(New York, N.Y.) — On January 15, Hamas announced its agreement to a ceasefire with Israel to end the 15-month war in Gaza started by Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terror attack. The United States, Qatar, and Egypt brokered the multiphase agreement, which would see Israel pause its war in Gaza during the first stage and release an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners from its custody. In exchange, Hamas would begin the phased release of 33 hostages over the course of 42 days, including women, children, people with severe injuries, and those older than 50. It remains unclear how many of the 33 hostages in question are still alive. The remaining 65 hostages would be released only if Hamas and Israel agree to extend the pause in fighting and negotiate for a permanent ceasefire and the release of the remaining hostages. Negotiations to secure a second phase of the deal would begin after 16 days. The latter stages of the agreement would include the release of all remaining hostages and a plan to rebuild Gaza. Israel’s security cabinet approved the agreement early on January 17 and sent the deal to Israel’s full cabinet for final approval. Though far-right members of Israel’s government oppose the agreement, observers largely expect it to pass the cabinet. Upon approval, the ceasefire and Hamas’s first wave of hostage releases would begin on January 19.
CEP Senior Director Hans-Jakob Schindler
This deal clearly shows the weakness of Hamas because its multi-pronged strategy to stop Israeli military operations through political pressure—via propaganda and intentional suffering of civilian population and the expansion of the conflict regionally—has failed. Israel did not ultimately bend to international pressure. Moreover, Hamas now has a much-diminished terror infrastructure in Gaza, including the tunnel network, as well as its command-and-control structure in the Strip.
Phase one of the deal is likely to be implemented, since in this instance the individual steps have been agreed: timing and number of hostages and Palestinian prisoners. However, phases two and three are politically very difficult for the Israeli government internally to agree and therefore less likely to be achieved, at least in the short-term.
Clearly, Hamas is significantly weakened at the moment. However, most of the Hamas money is still untouched (companies still operating in Turkey, Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia) and the financial management of Hamas in Lebanon and Turkey is still operational. The world should now demand: no safe havens for Hamas leaders and in particular Hamas financial managers; the freezing of Hamas assets globally; and pursue global efforts to classify Hamas as a terrorist organization.
CEP Senior Analyst Josh Lipowsky
The acceptance of a ceasefire and hostage deal by both Hamas and Israel’s security cabinet brings renewed hope to families whose loved ones have been held captive by Hamas for over a year. Hamas has been notably weakened by the ensuing war, the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, and the deaths of October 7 architects Mohammed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Yahya Sinwar. It is likely not a coincidence that Hamas announced the resumption of ceasefire talks on January 5, two days after Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire with Israel, which left Hamas without the ‘safety net’ of Hezbollah waging war on Israel’s northern front and distracting it from Gaza. As it has done in the past, Hamas turned to negotiations when it saw it had been backed into a corner. But Hamas has a history of breaking ceasefires with Israel, most notably the ceasefire that was in place on October 6, 2023. The international community must ensure that Hamas does not use this time to rebuild itself. Gaza must be rebuilt, but without Hamas.
To read CEP’s Group Report on Hamas, click here.
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