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Week of May 12, 2025 [[link removed]] | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

* U.S. Offer on Nuclear Deal En Route to Iran After Back and Forth [[link removed]]
* Cautious Progress in Oman: Iran-U.S. Talks Continue Despite Deep Divides and Military Doubts [[link removed]]
* From Mountains to Mandates: How the PKK’s Dissolution Reshapes Iran’s Kurdish Question [[link removed]]
* Iran Conditionally Approves Palermo Convention Amid Renewed FATF Debate [[link removed]]
* Iran Rises to the Top of Asian Chess as Bardiya Daneshvar Makes History [[link removed]]

U.S. Offer on Nuclear Deal En Route to Iran After Back and Forth [[link removed]]
President Donald Trump, during a four-day regional tour of the Gulf, asserted that the U.S. has offered a nuclear deal proposal to Iran . His remarks, made during stops in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, would appear to hint at growing momentum toward a potential agreement, despite lingering tensions and the risk of escalation. Iran, however, has strongly stated that the U.S. has not put forward a formal written offer.

“They have our offer. They have to make a quick decision, or something bad will happen,” Trump said aboard Air Force One. While he did not disclose the full details of the proposal, Trump reiterated in Doha that a nuclear agreement with Iran is “within reach” and that a military confrontation might be avoidable. “Iran has sort of agreed to the terms: They’re not going to make, I call it, in a friendly way, nuclear dust. We’re not looking to create nuclear dust in Iran. I think we’re getting close to a deal, maybe without having to do that,” he added

However, the dispute over the existence of the U.S. proposal has added to uncertainty surrounding the negotiations. Iranian Foreign Minister tweeted on X on May 16:

Iran has not received any written proposal from the United States, whether directly or indirectly.

In the meantime, the messaging we—and the world—continue to receive is confusing and contradictory. Iran nonetheless remains determined and straightforward: Respect our rights and terminate your sanctions, and we have a deal.

Mark my words: there is no scenario in which Iran abandons its hard-earned right to enrichment for peaceful purposes: a right afforded to all other NPT signatories, too.

The Great Iranian Nation has shown its Power and Fortitude in the face of those who have attempted imposition. We ALWAYS welcome dialogue based on mutual respect and ALWAYS reject any diktat.

Separate comments from Araghchi, and other Iranian officials, make this position clear – Iran is insisting that there is no U.S. written proposal to react to.

Axios had reported the Trump administration gave Iran a written nuclear proposal during the fourth round of talks in Oman . U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff reportedly handed the document to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who then according to the account took it back to Tehran for consultation with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, and other senior officials.

Likewise, Axios details a process of back-and-forth document exchanges, beginning with Iran’s written proposals in April . The U.S. responded with clarifying questions and eventually a formal offer. Witkoff reportedly described the U.S. document as “elegant” and “very big” in a UN Security Council briefing. Witkoff called the process promising, while Araghchi described it as “difficult but useful.”

Friday afternoon, Reuters reported that the U.S. offer was en route to Iran. They cited an Iranian official, who indicated that while Tehran has yet to receive the U.S. proposal, “Oman has got it and will hand it over to Tehran soon.” This follows the pattern of President Trump’s letter to Ayatollah Khamenei, which does not appear to have been delivered until well after the President first announced the news that he had sent it.

Trump’s comments followed a pivotal interview by Iranian political advisor Ali Shamkhani, a former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and senior advisor to the Supreme Leader . In an interview with NBC, Shamkhani affirmed that Tehran is prepared to halt high-level uranium enrichment and get rid of its 60% enriched uranium stockpile—if the United States lifts all sanctions immediately. Notably, Donald Trump personally shared a screenshot of the interview on his social media platform, highlighting Iran’s offer to halt enrichment of highly enriched uranium. The post appears to show that the President is closely watching the back-and-forth of the negotiating process.

Recent statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio are also notable . While he has called for zero enrichment and full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program, Rubio – speaking with Fox News – focused on the dangers of Iran’s current 60% enrichment and uranium stockpile, declining to reiterate demands for zero enrichment or destruction of facilities. According to Rubio, “Once you’re at 60, you’re 90% of the way there. You are, in essence, a threshold nuclear weapons state, which is what Iran basically has become.” Rubio continued, “They are at the threshold of a nuclear weapon. If they decided to do so, they could do so very quickly. If they stockpile enough of that 60 percent enriched, they could very quickly turn it into 90 and weaponize it. That’s the danger we face right now. That’s the urgency here.”

Trump’s broader tour across the Gulf included many notable remarks on regional security and U.S. interests in the Middle East . In a speech at the GCC summit in Saudi Arabia, Trump stressed his desire for a deal with Iran—contingent on halting terrorism support and nuclear weapons development. However, he sharply criticized Iran’s leadership and economy, contrasting infrastructural growth in Gulf states with “crumbling” buildings in Iran. He accused the Iranian regime of turning fertile lands into desert and emphasized that his offer—a “olive branch”—would not last forever.

Iranian officials swiftly responded . Araghchi labeled Trump’s Riyadh remarks as “deceptive,” attributing Iran’s economic challenges to decades of U.S. sanctions and military threats. Iranian lawmakers issued a joint statement calling the negotiations a renewed opportunity for an “untrustworthy” America, reiterating that Iran demands full sanctions relief and the right to peaceful nuclear activity. The statement also warned U.S. lawmakers against reviving “cat-and-mouse” tactics from past JCPOA talks.

The statement further emphasized Iran’s strategic leverage in the Persian Gulf, warning that threats to Iranian oil exports would undermine regional energy security. Notably, Trump did not seek to rename the Persian Gulf nor introduce new public conditions, thereby avoiding additional provocations that could have prompted harsher Iranian responses.

Meanwhile, the Iranian side held a meeting with European JCPOA signatories (UK, France, Germany) in Istanbul, following a previously canceled round that was scheduled for Rome .

Recent developments surrounding the U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations suggest that Arab Gulf countries, particularly Qatar, may have played a key facilitative role in thawing the diplomatic freeze. he situation remains delicate—but not without hope. Trump’s economic vision for the Middle East—built on trillions in investment—is fragile in the face of conflict with Iran. Thus, between deal and war, diplomacy appears increasingly favored.

Cautious Progress in Oman: Iran-U.S. Talks Continue Despite Deep Divides and Military Doubts [[link removed]]
Published May 12, 2025

The fourth round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States concluded on Sunday, May 11, 2025, in Muscat, Oman . Led by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff, the talks lasted around three hours and were mediated by Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi. After the talks, Albusaidi stated “The discussions included useful and original ideas reflecting a shared wish to reach an honorable agreement. The 5th round of talks will take place once both parties have consult their leaderships.”

A senior U.S. official told Axios that the administration was “encouraged by today’s outcome and look forward to our next meeting, which will happen in the near future.” The official also noted that the negotiations were a mix of direct and indirect discussions, similar to previous rounds.

President Trump, speaking Monday, spoke positively about the negotiations. He stated “they are talking intelligently, we are in the mix of talking to them…we want Iran to be wealthy and wonderful and happy and great, but they can’t have a nuclear weapon, it’s very simple. I think they understand that I mean business, and I think they’re being very reasonable thus far.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that this round of talks was “more serious and direct” than the previous three, adding, “We now have a better understanding of each other and hope to make further progres s.” He reiterated that uranium enrichment remains a red line for Iran and is not open to negotiation, although the level and scope may be adjusted.

The lead-up to the talks was marked by tough rhetoric from Washington . Witkoff, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and President Trump all had recently stated in various ways that Iran must completely halt uranium enrichment, with Rubio falsely claiming that only countries seeking nuclear weapons engage in enrichment. These remarks were seen in Tehran as provocation and a nonstarter for any constructive dialogue. At the same time, U.S. officials have repeatedly warned that failure to reach an agreement could leave military action as the only remaining option.

However, many experts have cast serious doubt on the viability of a military solution . Iran’s current facilities are dispersed, deeply fortified, and resilient to airstrikes. The recent U.S. experience in Yemen has shown the limits of bombing campaigns, especially against entrenched or mobile targets. There is also a growing consensus that Israel alone lacks the operational capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, and even for the United States, such an operation would likely require a full-scale occupation to ensure that Iran doesn’t pivot from attack toward a full-bore, covert drive for weaponization.

In a post on X (formerly Twitter), Araghchi warned that any misuse of the snapback mechanism—the clause in the JCPOA allowing for automatic reimposition of sanctions—would not only end Europe’s role in the deal but could also trigger irreversible escalation . He urged European powers to abandon confrontational strategies, warning that they risk sparking a broader nuclear crisis, with Europe among the most affected. Additionally, in an op-ed published by the French weekly Le Point , Araghchi criticized France, Germany, and the U.K. for adopting a confrontational approach, using human rights and Iran’s relations with Russia as excuses to distance themselves diplomatically. He called on them to reassess their role in creating the current impasse.

In response to Rubio’s earlier remarks, Iranian officials reaffirmed that uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is permitted under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) . Iran maintains that its program is entirely lawful, transparent, and not aimed at building nuclear weapons. However, there is significant evidence that Iran shelved an active weapons program in the lead up to 2003, and Iran is currently enriching uranium at a level that is just beneath weapons grade and arguably has little civilian justification.

President Masoud Pezeshkian also firmly rejected the idea of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, stating that such demands are “unacceptable .” He added that Iran will never give up its peaceful nuclear rights and emphasized that the country has never sought nuclear weapons, and remains committed to meaningful diplomacy. The Iranian Foreign Ministry echoed this stance, expressing continued dedication to the NPT framework and to lifting what it called “illegal and inhumane sanctions” on the Iranian people.

Notably, President Trump travels to the Middle East this week and is scheduled to arrive in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on Tuesday. While his visit will not include a trip to Israel, despite an invitation, the President will travel to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates before he returns. There is some speculation that President Trump could announce a new framework for civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia, which may partly explain some of the administration’s recent rhetoric surrounding enrichment. Likewise, prior reporting indicated that the President could announce that the U.S. government will relabel the Persian Gulf the “Arabian Gulf,” which drew harsh criticism from Iran and the Iranian diaspora. While there was some speculation that an Iranian official could meet President Trump during his visit, the talks do not seem poised for a breakthrough and recent rhetoric could have diminished such chances, if indeed they were considered.

As the fourth round concludes, attention now turns to the fifth round of talks, which is to be set at a future date . While no breakthrough has yet occurred, the exchange of technical ideas, the measured tone, and the mutual agreement to continue discussions suggest that diplomacy remains alive—though the path forward is both narrow and fragile.

From Mountains to Mandates: How the PKK’s Dissolution Reshapes Iran’s Kurdish Question [[link removed]]
In a historic and potentially transformative development, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced its formal dissolution and the end of its armed struggle . The decision, made during the party’s 12th Congress in northern Iraq, follows a public call by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, urging a shift from armed resistance to democratic political engagement. The PKK’s final statement confirmed the termination of its organizational structure and activities under its historic name, ending a conflict that has claimed over 40,000 lives since the 1980s.

The Islamic Republic of Iran swiftly responded . Foreign Ministry spokesperson Seyed Esmail Baghaei welcomed the move, calling it “an important step toward rejecting violence and strengthening regional security.” He expressed hope that the transition would promote stability in Turkey and the broader region. This rare diplomatic endorsement signals that Iran may be recalibrating its long-standing approach to Kurdish movements, especially those along its western border.

Iran’s Kurdish landscape is not defined by PJAK alone . In addition to the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK)—often linked to the PKK—Komalah and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) represent two of the most historically significant Kurdish opposition groups in Iran. Both have operated militarily and politically from northern Iraq and embody traditional nationalist and leftist Kurdish currents. While PJAK quickly expressed support for the PKK’s decision, Komalah and KDPI have yet to publicly respond. The future of these groups will likely be influenced by the same regional dynamics now reshaping the Kurdish question.

PJAK praised the PKK’s dissolution as “historic and transformative,” urging Kurdish communities to embrace peaceful and democratic pathways forward . While honoring past sacrifices, PJAK emphasized that armed resistance must now evolve into civic participation and political strategy.

Jalal Jalalizadeh, an Iranian Kurdish intellectual and former MP, offered a heartfelt reflection: “I cried and I smiled .” He grieved the loss of tens of thousands of young Kurds, yet expressed hope that the next generation will live without war. While critical of the PKK’s Marxist ideology, he recognized the group’s role in resisting state repression and preserving Kurdish identity. Jalalizadeh urged Iranian and regional leaders to support this new chapter and turn Kurdish grief into political dignity.

Iranian journalist Mr. Khadiv added a more analytical and cautious voice . He questioned whether the dissolution is a true structural end or a tactical rebranding, noting the PKK’s history of operating under alternate names. Yet he acknowledged that this declaration seems more serious—possibly part of a confidential peace process with Ankara.

Khadiv pointed to a shift in the PKK’s ideology. Absent are calls for autonomy or federalism. Instead, the group now emphasizes democratizing the Turkish Republic as a space of shared political citizenship. He suggested that in the short term, the PKK may seek the release of political prisoners and the restoration of Kurdish municipalities, while in the long term, it hopes for constitutional reforms.

He also analyzed Erdoğan’s political motivations: facing his most serious electoral challenge in decades, the Turkish president may need Kurdish parliamentary support to maintain power . Meanwhile, Ankara’s military efforts to fully dismantle Kurdish autonomy in Syria have stalled. This may prompt Turkey to pursue a soft détente with Syrian Kurds, akin to the Erbil–Qamishli model.

For Iran, these developments carry significant weight . As Syria and Iraq fade from the Kurdish equation, the issue is increasingly becoming a geopolitical competition between Iran and Turkey. If Ankara finalizes a peace settlement, it could gain strategic soft power in Kurdish regions across the Middle East—similar, Khadiv argues, to the post-Chaldiran era, when Kurdish emirates aligned with Ottoman Istanbul over Safavid Isfahan.

The PKK’s dissolution is not just an end—it’s a recalibration. For Iran, this moment offers both risk and opportunity. Tehran can continue its security-first posture, potentially isolating itself from evolving Kurdish dynamics, or it can engage politically with Kurdish actors through more inclusive strategies. Whether this transformation leads to broader peace or renewed fragmentation will depend in large part on how Iran and its regional counterparts choose to respond.

Iran Conditionally Approves Palermo Convention Amid Renewed FATF Debate [[link removed]]
Iran’s Expediency Council has conditionally approved the country’s accession to the United Nations Palermo Convention, a major international treaty aimed at combating transnational organized crime, including human trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal trade. According to council spokesperson Mohsen Dehnavi, the decision follows three plenary sessions and five joint commission meetings. He stated that the accession was approved on the condition that it aligns with Iran’s constitution and domestic laws. The council is expected to review the related Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention in upcoming sessions.

The move comes after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorized a renewed review of Iran’s potential accession to both the Palermo and CFT conventions in January 2025 . Although a special committee within the council had already approved both bills in March, the final decision required a full vote by the Expediency Council.

Iran’s accession to these conventions is a prerequisite for coming into compliance with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global body that monitors and seeks to combat money laundering and terrorism financing through adoption of uniform legal and regulatory standards . Iran has remained on FATF’s blacklist since 2007. In 2016, the country pledged to address its strategic deficiencies, but by 2020, FATF confirmed that Iran had failed to meet its commitments, leaving it exposed to financial isolation.

FATF includes 37 member countries as well as entities like the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council . TRussia’s membership is currently suspended.

Domestic opponents of the Palermo and CFT bills argue that their implementation could severely restrict Iran’s financial and military support for regional groups such as Hezbollah, which they believe would be contrary to Iran’s strategic interests . Supporters, including the administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, argue that Iran’s failure to join FATF hampers foreign investment and contributes to the country’s ongoing economic difficulties.

While most countries worldwide have ratified both conventions, Iran’s efforts have been stalled by internal political divisions . The bills were initially approved by Parliament under President Hassan Rouhani, but were rejected by the Guardian Council in 2018 and sent to the Expediency Council for arbitration. A previous review was launched in 2020 with Khamenei’s approval but had since remained dormant until the current renewed push.

Iran Rises to the Top of Asian Chess as Bardiya Daneshvar Makes History [[link removed]]
Bardiya Daneshvar, a 19-year-old Iranian grandmaster, has made history by securing Iran’s first-ever championship title at the Asian Chess Championship. In the 8th round of the tournament, held in the United Arab Emirates, Daneshvar defeated Abhimanyu Puranik of India, bringing his score to 7 points. With one round still to go, he became the individual champion of the tournament, marking a historic achievement for Iran.

Daneshvar had recently placed second in the West Asian Championship, earning a spot in the World Chess Championship. Sina Movahed, another Iranian chess player, also brought home a silver medal in the blitz section of the same tournament.

This year’s Asian Chess Championship resumed after a one-year hiatus and was held in the UAE with around 300 participants, including top players from China and Uzbekistan. Born in 2006, Bardiya Daneshvar began playing chess at the age of six and quickly rose through the ranks.

In 2017, at just 11 years old, he earned silver and bronze medals in the under-12 category at the World Rapid and Blitz Chess Championships—his first global medals. Two years ago, Daneshvar won the Lozovatsky Memorial tournament in Russia, where he delivered outstanding results and earned his third and final Grandmaster norm. Following confirmation by FIDE, the International Chess Federation, he officially received the Grandmaster title.

He is the youngest Iranian to achieve this prestigious title and one of only 19 Iranian chess players to do so. Daneshvar and his family lived for some time in Georgia, which contributed to his international experience and exposure.

According to the latest FIDE rankings, Daneshvar is ranked 4th among Iranian chess players and 126th in the world. While Iranian players continue to find success on the international stage, several top Iranian champions have left the country in recent years and now compete under other national flags.
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