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DANIEL BENSAID AND QUESTION OF STRATEGY  
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Sankha Subhra Biswas
September 8, 2025
Socialist Project
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_ The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not merely a geopolitical
event but also resulted, globally, in a profound crisis in
revolutionary thought. _

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Introduction: A Strategist in the Ruins of Defeat

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was not merely a geopolitical
event but also resulted, globally, in a profound crisis in
revolutionary thought. Amidst the ruins of socialist hope scattered
across a neoliberal landscape, one encounters Daniel Bensaïd, a
Marxist who refused to accept defeat without extracting lessons from
historical setbacks. As a prominent intellectual within the French
Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) and a prolific writer
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debate on communist strategy at a time when the very notion was often
ridiculed or dismissed. His Marxism was not a set of rigid dogmas but
rather an orientation – a wager on the potential for rupture, shaped
by the tragic memories of past revolutions and the pressing need for
battles in the present.

For Bensaïd, communism was not an endpoint but a strategic process,
an emancipatory project that must be continually reinterpreted in
response to changing circumstances. His legacy lies in the revival of
the concept of strategy as a political art – one that is temporary,
contingent, organised, and inherently revolutionary.

I. Strategy as Historical Recomposition

Bensaïd starts from a sense that the Left has not merely lost battles
but also forgotten them. “We have not only lost battles,” he says,
“but also the memory of battles lost and won.”1
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His initial strategic project, therefore, is the recovery of
revolutionary memory – not nostalgia but a way of remembering lost
possibilities.

Instead of canonising the October Revolution or dropping it, Bensaïd
argues that it should be left as a contradictory legacy: “We must
neither canonise nor cancel the October Revolution. We must inherit it
as a contradictory legacy, a laboratory of strategic hypotheses.”2
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This dialectical transmission of Bolshevism as a lesson and warning is
at the heart of Bensaïd’s strategy. It is not a matter of copying
Leninist forms but of relearning the strategic art of invention in
completely changed conditions.

II. The Temporal Turn: Breaking with Historicist Fatalism

Bensaïd’s most significant theoretical contribution lies in his
rethinking of political temporality. He challenges both reformist
gradualism and insurrectionary immediatism by constructing a strategic
model that embraces a nonlinear, messianic conception of time.
Influenced by Walter Benjamin, Bensaïd rejects the notion of history
as a linear progression and emphasises the potential for rupture,
interruption, and bifurcation.

“Politics is the art of the event,” he asserts, “of
interruption, of bifurcation.”3
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Revolution is not simply the realisation of objective necessity;
rather, it constitutes a risk taken amidst the unforeseen. This
understanding of temporality enables Bensaïd to conceptualise
revolution as a possibility, distinct from both utopia and
determinism. Revolution acts as an interruption to the continuity of
the mundane, rather than its culmination. This line of reasoning
prompts Bensaïd to reconsider strategy as a gamble, as Pascal has
suggested: an action undertaken in the face of uncertainty, yet one
that remains guided by reason, prudence, and commitment. He states,
“To be revolutionary is to act in the interval, to seize the moment
when time is out of joint.”4
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III. A Return to Lenin – Without Leninism

One of Bensaïd’s most difficult claims is the call for a “return
to Lenin without Leninism.”5
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This is not a call for the restoration of a bureaucratic system of
centralised party politics but rather a call for recapturing Lenin’s
strategic imagination in facing new historical conditions.

Bensaïd argues, “Lenin was not a strategist of revolution in
general” (…) “but of a revolution in a backward country in a
moment of world war.”6
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Today’s assignment is not to repeat Lenin’s conclusions but
instead to employ his method: a fierce concentration on the
conjunctural situation, a commitment to tactical flexibility, and a
firm commitment to revolutionary breaks.

It is a vision that enables Bensaïd to assert the need for
organisation without adopting the vulgar and distorted dogmas, peddled
by the CP tradition, of “Leninism” as a model. The revolutionary
party, in his view, is a hypothesis of strategy and not a metaphysical
model. It has to be judged on whether it can organise revolutionary
agency, act in crisis, and anticipate rupture – rather than on
whether it is in accordance with the canonical model.

IV. Contrary to the Attrition Strategy

One of Bensaïd’s most incisive criticisms pertains to the strategy
of attrition (_guerre de position_), particularly as it was
conceptualised and implemented by a significant portion of the postwar
European Left, especially within the Eurocommunist framework. In
recognition of Gramsci’s influence, Bensaïd warns against reducing
Gramsci to a mere form of parliamentary realism.

“In the name of hegemony, the left has often abandoned conflict; in
the name of realism, it has abandoned rupture.”7
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The prolonged engagement with institutions, initially perceived as a
necessary adaptation, often serves as a façade for tactical
surrender. This approach has resulted not in revolution but rather in
assimilation into the bourgeois system.

Bensaïd expresses scepticism about the appeal of spontaneous
revolution and gradual electoral reform. He posits that strategy must
encapsulate a dialectical tension between preparation and rupture, as
well as between position and manoeuvrability, all while being firmly
anchored in a realistic analysis of power relations. He believes that
a radical transformation of the state cannot occur without a
disruption of the constitutional and legal order. “No revolution has
ever been made without breaking laws, without upsetting the legal
order.”8
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V. Organisation as Strategic Hypothesis

Amidst the horizontalist upheavals, re-emerging anarchist tides, and
frustration with institutionalised forms, Bensaïd emphasises the
requirement for political organising – not as an issue of coercion
but as a pragmatic necessity of efficacious strategic action.

“I have never been a party fanatic,” he claims in his political
memoir, An Impatient Life. “But I have always defended the necessity
of organised political will.”9
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The revolutionary party for Bensaïd is not an object of fixation.
Instead, it is a tool, a provisional and flexible hypothesis, and a
means of bringing revolutionary strategy together over time.

In opposition to the anti-organizational thrusts of autonomism and
anarchism, Bensaïd argues that without coordination, without memory,
and without continuity, revolt is episodic and finally reabsorbed. He
is adamant, however, that organisation needs to be open, democratic,
and flexible – it cannot stiffen into hierarchy or dogma.

VI. Strategic Hope and the Revolutionary Wager

Bensaïd’s theory reaches its pinnacle in the concept of the wager.
Strategy should not be perceived as a science of the inevitable;
rather, it should be understood as a political practice rooted in
possibilities. He asserts, “To be a revolutionary today (…) is to
wager on the possibility of another world in a world that declares
itself without alternatives.”10
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This wager is not absurd; it represents a rational gamble within the
context of uncertainty.

In the face of disaster – be it ecological catastrophe, imperial
warfare, or capitalist brutality – revolution must be reaffirmed as
a risk rather than a guarantee. “Politics is not the art of
prediction,” Bensaïd asserts, “but of the possible. The possible
is not what is probable, but what we make possible.”11
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Bensaïd reminds us of the fundamental essence of Marxism – not
merely as a form of crude economic determinism but as an approach
centred on practice, a theory of liberation, and a strategy for
radical transformation. His work is characterised not by the creation
of new slogans but by his reclamation of the very possibility of
communist political practice in the 21st century.

Comrade Bensaid: A Communist for Catastrophic Times

Daniel Bensaïd’s contribution to the question of communist strategy
is both existential and theoretical. He does not provide final
blueprints, rigid dogmas, or redemptive ideologically framed plans.
Instead, he offers something far more essential amidst disintegration:
a strategy, a sense of context, and a commitment to liberty. In the
wake of the 20th century’s ruins, Bensaïd resisted the dual
temptations of nostalgia and despair. He insisted that the future must
remain open, in flux, and contested. His legacy should not be embalmed
but actively engaged with. As capitalism seems invincible and the
prospect of an apocalypse appears more plausible than the end of
capital itself, Bensaïd’s voice resonates: “We are no longer in
the time of promises but of urgency. The urgency to act, to think, to
organise, to rebel.”12
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It would be unjust to Bensaïd if we did not extend our analysis to
the current scenario in India, where the parliamentary space for the
left has diminished and the younger generation perceives left parties
as relics of the past. In the following section, we will attempt to
formulate a strategic plan informed by Bensaïd’s insights.

Bensaïd in the Time of Hindutva: Strategic Thought for a
Besieged Democracy

Daniel Bensaïd’s strategic rejuvenation is of critical importance
in the post-Cold War West, but it assumes an even more urgent
importance in India – where the Hindutva march has redrawn the
terrain of conflict. The Sangh Parivar’s capture of state machinery,
the consolidation of Hindu majoritarianism, and the use of religion to
serve capital and imperial interests are not temporary problems;
rather, they are symptoms of a deep strategic disorientation affecting
the Indian Left.

In this time of a catastrophic surge from the far right, Bensaïd’s
writings resonate with renewed significance. He does not provide
ready-made solutions but instead offers tools for orientation – a
call for historical memory, a rejection of linear determinism, and a
vigorous defence of revolutionary will as a gamble. What is needed is
not orthodoxy or nostalgia but the tactical rearming of communists at
a moment when fascism dons saffron robes, and “_Jai Shri Ram_”
slogans fill the air alongside acts of lynching.

To situate Bensaïd within the context of India is not merely to
introduce theoretical concepts; it is to translate the ongoing
struggles. It involves the reclamation of the communist art of
strategy in a landscape that is deeply fractured by caste, religion,
and the impacts of neoliberal dispossession.

I. Rupture, Not Accommodation: The Bankruptcy of
Parliamentary Caution

The Indian Left, particularly its leading political parties, has
predominantly adopted an attritionist strategy – a gradualist
approach rooted in parliamentary communism and Gandhian ethics.
However, faced with the formidable within the context of the RSS-BJP
trajectory, this strategy has proven to be vastly inadequate. The
timidity associated with parliamentary norms, opportunistic
conciliation, and reliance on constitutional principles have failed to
curb the growing popularity of Hindutva, let alone establish a
counter-hegemonic movement.

Bensaïd’s critique of Eurocommunism holds particular relevance in
this context. Similar to the Western communist parties that were drawn
into the embrace of bourgeois democracy under the pretence of a
“hegemonic strategy,” the Indian Left faces a comparable dilemma
– caught in a position of disarmament while ostensibly upholding the
“idea of India.” As Bensaïd cautioned, _“In the name of
realism, the left has abandoned rupture.”13
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Defending the progressive ethos of Constitution is not merely a
strategy; it is a position. While it is essential, it is not
sufficient on its own. Hindutva represents more than just an electoral
challenge – it is a fascistic movement grounded in mass
mobilisation, ideological indoctrination, and violence. To effectively
counter this threat, we need more than just slogans and coalitions; we
require a revolutionary counter-offensive that is built on popular
organisation, tactical imagination, and strategic audacity.

II. Time Out of Joint: Strategic Temporality in a Fragmented Society

India’s experience of time is fractured. The rural and urban
populations, the Adivasi and the metropolitan elite, as well as the
Dalit and the Savarna, all perceive time as being out of joint. The
Modi regime has exploited this temporal dissonance – infusing
everyday life with spectacle, myth, and urgency, while simultaneously
enacting a slow and brutal transformation of the state.

It is at this juncture that Bensaïd’s cartography of time provides
profound insights. He contends that revolution is not merely a matter
of “ripening conditions” but rather about seizing “time out of
joint.”14
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The revolutionary subject must act when contradictions are in
conflict, rather than waiting for economic determinism to indicate
that the moment is opportune.

For Indian communists, this necessitates a departure from the stageism
that has long stifled strategic initiative – waiting for the
‘consolidation of democracy’, the ‘maturity of the
bourgeoisie’, or for ‘the appropriate time’. That moment will
never arrive – it must be enforced through intervention,
articulation, and rupture as politics is all about the art of
possibility.

In an era where fascism seems ever-present, maintaining hope is a
strategic necessity. Communists must embrace the role of artists of
disruption, rather than mere prophets of historical inevitability.

III. Opposition to Spontaneism and Electoralism: Reconstructing the
Party as a Strategic Proposition

The decline of major communist parties in India, most notably the
CPI(M) in West Bengal, has led to a dual phenomenon of electoral
dissolution and spontaneous despondency. On the one hand, some
individuals view the voting process as the sole arena for conflict,
aligning their discourse with the prevailing liberal consensus. On the
other hand, there are those who retreat within a horizontal framework,
rejecting organisational structures in favour of localised resistance
movements and identity-based struggles.

Bensaïd dismisses both perspectives. For him, the revolutionary party
is neither a bureaucratic entity nor an outdated relic. It represents
a gamble, a democratic means of preserving collective memory and
fostering coordination, as well as a space for developing
counter-power.

“I have never been a party fanatic,” Bensaïd reminds us. “But I
have always defended the necessity of organised political will.”15
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In contemporary India, such an effort necessitates the reorganisation
of revolutionary movements – not by emulating Bolshevik models, but
rather as a strategy for cultivating a strategic subjectivity capable
of countering both state and movement fascism. This entails training
militants who can navigate crises, establish counter-institutions, and
place the question of power at the forefront – not merely engage in
protest.

Such a party must not be dominated by Savarna interests, nor should it
embody patriarchal or caste-blind ideologies. It must be grounded in
anti-caste praxis, Dalit-Bahujan-Adivasi resistance, Muslim
solidarity, and working-class rebellion. Its strategy should be
intersectional in substance, Leninist in initiative, and imbued with
the spirit of Bensaïd.

IV. Revolution as a Wager in Catastrophic Times

India under Modi has entered a phase characterised by managed
catastrophes, marked by a climate crisis, widespread joblessness, the
suppression of dissent, and a form of digital fascism that operates
through algorithms and annihilation. In this environment,
revolutionary politics is often dismissed as either utopian or
outdated.

However, it is precisely within this context that Bensaïd’s wager
becomes vital. The revolutionary does not act out of a mere belief in
victory; she acts because everything is at stake. To remain inactive
is to be complicit.

“To be revolutionary today is to wager on the possibility of another
world in a world that declares itself without alternatives.”16
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This wager does not reject defeat; rather, it is born from it. The
Left in India has encountered significant setbacks. Movements have
been crushed, comrades are imprisoned, and laws have been
criminalised. Nevertheless, Bensaïd reminds us that memory itself
serves as a form of resistance: the memory of Naxalbari, of Bhagat
Singh, of the Dalit Panthers, and of Shaheen Bagh.

From these fragments, strategy can be reassembled – not as mere
repetition but as a process of reinvention.

V. Tactical Lessons for India: Meeting the Conjuncture

Bensaïd provides specific strategic insights that could be beneficial
to the Indian Left in the current context:

* CONJUNCTURAL ANALYSIS: The Left must refrain from merely repeating
slogans and instead cultivate the ability to analyse the contemporary
configuration of forces. What is the relationship among Hindutva,
capital, caste, and the state today? Where are the critical points of
rupture – such as university campuses, gig economy strikes, Adivasi
areas in rural India, and Dalit urban ghettos?
* ALLIANCE WITHOUT LIQUIDATION: Bensaïd advocated for the formation
of united fronts while maintaining programmatic clarity. In the Indian
context, this entails forging alliances with anti-fascist forces –
such as Ambedkarite, feminist, and ecological movements – without
diluting communist principles into generic resistance.
* MULTIPLE TEMPORALITIES: The strategy should function on various
levels – mass mobilisation, cadre education, electoral positioning,
and revolutionary preparation. Each moment must be understood as part
of a broader totality in motion.
* MEMORY AS STRATEGY: The Hindutva reimagining of history must be
countered with a militant memory – one that recalls the Bhima
Koregaon revolt, the Muslim resistance against partition violence, as
well as the solidarities of the working class and peasant
insurgencies.

Bensaïd advocates for a militant politics characterised by
imagination – a form of politics capable of generating new symbols,
narratives, and visions of freedom that resonate deeply with the
oppressed.

VI. Conclusion: What Needs to Be Done in Modi’s India

How would Daniel Bensaïd address Indian communists today? He would
likely begin with humility, avoiding abstract prescriptions. Instead,
he would affirm that strategy is possible, that rupture is necessary,
and that hope can be political. He would warn against the twin dangers
of despair and complacency. He would encourage communists to organise
– not in secretive cliques but through direct confrontation with
power. He would urge them to sharpen their minds, recalling past
struggles not as relics but as current responsibilities. As he stated:
“We must be strategists of possibility, not administrators of the
probable. We must act in the name of that which does not yet exist,
but must.”17
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India does not need more of today’s managers but rather
revolutionaries capable of envisioning what is possible. In this
sense, Bensaïd is not merely an external voice; he is a comrade
speaking about the future. •

This article first published on the Alternative Viewpoint
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website.

Endnotes

* Daniel Bensaïd, Marx for Our Times: Adventures and Misadventures
of a Critique
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trans. Gregory Elliott (London: Verso, 2002), 18.
* Daniel Bensaïd, Un héritage sans testament (Paris: La
Découverte, 2001), 34.
* Daniel Bensaïd, La discordance des temps (Paris: Editions de la
Passion, 1995), 107.
* Daniel Bensaïd, Walter Benjamin, sentinelle messianique
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(Paris: Plon, 1990), 123.
* Bensaïd, Stratégies de la gauche radicale (Paris: Textuel,
2003), 56.
* Ibid., 58.
* Bensaïd, La discordance des temps, 120.
* Ibid., 125.
* Daniel Bensaïd, An Impatient Life: A Memoir
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trans. David Fernbach (London: Verso, 2013), 243.
* Bensaïd, Marx for Our Times
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289.
* Daniel Bensaïd, Fragments mécréants: Sur les mythes
identitaires et la république imaginaire (Paris: Lignes, 2005), 71.
* Bensaïd, An Impatient Life, 280.
* Daniel Bensaïd, La discordance des temps (Paris: Editions de la
Passion, 1995), 120.
* Daniel Bensaïd, Fragments mécréants (Paris: Lignes, 2005), 71.
* Daniel Bensaïd, An Impatient Life: A Memoir (London: Verso,
2013), 243.
* Bensaïd, Marx for Our Times, 289.
* Daniel Bensaïd, Le Pari mélancolique
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(Paris: Fayard, 1997), 212.

Sankha Subhra Biswas is an editorial board member of _Alternative
Viewpoint_.

 

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