Ending the Strategic Holiday: Rising to meet the China Challenge

by Shawn Creamer

The United States has been on a strategic holiday for more than three decades, leading to a withering of American power and global position. Many of the assumptions underpinning American strategy during this period have not withstood the test of time, particularly those concerning the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The prevailing theory driving China policy was that accommodation and wealth would lead to increased liberalization. This belief proved an illusion and led to inaction. The PRC now presents an acute threat to international peace and security. The United States is the only nation which has the capability and the resources to prevent PRC dominion.

Chairman Xi is not an anomaly but the embodiment of enduring Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ambitions — to rewrite global rules, reassert dominance over neighbors, and seek retribution against the West. The Party retains its Leninist soul.

Chairman Xi is not an anomaly but the embodiment of enduring Chinese Communist Party ambitions — to rewrite global rules, reassert dominance over neighbors, and seek retribution against the West.

China has pursued a strategy linking economic growth with military might. In fewer than 50 years, CCP leaders built the world’s second-largest economy by relentlessly exploiting Chinese society, manipulating Western sensibilities, and skillfully navigating the fault lines of the international system.

The CCP has played the long game, incrementally building Chinese national strength. It did so by manipulating a core Western vulnerability — its short-term profit orientation. State-backed entities stole trillions in intellectual property (IP), while one-sided trade policies allowed China to capture global manufacturing and establish monopolies across supply chain ecosystems.

As China developed, the CCP ensured civilian and military requirements were integrated into dual-use projects, enabling the conversion of national strength into both hard and soft power.

Chinese rearmament has been underway for over 30 years. The PRC has been very clear about the timelines and goal for its military buildup — to field a world-class military by 2049. The buildup has already shifted the balance of power in the Western Pacific.

China’s naval growth is historic, exceeding 370 ships and possibly reaching 600 by the latter 2030s. The Coast Guard has quadrupled in size. China’s air force now fields a robust fleet of advanced fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft developed through both indigenous innovation and IP theft. Meanwhile, the Chinese army is preparing for large-scale missions, including airborne assault, amphibious assault and land-based-breach and exploitation.

The Chinese military has also made substantial progress toward operational jointness, building theater-level unified command headquarters and improving training and integration across the force.  

China is also rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, expected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. In comparison, the U.S. and Russia each currently deploy around 1,700 strategic warheads. Cold War strategic thought is inadequate for guiding policy in this emerging multipolar “Third Nuclear Age.”

While Chinese forces may still lag in some qualitative aspects when compared to the United States, the Chinese military is now fielding weapons equal to or more advanced than the United States. The Ukraine war has validated what the PRC has been doing for modernization, including a rapid move toward unmanned systems.

While Chinese forces may still lag in some qualitative aspects when compared to the United States, the Chinese military is now fielding weapons equal to or more advanced than the United States.

The Ukraine war has also demonstrated that in large-scale conflict, quantity is a quality of its own. When firepower, attrition, and defense outweigh speed and maneuver as the character of war, scale and mass matter. Should a Sino-American conflict occur, it will most likely be both large-scale and protracted. In such a war, production will matter greatly to terminating the war on favorable terms.

China’s confidence to exert itself more aggressively has grown as its geostrategic power increased. The CCP has viewed the past two decades as a “strategic opportunity,” leveraging U.S. distraction and global crises to its advantage. Although the 2011 U.S. pivot to the Pacific may have surprised China, its failure to follow through gave the PRC time to advance and solidify gains.

Over the past 35 years, America has allowed its bureaucracy to bloat, infrastructure and manufacturing base to decay, and military power to decline. It has become overburdened by debt. For much of this era, the U.S. has funded the defense of an early fight, not the winning moves for a protracted war. This erosion of American power has left it vulnerable.  

Despite this bleak picture, not all is lost. For every measure of Chinese strength, there is a corresponding weakness. The PRC faces profound internal challenges: a looming demographic crisis, restive minority populations, unsustainable levels of corporate and public debt, and severe environmental degradation.

The United States can contain the Chinese threat — but only through serious, sustained action. Preparedness is realized with actions, not words.

The United States can contain the Chinese threat — but only through serious, sustained action. Preparedness is realized with actions, not words.

America must restore fiscal discipline to remain a great power. Congress must pass budgets on time, prioritize essential functions, and eliminate spending on nonessential amenities. Taxation cannot solve out of control spending.

Federal fraud is another critical issue. The Government Accountability Office estimates fraudulent losses in federal spending at up to $521 billion annually, with some estimates as high as $750 billion. This must be addressed.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency should be revitalized and restored to its original national security mission. It must become a standalone agency reporting directly to the President, responsible for coordinating preparedness and integrating emergency management across the federal government. It must supervise the resurrection of Cold War-era mobilization programs.

The President must direct — and Congress must fund — a multi-theater defense strategy. The active and reserve force must be sized accordingly for deterrence and to fight the first 12 months of a large-scale war. The Defense Department must prepare detailed plans to expand the force for a multi-year protracted war. The nuclear triad must be modernized and diversified to reflect the multipolar nuclear landscape.

The Selective Service System (SSS) requires a complete overhaul. By law, the SSS must deliver 100,000 conscripts within 210 days. This goal is highly unrealistic. The military is unprepared to absorb this number of recruits, and the defense industrial base (DIB) lacks the capacity to fight a large-scale war and support a major force expansion.

If the U.S. wants a capable and resilient DIB, it must invest accordingly. That means diversifying away from large defense primes, expanding government arsenals, integrating civilian industry, and leveraging co-development and co-production with allies. In conjunction with these efforts, the U.S. will need to begin the systematic strategic decoupling of its economy from the PRC and cut off Chinese student visas to not resource the mechanisms of a future defeat.

Confronting the full scope of the China challenge demands that the United States reject its decades-long pattern of underinvestment, short-termism, and bureaucratic inertia. The balance of power is shifting, and the window to deter aggression, strengthen alliances, and reconstitute American strength is narrowing. If the U.S. is to preserve international peace and security, and uphold a free and open order, it must act with urgency to revitalize its national defense, rebuild its industrial and institutional foundations, and reestablish the credibility of its deterrent posture.

Shawn Creamer is a retired U.S. Army Colonel, where he served as an infantry officer for 30 years. In retirement, Shawn serves as a strategic advisor for Artesion Inc, as a fellow with the Institute for Corean-American Studies, and as a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative and the GeoStrategy Initiative.

The Ripon Forum is published six times a year by The Ripon Society, a public policy organization that was founded in 1962 and takes its name from the town where the Republican Party was born in 1854 –Ripon, Wisconsin. One of the main goals of The Ripon Society is to promote the ideas and principles that have made America great and contributed to the GOP’s success. These ideas include keeping our nation secure, keeping taxes low and having a federal government that is smaller, smarter and more accountable to the people.

SOURCE: https://riponsociety.org/article/ending-the-strategic-holiday/