[[link removed]]

ISRAEL’S EUPHORIC ‘VICTORY’ OVER IRAN IS QUICKLY GIVING WAY TO
DISILLUSIONMENT  
[[link removed]]


 

Meron Rapoport
June 27, 2025
+972 Magazine
[[link removed]]


*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ The “endgame” goal wasn’t achieved. In fact, while the
details of the Trump-Tehran ceasefire agreement remain murky, what’s
clear is that none of Netanyahu’s three aims have been fulfilled. _

,

 

“Can we say this is the greatest victory in the history of the State
of Israel?” This is what a host on Israel’s Channel 12 asked
retired Israeli army General Giora Eiland — father of the so-called
“Generals’ Plan
[[link removed]]”
to starve and ethnically cleanse Gaza’s northernmost cities — some
two hours after the ceasefire between Israel and Iran took effect on
June 24. Eiland was modest. The victory in the 1967 war was bigger, he
reassured the anchor, but this was certainly a tremendous achievement.

As someone old enough to remember the euphoria following the 1967 war,
I can’t deny the echoes between the Six-Day War and this “12-Day
War” with Iran: the same collective relief that a perceived
existential threat was supposedly eliminated, the same disdain and
mockery directed at the enemy’s performance, the same overwhelming
pride in Israel’s military prowess — paired with the belief that
such a victory secures the country’s future for decades to come.

But as history reminds us, the war of June 1967 wasn’t Israel’s
last. Far from it. In many ways, it marked the beginning of a new era
of bloodshed. The current war in Gaza, and perhaps the war with Iran
as well, can be seen as a direct continuation of that “glorious
triumph.”

It took years after 1967 for Israelis to grasp that the war hadn’t
ushered in the transformation they had hoped for. This time, the
disillusionment set in almost immediately. Mere hours after U.S.
President Donald Trump abruptly announced the ceasefire, it was
already apparent that victory over Iran was unlikely to end Israel’s
conflict with the Islamic Republic, let alone all of its future wars.

In the early hours of Sunday morning, right after the U.S. strike on
Iran’s nuclear sites, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu declared [[link removed]],
“I promised you that Iran’s nuclear facilities would be destroyed,
one way or another. That promise has been fulfilled.” In a televised
address, Trump echoed that sentiment
[[link removed]],
claiming the sites were “totally obliterated” in the Saturday
night airstrike. 

The Iranians, meanwhile, countered
[[link removed]] that
they had removed most of the enriched uranium from Fordow before the
attack, while a CNN report
[[link removed]] citing
U.S. intelligence sources revealed that the strike had likely delayed
Iran’s nuclear program by “a few months” at best. Given that the
war’s stated goal was to eliminate the immediate threat of an
Iranian bomb — and that U.S. intelligence
[[link removed]] never
believed Iran was close to producing one — it’s hard to argue this
goal was achieved.

THE ‘BITTER TASTE’ OF WAR

Another question mark hangs over the war’s impact on Israel’s
deterrence in the Middle East. On one hand, Israel’s military
clearly demonstrated overwhelming superiority: it flew over Iranian
airspace unimpeded, possessed precise intelligence on the whereabouts
of senior Iranian defense officials and nuclear scientists, and
carried out targeted strikes with remarkable accuracy. Its operational
and technological capabilities were on full display. 

Israel also proved that it can act as the region’s neighborhood
bully — disregarding international law, bypassing ongoing
negotiations between Iran and the Trump administration — while
continuing to enjoy unwavering support from the West
[[link removed]],
especially from Washington.

But while Netanyahu’s success in drawing the United States into a
war he initiated undoubtedly bolstered Israel’s image as a regional
power, it would be a mistake to overlook the degree of deterrence Iran
managed to establish.

Since 1948, Israel’s major cities have never faced the kind
of sustained threat experienced during this war
[[link removed]]:
multiple buildings reduced to rubble; 25 more slated for demolition
due to structural damage; 29 Israeli civilians killed; nearly 10,000
people left homeless; over 40,000 compensation claims
[[link removed]] filed with
the property tax authority; city streets emptied; and economic
activity grinding to a halt. October 7 was horrifying, but it was
largely perceived by Israelis as a singular catastrophe. The 12-day
war with Iran, however, chipped away at their long-held sense of
security. Millions felt that immunity begin to crack
[[link removed]].

Iran demonstrated that despite Israel’s cutting-edge defenses, its
home front is still vulnerable. Images of destruction from Tel Aviv
[[link removed]], Bat
Yam
[[link removed]],
and Be’er Sheva resembled scenes from Gaza — and they were widely
circulated across the region, even by those who don’t necessarily
support the Iranian regime. Even if most Israelis feel the suffering
was “worth the price” of dealing a major blow to Iran, the
constant scramble to shelters, sleepless nights, and daily
disorientation left a lasting psychological toll. Should conflict
reignite, Israelis are unlikely to approach it with the same
composure.

It’s clear Netanyahu and the Israeli leadership were not seeking a
drawn-out confrontation with Iran — precisely because it would
undercut the narrative of “total victory” that dominated the early
days of the campaign. That likely explains why, immediately after the
U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear sites, most Israeli commentators and
analysts began speaking of “wrapping up the story” within days.

Yet even in this limited 12-day confrontation, Israel did not
accomplish its stated goals. At a press conference shortly after the
offensive began, Netanyahu set out three objectives
[[link removed]-]:
dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, eliminate its ballistic missile
capabilities, and sever its support for the “axis of terror.”
Defense Minister Israel Katz went even further
[[link removed]],
stating one of Israel’s goals was to assassinate Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei — effectively, to trigger regime change.

That “endgame” goal wasn’t achieved. In fact, while the details
of the Trump-Tehran ceasefire agreement remain murky, what’s clear
is that none of Netanyahu’s three aims have been fulfilled. Iran is
in no rush to return to nuclear talks, accusing Washington of
duplicity by engaging in diplomacy while greenlighting Israeli
strikes. No restrictions have been made on Iran’s expanding missile
arsenal, which Israeli army Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir cited
[[link removed]] as the main reason
for the “preemptive strike.” And there’s no reduction in Iranian
support for its so-called “ring of fire” — the regional network
of proxies encircling Israel.

If Israel has emerged as the superior military power, diplomatically,
it appears to have gained little, if anything at all. That outcome
shouldn’t be surprising: since the war in Gaza began, Netanyahu has
largely abandoned efforts to set clear diplomatic goals for military
action, relying instead on force as the sole instrument of policy,
from Gaza and Lebanon
[[link removed]] to Syria
[[link removed]] and
now Iran. 

This latest front has once again exposed the limits of that approach.
From day one, Iran declared it would not negotiate under fire
[[link removed]],
demanding a ceasefire before any return to nuclear talks. Israel
refused, and Netanyahu seemed to apply the same strategy that was
previously reserved for Hamas: negotiations only under fire
[[link removed]].
Yet in the end, the ceasefire was declared without any (known)
preconditions, exactly as Iran had demanded.

The gap between ambitious “objectives” and more elusive
“achievements” is already sowing disappointment, at least on the
Israeli right. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich described
[[link removed]] a “bitter taste”
alongside the “decisive victory.” Benny Sabti, an Iranian-born
Israeli analyst who has become a prominent voice on Israeli news
panels during the war, tweeted
[[link removed]] that “a
ceasefire amid ongoing rocket fire and fatalities is an irrational
decision. Iran will emerge stronger.”

Even Netanyahu’s apparent diplomatic coup in drawing the U.S.
military into an Israeli-initiated war is now being reassessed. Just
days ago, it was hailed as a personal triumph for the Israeli premier,
with lawmaker Aryeh Deri calling Trump
[[link removed]] “God’s messenger
for the Jewish people.” But by relying on the United States to
deliver the final blow at Fordow
[[link removed]],
Israel effectively ceded a degree of control, culminating in a clear
reminder that Trump still had the last word. After Iran launched a
missile three hours after the ceasefire, Israel sent warplanes to
retaliate. But as they were already en route, Trump publicly warned
Israel on his Truth Social account, “DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS,”
forcing the planes to turn back.

A POLITICAL RESTORATION?

On the surface, Netanyahu appears to be the big winner of this war in
Israel. Even his fiercest critics in the media have given him credit
for the military success, to say nothing of his supporters, who have
returned to speaking about him in near-divine terms. He himself seems
reborn: giving interviews, visiting missile impact sites, eating
falafel with the people — gestures he had all but abandoned since
the launch of his judicial overhaul
[[link removed]],
and certainly since October 7. Unsurprisingly, speculation is already
swirling in the media that he might call early elections to capitalize
on his newfound glory.

But the polls published since Israel’s opening strike against Iran
have been less encouraging for Netanyahu than one might expect. Likud
has gained some ground, but the right-wing coalition bloc remains
stuck
[[link removed]] at
a projected 50 Knesset seats — not enough to prevent the opposition
from forming a government. One possible explanation is that air force
pilots and intelligence officers, the two groups perhaps most
associated with the anti-Netanyahu protest movement, have emerged as
the war’s true heroes. 

The main reason Netanyahu chose this moment to launch a war with Iran
was to make Gaza fade from view
[[link removed]]: to make people
forget his failure to eliminate Hamas; to forget the hostages that are
still in captivity; to forget the mounting international outrage over
the horrific images emanating from the Strip; to forget the growing
domestic frustration with the war; and to forget that the monstrous
plan [[link removed]] to push
Palestinians into southern Gaza in preparation for expulsion has
stalled, accomplishing little beyond shooting at starving civilians
[[link removed]] waiting
in line for food.

But now that the war with Iran is over, Gaza is once again impossible
to ignore. Any Israeli who needed a reminder didn’t have to wait
long: on June 25, seven soldiers were killed
[[link removed]] by
an IED in Khan Yunis. And contrary to Netanyahu’s hopes, the
pressure to end the war in Gaza is only likely to intensify.

[Protesters march through the streets of Haifa calling for an end to
Israel's war on Gaza, May 31, 2025. (Yahel Gazit)]
[[link removed]]
Protesters march through the streets of Haifa calling for an end to
Israel's war on Gaza, May 31, 2025. (Yahel Gazit)
Protesters march through the streets of Haifa calling for an end to
Israel’s war on Gaza, May 31, 2025. (Yahel Gazit)

Even before the deadly incident in Khan Yunis, there was already a
palpable sense of fatigue and despair
[[link removed]] among
Israeli troops serving in Gaza, particularly reservists. The war with
Iran may in fact reinforce a growing belief among Israelis that if the
country can successfully confront a supposedly existential threat like
Iran’s nuclear program, then it can certainly manage a far lesser
challenge like Hamas, striking a deal to end the war in exchange for
all the hostages. Indeed, the “Hostage and Missing Families
Forum,” the main group representing the families of Israelis still
held captive in Gaza, wasted no time in making the connection.
“Anyone who can bring about a ceasefire with Iran can also end the
war in Gaza,” it declared in a statement following the ceasefire.

It remains unclear whether Trump will now push to end the war in Gaza
in order to bolster his image as a peacemaker. But if he does head in
that direction, it will be far harder for Netanyahu to resist,
especially after effectively handing Trump the keys to ending the war
with Iran.

MAGA figurehead Steve Bannon’s furious outburst, calling Netanyahu
a “brazen liar”
[[link removed]] for
violating the Trump-brokered ceasefire, is an early warning sign. And
European countries, many of which backed Israel during the Iran war
out of an instinctive West-versus-East reflex, may now escalate their
threats to sanction Israel unless it “ends the suffering
[[link removed]]”
in Gaza, and perhaps even follow through on them.

For over 30 years, the “existential threat” from Iran — and the
claim that only he could neutralize it — has been one of
Netanyahu’s most powerful political cards. But now he’s played it.
And it won’t be easy to play again. He cannot credibly claim in the
near future that Iran is on the verge of building a bomb without
undermining the very “decisive victory” he celebrated on live
television.

That leaves the ethnic cleansing in Gaza and the annexation of the
West Bank as Netanyahu’s remaining agenda. But politically, those
are far weaker cards, especially if they stand alone without the
looming specter of an Iranian “axis of evil.”

Without a strong card left to play, Netanyahu may come to see a
comprehensive deal on Gaza — as recently floated by Gilad Erdan,
former ambassador to Washington and longtime Netanyahu loyalist — as
the most viable path forward: End the war, bring the hostages home
(the few that are still alive
[[link removed]]),
and go to elections riding the fumes of victory in Iran and pictures
embracing the returning captives.

* Israel
[[link removed]]
* Iran
[[link removed]]
* Israel-Iran war
[[link removed]]
* Benjamin Netanyahu
[[link removed]]
* Gaza
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

INTERPRET THE WORLD AND CHANGE IT

 

 

Submit via web
[[link removed]]

Submit via email
Frequently asked questions
[[link removed]]
Manage subscription
[[link removed]]
Visit xxxxxx.org
[[link removed]]

Twitter [[link removed]]

Facebook [[link removed]]

 




[link removed]

To unsubscribe, click the following link:
[link removed]