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Week of April 14, 2025 [[link removed]] | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

* Is Saudi Arabia Playing Peacemaker? Khalid bin Salman Delivers Royal Message in Tehran as Nuclear Diplomacy Intensifies [[link removed]]
* Prospects for Further Progress: Iran-U.S. Nuclear Negotiations, Agenda, and Red Lines [[link removed]]
* Iran Rejects Zero-Enrichment Demands, Says Uranium Program Is Non-Negotiable [[link removed]]
* Iran Sends Message to Putin Amid Strategic Pact; Lawmakers Question Transparency [[link removed]]
* Newly Revealed Audio Exposes Montazeri’s Blistering Critique of 1988 Prison Massacres [[link removed]]
* Fatal Attack on Pakistani Laborers in Iran Underscores Intensifying Border Militancy [[link removed]]
* Pezeshkian Replaces Zarif and Dabiri in Quiet Cabinet Reshuffle [[link removed]]
* Iran and Armenia Conduct Joint Military Drill Amid Regional Tensions with Azerbaijan [[link removed]]

Is Saudi Arabia Playing Peacemaker? Khalid bin Salman Delivers Royal Message in Tehran as Nuclear Diplomacy Intensifies [[link removed]]
Published on April 18, 2025

In a development rich with diplomatic symbolism, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman delivered a written message from King Salman to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during his visit to Tehran on April 17, marking a historic moment in Saudi-Iranian relations. The visit, which comes just before the second round of indirect U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, is the highest-level Saudi delegation to visit Iran since ties were restored.

Though the contents of the Saudi king’s message remain undisclosed, Iranian state media reported that Ayatollah Khamenei described improved ties as beneficial to both nations , noting that “Iran and Saudi Arabia can complement each other,” and emphasized the need to overcome hostility from parties opposed to the bilateral thaw.

Prince Khalid, who was accompanied by a 70-member delegation, first met with General Mohammad Bagheri, Iran’s Armed Forces Chief of Staff. The visit was reportedly made at Bagheri’s invitation, and Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that the trip focused on bilateral cooperation and shared regional concerns.

The timing of the visit is significant – Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was in Moscow on April 17, delivering a message from Ayatollah Khamenei to Russian President Vladimir Putin, as part of Iran’s ongoing coordination with its regional allies. Meanwhile, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi was also in Tehran for a two-day visit, engaging with Iranian officials ahead of a crucial nuclear report mandated by the IAEA Board of Governors.

Grossi told reporters in Tehran that Iran and the United States are “running out of time” to reach a nuclear agreement, adding, “We are at a very sensitive stage, and we know there is not much time left.” He noted that facilitating talks between Iran and the U.S. was part of his goal for this visit.

Grossi also met with Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, and stated his visit was intended to help clear remaining ambiguities and pave the way for diplomatic progress. Eslami acknowledged the difficulty of reaching a deal, but said, “We are working hard and we want to succeed.”

During his press availability, Grossi toured Iran’s nuclear achievements exhibition, including its heavy water production capabilities, accompanied by Kazem Gharibabadi, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Behrouz Kamalvandi, Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization. Grossi later posted on X about “a full day of productive discussions.”

Grossi also met with Araghchi before the Foreign Minister had departed for Moscow. Araghchi described his meeting with Grossi as constructive, emphasizing the need to keep the IAEA depoliticized. “In an environment where various actors are trying to derail negotiations, what we need is a ‘director of peace,'” he said.

Araghchi also told Press TV that Iran is still awaiting Oman’s final decision on the location of the next round of nuclear talks. “We are in contact with our Omani partners and waiting for their final word,” he said. It has since been confirmed that the next round of talks on April 19 will be held in Rome, Italy.

Iranian officials have emphasized that Grossi’s upcoming report will be pivotal in determining whether U.N. sanctions relief is extended. Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibabadi confirmed that further technical-level meetings with the IAEA are planned in Tehran.

As nuclear diplomacy accelerates, Saudi Arabia’s high-profile engagement with Iran, symbolized by the delivery of a personal message from the Saudi monarch, raises questions about whether Riyadh could eventually position itself as a bridge between Tehran and Washington.

Prospects for Further Progress: Iran-U.S. Nuclear Negotiations, Agenda, and Red Lines [[link removed]]
Published on April 15, 2025

After what both sides described as a “positive” first round of negotiations in Muscat, Oman, Iran and the United States initially appeared set to continue talks on Iran’s nuclear program in Rome. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani announced that Italy had received a request from “the interested parties and also Oman” to host the dialogue, and the Netherlands’ Foreign Minister similarly indicated that Rome was confirmed as the venue. However, on Monday night, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei clarified that the second round of talks would remain in Muscat at Oman’s request, scheduled for Saturday, April 19 (30 Farvardin). Baghaei cited “issues related to support and coordination” as the reason for keeping negotiations in Oman rather than moving them to Italy. Italian officials expressed readiness to host if asked in the future. However, newer reports have now confirmed that the talks will take place in Rome this weekend.

Regarding whether the talks are direct or indirect, confusion has arisen. Iranian officials have insisted they remain indirect through Omani mediation, but some reports also indicate a 45-minute face-to-face discussion took place between the Iranian and American delegations during the Muscat visit on April 12. Iran’s chief negotiator and Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, acknowledged only a “brief greeting,” fueling speculation that there may have been more direct engagement than Tehran admits publicly.

In his first public remarks about the renewed talks, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cautioned officials “not to tie the country’s affairs to negotiations with America,” referencing disappointments following the 2015 JCPOA. He urged avoidance of “extreme optimism or pessimism,” adding that “the first steps have been good” but that Iran remains wary, as “the red lines for us—and for the other side—are entirely clear.”

Meanwhile, Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs, explicitly linked Iran’s military capabilities to any future agreement, stating in a Fox News interview on
April 14 that “verifying Iran’s enrichment and armament capabilities” would be crucial. He insisted Iran “does not need enrichment beyond 3.67%” and that higher enrichments—sometimes surpassing 60%—raise doubts about the program’s civilian nature. Witkoff also stressed that verifying Iran’s weapons capabilities “includes missiles, the type of missiles that they have stockpiled there, and it includes the trigger for a bomb .”

Shortly thereafter, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reaffirmed that its military capabilities are non-negotiable, calling them a “red line”. IRGC spokesperson Ali Mohammad Naeini declared: “National security, defense power, and military capabilities are among the Islamic Republic’s red lines under any circumstances. We do not negotiate on such matters.” He characterized U.S. demands to discuss Iran’s missile program as a certain deal-breaker.

Despite these disagreements, both Iranian and American officials characterized the first round in Muscat as “constructive” and “calm,” crediting Oman’s mediation. Baghaei stressed that negotiations focus strictly on Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief—no other topics will be entertained. Araghchi said the Muscat session narrowed some gaps and that Tehran “stands ready to continue serious talks” if Washington is similarly committed. President Donald Trump offered a measured response, saying: “I think the talks are going well… Things aren’t bad. I think things are moving fairly well.” Yet he maintains that “all options remain on the table,” a reminder of possible escalation if diplomacy fails.

In Tehran’s parliament (Majles), lawmakers remain divided. Some warn that the United States could again renege on any deal, while others note the severe economic toll of sanctions and see negotiation as necessary. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf called for “neutralizing sanctions through internal strength” rather than relying on outside powers. Conservative MP Mehdi Kouchakzadeh criticized the talks, but MP Hassan Qashqavi, Head of the Parliament’s Nuclear Committee, defended them, emphasizing that “the Leader’s decisions are final” and that the negotiating team is acting in line with those decisions.

Khamenei has consistently warned against crossing “red lines” on missiles, regional alliances, and national sovereignty . Many analysts in Tehran believe that while Iran welcomes sanctions relief, the leadership will remain steadfast on these core principles. So far, no institution has openly opposed the talks, suggesting cautious support for possible breakthroughs.

Iranian newspapers mirror the nation’s cautious optimism. Reformist-leaning publications speak of a “rare opportunity to redefine interaction” with the United States, while conservative outlets argue “an optimistic path to agreement with Trump remains unlikely” and urge stronger domestic economic measures. Nonetheless, recent developments have lifted the Iranian rial against the dollar, signaling that markets are tracking any signs of de-escalation.

Whether these talks can successfully navigate the new U.S. emphasis on ballistic missiles and armament verification is an open question. With Oman mediating and Khamenei calling the initial steps “good,” there is a narrow window for progress. Yet memories of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA remain vivid in Tehran, fueling skepticism. As Khamenei himself noted, “We are not very pessimistic or very optimistic,” but all parties know precisely where “the red lines” lie. The upcoming session in Rome will test whether these positive signals can yield a comprehensive agreement—or revert to an entrenched stalemate.

Iran Rejects Zero-Enrichment Demands, Says Uranium Program Is Non-Negotiable [[link removed]]
Published on April 16, 2025

Amid conflicting signals from U.S. officials regarding the end goal of negotiations, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Tehran will not accept any proposal requiring it to dismantle its uranium enrichment program. “The principle of enrichment is not up for negotiation,” Araghchi told reporters, adding that while Iran is open to trust-building steps, enrichment is a “real, legitimate, and established right” that “cannot be negotiated.”

He also criticized what he described as “inconsistent messaging” from U.S. officials, warning that such remarks undermine the negotiation process . However, he noted that “true positions are clarified at the negotiation table.”

These comments came in response to contradictory statements from Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special envoy for Middle East affairs, who initially told Fox News earlier this week that “Iran has no need to enrich uranium beyond 3.67%,” but later posted on social media that “Iran must eliminate and halt all enrichment activities, including any weapons-related capabilities.” The 3.67% threshold refers to the enrichment limit associated with most civilian nuclear purposes and which Iran agreed to observe under the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) abrogated by the first Trump administration.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt added that President Trump, in a recent call with the Sultan of Oman, reiterated that “Iran must end its nuclear program entirely.” When asked whether that meant dismantling enrichment facilities or limiting both uranium and missile capabilities, Leavitt responded:

“The president does not want to see Iran with a nuclear program. He does not want Iran to possess nuclear weapons. He has made that clear.”

U.S. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce, when asked about the apparent contradictions in American messaging, said:

“What matters is the outcome of the negotiations, not individual statements. I recommend patience.”

In a separate briefing, Bruce also emphasized:

“The views of the President, the Secretary of State, and our envoy Mr. Witkoff are unified and clear: Iran cannot have a nuclear enrichment program or nuclear weapons.”

President Trump has expressed hope for a deal but has also warned on multiple occasions that military options remain on the table if diplomacy efforts fail. He has consistently stated that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon, and that securing this outcome is the sole goal of current negotiations.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to insist that its nuclear program is peaceful.

Ahead of IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s visit to Tehran this week, Iran’s new ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, expressed hope that Grossi’s visit would strengthen cooperation . However, Grossi has previously warned that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is now sufficient for a nuclear weapon, which has raised significant global concerns for the past few months.

Still, he voiced cautious optimism that the current U.S.-Iran negotiations could lead to de-escalation and an improvement in Iran’s engagement with the agency.

Iran Sends Message to Putin Amid Strategic Pact; Lawmakers Question Transparency [[link removed]]
Published on April 18, 2025

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Moscow on Thursday to deliver a written message from Iran’s Supreme Leader to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Araghchi announced the visit following Wednesday’s cabinet meeting, describing the purpose as the formal transmission of the Supreme Leader’s message. Iran’s ambassador to Russia confirmed the visit and said the message will be personally delivered during the trip.

The timing of the visit is significant, coming just as the Russian Federation Council—the upper house of Russia’s parliament—approved a 20-year comprehensive strategic agreement with Iran . While both Russian chambers have now ratified the deal, Iranian lawmakers say the agreement has yet to be submitted to Iran’s parliament for review, raising constitutional concerns.

Iranian lawmaker Mohammadreza Sobhaniyan warned that failure to submit the treaty to the Majles violates Article 77 of the Iranian Constitution, which requires all international agreements to be reviewed and ratified by the legislature:

“We just learned that the Russian Duma ratified the treaty, but members of the Iranian parliament have received no official details. If the deal has been signed, why hasn’t it come before the Majles for review?”

The strategic pact—signed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin in December 2024 , just days before Donald Trump’s U.S. inauguration—outlines long-term cooperation in the political, economic, and security spheres.

While Russia has now completed its legal ratification process, the Iranian government has not yet forwarded the treaty to parliament, despite having published the full text on official websites . The deal is seen as part of Tehran’s broader effort to balance growing pressure from Washington, especially as indirect U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations are set to continue. Iranian outlet Nour News described the Moscow trip as part of a new strategic posture “aimed at counterbalancing U.S. pressure.”

The timing of these diplomatic engagements has also drawn attention. Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special envoy, met with President Putin in Moscow shortly before last week’s U.S.-Iran negotiations began in Oman. Now, following Araghchi’s April 17 meeting with Putin, it appears that Russia may be playing a quiet but significant role in facilitating—or at least influencing—the broader diplomatic process. Observers suggest that Moscow could be acting as an informal conduit or strategic sounding board for both parties.

Despite references to military cooperation, the agreement does not constitute a mutual defense pact . Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko told Russian lawmakers during the ratification process that the agreement does not obligate either country to provide military support in the event of an attack. This clarification is both notable and relevant, given threats from President Trump of military action against Iran should a new nuclear deal fail to be reached.

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has significantly deepened ties with Iran, along with China and North Korea . As such, western countries and Ukraine have accused Iran of supplying Russia with attack drones—allegations that Tehran denies.

Article 3 of the Iran-Russia pact states that neither country shall support or aid any state that attacks the other . While the agreement stops short of a formal military alliance, it underscores shared concerns over mutual threats and ambitions to deepen economic and strategic alignment.

The pact has drawn concern from Western governments, some of whom have expressed unease about the growing ties between Tehran and Moscow . The Iran-Russia agreement mirrors a similar 25-year strategic pact signed between Iran and China in 2021, reinforcing Iran’s pivot toward alliances with non-Western powers amid intensifying sanctions.

Newly Revealed Audio Exposes Montazeri’s Blistering Critique of 1988 Prison Massacres [[link removed]]
Published on April 16, 2025

According to BBC Persian, a newly revealed audio recording captures a second conversation between Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri—formerly the Islamic Republic’s Deputy Leader—and three officials known as the “Death Committee,” who oversaw the 1988 mass executions of political prisoners. Recorded three months before Montazeri’s dismissal, it features his severe condemnation of these executions and his assertion that Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) has become “repulsive” to the public.

During August and September 1988, on the orders of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, thousands of political detainees were secretly executed and buried in mass graves. The first wave in early August targeted supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO); the second wave, beginning in early September, targeted leftist and communist prisoners. Montazeri had previously met with the Death Committee on August 15, 1988, before the leftist executions began, though MKO-affiliated prisoners were already being put to death.

The recording now in question reportedly came from a December 30, 1988 (9 Dey 1367) meeting at Montazeri’s residence in Qom, which included Hossein-Ali Nayeri (Sharia judge), Morteza Eshraqi (Tehran prosecutor), and Ebrahim Raeesi (deputy prosecutor). The survivors and families of Iran’s political prisoners during the 1980s refer to them as the “Death Committee.” Their discussion highlights the roles and awareness of top officials during the 1988 executions, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (then President), Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (Parliament Speaker), Ahmad Khomeini (Manager of the Supreme Leader’s office), and Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili (Chief of the Supreme Judicial Council).

In this audio recording, Montazeri recounts Ali Khamenei saying he had “fought with Hossein-Ali Nayeri” over the killings. Montazeri also references a “separate decree” for leftists—allegedly prompted by Nayeri—on the grounds that “if religious prisoners were executed, then so must the communists.” Montazeri later expressed uncertainty in his memoirs about Khamenei’s exact awareness of the executions of MKO members in August of that year, wondering “whether Ayatollah Khamenei really did not know or was simply telling me so.”

Ayatollah Khomeini had issued an earlier decree in August 1988, shortly after the MKO’s “Forogh Javidan” operation, urging officials to show no mercy to those labeled “enemies of God.” He appointed Nayeri, Eshraqi, and a Ministry of Intelligence representative to lead the process. Montazeri, serving as Deputy Leader, met with the Tehran committee on August 15 and requested a pause during Muharram. Yet after Ashura (early September), the executions shifted focus to Marxist prisoners.

Survivors report that the Death Committee often questioned inmates about their faith—including whether they prayed or renounced their affiliations—and used “apostasy” as grounds for execution. Three months after Montazeri’s second meeting, he was ousted on March 26, 1989 (6 Farvardin 1368), following the leak of his protest letter condemning the killings. In June 1989, Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader and later defended Khomeini’s orders.

Montazeri laments in the audio that no official has accepted responsibility : “ They’ve done something for which none of them dares say, ‘I did it.’ They all point to Imam Khomeini’s written order. Hashemi Rafsanjani denies it. The whole world knows about this—so what are we even saying?” He asserts that some inmates who had received amnesty were still executed. At the time, Rafsanjani publicly claimed “fewer than a thousand” had been executed, a figure disputed by sources like the United Nations Special Rapporteur, who put the total above one thousand. Montazeri personally accused the Death Committee of having “killed three thousand people,” later suggesting over 3,800 were executed.

Toward the end of the recording, Montazeri warns: “ For the public, the concept of Velayat-e Faqih has truly become repulsive. People are fed up.” He recounts a discussion with Ahmad Khomeini—Ayatollah Khomeini’s son—and the Ministry of Intelligence, claiming they colluded to secure approval for mass executions. Montazeri insists they had sought a pretext to eliminate political opposition for years. Despite repeated protests and letters to Ayatollah Khomeini, Montazeri’s opposition cost him his position as Deputy Leader. Ahmad Khomeini, who signed the decree removing Montazeri, wrote that Ayatollah Khomeini had taken “religious responsibility” for the executions.

Decades later, the Iranian government has not returned the bodies of the executed prisoners to their families, and the exact number of victims remains unknown. This newly disclosed audio, however, underscores Montazeri’s unwavering resistance to the 1988 mass executions—an event that continues to cast a long shadow over Iran’s political and judicial history.

Fatal Attack on Pakistani Laborers in Iran Underscores Intensifying Border Militancy [[link removed]]
Published on April 16, 2025

Eight Pakistani laborers were shot dead on Saturday, April 12 (23 Farvardin) by unknown armed assailants in the village of Heizabad-e Paeen in Mehrestan County, located in Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan. According to local reports, the attackers entered a repair shop in the early morning and opened fire on the workers; when found, the victims’ hands and feet were bound.

The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack. However, Agence France-Presse reported that Jaish al-Adl also issued a statement taking credit. The BLA is a militant separatist group advocating for independence in Pakistan’s Balochistan region, and the eight victims are believed to have come from Punjab Province in Pakistan.

The Iranian Embassy in Islamabad condemned the incident as a “terrorist” act and is working to return the victims’ bodies to Pakistan; Iranian authorities have also launched an immediate investigation . Esmaeil Baghaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, described the killing of innocent people as a “criminal act contrary to all Islamic standards and legal and human norms,” although Iranian officials have not publicly identified any motive for the attack. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif termed it “the brutal killing of eight Pakistanis,” calling on Tehran to “immediately arrest the perpetrators, apply appropriate punishment, and publicize the cause of this attack.” Yousaf Raza Gilani, Chairman of Pakistan’s Senate, called it a “barbaric and heartbreaking tragedy,” and Syed-al Khan, Deputy Chairman of the Senate, labeled it “an unbearable and deeply shocking act.”

This is the second deadly incident involving Pakistani citizens in Sistan and Baluchestan in recent months. In February, nine Pakistani nationals were killed in Saravan, another border town in the same province. Cross-border militancy has long challenged both Iran and Pakistan, particularly in Sistan and Baluchestan, with each country occasionally conducting strikes against separatist groups operating across the border. In January 2024 (Dey 1402), Iran launched a missile and drone attack on a target in Pakistan, followed two days later by a Pakistani missile strike on a village in Sistan and Baluchestan; both attacks caused multiple casualties.

In November, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) staged a military exercise in Rask, leading to clashes that killed several Jaish al-Adl members and IRGC personnel. The Balochistan Liberation Army, now considered a major security threat by the Pakistani government, took over 300 train passengers hostage in the Pakistani province of Balochistan in late March. While eventually released, at least 21 civilians and four soldiers were killed.

Several Western countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, have designated the BLA a terrorist organization. The group’s tactics have evolved from targeting Pakistani security forces in Balochistan to attacking Chinese nationals involved in regional infrastructure projects. According to Agence France-Presse, these militant and separatist groups have recently expanded operations into other parts of Pakistan, especially Punjab, the most populous province and closely tied to the country’s military.

Iran and Pakistan have both pledged to bring the perpetrators of this latest incident in Mehrestan to justice, but the broader issue of cross-border militancy remains unresolved.

Pezeshkian Replaces Zarif and Dabiri in Quiet Cabinet Reshuffle [[link removed]]
Published on April 18, 2025

President Masoud Pezeshkian has appointed Mohsen Esmaeili as Vice President for both Strategic Affairs and Parliamentary Affairs, quietly replacing Mohammad Javad Zarif and Shahram Dabiri. The move comes at a time when the administration is under pressure to manage serious domestic and international challenges, including indirect negotiations with the United States.

Esmaeili, a seasoned legal scholar and former jurist on the Guardian Council, is known more for his institutional background than political influence. Although he has held prominent posts, including a term in the Assembly of Experts, he is not viewed as a major political figure or a bridge between rival camps. Rather, his appointment appears to be a practical move by Pezeshkian to quiet ongoing criticism over previous high-profile appointments, as the president looks to shift focus toward more urgent priorities such as diplomacy and economic recovery.

The reshuffle ends the brief and contentious tenure of Mohammad Javad Zarif as Vice President for Strategic Affairs, a post created specifically for him after the election. Zarif’s appointment was met with political and legal backlash due to a 2022 law banning officials with close family members holding foreign citizenships. Zarif’s children, born in the U.S. during his time as a diplomat, hold American citizenship. Though supported by some, the controversy surrounding his eligibility proved to be a major distraction, and his resignation—reportedly at the recommendation of Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei—was accepted quietly.

Shahram Dabiri, a longtime friend of Pezeshkian who had served as the Vice President for Parliamentary Affairs, was also removed. His departure followed public criticism over an expensive and widely publicized trip to Antarctica—a journey that, while not unauthorized, was seen as politically tone-deaf amid Iran’s worsening economic conditions. Pezeshkian, seeking to maintain credibility and avoid further backlash, opted to distance himself from Dabiri.

Now with Esmaeili holding both vice-presidential posts, questions remain about the structure and purpose of the newly created Strategic Affairs role, established in August 2024. The office currently oversees the Center for Strategic Studies, which historically functioned as a policy think tank linked to the presidency. However, its role remains loosely defined, and the dual appointment may either be a temporary administrative choice or an early step in streamlining Pezeshkian’s inner circle.

As the president faces mounting pressures both at home and abroad, the reshuffle signals a desire to remove political distractions and refocus the administration’s efforts on critical foreign policy challenges—chief among them, the future of Iran-U.S. diplomacy.

Iran and Armenia Conduct Joint Military Drill Amid Regional Tensions with Azerbaijan [[link removed]]
Published on April 18, 2025

In a rare display of regional military cooperation, Iran and Armenia held a two-day joint military exercise in the Norduz border region, under the supervision of Iran’s Ashura Regional Command of the IRGC Ground Forces. The drill, dubbed a “Simultaneous Peace Exercise,” featured special operations training, sniper coordination, explosive handling, and heavy artillery maneuvers, aiming to enhance border security and counter-terrorism readiness.

Brigadier General Valiollah Madani, Deputy Operations Commander of Iran’s Ground Forces, oversaw the exercise, while senior representatives from Armenia’s military also participated, highlighting the growing military collaboration between the two countries. According to Iranian commanders, the goal of the exercise is to support lasting peace and security in the region.

Brigadier General Seyed Morteza Mirian, Iran’s senior military representative at the drills, emphasized that respecting the territorial integrity of neighboring countries remains a top priority for the Islamic Republic . He also stressed the preparedness of the IRGC’s ground forces to cooperate with friendly nations like Armenia.

Brigadier General Alireza Madani, Commander of the Ashura 31st Operational Division, stated that the joint drill was aimed at fostering sustained bilateral coordination and enhancing military preparedness . According to Madani, the drill was designed and executed in a short period, demonstrating high levels of tactical readiness, particularly in difficult terrain.

Masoud Pourdehghan, Deputy Commander of the Ashura Regional Command, noted that the exercise incorporated a substantial portion of the Ashura Division’s combat units and was conducted with speed and precision in simulated counter-terrorist operations. He further stated that the purpose was to strengthen defensive cooperation and ensure shared border stability.

The joint drill comes amid rising regional tensions, particularly over the proposed Zangezur Corridor, which Azerbaijan has pushed to establish as a direct land link to its exclave Nakhchivan, through southern Armenia. Iran strongly opposes the corridor, fearing it would cut off its northern border access to Armenia and alter the sensitive geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus.

Both Iran and Armenia have expressed firm opposition to any border changes in the region, which they see as a violation of sovereignty and a potential trigger for future conflict. Tehran has repeatedly warned against what it views as Azerbaijan’s irredentist ambitions, supported by Turkey, and has positioned itself as a defender of regional stability and territorial integrity.

In recent years, Iran and Armenia have strengthened bilateral ties, particularly in military and economic domains, as both countries face pressure from a Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance that seeks to reshape borders and expand regional influence . This joint military exercise signals Tehran’s strategic alignment with Yerevan and its willingness to demonstrate power projection along sensitive border zones.

As diplomatic maneuvering continues over the future of the Zangezur region, the Iran-Armenia military partnership may become a key factor in deterring unilateral moves by Baku or Ankara, reinforcing the complex power dynamics shaping the post-war South Caucasus.
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