In a July SCOTUSblog post, Columbia University law professor Abbe Gluck suggested the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Kennedy v. Braidwood Management might reflect what some have forecast as a “revival” of so-called “Skidmore deference.” On her reading of Kennedy, the Court’s examination of “considered and consistent Executive Branch practice—which beg[ins] contemporaneously with enactment of [a] statute”—should not only play an essential role for judges offering their independent judgment as to the best meaning of the law, as required by Loper Bright, but also hints at a reinvigoration of the deference—or “weight”—given to agency legal interpretations under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Although Professor Gluck is right to highlight Justice Kavanaugh’s emphasis on the utility of longstanding and consistent agency interpretations, it would be wrong to see such emphasis as a revival of Skidmore, let alone any other type of special solicitude for the views of agency “experts.” The Kennedy decision—along with other cases this term like McLaughlin Chiropractic and VanDerStok—is best understood as part of the Supreme Court’s efforts in the wake of Loper Bright to revitalize the traditional canons of statutory interpretation. Those canons, which play a vital role in the judicial act, long predate Chevron, Skidmore, or the modern administrative state.