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Week of March 24, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council 

Iran Delivers Response to Trump, Signaling Openness to Indirect Negotiation

Yesterday, March 27, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi traveled to Oman to deliver Iran’s official response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s letter. Araghchi explained that the response outlines Iran’s views on the current situation and on the proposals from Washington, emphasizing that it was fully conveyed to the other side. He reiterated that Tehran refuses direct negotiations under what it calls “maximum pressure and military threats,” but remains open to indirect talks.

Former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, stated that while the United States preferred a different communication channel, Iran insisted on using Oman. He characterized Iran’s message as “restrained,” citing a history of U.S. sanctions, military threats, and broken agreements that inform Tehran’s cautious stance.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadeq, revealed that President Trump’s letter also addressed the future of the Iraqi paramilitary group Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces). He asserted that only Iraqi authorities have the right to determine the group’s fate, and that dissolving or integrating it is unacceptable from Iran’s perspective.

Kamal Kharrazi, head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, reiterated that Iran remains prepared for indirect negotiations to “evaluate the other side, announce our conditions, and make necessary decisions.” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has continued to strike a cautious tone, warning that the U.S. invitation to negotiate is a “ploy,” citing Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA as proof of its unreliability.

Ali Larijani also expressed optimism, saying, “We are hopeful about the outcome of the negotiations.” He added that any agreement must be acceptable to both parties. 

In a speech before Friday prayers on March 28 (8 Farvardin), Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, warned that if the United States carries out its military threats against Iran for failing to reach a new nuclear agreement, American bases in the region will not remain safe. “If the Americans violate Iran’s sovereignty, it will be like a spark in a powder keg that sets the entire region ablaze,” he said, adding that “their bases and those of their allies will not be spared.” Ghalibaf described negotiations conducted under the shadow of threats as an attempt “to impose [their demands] on us” and claimed that “American leaders not only want to ignore the Iranian nation’s economic interests, but they also intend to strip us of our defensive capabilities… The purpose of these talks is to disarm Iran.” He concluded that “Negotiation aimed at forcibly accepting the enemy’s demands is the prelude to war.”

On the same day, Araghchi revealed further details regarding Trump’s letter, saying Iran had studied it carefully and sent a “suitable response” through Oman. “There are sections in this letter that contain threats, and we will not allow anyone to speak to the Iranian people with the language of threat,” Araghchi declared, noting that “the letter also attempts to keep a window open for diplomacy.” On the U.S. side, Michael Waltz, the White House National Security Advisor, has demanded the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, while Steve Witkoff, the President’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, described Mr. Trump’s letter as an effort to build trust and avert military conflict.

Iran’s response to Trump’s letter could open the door to diplomatic progress, though now the ball is once again back in America’s court. Iran has apparently signaled willingness to explore indirect dialogue, while still insisting that Washington demonstrate mutual respect, provide verifiable commitments, and halt its pressure campaign if there is to be meaningful progress in resolving their long-standing tensions.

Iran and U.S. Consider Dialogue Amid Pressure, Discussion of Direct Trade

Recent developments suggest that both Iran and the United States have signaled an interest in some form of dialogue regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Amwaj Media, citing sources in Iran, suggests that Iran could soon make a decision on pursuing indirect “proximity talks” with the U.S., mediated by the United Arab Emirates, which had delivered President Trump’s letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei earlier this week.

On the Iranian side, the government’s official stance appears to favor indirect talks. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Foreign Minister in these reports, has stated that direct negotiations with the United States are not feasible at this time unless certain conditions change. However, there are other voices in Iran advocating more direct engagement. Abbas Abdi, a well-known political figure and journalist who supported Masoud Pezeshkian in the latest election, openly suggested that meeting with influential Americans could offer a chance to clarify each side’s intentions without formally committing to direct negotiations. Abdi has said:

As far as I know, talking to influential Americans who do not hold official State Department positions in the U.S. government is not prohibited. Steve Witkoff may be Trump’s special representative in the region, but that does not necessarily constitute a conventional official post. His positions regarding Iran, as expressed in interviews with Tucker Carlson, are more reasonable than those of most others in the U.S. government, and he has sent clear messages about potential dialogue.”

In his recent Norooz speech, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei did not explicitly reiterate a ban on negotiations; rather, he warned the United States against threatening Iran, declaring that hostile actions would be met with a forceful response. He also stressed that regional resistance movements, such as those in Yemen, act on their own initiative and are not proxies of Iran, a misconception he believes exists among U.S. and certain European policymakers.

On the American side, there also appear to be conflicting perspectives and statements. Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special representative for the Middle East, stated in an interview with journalist Tucker Carlson that the administration prefers to avoid war and is interested in pursuing a verifiable deal on Iran’s nuclear program. He has mentioned ongoing indirect talks with Iran through “hidden channels,” emphasizing the administration’s preference for diplomacy over military force. Witkoff also discussed the contents of Trump’s letter to Khamenei via an Emirati intermediary, describing it as intended to build trust, not threaten. By contrast, Michael Waltz, the White House national security advisor, struck a more hawkish tone when asked about Witkoff’s remarks, insisting that the Trump administration’s policy is “full dismantlement” of its nuclear program. Absent concrete directives from the President, each official appears to have offered their own interpretation of the policy, with Iran seemingly left to parse whose remarks best reflect the U.S. position.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed last week that Iran received Trump’s letter, characterizing it as both a threat and an opportunity, while noting that Iran’s rejection of direct negotiations is not due to stubbornness but rather historical experience. Iran’s circumspect approach to diplomacy stems not just from the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during Donald Trump’s presidency, but also the subsequent tightening of sanctions that the U.S. has pursued in recent weeks. While Araghchi conceded that the JCPOA in its original form may no longer be fully viable—given Iran’s expanded nuclear activities and America’s extended sanctions—he believes its core “formula and logic” could still guide any future agreement, whereby sanctions relief would be exchanged for verifiable assurances of a peaceful nuclear program.

Araghchi also stated in this interview that there is no ban on Iran’s economic relations with the United States. Araghchi further stated: “One criticism of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is that it did not pave the way for American businesses to engage commercially with Iran. However, this limitation originated from the United States itself, as it only lifted secondary sanctions under the JCPOA while primary sanctions remained in place, effectively preventing American individuals from doing business with Iran.” He also added:

“Nevertheless, the U.S. did introduce some exceptions within its primary sanctions, including permissions for aircraft purchases and a few other limited activities. Immediately after the JCPOA, we began negotiations to purchase airplanes from Boeing in the U.S. and Airbus in Europe. Contracts were signed for approximately 80 aircraft, and had the JCPOA remained in effect, these deliveries would likely have started last year. Thus, we have no barriers on our side to trade with the United States; the restrictions exist only from the American side.”

The U.S. has engaged in a number of new sanctions designations of entities involved in Iran’s oil sector, following the President’s signature of a memorandum laying out “maximum pressure.” This includes the Trump administration’s sanctioning of a Chinese refinery that had reportedly purchased about 500 million dollars’ worth of Iranian oil, signaling that the activities of a major global power in China are not necessarily beyond the reach of America’s economic coercion. The announcement appeared to trigger further economic losses and depreciation of Iran’s currency.

Amid this tightening, Iraq’s Oil Minister, Hayan Abdel-Ghani, stated in an interview with Al-Iraqiya Network that some Iranian tankers have used falsified Iraqi paperwork to evade sanctions, and that Baghdad has reportedly informed Washington of these instances, prompting U.S. forces to intercept tankers carrying Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi shipments. However, Iran has denied the claims that new Iranian tankers have been seized by the United States.

Still, past reports suggest Iranian vessels have sometimes resorted to various methods to bypass sanctions, including disguising transponder information. In response, the United States has intensified its scrutiny of Iranian oil exports, especially large-capacity tankers (VLCCs) critical to Iran’s export capabilities. Iran, for its part, has reacted to past seizures of its oil by seizing certain foreign tankers in regional waters, further inflaming tensions. 

Despite these friction points, both governments hint at a willingness to avoid a military confrontation. Abdi’s suggestion to invite Witkoff and journalist Tucker Carlson to Iran—ostensibly to hold informal discussions and convey Iran’s perspectives directly to Washington—reflects an openness in parts of Iran’s political sphere to shedding diplomatic restraints to pursue Iran’s interests. Even so, progress toward full-fledged talks remains uncertain, given the many actors determined to prevent an opening and the conflicting statements in both Washington and Tehran. Iran’s response to President Trump’s letter, which Araghchi suggests will come in due course, could prove a pivotal moment. For now, tensions persist, and the notion of formal negotiations remains just a possibility.

Arrests and Tensions Surround Norooz 1404 Celebrations Amid Overlap with Ramadan

Three days into the new Persian year (1404), Iranian judicial authorities announced the arrest of several individuals who allegedly used Norooz festivities as a cover for “norm-breaking” and “unlawful behavior.” Despite official warnings — particularly given the overlap of Norooz with the Islamic month of Ramadan and its sacred nights — celebrations, music, and dancing took place in many parts of Iran, in some cases on a larger scale than usual. Videos circulated on social media show participants chanting anti-government slogans or expressing support for the Pahlavi family, as well as women appearing without the mandatory hijab.

Prosecutors in the provinces of Fars, Khorasan Razavi, and Kurdistan—where large Norooz gatherings were documented—have confirmed multiple arrests. In Fars Province, Prosecutor Kamran Mirhaji stated that certain individuals were detained for “insults, disturbing public order, and failing to respect Islamic norms” in popular tourist sites during the New Year’s celebrations. While he did not specify the exact number, Mirhaji referred to a “small group” whose “actions were against customary and legal standards,” adding that they would face legal consequences.

Notably, extensive Norooz events took place at sites such as Persepolis, Pasargadae, and Hafezieh in Shiraz. Videos show some participants singing anthems, chanting slogans, and expressing support for the Pahlavi family. A similar situation was reported in Khorasan Razavi Province. According to Prosecutor Mohammad Hossein Doroudi, the judiciary took action against a “small minority” who behaved inappropriately at the Tomb of Ferdowsi. The governor of Mashhad had already stated that 15 individuals were detained after videos emerged of some participants chanting slogans such as “Long live the Shah” or “Reza Shah, rest in peace.” He underlined that a gathering of over three thousand people had been “disrupted” by the behavior of a few.

In Kurdistan Province, which traditionally hosts colorful Norooz celebrations, local authorities also announced arrests. Provincial Prosecutor Mohammad Jabari disclosed that seven people were detained for allegedly “organizing and exploiting Norooz festivities to carry out propaganda against the system, break social norms, and commit insults.” He described them as “leaders and key actors” with purported “group or organizational connections.”

Meanwhile, events in Urmia (Orumiyeh) have drawn particular attention in the past two days. According to local sources, Kurdish residents of the city first held their customary Norooz ceremony, complete with dancing and festivities. Subsequently, a gathering called the “Alawite Assembly” was organized in response—allegedly by a prominent local cleric—and attracted mostly Turkish/Azerbaijani speakers who were protesting the Kurdish Norooz celebrations. One side framed the dispute in nationalist terms, while the other emphasized Shiite identity. Certain media outlets, such as Mehr News, covered only the Alawite gathering and did not mention the Kurdish Norooz festivities. Observers warn that ethnic conflict poses a genuine threat in Iran, especially when cultural celebrations become grounds for communal tension. 

Due to the overlap of Ramadan with Norooz this year, Iranian officials had issued prior warnings about festivities. In March, during a meeting of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (Amr-e be Ma‘ruf) committee, Commander Sadegh Hosseini of the IRGC in Ilam Province declared that no government body was permitted to authorize Norooz 1404 celebrations incompatible with Islamic culture or the sanctity of Ramadan. He added that any breach of these guidelines would be considered illegal.

A massive crowd remained at Hafezieh in Shiraz two days after the New Year, drawing continued attention. Some social media videos show participants pushing through barriers to enter the site, damaging fences and sections of the landscaping. Critics have condemned this behavior, while others blame the authorities for inadequate crowd management. Some online commenters allege that government supporters are highlighting these acts of damage to distract from the large, spontaneous gatherings.

Following the Norooz ceremonies at the Tombs of Ferdowsi and Khayyam, officials announced that both sites would close on the first and second of Farvardin (coinciding with part of Ramadan). The Director of Cultural Heritage in Tous told state media that the Tomb of Ferdowsi was shutting its doors in observance of the anniversary of the death of Imam Ali, a Shia figure. Critics, however, point out that this closure was not included in the previously published holiday shutdown schedule, and some suggest the move was intended to prevent further large gatherings, especially after footage emerged of participants chanting pro-Pahlavi slogans. According to a report by the Shargh newspaper’s website, this closure order was issued “despite the opposition of provincial authorities and the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts and Tourism,” leaving numerous holiday visitors unable to visit these historic landmarks.

Parvaneh Etemadi, Experimental Iranian Painter, Dies at 78

Parvaneh Etemadi, an experimental painter and a pioneering figure in Iran’s contemporary art scene, passed away on Friday, March 21, at the age of 78. Born in 1947 (1326 SH), she studied briefly at the Faculty of Fine Arts in Tehran before leaving to pursue her own artistic path. She began her training with Bahman Mohasses—becoming his only direct student.

Etemadi’s work is known for its diverse range of techniques and materials, including oil paint, cement, colored pencil, drawing, and collage. Throughout her career, she pushed boundaries by shifting styles and experimenting with new forms. She is renowned for her use of deep shadows, subdued color palettes, and the representation of white-on-white motifs. Still life subjects such as narcissi, pomegranates, apples, and the traditional Iranian textile “termeh” appear frequently in her paintings, often rendered with a distinctive approach that fused realism with stylization or abstraction.

Over the decades, her style evolved significantly. In the 1960s and 1970s, she employed bold outlines and pared-back color palettes, producing simplified (stylized) drawings and collages. Later in the 1970s, she experimented with more realistic drawings in a dreamlike style, featuring human figures and still lifes. Following the Revolution, she returned to simplified, transformed forms—plants, vases, interior scenes, and fantastical creatures. Her later works became more expressive, echoing elements of modern European art.

A hallmark of Etemadi’s art was her depiction of “displaced” objects or figures—she once painted a sheep’s head on a white cloth draped over a table, symbolizing her fascination with things that are “out of place.” Recurring imagery in her still lifes included empty spaces, everyday items like flower bouquets and tin cans, and the ever-present tension between subject and environment.

Etemadi’s influence extended beyond her canvases—she taught numerous students, stressing “vision” rather than mere “knowledge.” Her paintings are among the most sought-after in Iranian contemporary art, with one 1978 work selling for 3.74 billion tomans at Tehran’s art auction.

In 2019, filmmaker Bahman Kiarostami produced “Parvaneh,” a documentary that offers insight into Etemadi’s life, career, and distinctive artistic perspective, supplemented by archival photos and footage from her youth. Published in 2021 (1400 SH), the book Ketab-e Parvaneh: Gozideh-ye Asar-e Parvaneh Etemadi (Parvaneh’s Book: A Selection of Parvaneh Etemadi’s Works) further documents her rich legacy. Parvaneh Etemadi leaves behind a body of work that is celebrated both in Iran and internationally, exemplifying her experimental spirit and commitment to continual exploration in art.

The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) extends its deepest condolences to her family and to everyone who admired her, honoring the memory of a remarkable artist whose legacy will continue to inspire.

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