysis of his activism, prompting a lawsuit he later dropped before leaving the country. Taal said the HSI subpoenas were a “phishing [sic] expedition.”
Google confirmed it released only basic subscriber information. Legal experts and civil liberties advocates expressed alarm at Silicon Valley’s compliance, arguing it increases risks for noncitizens engaged in political dissent.
If You Read One More Thing: A Bill to Cut ‘Greedy’ Military Contractors
At Military.com, Patricia Kime [ [link removed] ]reported [ [link removed] ] on a bipartisan effort led by US Senators Elizabeth Warren and Joni Ernst to crack down on excessive markups by military contractors.
The proposed legislation, titled the Stop Price Gouging the Military Act, aimed to curb inflated costs on basic items — such as a soap dispenser with a 7,943% markup — by requiring contractors to provide a reason if the cost of spare parts jumps by more than 25%.
A watchdog report found the Air Force did not “pay ‘fair and reasonable prices’” for some spare parts,” according to the article.
Warren said “[g]reedy contractors are threatening our military readiness by sneaking unreasonably high prices into our military’s contracts for basic materials or spare parts.”
Ernst said “defense dollars should be spent on making our military the most lethal fighting force the world has ever seen, not padding the pockets of slick government contractors.”
No More Russian Energy?
For Politico, Barbara Moens [ [link removed] ]examined [ [link removed] ] the European Union’s struggle to meet US conditions to halt Russian oil imports as the Trump administration piles more demands on its European allies.
Moens reported that although the EU had significantly reduced its reliance on Russian energy, it reported internal EU divisions, particularly stemming from Hungary and Slovakia, who view Russian energy as critical.
Moens concluded that while the EU may cut Russian oil, it’s less likely that Turkey — a key NATO ally — would do so.
European officials expressed that some of Trump’s demands, including sanctions on China, were impossible.
Deep Dive: The US Tech that Paved the Way for Pakistan’s Digital Surveillance State
Amnesty International has published “Shadows of Control: Censorship and Mass Surveillance in Pakistan [ [link removed] ],” a sweeping investigation into the country’s digital repression apparatus. The report revealed how Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies have built a vast surveillance infrastructure with the help of foreign companies — including several based in the United States. These firms supplied critical technologies that now underpin Pakistan’s ability to monitor, censor, and intimidate its citizens at scale.
“Pakistan has expanded its censorship and surveillance capacities through acquisition of the technologies” covered in the report, according to Amnesty.
At the center of Pakistan’s surveillance regime are two systems: the Web Monitoring System 2.0 (WMS 2.0) and the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS). WMS 2.0 functions as a nationwide firewall capable of inspecting and blocking up to two million concurrent internet sessions. LIMS enables real-time interception of phone calls, messages, and browsing activity, with the capacity to monitor over four million mobile devices.
The report warned that “routine use of internet shutdowns has created an environment where authorities can arbitrarily decide, without any transparency, when a website is added to a block list or removed from it, creating a chilling effect on civil society, disproportionally targeting marginalized communities.”
Amnesty said that “International companies and exporting states bear significant responsibility for allowing this to happen.”
While Chinese firm Geedge Networks supplied the backbone of WMS 2.0, Amnesty identified Niagara Networks, a US-based company headquartered in Silicon Valley, as a provider of hardware components used in Pakistan’s WMS 1.0. Niagara Networks told Amnesty that “oftentimes we do not know the end customers and how our products are utilized … Our products are primarily used in the financial, healthcare & energy markets.”
Another US connection emerged through Sandvine, now Applogic Network, a company originally based in Canada but acquired by San Francisco-based private equity firm Francisco Partners in 2017. Sandvine’s technology powered Pakistan’s earlier firewall system, WMS 1.0, installed in 2018. According to trade data reviewed by Amnesty, Sandvine supplied equipment to Pakistani firms with close ties to the government, including Inbox Technologies and SN Skies Pvt Ltd. Although Sandvine reportedly exited the Pakistani market in 2023, its legacy infrastructure laid the foundation for future upgrades.
Amnesty’s investigation revealed that many of these companies failed to conduct adequate human rights due diligence. Of the 20 firms contacted, only two provided substantive responses — Niagara Networks and Sandvine. The rest either declined to comment or offered vague assurances.
Pakistan’s surveillance systems operate with minimal legal oversight. The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) formally directed all four major telecom providers to integrate with LIMS, effectively mandating mass interception capabilities. Once a phone number is entered into the system, state agents — including those from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) — can access call records, location data, and even encrypted browsing metadata. Amnesty documented how these tools were used to target journalists, activists, and members of civil society.
One journalist told Amnesty that “as a journalist, I know that I am under surveillance in my digital space … [We know that] telecom companies in Pakistan are helping the intelligence agencies to intercept my phone calls, messages and even my movement.” The journalist said intelligence authorities even intercepted his WhatsApp messages.
The report also warned that Pakistan’s surveillance regime is expanding under the Digital Nation Pakistan Act 2025, which aims to consolidate citizens’ digital identities and governance data. Amnesty argued that this centralization would deepen the state’s ability to track, profile, and punish dissent. Without change, “the unchecked expansion of digital repression in Pakistan will continue to erode civic space and democratic freedoms,” the report concluded.
Show Us the Receipts
At Inkstick, Katy Fallon [ [link removed] ]documented [ [link removed] ] a sweeping international crackdown on Palestine solidarity movements, spanning the US, UK, Germany, France, and Greece. Fallon detailed arrests, deportation threats, and legal designations of activist groups as terrorist organizations, all efforts to suppress dissent amid Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza. The piece underscored how governments weaponized legal systems — what advocates call “lawfare” — to silence pro-Palestinian voices, including students, academics, and artists. Fallon cited reports from the European Legal Support Center and Forensic Architecture, warning that these repressive tactics, often modeled on US policy, posed long-term threats to free expression globally.
Angie Mrad and Matthew Kynaston [ [link removed] ]chronicled [ [link removed] ] the harrowing experience of Mai, a Nepali domestic worker trapped for years under Lebanon’s abusive kafala foreign worker sponsorship system. The article revealed how Mai was unpaid for six years, emotionally manipulated by her employer, and left undocumented and homeless. Through interviews and field reporting, Mrad and Kynaston illustrated how Lebanon’s sponsorship laws foster economic and psychological captivity for over 250,000 migrant workers. Despite interventions by NGOs and Nepal’s consulate, Mai remained and continued working for her employer until she departed Lebanon, receiving only $200 for six years’ work.
At The World, Rebecca Henschke [ [link removed] ]investigated [ [link removed] ] how TikTok became a lifeline for trafficking victims trapped in scam compounds across Myanmar’s lawless border zones. Henschke profiled rescue activist Araya Phisutthiratanaphan, who used viral videos to expose abuses and pressure authorities into action by saving victims himself. The article revealed how thousands of foreign workers were lured into cybercrime operations, then held captive under brutal conditions. Henschke highlighted the role of local networks and social media in circumventing state inaction, offering a rare glimpse into Myanmar’s hidden criminal enclaves and the fight to dismantle them.
Inkstick Call for US Pitches
Inkstick is on the lookout for pitches from the US. We’re especially interested in reported features and personal essays that examine issues like the weapons industry, the increasing militarization on the border and within the country, domestic extremism, and the people in power pushing for more wars abroad.
Critical State is written by Inkstick Media in collaboration with The World.
The World is a weekday public radio show and podcast on global issues, news, and insights from PRX and GBH.
With an online magazine and podcast featuring a diversity of expert voices, Inkstick Media is “foreign policy for the rest of us.”
Critical State is made possible in part by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

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