|
A note from the editor, Ryan Costello: Please see our Human Rights Tracker below on a recent violent assault against political prisoners being held at Evin Prison.
Week of August 4, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
Tensions between Iran and Lebanon have escalated sharply in recent days, following remarks by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi about the potential disarmament of Hezbollah. Lebanon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs swiftly condemned the comments, accusing Iran of interfering in its internal affairs and undermining national sovereignty and unity. In its official statement, the Lebanese government emphasized that bilateral relations must be based on mutual respect, equality, and non-interference, and warned that supporting internal groups outside of state institutions is unacceptable.
The controversy emerged after Araghchi, during a televised interview on August 6, commented on growing international pressure to disarm Hezbollah. He said this was not the first time efforts had been made to neutralize the group’s military capabilities, highlighting what he described as Hezbollah’s proven strength on the battlefield. While Araghchi stressed Iran would support Hezbollah’s decisions and refrain from intervening directly, his comments were widely interpreted in Beirut as a veiled endorsement of continued militarization. Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, reinforced the group’s uncompromising stance, stating it would not enter any negotiations about its arms so long as Israeli aggression persisted. He accused Israel of violating ceasefire agreements and justified Hezbollah’s armament as necessary for resistance.
In response to these developments and increasing international pressure, particularly from the United States, the Lebanese cabinet convened on August 7 to address the politically sensitive question of Hezbollah’s disarmament. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack has reportedly presented a phased plan to Lebanese officials aimed at transferring all military capabilities to the state by the end of 2025. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam publicly declared that the Lebanese Armed Forces had been tasked with developing a comprehensive plan to ensure only government forces retain arms. This move marks a significant shift in Lebanese policy, given that Hezbollah has been the only armed faction to retain its weapons since the end of the civil war more than thirty years ago.
Details of the American proposal, referred to as the “Barrack Paper,” were leaked to the press. The document outlines a three-phase disarmament plan. In the first two phases, covering the initial sixty days, the Lebanese army would be responsible for confiscating Hezbollah’s heavy weaponry across the country—including long-range missiles, drones, and anti-air systems—and expanding its military presence in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and the outskirts of Beirut. In the third phase, spanning days 60 to 90, Israel would begin a phased withdrawal from three currently occupied areas, while the Lebanese army dismantles remaining Hezbollah military infrastructure and provides verification to international observers, primarily from the United States and France. If the process proceeds without obstruction, Israel is expected to vacate two additional points. Reconstruction aid from the U.S., France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states would accompany the plan’s successful execution, though Iran is explicitly excluded from any reconstruction role.
The enforcement mechanism built into the plan has provoked criticism for its asymmetry. Should Israel violate the agreement, it would face a reprimand from the United Nations and a possible review of its military partnerships. Conversely, Lebanese non-compliance would result in punitive economic sanctions and the suspension of military and financial assistance. This imbalance has fueled accusations that the framework is biased in favor of Israel and designed to weaken Hezbollah and Iranian influence under the pretext of regional stabilization.
Hezbollah categorically rejected the disarmament initiative, declaring the Lebanese government’s decision null and void and accusing it of committing a grave mistake. The group warned that it would treat the directive as if it did not exist. Despite Hezbollah’s resistance, Lebanon’s president reaffirmed that the disarmament plan would move forward. The group’s domestic standing has weakened in the aftermath of last year’s war with Israel, which resulted in significant military losses and declining public support, especially in the south. Still, Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc urged the cabinet to reconsider, warning that aligning with American demands ultimately serves Israel’s interests.
Strategically, this episode signals a potentially dramatic reconfiguration of the post-civil war Lebanese order. Iran, long seen as a dominant player through its support for Hezbollah, now finds itself sidelined from both security arrangements and post-conflict reconstruction. The U.S. and its allies view the Barrack Paper as an opportunity to further shift the balance of power in the Levant, while Israel seeks to lock in a weakened Hezbollah presence on its northern border. For Lebanon, the challenge lies in asserting state sovereignty while maintaining internal cohesion and withstanding external pressures. The outcome of this initiative could either strengthen Lebanon’s institutional framework or plunge the country deeper into political and sectarian fragmentation.
On Friday afternoon, August 8, U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to hold two separate meetings at the White House—first with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, followed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. According to informed sources within the U.S. government, these talks will culminate in bilateral agreements aimed at expanding U.S. trade relations with South Caucasus nations.
However, the most significant development is expected during a joint trilateral summit, where Pashinyan and Aliyev are anticipated to sign a declaration outlining the final framework for a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
A key element of this agreement is the announcement of a new overland corridor linking mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, running through Armenia’s Syunik province, adjacent to the Iranian border. This project is widely viewed as a revived version of the controversial Zangezur Corridor.
According to BBC Persian, unlike previous iterations, this new route will be jointly developed by Armenia and the United States, fully administered under Armenian sovereignty, and will not include any foreign military presence. To reduce political sensitivity—particularly from Iran—the corridor will be renamed the “Trump Road for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)”, distancing it from the term “Zangezur.”
The U.S. frames TRIPP as a peacebuilding and economic project to enhance trade routes between Asia and Europe, benefiting Turkey and the South Caucasus. However, this has reignited long-standing concerns in Tehran, where officials see it as a challenge to Iran’s regional role.
Iran has historically opposed any corridor resembling Zangezur. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned last year, during his meeting with Pashinyan in Tehran, that such a project could carry unacceptable geopolitical consequences for Iran.
Many Iranian commentators argue that such a route could cut Iran’s narrow land access to Armenia and Russia, resulting in what they call “geopolitical suffocation.” The fear is not that Iran would be bypassed entirely, but that its critical border with Armenia could be undermined and its strategic leverage diminished.
Some Iranian voices have raised the specter of NATO involvement, suggesting the corridor might be used to expand Western influence near Iran’s northern frontier. Yet Caucasus expert Omid Shokri dismissed this interpretation, stating:
“If this were truly about NATO moving to Iran’s borders, why haven’t China and Russia opposed it?”
Amid this polarized debate, President Masoud Pezeshkian has struck a more moderate and strategic tone. In a meeting with Foreign Ministry staff, Iran had called for “de-sensitization” regarding the Zangezur corridor:
“If we take a comprehensive view of expanding relations and cooperation with neighboring and regional countries, then we need not be overly concerned with some of the more minor issues—such as matters involving border corridors in the northwest of the country.”
This call for “desensitization” marks a shift in Iran’s official tone, signaling a willingness to de-escalate tensions and demonstrate flexibility in regional diplomacy. His remarks were well received in Baku and Ankara, interpreted as a sign of Tehran’s openness to peaceful cooperation.
If the TRIPP corridor is genuinely governed by Armenian law, involves no territorial transfer, and respects the Iran–Armenia border, it may not pose the existential threat some Iranian factions anticipate. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s continued investment in infrastructure through Iran, including the Aghband–Ordubad railway, shows Tehran still holds critical regional relevance.
Still, the issue underscores Iran’s broader strategic challenge: how to maintain influence in a changing geopolitical landscape.
Published August 7, 2025
Iran is currently facing one of its most severe infrastructure breakdowns in decades, with overlapping crises in water supply, electricity distribution, and now looming gas shortages. These issues are disrupting daily life, threatening industries, and exposing deep-rooted failures in national planning and governance. The current administration is making efforts to respond, including the accelerated implementation of emergency projects such as the Taleghan-Ziaran water transfer system. This pipeline, spanning 54 kilometers, is designed to move 5 cubic meters of water per second from Ziaran intake near the Taleghan Dam to the Bilqan reservoir in Karaj, with half the supply allocated to Tehran and the other half to alleviate shortages in Karaj. Officials estimate that initial flows will reach Karaj by August 21, and Tehran by mid-October. However, while such projects provide temporary relief, they fall short of addressing the deeper structural imbalances in Iran’s water governance.
Moreover, the current drought—exacerbated by climate change, poor water management, and rising demand—is among the worst in over half a century, with rainfall down 40% from the 57-year average and 43% lower than last year. Iran is not alone in facing such challenges; neighboring countries like Turkey have also reported critical water stress in 2025, highlighting a regional water scarcity crisis that transcends borders and demands cross-national collaboration. Nonetheless, without a fundamental shift in national policy and investment priorities, Iran’s ad hoc interventions risk offering only temporary reprieve while systemic vulnerabilities continue to grow.
In a recent public appearance in Zanjan on July 31, President Masoud Pezeshkian issued a stark warning that Tehran may run out of water entirely in September and October unless consumption is drastically curbed. Instead of offering structural or policy‑based reforms, Pezeshkian shifted blame to previous administrations and distanced himself from failed projects, rhetorically dismissing responsibility: “Why is it my fault? I didn’t do it. I’m the president, but I wasn’t the one who took the water away from there.”
Reports show a 40% drop in water inflow to Tehran’s dams, and forecasts predict no significant rainfall in the coming weeks. Officials at the Ministry of Energy have warned that August and September will be among the hardest months of the year. Yet, to avoid public panic, the government has refrained from implementing formal water rationing, even as pressure builds.
In the absence of systemic responses, residents and building managers are turning to private coping strategies, including the installation of water pumps and storage tanks, at costs exceeding 130 million toman per building. Meanwhile, many families struggle to even pay their utility bills, underscoring the growing divide between infrastructure resilience and household economic capacity.
Notably, despite persistent messaging from authorities urging the public to save water, official data from Tehran Water & Wastewater Company reveals that only 9% of Iran’s water consumption is domestic. A staggering 90% is used in agriculture, and within that 9%, about 22% is lost due to leaks, illegal connections, and faulty metering systems.
The government’s primary response to agricultural water stress has been to push costly desalination and inter-basin transfer projects—such as moving water from the Sea of Oman to central provinces like Isfahan. Critics, including Issa Kalantari, former head of Iran’s Department of Environment, argue that such projects benefit politically connected contractors more than farmers or the public. Kalantari noted in an interview that the annual cost of the Sea of Oman transfer project is $400 million, while Isfahan’s total agricultural output is worth only $150 million, calling the project economically irrational. He estimated the cost of desalinated water at 500,000 tomans per cubic meter, asserting that direct subsidies to farmers would be far more cost-effective.
Studies from Sharif University of Technology back this critique, showing that Iran currently pays $15 in water cost per $1 in agricultural output, a model that threatens to bankrupt both ecosystems and the economy. In a separate warning, Ahad Vazifeh, director of Iran’s National Center for Drought and Crisis Management, described the nation as “rapidly approaching water misery”—a point of no return beyond which water loss becomes irreversible, leading to climate migration, agricultural collapse, and food insecurity.
Parallel to the water crisis, electricity shortages are having a devastating economic impact. A recent report by the Iran Chamber of Commerce Research Center estimates that power outages cause daily economic losses of nearly 18 trillion tomans, with more than 51% of these losses hitting the industrial sector. Based on national accounts and inflation-adjusted data from 2023–2024, the analysis confirms that the electricity crisis has evolved beyond a technical issue and now threatens macro-economic stability.
Official statistics show that 36% of electricity is consumed by industry, followed by households (31%), agriculture (14%), and public institutions (9%). Industries once shielded from planned outages—such as steel, cement, automotive, food processing, and petrochemicals—are now facing frequent blackouts. Steel production in Esfahan, Yazd, and Khuzestan has been disrupted, with companies halting night shifts and facing multimillion-toman losses per day. Cement manufacturers in Khorasan and Fars report a 50% production cut, triggering price hikes and material shortages. Cold storage facilities in northern provinces have suffered spoilage of frozen goods due to outages, directly harming both farmers and consumers. Automotive plants at Iran Khodro and Saipa have experienced full-day shutdowns, delaying vehicle deliveries and disrupting supply chains.
The blackout-driven halt in production is already affecting employment. Over 80,000 industrial workers have been temporarily furloughed without pay this summer alone, with labor unions warning of a broader employment crisis if the situation continues into the fall. In small and medium-sized enterprises, contract and day-wage workers are often the first to be let go, compounding the social impact of infrastructural failure.
If unaddressed, these blackouts will raise the cost of domestic production, damage Iran’s export competitiveness, disrupt supply chains, and lead to price hikes in consumer goods. Economists now warn that if blackouts persist, Iran’s industrial growth in 2025–2026 may turn negative, erasing years of slow recovery.
With winter approaching, Iran is bracing for an intensifying gas crisis that could further strain its fragile infrastructure. Despite being home to the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves, Iran has repeatedly faced seasonal shortages due to a combination of rising domestic demand, export obligations, lack of infrastructure upgrades, and years of mismanagement. In previous winters—including late 2024—gas shortages forced school and government office closures, left highways without electricity, and deprived homes and hospitals of adequate heating.
Energy officials are now warning that without immediate conservation measures and strategic intervention, the situation could worsen dramatically in the 2025–2026 winter. Cold regions in the north and west—already vulnerable—may face long-term heating outages, with ripple effects on public health and productivity. The government has issued early appeals for energy-saving behavior, but analysts argue that such short-term messaging ignores the long-standing structural inefficiencies and investment gaps in Iran’s energy grid.
The gas crisis, combined with water and electricity instability, is shaping a perfect storm that threatens to engulf the country’s social and economic fabric during the most vulnerable season of the year. Iran’s triple crisis—water, electricity, and gas—is the result of decades of mismanagement, underinvestment, and politicized infrastructure policy. The current administration’s reactive stance—centered on blame-shifting and piecemeal interventions—fails to address the structural failures that continue to escalate. Without transparency, strategic planning, and a pivot toward sustainable and equitable resource governance, Iran’s environmental and economic future remains deeply uncertain. As the country struggles through a dry summer and faces another harsh winter, the consequences of inaction may become uncontainable.
Published August 6, 2025
In the early hours of August 6, 2025, Iran carried out the executions of Rouzbeh Vadi, a nuclear physicist accused of espionage for Israel, and Mehdi Asgharzadeh, an alleged ISIS affiliate, in what has become an increasingly systematic pattern of state executions of individuals on national security grounds. The executions were officially announced by Mizan News Agency, the media outlet affiliated with Iran’s judiciary, and have since drawn sharp attention from domestic and international observers, including human rights organizations who have criticized due process deficiencies in the cases, including lack of transparency, allegations of torture and limiting the defendants’ access to lawyers.
These executions mark a critical escalation in the use of capital punishment in Iran. As of mid-2025, the number of total executions in the Islamic Republic exceeded 617, with a substantial proportion involving charges such as “enmity against God,” “corruption on Earth,” and “espionage”—charges often criticized by international legal experts for their vagueness and susceptibility to abuse.
Rouzbeh Vadi, a roughly 40-year-old nuclear engineer with a PhD in Reactor Engineering from AmirKabir University of Technology, was employed at the Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute, a body tied to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. His arrest date was not made public, though the Iran Human Rights Organization indicates that Vadi was arrested a year and a half ago and later sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court on charges of “espionage for Israel.” According to judiciary sources, Vadi allegedly provided sensitive classified information to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad and was executed after his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court. He had reportedly published a scientific paper in 2011 with two prominent Iranian nuclear scientists—Abdolhamid MinooCher and Ahmad Zolfaghari—both of whom were killed during the twelve-day war with Israel in June 2025.
The Iranian judiciary detailed a dramatic account of Vadi’s alleged espionage activities. According to official court narratives and self-incriminating confessions—whose authenticity and voluntariness remain unverified by independent sources—Vadi was recruited via encrypted digital platforms, trained in secure communications, and traveled to Vienna on five separate occasions to meet with Mossad operatives under elaborate protocols involving physical searches, use of disguises, digital wallets for compensation, and counter-surveillance tactics. He was reportedly tasked with weekly data extraction from within Iran’s nuclear establishment and passed information to Mossad in exchange for cryptocurrency. The judiciary further claimed that Vadi disclosed the identities and internal activities of Iranian nuclear scientists, including those who were later assassinated. His behavior was characterized as “deliberate,” “calculated,” and “deeply compromising to internal and external national security.”
Vadi was reportedly arrested in Tehran upon returning from one of his foreign assignments following intense surveillance. The indictment charged him with “conscious and paid collaboration with a hostile intelligence agency” under Article 6 of the Law on Countering Hostile Israeli Actions Against Peace and Security, alongside multiple provisions of the Islamic Penal Code. After the judicial process, including a failed appeal, his execution was carried out.
On the same morning, Mehdi Asgharzadeh, a 35 year-old Kurdish inmate held for nearly a decade, was also hanged. He was accused of receiving paramilitary training in Syria and Iraq and plotting terrorist attacks on Iranian soil in affiliation with ISIS. According to Hengaw, Asgharzadeh was arrested in Javanrud in 2016 (1395) after returning from Syria, placed in two years of solitary confinement in Tehran, and then transferred to Dizelabad Prison in Kermanshah, where he spent the next eight years. In 2023, he was sentenced to death by the Revolutionary Court in Kermanshah on charges of “corruption on earth through extensive involvement with the terrorist and Takfiri group ISIS and actions against national public security,” and the sentence was twice upheld by the Supreme Court. His body was reportedly not returned to his family, a practice frequently condemned by human rights groups for its psychological and cultural cruelty.
These executions come against a backdrop of intense post-war insecurity. Following the June 2025 conflict with Israel, a series of assassinations targeting Iranian scientists, and continued external pressure over Iran’s nuclear program and regional domestic policies. Within this environment, the boundaries between legitimate national security and punitive state repression appear increasingly blurred, especially in cases lacking transparency and independent oversight.
Published August 6, 2025
In recent days, the political and security structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran entered a new phase of recalibration and strategic realignment, marked by two intertwined developments: the reappointment of Ali Larijani as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the reestablishment of the Supreme Defense Council. These decisions, while framed within constitutional and institutional logic, reflect deeper shifts within Iran’s domestic power matrix and its evolving posture in the post-war regional and global order.
Ali Larijani’s return to the SNSC is a significant political signal. As a veteran statesman, former Parliament Speaker, ex-chief of IRIB, and long-time adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Larijani embodies the hybrid profile of a loyal insider with pragmatic inclinations. His earlier tenure as SNSC Secretary between 2005 and 2007 ended in disagreement with then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Nearly two decades later, his reinstatement by newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian suggests an effort to integrate moderate conservative technocrats into a recalibrated decision-making framework. This is especially relevant as Iran emerges from a bruising twelve-day war with Israel in June 2025—a conflict that exposed serious vulnerabilities in Iran’s military coordination, intelligence infrastructure, and strategic deterrence.
In the weeks preceding his appointment, Larijani conducted an unannounced diplomatic visit to Moscow, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin as the President’s special envoy, bearing a message on behalf of the Iranian leadership. This move hinted at Tehran’s desire to rebuild its international partnerships and redefine its strategic latitude amid deepening threats. Larijani was also the first senior official to publicly disclose that Israel had successfully discovered the physical location of a SNSC meeting during the war, confirming that Israeli intelligence had planned to eliminate many of the nation’s foremost leaders through targeted bombing—a plan that ultimately failed. These revelations amplified public pressure on the state’s security apparatus and underlined the need for immediate institutional reform.
Parallel to Larijani’s return, the Iranian government announced the formation of a newly structured Supreme Defense Council, citing Article 176 of the Constitution which permits the formation of subsidiary councils under the SNSC. Historically known as the wartime Supreme Defense Council of the 1980s, this resurrected body will be chaired by the President and composed of heads of the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, senior military commanders, key cabinet members, and representatives of the Supreme Leader. The council’s stated mandate includes reviewing defense plans, strengthening military capabilities, and responding swiftly to emerging threats. Analysts describe it as a permanent “strategic war room,” created not merely in reaction to the Israel conflict, but as part of a longer-term effort to centralize and streamline Iran’s military decision-making structure in the face of hybrid warfare, cyber threats, and regional proxy dynamics.
This institutional repositioning takes place alongside a fragile and contentious international backdrop. After the June war, the U.S. launched strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, claiming to dismantle its uranium enrichment capabilities. In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi asserted that Iran’s enrichment capability remains intact, and that the damage is repairable due to retained technological know-how and human capital. He added that while Iran is capable of resuming enrichment at any moment, its decision will depend on evolving political conditions. Furthermore, Araghchi stressed that any renewed diplomatic engagement with the U.S. would require guarantees, reparations, and recognition of Iran’s sovereign rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
While Iranian officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh, have emphasized that they are in no rush to reenter indirect negotiations, there has been some speculation about a possible new round of U.S.–Iran dialogue. A notable report by the Iranian outlet Tabnak, published this week, states that indirect negotiations are expected to begin in the coming days. However, the report has been disputed and contrasts with public statements from senior officials.
The Financial Times reported this week that Araghchi reaffirmed Iran’s position: negotiations would only resume with Washington if it agrees to compensate for the June attacks, offer credible security guarantees, and halt further provocations. Araghchi stated “The road to negotiation is narrow but it’s not impossible. I need to convince my hierarchy that if we go for negotiation, the other side is coming with real determination for a win-win deal.” Araghchi said Witkoff has tried to convince him that it is possible and has proposed resuming talks. But the veteran Iranian diplomat added: “We need real confidence-building measures from their side.”
In parallel, European powers (UK, France, Germany) are offering a delay in the reimposition of U.N. “snapback” sanctions if Iran returns to negotiations and reengages with the IAEA. Araghchi reacted harshly to the threat to reimpose the UN Security Council sanctions, telling the Financial Times “With the Europeans, there is no reason right now to negotiate because they cannot lift sanctions, they cannot do anything,” he said. “If they do snap back, that means that this is the end of the road for them.”
The convergence of Larijani’s reappointment, the defense council’s revival, and calibrated diplomatic signaling indicates a dual-track strategy: institutional fortification at home and strategic ambiguity abroad. Tehran appears intent on consolidating internal security command and crisis readiness while maintaining the possibility of reengagement with Western powers—if and when the terms suit its national interests. This hybrid approach may reflect a new era in the Islamic Republic’s statecraft, one that seeks to insulate itself from potential existential threats while projecting resilience and control on both domestic and international fronts.
برای خواندن این مطلب به فارسی اینجا را کلیک کنید
On August 7, 2025, political prisoners in Iran were subjected to violent assault by security forces during their transfer back to Evin Prison in Tehran. These detainees, many of them prominent activists and political figures, were being returned to Evin following their temporary relocation in the aftermath of the Israeli airstrike on the facility in June. Reports indicate that several prisoners who refused to wear handcuffs during the transfer were beaten, physically restrained, and brought back to the prison with visible injuries.
Among those named as victims of this abuse are Mostafa Tajzadeh, Abolfazl Ghadyani, Mehdi Mahmoudian, Matlab Ahmadiani, Mohammad Bagher Bakhtiar, Hossein Shanbehzadeh, Khashayar Sefidi, and Saeed Ahmadi Maljou. Fakhrosadat Mohtashamipour, wife of political prisoner Mostafa Tajzadeh, reported on Instagram that security agents attacked detainees for nearly six hours. She stated that two officers sat on her husband’s chest and forced handcuffs onto him, and described the assault as savage, humiliating, and unlawful. In a phone call after the incident, Mr. Tajzadeh confirmed the violence, stating that the behavior during the transfer sharply contrasted with more standard treatment of prisoners.
Iranian authorities, including the Tehran Province Prisons Organization, have denied all allegations, claiming the transfer followed proper legal protocols and that only five inmates briefly refused handcuffing. They described the claims as part of a psychological propaganda campaign against the state. However, these denials have been met with outrage from families, activists, and human rights defenders, who are calling for accountability and an independent investigation.
This violence comes in the wake of the June 23, 2025 Israeli military attack on Evin Prison, which resulted in the deaths of at least 80 civilians, including five prisoners, 41 staff, and 13 conscript soldiers. In a statement released on July 22, Amnesty International condemned the bombing as a grave breach of international humanitarian law and asserted that it should be investigated as a war crime. The organization emphasized that prisons are protected civilian structures, and that no credible evidence had been presented to justify targeting Evin. The strike occurred during visiting hours, when the prison was populated by civilians—including family members of inmates and a five-year-old child, all of whom were among the dead.
The combination of this external violence and continued domestic repression of political detainees points to an alarming deterioration in the protection of human rights in Iran. The use of force against nonviolent prisoners, especially amid heightened instability, signals a systemic pattern of abuse, intimidation, and lack of accountability.
The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) strongly condemns the recent violence committed by Iranian security forces against political prisoners and reiterates its call for their immediate and unconditional release. These individuals should never have been imprisoned for exercising their legitimate rights to free speech, peaceful protest, and political belief. NIAC also once again condemns the Israeli military’s attack on Evin Prison, which resulted in the death of innocent civilians and constitutes a clear violation of international humanitarian law.
|
