From Iran Unfiltered from NIAC <[email protected]>
Subject A Renewed Deadlock: Trump Revives “Maximum Pressure” While Khamenei Rejects Talks, Iran Khodro’s Looming Privatization: Controversy Over Transfer of Shares to Krooz, Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, Spiritual Leader of the Ismaili Community, Dies at 88, and More
Date February 7, 2025 9:34 PM
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Week of February 2, 2025 [[link removed]] | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

* A Renewed Deadlock? Trump Suggests Deal and Readies “Maximum Pressure” While Khamenei Dismisses Talks [[link removed]]
* Iran’s Show of Strength: Pezeshkian’s Military Visit and Expanded Exercises Underscore Defensive Resolve [[link removed]]
* Disturbing Pattern: Ambulance Sex Assault Cases Spark Outrage in Iran [[link removed]]
* Iran Khodro’s Looming Privatization: Controversy Over Transfer of Shares to Krooz [[link removed]]
* Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, Spiritual Leader of the Ismaili Community, Dies at 88 [[link removed]]

A Renewed Deadlock? Trump Suggests Deal and Readies “Maximum Pressure” While Khamenei Dismisses Talks [[link removed]]
Over the past few weeks, a sense of cautious optimism seemed to emerge regarding potential negotiations between the United States and Iran . Officials such as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had hinted at being “open, in principle,” to dialogue—though tempered by deep skepticism about President Donald Trump’s policies. However, the latest developments in Washington and Tehran suggest a rocky road ahead for possible future negotiations.

In his first extended remarks on Iran since his inauguration, President Trump signed a new memorandum to restore the “maximum pressure” campaign against the Islamic Republic, even though it was arguably never stopped under the Biden administration. In a contrast to the rhetoric from his first term in office, Trump signaled that he was “torn” over whether to sign the memorandum. “I’m signing this,” Trump stated, “and hopefully it will be a document which won’t be very important and will hardly have to be used.” He also reflected insight into Iran’s factional politics and positioning on Iran’s nuclear program, stating “There are many people at the top ranks of Iran that do not want to have a nuclear weapon.”

Whether the maximum pressure memorandum itself is implemented will likely go a long way to determining whether there is space for negotiations . In contrast to President Trump, who stated that his sole demand is that Iran not secure a nuclear weapon, the memorandum lays out additional non-nuclear goals to counter Iran’s missiles and halt its support of designated terrorist groups. And while many of the pressure steps outlined in the memorandum were underway amid the Biden administration, it does suggest new efforts to bring Iran’s oil exports to zero, to cancel sanctions waivers that benefit Iran and to potentially pursue snapback of United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Notably, President Trump’s pro-diplomacy rhetoric continued amid a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4 and in a post on Truth Social on February 5. “ I say this to Iran, who is listening very intently: I would love to be able to make a great deal, a deal where you can get on with your lives and you’ll do wonderfully,” said President Trump . He laid out his criteria for a deal, stating “They cannot have a nuclear weapon. It’s very simple. I’m not putting restrictions. I’m not. They cannot have one thing. They cannot have a nuclear weapon.”

His post on Truth Social underscored his apparent interest in a deal. Trump wrote, “Reports that the United States, working in conjunction with Israel, is going to blow Iran into smithereens,” ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED. I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper. We should start working on it immediately, and have a big Middle East Celebration when it is signed and completed.”

By contrast, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei expounded on his thinking on possible talks with the United States on Friday, February 7, casting significant doubt on the prospect of negotiations serving Iran’s interests. Khamenei emphatically argued that “talks with the U.S. will not solve the country’s problems.” Highlighting America’s exit from the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), Khamenei called negotiations under pressure “neither rational, wise, nor honorable.” He suggested Iran’s problems cannot be resolved through external actors but instead must be resolved internally, while citing the upcoming anniversary of the 1979 revolution.

On Sunday, February 2, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also delivered a speech hailing what he called “the victory” of Gaza-based militants over “the Zionist regime and the American regime,” framing it as an example of an “impossible event” turned into reality . He asserted that “unlike others, Iranians dare to say ‘Death to America,’” labeling the U.S. as a deceitful, colonial power.

News of Trump’s revived maximum pressure campaign caused a steep decline in Iran’s currency, the rial, reaching an unprecedented level of 85,000 tomans to the dollar (some local sources reported even higher intraday quotes) . The free-market exchange rate for the Euro also surpassed the 89,000-toman mark—an all-time high. Meanwhile, the price of gold coins soared dramatically. Economists both inside and outside Iran warn that renewed sanctions and deepening isolation could exacerbate Iran’s already-dire economic situation, marked by inflation, high unemployment, and structural “imbalances” that many experts see as a near-crisis.

Rumors of a Joint U.S.-Israel “Plan to Pulverize Iran” have also surfaced . Simultaneous with Trump’s announcements, certain media outlets and analysts speculated on a potential U.S.-Israel strategy to strike Iranian targets decisively. Reports even suggested there is a plan to “pulverize” or “powder” Iran. President Trump has since dismissed this notion, but it is nevertheless notable.

Other actors in Iran have signaled more openness to negotiations. Abbas Araghchi, Foreign Minister, in reaction to the revived sanctions, called “maximum pressure” a “failed experiment” that did not force Iran into submission during Trump’s first term. He noted Tehran emerged “stronger” in certain sectors and reiterated that if the United States truly aims to prevent nuclear weapons, an agreement “is not a problem.”

On the sidelines of a meeting with OPEC Secretary General Haitham Al Ghais, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian urged fellow OPEC members to act in solidarity so no single member is harmed by the U.S. policies . He argued that if OPEC remains united, the United States cannot isolate and sanction just one member. Nonetheless, in Iranian media, the president has sometimes hinted at readiness for talks with the U.S.—while underlining that the current approach of “maximum pressure” is inherently counterproductive.

Echoing Khamenei’s defiant note, IRGC Commander Salami said Iran would respond to “maximum pressure” with “maximum resistance and domestic production .” He claimed that previous rounds of sanctions not only failed to halt Iran’s progress but contributed to “economic self-sufficiency,” a view that most independent economists dispute.

On February 6, the Treasury Department revealed fresh sanctions measures against networks alleged to facilitate Iranian oil sales—particularly to China. Tehran labeled the new sanctions “illegitimate and illegal.” The foreign ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Baghai, accused Washington of “unilateral bullying,” holding the U.S. responsible for any fallout.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Majed Al-Ansari, said Doha is ready to mediate between Washington and Tehran to resolve the nuclear standoff, referencing previous Qatari interventions during Trump’s first term . Although no direct talks have materialized, this offer underscores that some in the region are actively seeking to de-escalate tension. Iran has made a concerted effort in recent years to improve its relations with its regional neighbors, and has proven at least partially successful. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to stop in Qatar on his next foreign trip between February 13 and 18, with many regional nations also on the agenda.

Trump’s “Peace Deal” pitch contrasts sharply with Iranian skepticism. In public, President Trump insists that his end goal remains “a peaceful and verifiable” agreement preventing any Iranian nuclear ambitions. He has repeatedly invited Iran to sit down for talks. Yet Iranian leaders point to Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA as proof that the U.S. does not abide by its commitments. Iranian officials have often argued that the United States must first lift all sanctions and restore the original terms of the 2015 agreement before Tehran would consider new negotiations, even though most consider that agreement effectively dead and buried.

These latest statements by Khamenei also provoked widespread reactions among Iranian activists and social media users . Some conservative voices celebrated his firm line against Washington. Hamid Rasaei, a conservative parliamentarian, wrote that the Supreme Leader’s stance “demolished any attempt to justify negotiations with a deceiving government” and saw it as an affirmation that “negotiations can only succeed if they uphold Iran’s dignity and independence.”

Others with more pragmatic inclinations, such as Hesamoddin Ashena—adviser to the previous administration—suggested that “while the Leader’s emphasis on mistrust is non-negotiable, there remains room for future talks if they are managed intelligently and based on a clear outcome.” Some social media users went further, calling for Masoud Pezeshkian to resign if “he cannot secure sanctions relief,” while others argued that “the responsibility for the country’s economic predicament should shift from the administration to higher power centers if negotiations are disallowed.” Several commentators saw Khamenei’s hardline stance as “part of a negotiation strategy,” while others insisted that “the door for talks is permanently closed under maximum pressure.”

Despite hints of readiness for dialogue—most prominently from President Trump’s side, who reiterates he’d rather see Iran become “great and successful” than continue the path of confrontation—Tehran’s official stance remains skeptical . The Supreme Leader’s repeated denunciations of any talks with the U.S. underscore deep-seated mistrust, fueled by the memory of the abandoned nuclear deal and other hostilities. Still, while the Supreme Leader has often taken a harsh position toward negotiations with the U.S. both as a negotiating tactic and out of genuine distrust, these hard lines can prove more flexible than they might first appear.

Further complicating the picture is Iran’s worsening economic state : the rial is in freefall, inflation is high, and unemployment remains a serious concern. A possible new wave of sanctions, combined with Trump’s threats to intensify enforcement, adds significant pressure. At the same time, talk of a potential U.S.-Israel military option—though described by Trump as “exaggerated”—has kept tensions on a knife’s edge. For the moment, the revival of America’s maximum pressure campaign may have pushed both sides into a renewed deadlock, with further escalation quite possible ahead of any diplomatic breakthrough.

Iran’s Show of Strength: Pezeshkian’s Military Visit and Expanded Exercises Underscore Defensive Resolve [[link removed]]
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited the latest defense and aerospace achievements of the Ministry of Defense on February 2, 2025, declaring that with these advancements “no country would dare to attack Iranian soil.” He insisted that Iran’s development of military industries and missile programs is purely defensive, designed to deter aggression rather than initiate it. While not referring directly to recent rumors of possible U.S. or Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, Pezeshkian noted that there was a time when enemies might have considered invading Iran, but today they “cannot even entertain the idea.” During his tour, he inspected a new ballistic missile called “Etemad,” which reportedly has a range of 1,700 kilometers and carries a guided warhead, as well as several upgraded air-defense systems, including the mobile Dezful platform.

Shortly after the president’s visit, the Iranian military announced a significant increase in annual winter exercises, nearly doubling the usual number of drills across western and southern provinces . Brigadier General Ali Mohammad Naeini, a spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), explained that the exercises will involve joint ground, air, and naval operations by the IRGC and the regular Army until mid-March.

It seems Iran aims to show it remains strong and prepared for “emerging threats,” despite facing regional setbacks in recent months . Members of the “axis of resistance” have come under pressure during the latest conflict in the Middle East, with Israeli forces carrying out multiple strikes on Iran-linked bases and exchanging fire directly with Tehran for the first time.

While this has raised speculation that the Islamic Republic’s regional influence might be weakening, Iranian officials insist they are unbowed. In addition to unveiling a new underground IRGC Navy missile base, Commander Hossein Salami revealed extended-range naval missiles exceeding one thousand kilometers, and state media reported that the Army began air defense drills near key nuclear sites.

Iran also showcased the Bagheri drone carrier—originally a converted civilian vessel—capable of deploying multiple unmanned aerial squadrons, and introduced a super-heavy drone named “Ghaza.” Meanwhile, footage from the Russian Embassy hinted at the start of long-awaited Su-35 fighter jet deliveries to Iran.

By conducting large-scale maneuvers, rolling out advanced weapons, and emphasizing self-sufficiency, the Iranian government is sending a clear message that it will continue to develop its military potential . The signal being sent both to the United States under President Donald Trump and to Israel is that, despite the blows dealt to its regional allies, Iran remains equipped and determined to defend itself against any heightened pressure or future attacks.

Disturbing Pattern: Ambulance Sex Assault Cases Spark Outrage in Iran [[link removed]]
Over the past few years, disturbing reports have emerged in Iran of sexual assaults and other forms of misconduct by ambulance technicians against female patients . At least four separate cases, spanning from 2017 to as recently as 2024, have come to light in Iranian media. These reports suggest a pattern of abuse within emergency medical services (EMS) and raise questions about accountability and the efficacy of judicial measures intended to protect victims.

The first widely reported incident took place in 2017. According to Iran’s Emergency Organization, an EMS technician sexually assaulted a woman inside an ambulance. Although the spokesperson for the organization claimed the assailant was dismissed, the victim’s lawyer, Neda Shams, stated that the individual was merely transferred from one medical facility to another rather than permanently removed from service. Shams detailed how the woman, semi-conscious and sedated, was held for 57 minutes on a diverted route. Despite evidence including the victim’s condition and bruising, the court classified the crime as “unlawful sexual relations short of rape” (known in Iranian legal terms as “madun-e zina”), sentencing the perpetrator to 74 lashes and a two-year ban from EMS duties. Shams contends this sentence did not reflect the seriousness of the crime and was upheld by an appeals court within two days.

Another assault occurred in April 2024 (Farvardin 1403) . A woman, injured in a car accident, sought help from an ambulance at the scene. During the initial check-up, the EMS technician asked her husband to leave to fetch water—only to drive away while he allegedly groped the patient in the back of the vehicle. The woman and her husband later reported the incident to the police at the hospital. In court, the technician’s colleague initially testified that no assault took place but later admitted he had been pressured to lie. Digital forensics further revealed the technician had taken the victim’s phone number under the guise of filling out forms and attempted to contact her via Instagram. Ultimately, the court classified his actions as “immoral acts (other than zina)” and sentenced him to 60 lashes. Despite this conviction, he reportedly continues to work for EMS.

In a third case reported by the newspaper Shargh, a father described how, in September 2022 (Shahrivar 1401), his 33-year-old daughter became weak from low blood pressure. Called to assist her was an ambulance from Karaj EMS, in which the technician refused to let anyone else accompany the patient. The father alleges that once inside the ambulance, his daughter was injected with anesthetics and sexually assaulted while semiconscious. The ambulance driver apparently delayed arrival at the hospital, providing enough time for the technician to commit the assault. Upon reaching the hospital more than an hour later, the victim was in poor condition and immediately disclosed that she had been raped. The father says the technician received 99 lashes and the driver 30 lashes, but he believes the sentence was inadequate, given that forensic testing reportedly confirmed oral contact and the presence of bodily fluids on the victim’s clothing. Tragically, about a year later, the woman died of a stroke while under psychiatric care, and her sister died by suicide soon after, saying she could not live without her sibling.

While these cases differ in their details, they share a troubling core narrative: alleged sexual assaults of vulnerable women in dire need of medical attention, and legal responses that many see as insufficient . In two of the incidents, courts refrained from classifying the assaults as rape, opting instead for lesser offenses—thereby imposing milder sentences such as flogging and short-term bans from EMS work. In at least one case, the convicted individual remains employed in emergency medical services, raising serious concerns about institutional oversight and professional ethics.

These revelations have caused public outrage, sparking debates in Iranian media over the need for stricter safeguards, transparent judicial proceedings, and systemic reforms. Lawyers and activists call for stronger penalties and better protections for patients, emphasizing that assault by a healthcare professional—especially one entrusted with saving lives—should be met with the full weight of the law. Meanwhile, for the families of victims, the trauma has been compounded by tragic outcomes, minimal legal penalties, and the absence of any meaningful closure or institutional accountability.

Iran Khodro’s Looming Privatization: Controversy Over Transfer of Shares to Krooz [[link removed]]
Over the past several weeks, Iranian media have circulated unconfirmed reports suggesting that the Supreme Council for Economic Coordination (SCECC) has approved the sale of the government’s shares in Iran Khodro to the private auto-parts manufacturer Krooz . If finalized, it could mark a major shift for Iran’s largest automaker. While critics argue that this would simply replace state dominance with a new monopoly, supporters see it as “the end of government mismanagement.”

Iran Khodro (IKCO) has long been a cornerstone of the country’s automotive sector, enjoying government support yet burdened by more than 127 trillion rials of accumulated losses . Privatizing such a massive entity has been on Iran’s political agenda for years, aligned with the broader push to implement Article 44 of the Constitution, which mandates transferring state-owned enterprises to the private sector. Despite this policy framework, efforts to fully privatize Iran Khodro have repeatedly stalled, partly because of its strategic economic importance.

Leaked documents bearing the SCECC letterhead indicate that the potential privatization would unfold in two phases: first, a transfer of management control, and then, over a maximum of five years, a transfer of ownership . Media reports suggested that Krooz, one of Iran’s largest auto-parts suppliers, was the leading candidate to acquire a controlling stake. Krooz currently holds about 30% of IKCO’s shares and occupies two seats on its five-member board.

As rumors spread, several parliament members and industry experts voiced objections, pointing out that Krooz has faced legal disputes over allegations of corruption, large-scale smuggling of auto parts, and bribe payments to Hussein Fereydoun, brother of former President Hassan Rouhani . Critics argue that allowing a parts supplier with this background to take over Iran’s leading automaker may engender a conflict of interest, replacing one form of monopoly with another. Some observers note that genuine privatization remains elusive in Iran, often described as “transfers of assets among quasi-governmental entities.” Some economists suggest the Iranian capital market lacks the funding for a deal of this magnitude unless a foreign investor is involved, and points to the closed and non-competitive economy as a deterrent to true privatization.

Despite these concerns, an extraordinary general assembly of Iran Khodro was convened on 17 Bahman (February 5). The convening appeared to be canceled by a handwritten notice on the Codal system, but was ultimately held after a seven-hour delay. Observers reported confusion, including power outages and microphone failures, along with contradictory announcements about whether the meeting would proceed. Eventually, participants voted to allocate three of IKCO’s five board seats to entities affiliated with Krooz, granting the company effective managerial control.

Ali Merdan Azimi, CEO of Iran Khodro, later wrote to the Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO), alleging that the assembly was convened illegally . He claimed Krooz’s representatives disregarded directives from the Prosecutor General’s Office advising against a share transfer until the appeals process related to the Competition Council’s ruling was concluded.

The issue is further complicated by a dispute between Krooz and regulatory bodies. Last year, the Article 90 Commission in parliament concluded that Krooz’s two seats on IKCO’s board violated fair-competition guidelines under Article 44 of the Constitution, instructing Krooz to lower its shareholding so it would no longer hold a board seat. Krooz appealed, and recent documents suggest the Appeals Commission reaffirmed the original decision. Critics say the outcome of the extraordinary general assembly may contradict this directive, raising questions about the legality of the move.

Supporters of the Krooz bid maintain that Iran Khodro, burdened by inefficiencies and heavy debts, needs fresh leadership . They argue a private firm can streamline decision-making and boost production quality. Others believe genuine reform would require partnering with a major international automaker, something complicated by sanctions and foreign policy challenges. Many fear the takeover might deepen monopolistic practices, fueled by persistent allegations of corruption.

For now, the fate of the sale remains uncertain. Even though Krooz-backed entities appear to have secured a board majority at IKCO, some observers speculate that higher authorities could reverse or invalidate the deal. As Iran’s automotive sector continues to be politicized and the country’s economy faces international sanctions, whether this privatization will succeed—or merely swap government oversight for a private monopoly—remains an open question, with implications that extend far beyond a single corporation.

Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, Spiritual Leader of the Ismaili Community, Dies at 88 [[link removed]]
Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, the 49th hereditary Imam of the Ismaili Muslims—a Shi’a sect tracing its lineage directly to the Prophet Muhammad—passed away at the age of 88 in Lisbon, Portugal, surrounded by members of his family. His death was announced by the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), which stated: “He passed away peacefully, and we express our deepest condolences to his family and to the global Ismaili community.”

Prince Karim Aga Khan was a prominent international figure and philanthropist whose charitable foundations, primarily under the AKDN, operate hundreds of hospitals, educational institutions, and cultural projects across the developing world. While born in Switzerland and holding British citizenship, he also had significant personal ties to Iran, where his family heritage and the Ismaili community maintain deep historical roots. Notably, he proudly represented Iran as an alpine skier in the 1964 Winter Olympics in Innsbruck, Austria, competing in the slalom, giant slalom, and downhill events—a testament to his lifelong passion for sports.

Beyond his Iranian athletic connection, Prince Karim’s role as the spiritual leader of approximately 15 million Ismaili Muslims was shaped by a belief that, following the sixth Shi’a Imam, the line of Imamate continued through Isma’il rather than Musa al-Kazim (as Twelver Shi’a assert). He became the community’s Imam in 1957 at the age of 20, succeeding his grandfather, and led them for nearly seven decades until his death. During his tenure, he established or greatly expanded multiple institutions, including universities and cultural centers, reflecting his view that faith and intellectual endeavor should harmoniously support human development.

The Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN)—sometimes referred to as the “Imamate Institutions”—has been lauded by some as an embodiment of a faith-centered yet humanitarian approach, serving people regardless of religious affiliation or nationality. Through this vast network, Prince Karim championed a message of human dignity, educational growth, and social progress, aiming to demonstrate a compatibility of modernity with deeply held religious values. Many Iranian thinkers, such as Abdolkarim Soroush, recognized him as a forward-thinking Islamic leader who exemplified reason, compassion, and tolerance. However, many Iranian clerics and the Iranian government do not officially acknowledge Ismailism as a legitimate branch of Islam.
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