The LCFS cost component in both gasoline and diesel prices consequently began from a relatively low point at the end of June, with the OPIS estimate of the LCFS component roughly back to levels last seen in summer 2024. The new LCFS regulations, however, still had an effect. Applying the Air Board’s new requirements and carbon intensity values, the OPIS calculations saw the LCFS per gallon estimates jump by over 50% on the first day of implementation alone. As increases at this level work through the system and as the credit market recovers as the backlog of credits is reduced, Californians are still likely to see significant price increases in the coming months.
The earlier price signal in diesel also reflects current market conditions. Nationally and globally, diesel production is struggling to rebuild stocks with current expectations that tight supplies will lead to much higher transport costs for food and other goods later this year. California’s LCFS addition to this price pressure would consequently accelerate this likely source of inflation within the state.
The extent of the overall LCFS cost pass-through for both gasoline and diesel (and aviation fuels) remain to be seen. Air Board staff continue to insist their rules will not have a major effect on prices. The occasional academic commentor given space in articles on this and similar cost issues—such as the one found by LA Times to comment on the currently tolled climate superfund bills—insist that market participants attempting to raise prices to incorporate this type of cost would be undercut by others willing to step in with alternative supplies. These arguments, however, fail to reflect California conditions in many respects.
First, the alternative supplier hypothesis is likely true for fully functioning markets. But California’s fuel markets are not fully functioning. They are heavily restricted by what fuels can be sold, and further isolated from national and global supplies by the absence of required transportation capacity and high regulation-driven costs of using what capacity does exist. California’s market instead has been altered and repeatedly revised by regulation to almost ensure that such costs will be passed on in order to maintain the economic survival of what supply does remain to service the state.
Second, this hypothesis assumes there is someone available to provide additional supplies. There is not. Any such supplier would still be bound by the added costs of LCFS, California formulations, Cap & Trade, and the other state-imposed additions to selling these products in the state. What supplies that are available primarily now come from Singapore, Japan, and South Korea, all of which are many weeks of tanker time removed from California and none of which produce in amounts capable of serving California’s needs. And even when the supply is available, the question still remains of which supplier would be willing to risk exposing themselves to the potential of future liabilities such as represented by the climate change superfund proposals that remain alive as two-year bills?
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