CEP Research Analyst Gregory Waters On The ISIS Insurgency In Central Syria


<[link removed]>
<[link removed]>
ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency – April & May 2020

CEP Research Analyst Gregory Waters On The ISIS Insurgency In Central Syria

Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2020 by clicking here
<[link removed]>
.

ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In May 2020
By Gregory Waters

Following a lull in the second half of April, ISIS attacks increased in both
quantity and geographic diversity during May. This boost in activity coincided
with increasingly persistent and widespread anti-ISIS operations conducted by
the Syrian regime and its allied militias. Both the ISIS attacks and
counter-insurgency operations spread across four governorates: Hama and Raqqa
in the north, and Homs and Deir Ez Zor in the south.


ISIS killed at least 27 Syrian regime-affiliated fighters in 18 confirmed
attacks occurring on at least 17 days in May. While May had the greatest number
of attacks as well as days with reported attacks in 2020, it ranks as only the
third deadliest month (behind April and January, respectively). ISIS did not
carry out major ambushes or large, complex operations, likely due to the
intensity of the Syrian regime’s anti-ISIS operations. Still, the terrorist
group effectively used mines and IEDs to regularly harass patrolling security
forces. Furthermore, ISIS was able, as it did in April, to successfully create
a fake checkpoint on the Palmyra-Deir Ez Zor highway, resulting in the death of
at least four soldiers and one civilian. The creation of fake checkpoints—in
which ISIS militants use stolen regime uniforms and flags to prey on passing
cars—demonstrates a high degree of operational freedom of the groups various
cells.

May also marked the first month of sustained ISIS activity in east Hama and
Raqqa. ISIS attacks and mines killed more than seven pro-regime fighters in six
separate attacks. Among those killed was a commander of Iran’sIslamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps
<[link removed]>
(IRGC), whose vehicle was struck by an IED as it drove near Ithriya, Hama.
These attacks coincided with two new anti-ISIS operations by pro-regime forces
in the governorates.

On May 11, the pro-regime Liwa al-Quds militia launched an operation in Raqqa
with the backing of the Syrian Air Force. This is the first known
counter-insurgency operation in central Syria to be accompanied by sustained
aerial support. This development likely occurred due to theopening of the
Tabqa-Raqqa crossing <[link removed]>, connecting the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF)-held and regime-held parts of Raqqa governorate. The
crossing opened on the same day the Liwa al-Quds operation began. Liwa al-Quds
continues its operation in the Raqqa and east Hama deserts as of the end of
May. It recovered some buried mines and IEDs and destroyed several ISIS
vehicles. However, it is unclear whether any ISIS fighters were killed.

On May 26, fighters from the National Defense Forces (NDF) in the Christian
towns of Suqaylabiyah and Mahardeh began patrolling the east Hama countryside,
their second such deployment in as many months. These two towns have a very
close relationship with the Russian military, with the militias’ commander
having met with the highest-ranking Russian officer in Syria multiple times in
April and May. Pictures of NDF fighters during their most recent operations
show them using brand new vehicles and outfitted with new Russian equipment.
However, this operation, much like the previous one, was mostly carried out for
publicity, with the fighters deployed for only five days and engaging no ISIS
targets.

In addition to the above-mentioned patrols and others taking place in Homs and
Deir Ez Zor, a group of 930 Damascus NDF fighters were deployed to central
Syria on May 19. An earlier batch of Damascus NDF fighters were deployed to the
same area on February 4.

May appears to have set the stage for an even more violent June. While regime
anti-ISIS patrols will likely continue at the same pace or increase in
frequency, they have produced little in terms of meaningfully degrading ISIS
capabilities. Meanwhile, Syria continues to devote more resources to the ongoing
insurgency
<[link removed]>
by ex-rebels in Syria’s southern Dara’a province while its core offensive
units remain near Idlib in the northwest, likely awaiting orders to resume the
regime’s offensive on the rebel stronghold.

Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted dots) and reported anti-ISIS
operations (highlighted cars, color-coded by the date the operation began) in
May. To view an interactive version of this map, please clickhere
<[link removed]≪=33.997992078704655%2C38.416906987500056&z=7>
.

 

###

Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In April 2020 by clicking here
<[link removed]>.

ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In April 2020
By Gregory Waters

At the end of 2017, the Syrian regime and Russian President Vladimir Putin
proudly proclaimed their militaries’ victory over ISIS. The terrorist group had
lost all of the urban centers—and ostensibly the rural areas—it once controlled
west of the Euphrates River. Nevertheless, ISIS has been able to effectively
wage a sophisticated and deadly insurgency throughout regime-held central Syria
for more than two-and-a-half years, as detailed in “‘A Force They Haven’t Seen
Before’: Insurgent ISIS in Central Syria
<[link removed]>
” by this author.

ISIS has deployed IEDs and mines, small arms, anti-tank guided missiles and
RPGs, car bombs, and fake checkpoints to repeatedly ambush Syrian regime and
Russian forces in the Deir Ez Zor, Homs, Raqqa, and Hama governorates. ISIS
attacks have spanned more than 15,000 square miles—striking as far west as
Khunayfis (just 40 miles from Damascus governorate) and as far north as Rahjan,
Hama (just 15 miles from Idlib governorate), and along the length of the
Euphrates from Boukamal in the south to Ruseifa in the north.

ISIS has proven to operate a robust intelligence gathering system in central
Syria. The group is reportedly responsible for killing high-value targets such
as Syrian and Iranian commanders using mines and IEDs and has successfully
avoided regime strongpoints during its deep pushes “behind enemy lines,”
finding roads through undefended parts of the countryside. In doing so, ISIS
has managed to effectively control territory at various times, most recently
controlling the crucial Bishri Mountains bordering the Raqqa, Homs, and Deir Ez
Zor governorates from April 2019 through February 2020.

For its part, the Syrian regime and its Hezbollah and Iranian allies have been
unable to make any serious advances against ISIS’s insurgent cells. Regime
anti-ISIS operations appear to consist of military convoys driving from point A
to point B and occasionally combing largely empty hamlets throughout the Syrian
desert (known as the Badia). Russian assistance has almost exclusively come in
the form of air support during the few prolonged ISIS engagements, such as
during the two-day battle that took place between Sukhnah and Humaymah
beginning on April 9, 2020.


Based on martyrdom reports published by pro-regime Facebook pages, ISIS
attacks have killed at least 887 pro-regime fighters, with actual figures
likely being twice that. In April 2020, ISIS killed at least 27 Syrian
loyalists in Homs, Deir Ez Zor, Raqqa, and Hama. On April 9, ISIS launched two
simultaneous attacks in Homs—the first just north of Humaymah and the second
south of Sukhna—followed by a third attack deep in north Hama the next day.
Clashes in Homs continued for two days and reportedly involved Russian
airstrikes. ISIS continued carrying out smaller scale attacks over the next 10
days, ending in an ambush in the Bishri Mountains that left five local loyalist
fighters dead. On April 22, the Syrian regime launched a two-day anti-ISIS
operation that claimed to target ISIS cells across the entirety of central
Syria. However, the regime has not produced evidence of captured or killed ISIS
fighters from these operations, and on April 25, ISIS again renewed its attacks
near the city of Mayadeen, Deir Ez Zor. Furthermore, on April 30, ISIS
successfully ambushed a bus carrying Syrian Arab Army soldiers from southern
Deir Ez Zor to Palmyra, killing at least six of them.

ISIS continues to benefit from a high degree of local support and a porous
border with Iraq. Unless Damascus can impact these conditions, their hopes of
effectively defeating ISIS, even with Russian assistance, will be minimal.

These April attacks and regime anti-ISIS operations are mapped below. ISIS
attacks are coded quarterly since January 2018, while anti-ISIS operations are
coded by specific date starting in April 2020.

 ###

Unsubscribe
<[link removed]>