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WHAT CAN ZOHRAN ACCOMPLISH?
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J.W. Mason
July 4, 2025
Dissent Magazine
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_ Mamdani’s agenda will face serious obstacles. A massive wave of
new voters doesn’t just carry you into office. It shifts the
landscape, it creates political capital that can be turned toward
other ends; changes political calculations for others... _
Zohran Mamdani holds a rally on May 4, 2025 in Brooklyn., Photo:
Andrew Lichtenstein/Corbis // Dissent
When I first heard that Zohran Mamdani was running for mayor last
fall, I admit I was skeptical. The New York City chapter of the
Democratic Socialists of America has an impressive track record of
winning legislative races, but the mayor’s race was a challenge an
order of magnitude larger. And Andrew Cuomo’s advantages—in name
recognition, in funding, in elite support—seemed almost impossible
to overcome.
But once I started canvassing for the campaign in April, I came to
believe he could win. It wasn’t just the responses from people at
the doors. It was the number of other people showing up to canvass,
most of whom had never volunteered for a political campaign before. In
the last week or two before the election, it felt like a
movement—there were canvassers everywhere (more than 40,000 people
volunteered in total) and you couldn’t leave the house without
seeing distinctive blue and yellow Zohran bandanas on the subway, or
young people with Zohran T-shirts on the street. In some
neighborhoods, every other small business seemed to have a Zohran
poster in the window.
There have been plenty of analyses of how the campaign won (including
an impressively detailed post-mortem by the candidate himself on
YouTube). There is a lot to study and learn from there. But we also
need to think about what comes next. Barring some extraordinary
calamity, Mamdani will win the general election in November and become
mayor at the start of next year. What can we reasonably expect him to
deliver?
What Can Be Done About Housing Costs?
Housing is the most important piece of the affordability agenda—the
single largest item in most families’ budgets, and the main reason
that the cost of living is so much higher in New York City than
elsewhere in the country. Whether or not a Mamdani administration can
bring down housing costs may well be the issue on which its success is
ultimately judged.
Housing politics on the left in recent years has been polarized
between a side emphasizing supply constraints and land use regulation,
and a side emphasizing rent regulation and public investment. Mamdani,
to his credit, recognizes that a both/and approach is called for. More
precisely, four distinct strategies will be needed to address the
housing crisis.
First is zoning reform. Much of New York City is still subject to
zoning rules that sharply limit density and impose parking minimums
and other requirements that make it difficult to build new housing.
During the Michael Bloomberg administration, these restrictions were
tightened by downzoning across the outer boroughs, while upzoning was
concentrated in a few areas, mainly lower-income neighborhoods and the
city’s remaining industrial zones like Long Island City. The result
was to channel development into a few areas, which was unsurprisingly
resisted by residents, especially given the weakness of rent
regulations at the time. Under Bill de Blasio, the same basic model of
concentrated development continued, though the targets now also
included some higher-income residential areas. This model tended to
provoke opposition to new development from tenants and homeowners,
while generating big windfall gains for landowners in the targeted
areas.
Surprisingly, it was Eric Adams (or rather his planning commissioner
Dan Garodnick) who broke with this model. Rather than picking a few
areas for massive redevelopment, his signature “City of Yes” plan
was intended to raise allowed densities moderately across the whole
city, while rolling back restrictions—especially minimum parking
requirements—that discouraged new housing development. The original
plan was watered down significantly by opposition from outer-borough
City Council members. But it represents a solid starting point for
further land use reform.
Land use changes can significantly increase the amount of new housing
built, allowing more middle-class people to live in the city. This is
a good thing—we should be clear that allowing more people to live
here, especially near transit lines, is a positive goal of housing
policy, independent of affordability. But land use reform by itself is
unlikely to bring down housing costs substantially or increase the
supply of affordable units.
One important reason for this is the high returns required by equity
investors, who typically supply 30 to 50 percent of the financing for
a new housing development. Given the relative illiquidity and
riskiness of housing investment, these returns need to be
significantly higher than those available from financial assets. And,
critically, returns do not come only from rents; they also come from
the expected capital gains when the project is sold or refinanced.
This means that private developers generally build only on the
expectation of rising rents. In order to keep equity finance flowing
in an environment of slower rent growth (let alone flat or falling
rents), land use reform would have to drastically reduce development
costs. This might be plausible in a few areas where land acquisition
is the biggest cost. But in general, it’s more reasonable to expect
land use reform to lead to more housing at current rents than to
significantly lower rents.
So the second piece of the housing package has to address the
financing side. With its vast balance sheet and long planning
horizons, the city government can accept a much lower return on
housing investment than equity investors will. If the city replaces
equity investment in new housing at a rate similar to existing debt
finance, it can substantially lower the required return and thus make
private investment in housing attractive even in an environment of
slower rent growth. This does not require subsidies—the city will be
paid back—and would be a logical purpose for which the city could
issue new debt. As an equity investor the city would be exposed to
falls in the value of its portfolio. But this is a much smaller
concern for the public sector, since it does not expect to liquidate
its investment to repay shareholders or finance new projects, so
capital gains or losses matter less than they would to a private
investor.
The city’s vast stock of private affordable housing—Mitchell-Lama
buildings, limited equity co-ops, and so on—testify to the ability
of public or nonprofit financing to deliver substantially lower
housing costs. But while financing, unlike land use reform, can indeed
lower rents, there will still be a floor set by the actual costs of
building and maintaining housing. For deeply affordable units, direct
public funding will be needed. This part of the housing program is
better funded by tax revenues than debt, so state agreement on new
taxes will be important here. Public funding can take the form of
subsidies to private developers or direct public ownership. I am not
sure there is a strong principled argument between these two
approaches. What one wants to avoid are subsidies in the form of
vouchers to individual renters, which are subject to landlord capture
and abuse. But no one seems to be proposing that.
The last piece of the puzzle is rent regulation. “Freeze the rent”
must have been one of the campaign’s most-chanted slogans. And with
good reason: this is one policy the mayor can deliver directly without
the need for approval of any other body. The mayor appoints all of the
Rent Guidelines Board’s members; as the board’s membership turns
over he can appoint members who will vote for a rent freeze, as de
Blasio’s board did more than once during his administration. And
thanks to the improvements to rent regulations passed in 2019—an
early victory for the socialist caucus in New York’s state
legislature—this will be sufficient to control rents on the city’s
one million rent-regulated apartments (close to half of the total
stock).
Despite what is sometimes claimed, there is no conflict between
favoring both more private housing development and stronger rent
regulation. Actually existing rent regulation in New York (and in the
few other American cities that have it) is limited to older
buildings—in New York, those built before 1974, plus ones where the
developer voluntarily opted in as a condition of city subsidies. And
they only limit rent increases, not the absolute level of rents. There
is no reason to believe that these types of regulations have any
effect on new housing construction. One could go a step further:
economically, land use reforms and stronger rent regulations should go
together. The same limits on new development that make land use reform
worth pursuing mean that owners of existing buildings are receiving
rents in the economic sense—payments in excess of the cost of
production. Limiting those economic rents will have no effect on the
supply of housing; it simply allows tenants to share in the gains from
improvements in their neighborhoods, rather than being displaced so
that landlords can capture them.
Rent regulation and land use reform are also political complements.
One of the big obstacles to allowing new housing
development—especially in a city of rents like New York—is
people’s fear that new development may lead to rising rents and
displacement. These fears are often well-founded: even if increasing
housing supply leads to lower rents across the city or metro area, it
is often associated with rising rents locally, since higher-density
areas are generally more desirable than lower-density areas. (That is
why cities exist in the first place.) This is especially true when new
development is channeled into a few limited areas, as has historically
been the case in New York. Strong rent regulation, by reassuring
existing tenants that development will not mean displacement, makes a
program of boosting housing supply more politically feasible.
There’s one other point to make on the political side. It’s common
on the left to talk about developers and landlords interchangeably,
and it’s true that in the political arena they often act as a team.
But economically, these are two quite different interests, and to a
large extent they are two distinct groups of people. It is at least
possible that a housing program that included substantial land use
reforms and public financing could peel off support from a significant
fraction of developers, even if landlords are strongly opposed.
What Kind of Fiscal Space Does the City Have?
At the federal level, leftists have long argued—correctly, in my
view—that tax revenue and bond markets should not be seen as
constraints on the public budget. With its own central bank issuing
the world’s reserve currency, spending by the federal government
should be seen, in the first instance, as a purely political question.
This is not the case at the city level. New York City cannot raise
taxes other than property taxes without state approval. It cannot
normally issue debt to meet operating expenses. And the level of debt
issued for capital projects that bond markets will accept is a genuine
concern. At the city level, “how are you going to pay for that?”
is a question that has to be answered.
On an economic level, to be sure, the city certainly has the capacity
to raise taxes. The current city income tax is essentially flat;
raising taxes by one point on incomes over $1 million would bring in
around $2 billion, enough to fund a significant part of the Mamdani
administration’s agenda. Winning agreement from the state may not be
easy. But the income is there to be taxed.
One thing we do not have to worry about is tax increases driving rich
people out of the city. Whatever they may say in the political arena,
when it comes to their actions, rich people show a clear preference
for high taxes and good public services. The two U.S. states with the
greatest numbers of billionaires are California and New York; as it
happens, these are also the two states with the highest top rates for
their state income taxes. The major U.S. city with the highest median
income is San Francisco, despite the fact that millionaires there pay
a higher tax rate than they would anywhere else in the country. A
recent study by the New York Fiscal Policy Institute found no increase
in out-migration by high income households following tax increases in
2017 and 2021; high-income households were significantly less likely
to leave New York than others were, and when they did leave it was
usually to other high-tax jurisdictions.
It’s worth noting also that the very high cost of commercial and
retail space in New York reflects the greater income that businesses
can generate here. A higher minimum wage, say, is not going to cause
businesses to move to New Jersey; given the much higher rents here, if
they could move, they already would have. Gristedes owner John
Catsimatidis may rage all he likes, but if you want to sell groceries
to New Yorkers your stores have to be in New York. Catsimatidis could
of course sell the business; but that would just mean it would keep
operating under the ownership of someone else. Rich people may
sincerely believe that it is only their physical presence that keeps
the business they own running, but there’s no reason the rest of us
need to share in their narcissism.
With respect to debt, on the other hand, economic constraints are a
more serious concern. Unfortunately, it is very hard to say a priori
how much more the city could borrow without running into trouble.
Certainly, the statements that any more debt would mean catastrophe,
and that the city can simply borrow whatever it needs, are equally
wrong. Clarifying how much more the city can reasonably borrow—and
what it can reasonably borrow for—will be an urgent task for the
administration and its allies.
What Can the City Do on Its Own Authority, and What Requires
Cooperation From the State?
Despite an inspiring history of municipal socialism, city government
is not the best platform for an ambitious program to expand the public
sector. In the American federal system, city governments are entirely
creatures of the state; their powers are limited to what the state
grants them.
Major spending expansions will require the cooperation of state
government, as will raising corporate and income taxes. There are
other areas where the city has the authority to act on its own. Land
use is one important area. Another is labor regulation. While the city
(probably) does not have the power to independently set its own
minimum wage, it can regulate employment terms in individual
industries. Recent city laws regulating pay for ride share workers and
delivery drivers are among the strongest in the country when it comes
to regulating the gig economy (and may be the reason that DoorDash
donated so generously to Cuomo’s PAC). This is a foundation we can
expect the Mamdani administration to build on.
On transportation, the campaign’s signature proposal was to make
buses free, with the MTA being compensated for the lost revenue. In
2023, the city’s Independent Budget Office estimated that this would
cost about $650 million per year. Some transit advocates are skeptical
of this proposal, arguing that improving service is more important
than reducing fares, and that scarce transit dollars would be better
spent elsewhere. On the other hand, free buses are not just about
reducing costs to riders—without the need to collect fares, buses
would move faster. (To be sure, if more people start using buses for
short trips, that could cut the other way.)
Whether or not free buses are the ideal transit policy, they have
another important virtue: like a freeze in regulated rents, they would
be an unambiguous promise made good on, a directly visible gain the
administration could deliver relatively quickly. Legibility,
simplicity, and universality are underrated virtues in policymaking.
Other transportation policies might be better on paper. But it’s
unlikely they would do as much to maintain support for the
administration or build momentum for further reforms.
Ironically, the criticism directed at this proposal by the Cuomo
campaign and others may have made it more effective in this respect.
$650 million is a lot, but it’s not an enormous amount in the scale
of the city’s budget. And if the result is a free public service
that people had been told was impossible, that will ease the path
toward other, perhaps more ambitious, improvements. The discovery that
we can have nice things is a powerful force to get people to demand
more.
Changes to the way the city’s streets are used should also be within
the city’s power. More busways, less free parking, closing blocks
with schools to cars during school hours—these are reforms that will
provoke anger initially but, like congestion pricing, are likely to
become much more popular once they are in place.
The parts of the agenda with big price tags—universal child care and
public money for housing—will require cooperation with the state,
either to provide funding or to give the city authority to raise taxes
itself. But it’s worth noting here that the substantive goals of
Mamdani’s proposals are, at least notionally, shared by the
Democratic mainstream. The recently passed city budget includes money
for a pilot program for universal child care, and Governor Kathy
Hochul has her own taskforce studying the issue. Everyone agrees that
housing is a major problem, and that addressing affordability will
require a mix of land use reforms and public money.
What distinguishes the socialist position, in this context, is not its
aims. It’s the willingness to take seriously the problem of how to
get there—meaning how to mobilize mass support, but also how to pay
for it, by raising taxes if necessary. The “moderate” position, as
embodied by Governor Hochul, also supports expanded public services.
But it resists the new taxes that would make them possible. In this
context, the challenge in winning state support may be less about
making the case for the program on principle, and more about
demonstrating a credible plan to carry it out.
What About the Police?
It’s no secret that the police in New York, as in many big cities,
operate largely outside the control of elected officials, and are
prepared to aggressively challenge a government that tries to limit
their prerogatives. You can avoid saying the words “defund the
police” on the campaign trail, as Mamdani did, but that doesn’t
answer the question of how much funding to dedicate to policing. There
will, inevitably, be high-profile cases of police violence that will
provoke protests; the mayor will have to take a position. If there are
renewed protests over Gaza on New York campuses, will he try to limit
police involvement? (And will the police listen if he does?) Mamdani
has promised to eliminate the NYPD’s Strategic Response Group, which
is notorious for its heavy-handed response to protests and is
responsible for a disproportionate share of brutality complaints,
lawsuits, and overtime. Whether he can deliver on this will be an
important test of his relationship with the department.
That said, the proposal to create a new Office of Community Safety is
promising, and it is an example of the kind of bureaucratic
reorganization that mayors are generally able to carry out without too
much difficulty. It fits the model of successful police reform that
scholars like Alex Vitale have emphasized—the goal is less to modify
police behavior than to reduce the number of occasions on which people
come into contact with the police in the first place. Similar offices
of public safety have been created in dozens of cities in recent years
such as Albuquerque Community Safety and the Office of Violence
Prevention and Trauma Recovery in Newark. In the best-case scenario,
this offers a route to reduce the role of the police without a public
confrontation.
What Does the Campaign Tell Us About the Shift in Political Climate?
The campaign’s single-minded focus on “a city we can afford” was
clearly a smart choice strategically. But it’s also important for
what it suggests about the shifting political valence of inflation. By
framing affordability in terms of expanded public services (universal
child care) and limits on the pricing power of private businesses
(rent freeze; publicly owned groceries), the campaign showed how the
cost of living can be an issue for the left.
This framing of affordability built on several years of debates at the
national level. The new anti-trust scholarship of people like Lina
Khan and Tim Wu (who himself opposed Cuomo in an earlier campaign as
Zephyr Teachout’s running mate for Lieutenant Governor in the 2014
primary), along with work by advocacy groups like the Groundwork
Collaborative (full disclosure: I am a fellow there) has advanced an
understanding of price increases as the result of the deliberate
exercise of market power, rather than the impersonal forces of supply
and demand. At the macro level, heterodox scholars like Isabella Weber
have made the case that responses to inflation should focus more on
relieving specific bottlenecks rather than cutting spending across the
board. From both these perspectives, an effective response to price
increases requires the government to do more, not less.
The choice to focus on affordability is, obviously, to the credit of
Mamdani and his campaign staff. And, obviously, it resonated with
voters who had never heard of Louis Brandeis. Was it easier to make
these arguments because the intellectual foundation was laid over the
past few years? Maybe—it’s hard to say. But at least, it shows
that heterodox perspectives on inflation can resonate with the public.
The idea that controlling inflation calls for more public spending and
regulation is a departure from the politics of inflation over the past
generation, but considered from a longer perspective it’s not so
strange. In the mid-twentieth-century debates, it was often union
representatives who were most concerned with rising prices, and
stronger unions could even be seen as a way of limiting inflation. Or
think of the protests against high rents and grocery prices by
communist housewives early in the century. “A city you can afford”
is probably a slogan they would have approved of.
Is the Mamdani campaign a vindication of the idea that winning
campaigns need to focus on a narrow set of economic issues, and leave
aside broader social justice concerns? I am not sure that it is. It is
certainly true that the campaign’s messages emphasized affordability
in a clear and consistent way. But that doesn’t imply that they did
not take positions on other questions. On Gaza in particular, Mamdani
was impressively forthright—in fact, one of the lasting impacts of
the campaign may be to break the taboo around criticisms of Israel and
its endless wars. No one paying any attention could be in doubt about
Mamdani’s support for the rights of gay and trans people. And while
he didn’t campaign on “defund the police,” he refused to join
other candidates in calling for more cops, proposing instead to
diminish their role in New Yorkers’ lives. His call to abolish the
Strategic Response Group was particularly significant, given their
leading role in the violent suppression of campus protests against the
genocide in Gaza.
Picking a single, broadly resonant message and communicating clearly
and consistently is surely a big reason why the campaign was so
successful. But the economic-populist view is wrong to argue that this
requires not talking about other issues. Avoiding a clear position on
Gaza or taking the safe route of calling for more police would not
have made the core economic message any stronger. The advantages of
focus come from what is focused on, not what is left out.
For the past five months, much of the center-left has been shell
shocked, off balance, and uncertain how to move forward. This campaign
may help break that spell—I suspect it will find many imitators
elsewhere in the country. It’s true that a few high-profile figures
have embarrassed themselves with public attacks on the mayoral
nominee. But many more elected officials and candidates—and probably
even more of their staffers—will see a model of how to mobilize an
electoral majority for a progressive program.
Mamdani’s agenda will face serious obstacles. But a massive wave of
new voters doesn’t just carry you into office. It shifts the
landscape, and creates political capital that can be turned toward
other ends. It is not just the official powers of the mayor’s office
that will allow Mamdani to fulfill his promise to improve the daily
lives of New Yorkers. It is also the way his upset victory changes the
political calculations for other officeholders across the city. And
while no city or campaign alone can reverse Trump’s assault on
immigrants or halt the genocide in Gaza, Mamdani’s victory has
opened up critical space for politicians and communities courageous
enough to take on these tasks.
_[J.W. MASON is associate professor of economics at John Jay College,
CUNY, and a senior fellow at the Groundwork Collaborative. His
book Against Money, coauthored with Arjun Jayadev, will be coming out
from the University of Chicago Press in 2026.]_
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