Major takeaways from the Hudson event, "Maintaining a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as Tensions Simmer."
1. H. R. McMaster on the significance of the Himalayan clash:
Xi Jinping has this combination of
ambition and also fear that the window of opportunity is closing for him to realize his ambitions. What if the PLA is believing their own propaganda now? And is internalizing it and acting aggressively, not only on the border here, but also in the South China Sea, and the Senkaku [Islands]. I think that, vis-a-vis Taiwan, this is a flash point and large measure because of the emotional aspect of it.
But I really am concerned that the PLA might be really believing its own propaganda. And then of course for Xi Jinping, he's in an echo chamber. I mean, how many people around Xi Jinping are going to want to tell him the reality of the degree to which the PLA can control a military operation, for example on the border with India? I think all of these factors make it an increasingly dangerous time.
2. Patrick Cronin on the historical precedent to the skirmish:
This has been a long-standing standoff because the Himalayan frontier has never been demarcated. The '62 War, of course China bloodied the Indian Army. Some people see maybe what just happened on Monday night in Eastern Ladakh next to Jammu and Kashmir, where at least 20 Indian soldiers were killed. This is the first time the PLA has been in combat under Xi Jinping's watch, where there's been lethal
combat as far as I know. That's a significant milestone, especially since Xi has been pushing the PLA, saying "let's show that we're ready for combat."
3. Tosh Minohara on how India should respond:
At one point, Modi was willing to reconcile with Xi Jinping. But now with this post-pandemic world, I think the lines have been drawn in the sand. It's important for all countries to give it some hard thought as to which side they're
on. Instead of buying weapons and missiles from the Russians, [India] should reorient themselves more to Europe, and definitely to the United States. The Indians could really use American military know-how to act as a deterrent. Because if the Indians are tough, the Chinese are not going to push in. You always want to grab what's easier. If you look at the situation on the ground realistically, it's very easy to figure out what Chinese motives and intents are.
4. Patrick Cronin on China's pattern of maritime aggression:
China seems to have stepped up even in the midst of the pandemic with more maritime coercion. On March 16 Chinese fishing boats, some 10 of them, were intentionally ramming a Taiwan Coast Guard vessel. There was also the ramming of a Japanese destroyer. And on April 2, the Chinese Coast Guard vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat. There have been no shortage of maritime incidents because of Chinese aggression, a lot of them by their maritime militia, their Coast Guards or their paranaval, paramilitary forces.
And yet, [Chinese forces have] announced a drill that would essentially approximate the seizure of Dongsha or Pratas Island. This exercise would occur this fall. Taiwan has a sort of a nature preserve, maritime marine
nature preserve on this island, and they occupy it. So this is very threatening to Taiwan. Meanwhile the United States has mobilized three aircraft carriers, the Reagan, Roosevelt, Nimitz in the maritime space around this area, which they haven't done since 2017 when the nuclear crisis with North Korea was flaring up before the diplomacy kicked in.
5. Yurika Ishii on the international agreements governing maritime conflict:
China is
pursuing its maritime interest in South China Sea, East China Sea and against Taiwan's vessels. China is of course subject to the United Nations Law of the Sea, which obliges member states to use the sea peacefully. It is debatable whether harassing activities or provocative activities could be contrary to this obligation. But it seems that China is intentionally using this, the width of the interpretation of the international obligations. There's a non-binding code for unplanned encounters at sea, which China has just signed. This instrument sets the rule for navies to secure the maritime safety. The recent activities of Chinese naval vessels seems to be contrary to the rules set in this document.
6. How China interprets the recent protests in the U.S.:
Minohara: I'm more worried about the Chinese rhetoric that's coming out right now from their country. And that is they are making a mockery of democracy. They see America as being weak with the protests, but I think such rhetoric can lead to an underestimation of American power. And so I think the Chinese could miscalculate. They could say, "Oh, America is not that strong. They're pushovers." And this would be a terrible mistake. If you look at American history, you know that's not
the case. That when push comes to shove, the Americans will stand up, stand up for what it believes in. And so this is why I think the situation is very dangerous that the Chinese are not really grasping the true nature of America.
Cronin: [China] may confuse the protests in the streets in America with weakness. As somebody who grew up in California in the 60's and watched these protests, I see it as a sign of strength. It's the resiliency of a democracy.
We are so comfortable with disorder. We don't need the Chinese style and the years of complete hierarchy in order to feel comfortable. We can put up with some disorder, because that's voicing democracy. That's allowing everybody to participate, and trying to improve and constantly reform
and aspire to be the best we can. None of our system give us the one message that we have to hue to, and we must follow the party line or else, and that's it.
Quotes have been edited for length and clarity