China and Russia unite in show of support for Iran on the nuclear issue
On March 14, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu hosted Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi for a trilateral meeting in Beijing. The meeting was apparently scheduled on relatively short notice, and the timing was reportedly related to a letter President Trump had sent to Iran’s leader via intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates the previous week. Trump’s letter proposed direct talks but threatened U.S. military action if the nuclear issue was not resolved in a timely manner.
The Chinese and Russian officials made a strong show of support for Iran, marking a significant departure from the situation leading up to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during the Obama administration. At that time, China and Russia were sitting on the other side of the table from Iran as part of the P5+1, alongside the United States and major European powers. The new Iran-China-Russia communiqué emphasized Iran’s right to nuclear energy development, and said that negotiations should proceed without “unlawful” sanctions, pressure, or threats of military action. Both Russia and China have played critical roles in keeping Iran’s economy afloat under U.S. sanctions, with China buying the overwhelming majority of Iran’s oil exports and Russia serving as a customer for Iran’s arms manufacturing industries.
In a subsequent development in April, Russia declined to confirm its willingness to take control of Iran’s stockpile of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in the manner it did in 2015 as part of the JCPOA, with Iran expected to reject such an arrangement in its initial negotiations with the U.S. China also saw another independent “teapot” refiner sanctioned by Washington on April 16 for its processing of Iranian crude oil, as well as a couple of shipping companies involved in transporting Iranian crude oil.
China, Russia, and Iran conduct joint naval exercises
Warships from China, Russia, and Iran conducted joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz over five days in mid-March. The exercise, called Maritime Security Belt 2025, featured live-fire gunnery practice and the simulated boarding of hijacked commercial vessels. It involved a Chinese guided missile destroyer and supply ship, two Russian corvettes, and more than ten Iranian vessels of various classes. This is the fifth consecutive year for the three navies to hold the Maritime Security Belt drills. During the exercises, vessels near the Strait of Hormuz reportedly experienced problems with their navigation systems, likely due to GPS-jamming as part of the exercise.
North Korea sends additional reinforcements to Russia
North Korea has sent approximately 3,000 more troops to Russia in January and February to join operations against Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, according to a report from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service. The new troops made up for previous losses of about 4,000 North Korean personnel estimated to have been killed or wounded already, according to the South Korean report. Other estimates have put North Korean casualties lower. Very few have been captured, reportedly due to threats by the North Korean regime of harsh reprisals against soldiers’ families if they surrender. North Korea has continued to supply Russia with munitions, with some recent analyses suggesting that a large majority of the artillery shells currently being used by Russia are of North Korean origin. Reports in April suggest that the Ukrainian military is concerned about an impending deployment of North Korean troops into Ukraine.
North Korean trade with China rises
North Korea saw increased trade with China in January and February compared to year-ago levels, despite the usual seasonal drop over the winter. The sectoral breakdown of the data suggests that North Korea is buying intermediate goods to be processed into finished goods. Textile imports have surged, which suggests that DPRK workers are making clothing for resale in violation of UN sanctions. In addition, construction seems to have restarted on some of the ancillary portions of the New Yalu River Bridge project, specifically the customs processing facility—suggesting that the bridge may be completed and opened to facilitate increased trade. The bridge construction stalled during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and had not resumed until now.
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