Evan Gottesman (RDI): This book is about Ukraine, Russia, and the US, a subject about which you are both an expert and participant. You have a doctorate from SAIS, a master’s from Harvard, and fluency in multiple relevant languages. You were posted in Kyiv, Moscow, the Pentagon, and the White House. You were born in Ukraine and a witness of that fateful Trump-Zelensky call in 2019.
What was it like to approach this kind of project where you are both scholar and participant?
Alexander Vindman: In certain regards, it was easy. In other regards, it was more challenging. It was easier in the sense that I had command of the events I participated in. I’ve studied Russia as an adversary for a long time, and I recognize how U.S. policy missteps fueled the brewing confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. What was more challenging was putting the academic lens on to write my dissertation, which this book is based on, and fleshing out a methodology to understand and distill what really went wrong.
EG: And what went wrong?
AV: We consistently favored our relationship with Russia over our relationship with Ukraine. The US was constantly trying to achieve some sort of policy aim as Russia became adversarial. We were trying to prevent the relationship with Russia from spiraling downwards. Those were short-term approaches to either achieve something or to mitigate risk, but they actually drove the long-term crisis.
I was just arguing with somebody in my think tank about whether Ukraine should end up in NATO. And my colleague argued that if Ukraine is in NATO, doesn't that mean that US troops are at greater risk of being drawn into war with Russia? And the answer is actually no. My colleague’s position has been the calculation all along the way, heading off short-term risks in order to avoid a crisis. That favors Russia and has actually emboldened it. If we had shown resolve along the way, we could have discouraged or deterred Russian aggression. And I think that is the part that is absolutely essential to note: our short-term risk mitigation measures often stack up adversely to our long-term interests.
Russia has no interest in direct confrontation with the US and Europe. We are too powerful in alliance, and NATO actually forestalls Russian aggression against Ukraine. It signals that Russia's aggression will produce the opposite effect of what they are looking to achieve.
EG: Let’s come back to that central pitfall in our approach to Kyiv and Moscow, which was this Russia-first policy. Playing devil’s advocate: Was this unavoidable to some extent, given that Russia is simply bigger than Ukraine, it is the USSR’s successor, and it possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal?
AV: This is an interesting question. I think it's important to work backwards…
