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Week of March 10, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
After days of conflicting claims—with President Trump stating he sent a letter directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian officials maintaining they had not received it—the letter has arrived in Tehran. Anwar Mohammed Gargash, an advisor to the President of the United Arab Emirates Mohammed bin Zayed, delivered the letter from Trump—addressed to Khamenei—to Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian Foreign Minister. Details of the letter have not yet been fully divulged.
However, Majid Abbasi, a faculty member at Allameh Tabataba’i University, appeared on a special news program in Iran discussing Trump’s letter to Iran and Lavrov’s visit to Tehran. He asserted that the letter sets forth certain preconditions. Specifically, the letter demands that the Islamic Republic of Iran adjust its relations with Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen—countries regarded as central to the axis of resistance—and adhere to prescribed measures.
Abbasi further stated, “While the appropriateness of imposing preconditions for negotiations is a separate matter, this very precondition effectively undermines the letter. If one believes that entering negotiations means respecting the other party’s sovereignty, then such negotiations should naturally be conducted on an equal footing, without any preconditions.
Ali Larijani also commented—without referencing the contents of Trump’s letter—saying: “Trump claims he is the president of peace. Do you really believe him? You’ve broken your commitments, so how can you bring peace to the world? If Trump’s talk of peace carried any real substance, it would mark a significant shift in American history. But it’s hard to imagine anyone taking his words seriously unless he backs them up.” He further added, “The true essence of peace is to create social calm. How does it make sense for someone to wave a banner of peace and then go on to threaten nations?
The letter’s delivery came on the heels of a forceful address by Khamenei, who dismissed the American invitation to negotiate as little more than a ploy to mislead global public opinion. Speaking to a gathering of university students, Khamenei stated that the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), not only dismantled a comprehensive agreement but also shattered the fragile trust between the two nations. He argued that engaging in negotiations while under pressure would only serve to intensify sanctions and further isolate Iran.
Khamenei addressed U.S. hints that it could join in strikes on Iran’s nuclear program directly. He condemned America’s reliance on militarism as unwise, emphasizing that war is never a one-sided affair. “Iran is fully capable of mounting a decisive counter strike, and it will certainly do so if provoked,” he declared. Khamenei further warned that any miscalculation or provocative action by American forces or their proxies would ultimately inflict greater harm on the United States, adding that while war is not a desirable outcome, Iran’s response to any act of aggression would be both firm and resolute.
Meanwhile, Iran, China, and Russia held a trilateral meeting in Beijing. Following the meeting, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for an end to the “illegal and unilateral” sanctions against Iran. Amid growing American pressure on Iran to reach a new nuclear agreement, China expressed its readiness to advance talks between Washington, Moscow, and Tehran. At a press conference held after the meeting, Ma Zhaoshu emphasized, “We stress that diplomatic dialogue based on mutual respect remains the only effective option.”
The meeting was attended by the deputy foreign ministers of Iran and Russia—Kazem Gharib Abadi and Sergey Alexeyevich Ryabkov, respectively. In a joint statement issued by the three countries afterward, they declared that “the relevant parties must work to eliminate the roots of the current situation and abandon pressure tactics such as sanctions, threats, and coercion.” The statement also noted that China and Russia welcomed Iran’s insistence on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program and its full adherence to the obligations outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Both Iran and Russia commended “China’s constructive role” and its hosting of the Beijing meeting, pledging that close consultations and cooperation among the three nations would continue in the future. Although the focus in Beijing was primarily on Iran’s nuclear negotiations and the lifting of sanctions, the joint statement mentioned that regional and international issues were also on the agenda.
On Friday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Gharib Abadi and outlined China’s five-point perspective on Iran, stating, “Any new agreement must be based on the JCPOA.” China expressed hope that the Beijing meeting would lead to an “early resumption of dialogue and negotiations,” stressing that disputes over Iran’s nuclear program should be resolved diplomatically without resorting to force. Wang Yi also criticized any “hasty intervention” by the UN Security Council, warning that triggering its mechanisms could undermine diplomatic efforts.
Before China’s intervention, Russia—another key global ally of Iran—had already announced its willingness to mediate between Iran and the United States and called for resolving differences through diplomacy. At the same time as the Beijing meeting, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters that “Western sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear program are illegal and must be lifted.” He further defended “Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy” and assured that “Moscow will assist Iran in this regard.”
On March 12, an United Nations Security Council meeting was convened following a new report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which noted a significant increase in Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. Representatives from six Security Council members in the United States, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Panama and South Korea called for a unified stance against what they termed Iran’s audacious behavior. The U.S. delegate stressed that Iran’s nuclear activities posed a threat to international peace, while the U.K. warned of the potential reactivation of UN sanctions. In turn, Iran’s ambassador decried the meeting as unwarranted interference in Tehran’s ongoing dialogue with the IAEA, accusing European partners of failing to uphold their commitments under the JCPOA.
Adding another layer to the evolving situation, Araghchi emphasized that negotiating under conditions of extreme pressure would leave Iran at a disadvantage. He hinted at a new proposal being discussed through European channels and with the IAEA aimed at resolving outstanding issues. Although deep mutual distrust continues to color relations between the two nations, the cumulative series of diplomatic maneuvers—from the exchange of letters to indirect talks and proposals for trilateral negotiations—reflects a precarious balancing act as Iran navigates calls to negotiate with renewed American pressure.
In a separate development on Thursday, the U.S. Department of Treasury announced that sanctions had been imposed on Mohsen Paknejad, Iran’s Minister of Oil, as well as companies and vessels alleged to be involved in the shipment of Iranian oil. This action is part of the Trump administration’s ongoing effort to increase economic pressure on Iran. According to the U.S. State Department, these ships were used on December 25, 2024, to transport Iranian oil off the coast of Nipa, Indonesia. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated in a press release, “The Iranian government continues to use its oil revenues to further its own interests at the expense of the Iranian people.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, has publicly criticized what he describes as “bullying governments” demanding negotiations with Iran in public remarks on Saturday. These comments were made shortly after the U.S. President Donald Trump claimed to have sent him a letter, with Khamenei contending that Washington’s push for talks is designed not to resolve disputes but rather to dictate terms to Tehran. Khamenei also accused European countries of failing to uphold their obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA)—either by withdrawing or by refusing to compensate for the U.S. exit—and labeled them “shameless” for criticizing Iran while neglecting their own commitments.
According to Khamenei, the negotiations the United States is seeking would not remain limited to the nuclear program but would inevitably expand to include limits on Iran’s missile capabilities, restraints on its defense infrastructure, and interference in its regional policies and alliances—all of which Tehran will not accept. “Some foreign governments and domineering figures insist on negotiations, while their goal is not to resolve issues but to exert control and impose their own agendas. If the other party agrees, all the better for them; but if they don’t, they stir up controversy and accuse the other side of abandoning the negotiations,” Khamenei stated. The remarks were made before an assembly of high-ranking Iranian officials, including former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and several other prominent figures.
President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed Khamenei’s position, insisting that Iran should not yield to external threats. In his remarks, he highlighted the country’s ability to overcome its challenges and called for greater unity among Iran’s political factions. Both Pezeshkian and Khamenei, along with other Iranian officials, made it clear that Tehran will not entertain negotiations if they seek to constrain Iran’s missile program, regional alliances, or foreign policy.
Despite these strong statements, Iran’s Mission to the United Nations in New York presented a somewhat more nuanced perspective. It stated: “If the objective of negotiations is to address concerns vis-à-vis any potential militarization of Iran’s nuclear program, such discussions may be subject to consideration. However, should the aim be the dismantlement of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program to claim that what Obama failed to achieve has now been accomplished, such negotiations will never take place.”
Meanwhile, Russia expressed optimism that Tehran might accept certain limitations on its nuclear activities in exchange for lifting Western sanctions. In a written interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova suggested that a blueprint similar to the original JCPOA could help stabilize the region. She also stressed the need for Moscow and Washington to use their influence to address pressing Middle Eastern concerns, specifically Iran’s nuclear dossier. Highlighting Iran’s repeated assertions that its nuclear ambitions are peaceful, Zakharova said Russia is ready to collaborate with Tehran and other stakeholders to reduce tensions and establish long-term stability.
Despite Iran’s leadership remaining firm that it will not negotiate on what it considers core security matters, such as its missile arsenal and broader regional posture, the statements from Iran’s UN Mission, coupled with Russia’s calls for renewed dialogue conditioned on sanctions relief, point toward the potential for diplomacy. Iran insists it does not seek nuclear weapons and aims only for peaceful nuclear development, while also emphasizing that no talks will proceed under military threats or crippling sanctions. Against this backdrop, the nuanced stance from the Iranian UN Mission, Russia’s readiness to mediate, and strong international interest in a diplomatic resolution all indicate a real possibility of renewed negotiations—provided there is a credible offer to ease sanctions.
It is not clear that the United States is prepared to accept this. The U.S. State Department recently announced that, as part of a campaign of “monetary pressure” on Iran, a waiver allowing Iraq to pay for electricity imported from Iran would be revoked. The waiver expired on March 8. According to Reuters, the State Department stated that ending the waiver “asserts that we will not allow Iran any economic or financial facilities,” adding that “ending the nuclear threat, limiting its ballistic missile programs, and preventing its support for terrorist groups” were key objectives in applying further pressure on Iran.
Taken together, the mixed signals from Iranian leaders, the U.S. administration, European signatories, and Russia underscore a fluid, high-stakes diplomatic environment. For now, no party seems eager to push the standoff toward full-scale conflict, but risks of miscalculation remain acute. Concerns from the IAEA over Iran’s expanding enriched uranium stockpile, the looming possibility of UN snapback sanctions, and persistent regional power struggles combine to create a delicate situation. As events unfold, Tehran’s eventual response to Trump’s letter—if it indeed materializes—could prove pivotal in deciding whether diplomacy can still win out over confrontation or whether entrenched hardline positions will drive the standoff closer to open conflict.
An interview with Mohsen Rafigh-Doust, former IRGC minister and ex-head of the Mostazafan Foundation, on the program “Oral History of Didban-e Iran” on March 8 (18 Esfand) has sparked widespread reactions and led to the reopening of serious investigations. In the interview, Rafigh-Doust, speaking with pride and even a smile, acknowledged his role—and that of his team—in the assassinations of prominent figures, including Fereydoun Farrokhzad, an artist and political activist; Gholam-Ali Oueisi, the military governor of Tehran; Shahriar Shafigh, son of Ashraf Pahlavi; and Shapour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister under Mohammad Reza Shah. He further claimed that he had threatened the French government by asserting that if Anis Naghash—the individual responsible for the attempted assassination of Bakhtiar—was not released, France should brace for bomb explosions and other terrorist acts.
Rafigh-Doust admitted in the same interview that he had commanded several assassination operations against opponents of the Islamic Republic abroad. He revealed that during the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamic Republic, with its dedicated team, executed the killings of political opponents—including Bakhtiar, Oueisi, Shafigh, and Farrokhzad—in France and Germany. According to his account, these assassinations were carried out by a separatist group from Basque, Spain in exchange for money. Rafigh-Doust noted that the Islamic Republic did not have a direct organizational link with them but merely enlisted their services for these operations. However, the attempted assassination of Bakhtiar was executed under his command by Anis Naghash, which was foiled by the arrest of Naghash. Although Bakhtiar was later assassinated, Rafigh-Doust did not address that subsequent development.
In response to these controversial comments—which implicitly implicated the government in the assassination of political opponents—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dismissed Rafigh-Doust’s statements as “distorted” and “unsubstantiated.” In a statement released through domestic media, the IRGC denied any state involvement in overseas assassinations, asserting that, as a “defender of national security,” it views such claims as merely part of the enemy’s psychological warfare.
Rafigh-Doust’s revelations have triggered widespread reactions both domestically and internationally, intensifying pressure on the Islamic Republic. Several European human rights organizations, including those based in Germany, have called for the IRGC to be designated as a terrorist organization and for a comprehensive review of the financial networks linked to the Islamic Republic in Europe. Some political activists and human rights advocates have described Rafigh-Doust’s comments as “an outright confession to a policy of eliminating political opponents,” prompting groups in Europe—such as the Women, Life, Freedom association in Germany—to demand immediate action against both the IRGC and the Islamic Republic. Although proposals to label the IRGC as a terrorist organization had previously been raised within the European Union, opposition from some EU countries had stalled such moves. Now, in light of Rafigh-Doust’s incendiary statements, the issue has once again been thrust onto the agenda of certain European politicians and security agencies.
In its official response, the IRGC not only refuted these allegations but also accused Rafigh-Doust of “inaccuracy” in his statements, further criticizing foreign media for “exaggerating and distorting” his remarks and insisting that the Islamic Republic has “always been a victim of terrorism.” It is important to note that this is not the first time Iran’s involvement in overseas assassinations has been discussed. Incidents such as the killings of Shapour Bakhtiar, Abdulrahman Qasmlou, and the Mikonos affair in Germany have long been cited internationally as examples of the Islamic Republic’s policy of eliminating its opponents through targeted operations. Rafigh-Doust had previously recounted in his memoirs the brutal suppression of Turkmen protesters in 1979/1980, explicitly confirming the IRGC’s active role in that operation and justifying it as a necessary measure for national security. That crackdown, which resulted in widespread massacres and summary executions, has become emblematic of the government’s repressive policies in the early years following the revolution.
The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has decided not to officially announce the Hijab and Chastity Law, sparking ongoing criticism from hardline parliamentarians. Previously, these parliamentarians spent weeks attempting to remove Foreign Minister Zarif from office, and now they are focused on forcing the promulgation of the hijab law. However, many moderate conservatives oppose the calls to enforce the hijab and chastity law, arguing that enforcement would only heighten tensions nationwide and asking that the law remain on hold.
Mehri Talebi-Daristani, an activist in the “Enjoining Good and Forbidding Wrong” movement and a former official in the same field—best known for her “Anti-Hijab Clinic” initiative—called for a protest on Twitter, scheduled for Wednesday, March 11, 2025 (21 Esfand 1403), from 1:00 PM to 4:00 PM. Although this gathering was deemed illegal under the country’s usual procedures for demonstrations, attendees demanded enforcement of the law that the SNSC Secretariat had halted. Their primary grievance was Masoud Pezeshkian’s statement that he would neither enforce the law nor stand against the people.
Some participants in this protest carried signs declaring, “Enforce the Hijab and Chastity Law,” “Removing Hijab Is Both a Religious and Political Transgression,” and “Defending the Hijab Means Defending the Family.” Others, however, displayed signs with overtly political or electoral messages, indicating that at least some demonstrators were motivated by broader political agendas. Observers noted that efforts to push for the law’s promulgation appeared, for certain participants, to be merely a pretext for drawing in higher authorities and creating divisions that could lead to a larger crisis.
Meanwhile, another group of women supporting the Hijab and Chastity Law gathered on March 7 (17 Esfand) outside the residence of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli in Qom. They stated, “Some of our clerics, who should stand with the revolutionary camp, have chosen silence! We see that the President is standing against the explicit laws of Islam! We are here to make our final stand.”
A critical turn came when Javad Nik-Bin, a member of Parliament, revealed that some individuals were allegedly being paid to attend hijab-related street protests. “Security agencies confirmed in a letter to Parliament that money was distributed among ‘revolutionary forces’ for demonstrations in front of Parliament,” he said. Having raised the issue during a parliamentary session, Nik-Bin emphasized that the Supreme National Security Council’s decision has blocked the law’s enactment.
He later responded to criticism of his assertions, stating “My remarks were misunderstood. I—and a hundred others like me—would sacrifice our lives for a single strand of a veiled woman’s hair. I have received more than 4,000 threatening or insulting text messages calling me a ‘haramzadeh’ (illegitimate). But it is evident these individuals are not truly defending the hijab. How can one claim to defend the hijab without observing respectful language?” Nik-Bin concluded by asserting that, while only a small number of people accept payment for attending protests, he has evidence to support this claim.
While many Izeh residents participated in largely peaceful demonstrations during the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom unrest, a smaller group resorted to armed confrontation—among them an individual named Abul Korkor. According to human rights media outlets, Korkor died by suicide on Saturday evening, 18 Esfand (March 8), after being surrounded by the Islamic Republic’s security forces in Izeh’s Koshtegah neighborhood. Korkor, who had been in hiding for over two years, allegedly shot himself rather than surrender.
A video streamed live on his Instagram account depicts the confrontation, with Korkor firing outside and cursing the Islamic Republic. Shortly before ending his life, he declared: “There’s no way out. Goodbye, Iran.”
Iranian state media described those involved in the incident as “armed outlaws.” However, Mizan News Agency, affiliated with Iran’s judiciary, claimed that Korkor was “one of the ringleaders of the 2022 unrest in Izeh,” and had been sought by authorities ever since.
Three other individuals were reportedly with Korkor at the time of the confrontation, but their current status is unclear. The state-run Mehr News Agency, citing an unnamed source, reported that several people were arrested and may have been wounded in the clashes. Eyewitness accounts identify his companions as Reza Abdollahzadeh, Sohrab Ahmadi, and Hossein Mehri, who allegedly declared their intention to surrender before coming under fire. Moments later, a powerful explosion occurred in the house where they had taken shelter. No verified information on their condition has since emerged.
Izeh experienced deadly violence during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, during which most protests were peaceful. On 25 Aban 1401 (November 16, 2022), a fatal attack at Izeh’s bazaar claimed seven lives, including nine-year-old Kian Pirfalak. Local families blame security forces for the shooting, while the government denies any involvement.
Although the Pirfalak family has repeatedly stated that government agents fired on their vehicle, Iran’s judiciary has identified Abbas (Mojahid) Korkori as the assailant and issued a death sentence against him. Meanwhile, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have voiced concern over what they describe as an unjust trial process, including allegations of torture used to coerce false confessions.
Tehran Province is facing one of its most critical water crises, with 85% of its reservoirs reportedly empty and 70% of its wells at risk of drying up. Multiple reports and official statements indicate that a convergence of diminishing rainfall, overexploitation of groundwater, and rising demand has pushed the region to the brink of a severe water shortage. Experts warn that if current trends continue, Iran’s capital may soon confront a full-blown water emergency.
Tehran’s five principal dams—Latian, Mamloo, Lar, Taleqan, and Amirkabir—collectively stand at around 15% of their total capacity. The Lar Dam, which supplies a significant portion of eastern Tehran, is reportedly down to 7% of its capacity, while Mamloo Dam, a key source for the capital’s southern districts, holds only 14% of its usual reserves. These alarming figures highlight the dire state of surface-water resources critical to both drinking water and agricultural irrigation. In recent weeks, residents in areas such as Damavand and Firuzkuh have begun relying on water tankers for their drinking supply, and 40% of farmland in eastern counties remains unused due to insufficient irrigation.
Officials from the Tehran Water and Wastewater Company report that 70% of the city’s wells are on the verge of drying up. Excessive pumping from underground aquifers and severe reductions in rainfall have depleted these wells at an unsustainable rate. If this continues, experts predict that Tehran could face catastrophic water shortages within five years.
Local and national authorities have identified three main factors contributing to the crisis. The first is reduced rainfall, with precipitation in Tehran falling by up to 40% relative to the long-term average, marking the lowest levels in 57 years. The second involves aging infrastructure and poor management, including 30% leakage in water networks and a lack of effective water-recycling initiatives. The third factor is high consumption, as water use in Tehran averages 250 liters per person per day, nearly double the global standard of 130 liters. This overuse is especially noticeable before Nowruz, when demand has spiked by 20%, exceeding 48,000 liters per second.
Tehran’s provincial government and national policymakers have proposed measures to mitigate the emergency, such as diverting water from Lar Dam and Taleqan Dam, repairing leaky pipelines, and boosting public-awareness campaigns. Longer-term ideas include transferring water from distant sources like the Sea of Oman, though experts caution that such projects would only address about 10% of the capital’s shortfall. They stress the need for modernizing outdated infrastructure, enforcing regulations against illegal well drilling, and adopting more water-efficient agricultural and industrial practices.
Authorities say they can ensure a basic water supply in the immediate future, but many specialists remain concerned that Tehran could face a 500-million-cubic-meter shortfall by 2030, imperiling the city’s food production and economic stability. The Ministry of Energy notes that inflows to dams nationwide have dropped by 31% over the past year, while eight provinces report over 50% less rainfall. Rural development experts add that continuing to expand water-intensive farming and livestock in the country’s arid and semi-arid regions is unsustainable, warning of escalating water conflicts across Iran if current practices remain unchanged. Without a concerted effort to modernize infrastructure, rein in unregulated water extraction, and shift consumption habits, Tehran—and much of Iran—risks spiraling into an unprecedented water emergency.
Toraj Rahnama, a renowned translator, poet, literary scholar, and professor of German language and literature at the University of Tehran, passed away at the age of 87 on Tuesday, March 11 at Tondis Hospital in Tehran. Born in 1937 in Ahvaz, Rahnama dedicated his life to bridging Persian and German cultures through his extensive work in translation and literary research.
After completing his early education in Iran, Rahnama pursued higher studies in Germany. Initially enrolling at the University of Munich in medicine, he later shifted his focus—with the approval of the university and the German Embassy—to German literature, psychology, and education, earning a master’s degree before returning to Iran. Supported by a scholarship from the Austrian government, he continued his studies at the University of Salzburg and obtained a PhD with a dissertation titled “Reflection of Psychoanalytic Theories in Contemporary German Literature.”
Over his illustrious career, Rahnama translated more than 150 works of German literature into Persian, including masterpieces by Goethe, Schiller, and Bertolt Brecht. His celebrated translations introduced Iranian readers to significant German literary traditions. He also rendered into German selected collections of Iranian short stories by authors such as Sadeq Chubak, Jamal Mirsadeghi, Bozorg Alavi, Ahmad Mahmoud, and Simin Daneshvar.
A prolific writer and researcher, Rahnama authored around 50 volumes of literary and scholarly works in both Persian and German. His literary output includes seven volumes of Persian poetry—with his latest, “پرده بگردان، بانو” (The Turning Curtain, Madam), published in 1398—as well as critical studies like “Brecht, Frisch, Dürrenmatt” and “Contemporary German Literature.” His works in German include titles such as “In the Breath of the Dragon,” “Narrative and Lyric Literature in Iran,” “Iranian Dramatic Literature,” and “The Image of Women in Contemporary Iranian Literature.”
Rahnama’s contributions were widely recognized. He received the Literary Award of the City of Hanover (2000) and the Goethe Medal in Weimar (2002), along with other prestigious honors including the Islamic Republic of Iran Book of the Year and the Goethe Literary Award in Germany. Publications from Behjat Publishing have proudly disseminated several of his works, such as “A Lifetime in Service of Two Cultures,” “Mazandaran, the Land of Legends,” “The Grey World,” “The Nonconformist Human,” and “From This Ash, the Phoenix Will Not Rise.” His recent publications, spanning from 1394 to 1401, further reflect his enduring engagement with Persian and German literary discourse.
Toraj Rahnama’s profound impact on literature and culture has left an indelible mark on both Iran and Germany. His dedication to fostering cultural exchange and his contributions to literary scholarship will continue to inspire future generations of students, academics, and literature enthusiasts.
The National Iranian American Council extends its heartfelt condolences to his family, friends, and all who were touched by his work. His innovative spirit, compassionate nature, and unwavering commitment to bridging cultures have left a legacy that will continue to inspire and uplift. Toraj Rahnama was not only a brilliant scholar and translator but also a cherished mentor and friend to many, whose light will forever shine in the hearts of those who admired him.
China, Iran and Russia held a joint naval exercise this week. Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), reported that the maneuvers began Monday, March 10 (18 Esfand) in southeastern waters near the Port of Chabahar. While similar Iran-Russia-China naval exercises have taken place in recent years, this latest event unfolds at a time when Israel and the United States have repeatedly threatened military action against Iran as a means to contain its nuclear program. These threats, which have intensified during Donald Trump’s presidency, underscore the heightened tensions surrounding Tehran’s nuclear activities.
In this exercise, Iran deployed 10 groups of ships from the Army Navy and the Revolutionary Guard, while Russia dispatched two destroyers and one support vessel. China also took part in the exercise with one destroyer and one support vessel. According to Iranian state media reports, military observers from Azerbaijan, South Africa, Oman, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Qatar, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Sri Lanka were also present. The Chinese Ministry of Defense stated that the exercise included naval target battle drills and joint rescue operations. Military officials said the goal of the maneuver was to strengthen trust among the armed forces of the participating countries.
While these drills are not the first of their kind, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, both Iran and China have faced additional scrutiny over their military ties to Moscow. In March 2022, Iran, Russia, and China conducted a four-day naval exercise, having carried out a similar series of maneuvers one year earlier in the northern Indian Ocean. Both the Iranian Navy and the IRGC Navy participated in the previous drills, officially known as the “Maritime Security Belt Combined Exercise 2022.” They took place in the Gulf of Oman, an extension of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz—a strategic maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil transits.
Following Iran’s accession as a permanent member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its closer ties through the BRICS framework, Tehran has bolstered its relationship with both Moscow and Beijing. Even as Russia has engaged in talks with the United States regarding a possible end to the war in Ukraine, Iran has reacted coolly to a mix of offers and threats from the United States. Abbas Araghchi, after a recent meeting in Tehran with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, reaffirmed that Iran “will not negotiate directly with the United States” on its nuclear program, adding that Tehran would proceed “in coordination with Russia and China.”
In January 2025, Iran and Russia formally signed a strategic cooperation agreement aimed, according to the Kremlin, at “strengthening military, political, trade, and economic relations” between Tehran and Moscow. About a year earlier, NATO’s former Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg had warned of an “alliance of authoritarian regimes,” noting that these nations appeared to be “cooperating more closely” against Western democracies. Particularly in the case of Russia and Iran, severe Western sanctions have only appeared to drive the nation’s security and economic cooperation closer together.
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