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A note from the editor, Ryan Costello. Thank you, Iran Unfiltered readers, for your generous support of our work during our end-of-year fundraising campaign [[link removed]] . We greatly appreciate your contributions and look forward to continuing to produce an informative Iran Unfiltered on a weekly basis.

Week of January 6, 2025 [[link removed]] | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

* Macron Labels Iran “Main Security Challenge” as New Nuclear Talks Loom [[link removed]]
* Makran as Iran’s Potential New Capital: A Four-Decade Debate Reignited [[link removed]]
* In Memory of Reza Raeis-Toosi: A Life of Activism and Scholarship [[link removed]]
* Iraqi Prime Minister’s Visit to Tehran Amid Heightened Regional Tensions [[link removed]]
* Fifth Anniversary of the Downing of Flight PS752 and the Deaths of Its 176 Passengers [[link removed]]
* Controversy Surrounding Iranian Eulogists: Azerbaijan Summons Iranian Diplomat and Arrest of a Qom Eulogist [[link removed]]
* UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Highlights Surge in Executions in Iran, With Pakhshan Azizi’s Case Drawing Growing Concern [[link removed]]
* Swiss Citizen Dies Under Suspicious Circumstances in Iranian Custody Amid Ongoing Foreign Detentions [[link removed]]

Macron Labels Iran “Main Security Challenge” as New Nuclear Talks Loom [[link removed]]
Emmanuel Macron, the President of France, described Iran as the “main security and strategic challenge in the Middle East.” Speaking before French ambassadors, he voiced concern about the accelerating pace of Iran’s nuclear program, warning that it is nearing a “point of no return.” He also criticized Tehran’s support for Russia in the war against Ukraine—an accusation that the Iranian government has repeatedly denied, insisting it has provided no weapons to either side and is not involved in the conflict.

Macron indicated that Iran’s nuclear activities and its regional posture will be central to discussions with the incoming U.S. administration of Donald Trump. President-elect Trump, who will soon begin his new term in the White House, “knows he has a strong ally in France,” Macron asserted.

Meanwhile, Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, announced that a new round of talks with Germany, Britain, and France is scheduled for January 13 in Geneva. The talks will take place in the context of continuing tensions between Iran and Western powers. In November 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution proposed by four Western powers that condemned Iran for expanding its nuclear program and failing to cooperate sufficiently with the IAEA. It was the second such resolution passed against Iran in six months. Notably, one day before the resolution was approved, Grossi had welcomed Iran’s initial and apparently contingent agreement to stop further increases in its 60% enriched uranium stockpile.

Shortly after the resolution passed, however, Iran declared it would install “a considerable number of new and advanced centrifuges,” and later confirmed having done so, along with greatly accelerating its enrichment to the 60% threshold. Mohsen Naziri-Asl, Iran’s ambassador and permanent representative to the IAEA, said that while Iran remains committed to its obligations as an IAEA member, it will respond to evolving circumstances. He regretted that the resolution was adopted despite “positive assurances” given during a recent visit by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi.

Grossi himself had remarked, on December 7, 2024, that “it is no secret” some Iranian politicians have called for the development of nuclear weapons, but after recent talks in Tehran, he concluded that it “does not seem to be the path chosen by the current leadership .” He also warned Israel that attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities could have very serious consequences, both in terms of retaliation and the potential release of radioactive materials.

These assessments from the IAEA coincide with Donald Trump’s impending return to office, which will significantly impact Iran’s nuclear future. During his first term as President, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal (the JCPOA) and reinstated sanctions on Iran. His advisors have discussed reinstating “maximum pressure” policies – even though they were largely continued under the Biden administration – in order to force Iran to halt its concerning activities, including in the nuclear realm. This strategy draws renewed scrutiny now that the IAEA reports Iran’s capacity to produce 60% enriched uranium has expanded significantly—a step that brings it much closer to the roughly 90% threshold for weapons-grade material. Some assessments indicate that Iran’s “breakout time” – the metric used to estimate how long it would take Iran to produce enough highly-enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon – has fallen to less than a week and Iran could relatively easily produce enough fissile material for multiple nuclear weapons in short order, if it made the decision to do so.

After President Macron’s comments, Esmail Baghaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denounced the French leader’s remarks as “baseless, contradictory, and accusatory,” urging Paris to rethink its “unconstructive approaches” toward peace and stability in West Asia. Baghaei also rejected Macron’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, stating that its activities fall within international legal frameworks and are subject to continuous monitoring by the IAEA. He dismissed as “unfounded” the claim that Iran supports Russia in its war with Ukraine, reiterating that Iran is not involved in the conflict and has not sent arms to either side.

Despite the sharp exchange, Gharibabadi confirmed that talks with the three European nations will proceed on January 13 in Geneva. Observers note that a meaningful resolution may depend on whether the European participants and the United States can unify their stance and whether Iran, in turn, can address Western concerns. As tensions remain high, diplomats on all sides hope these renewed negotiations could prevent further escalation and open a path toward a workable diplomatic agreement.

Makran as Iran’s Potential New Capital: A Four-Decade Debate Reignites [[link removed]]
For nearly four decades, successive governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran have raised the possibility of relocating the capital from Tehran to another city. The conversation first emerged in the 1980s, not long after the 1979 revolution, and it has resurfaced intermittently ever since. The most recent round of debate began when President Masoud Pezeshkian, referencing severe water shortages as a “national crisis,” suggested that one way to address Iran’s water imbalance would be to move the capital “to a city by the sea.” Soon afterward, his First Vice President, along with the government spokesperson, specifically mentioned Makran—a region by the shores of the Gulf of Oman—as the primary candidate for the new capital.

Critics question the feasibility, necessity, and motives behind proposing such a costly and complex endeavor at a time of economic difficulty . Government funds, they argue, are already overstretched, and the relocation of an entire capital would require enormous financial, infrastructural, and administrative resources. Some commentators accuse the administration of using the relocation debate to deflect from unfulfilled campaign promises and the lack of tangible progress.

Among the most vocal critics is Professor Hossein Akhani from the University of Tehran, who demanded transparency on the question: “Who will build this new capital?” He further accused the administration of lacking the authority to bring in either qualified domestic experts or foreign assistance—given that some influential figures even question the legality of the president’s own well-educated deputy.

Other experts, like Hossein Moradi, a faculty member in the Environmental Sciences department at the University of Tehran’s College of Natural Resources, warn of the environmental vulnerabilities in southeastern Iran. Rising sea levels and increasing temperatures pose significant risks to coastal areas, including Makran. Critics worry that relocating the capital might create yet another large-scale project driven by short-term development goals rather than robust, long-term sustainability, and have severe ecological and social consequences—a scenario reminiscent of controversial undertakings like the Gotvand Dam, the Lake Urmia Highway, and the Bushehr Nuclear Plant.

Government officials appeared to walk back the notion when the Deputy Executive for the President described the relocation as merely an “idea,” despite earlier statements suggesting a firm plan. This drew condemnation from a conservative newspaper, which argued that “hasty and unstudied remarks” by officials sow confusion and undermine public trust.

Whether the proposal to move the capital to Makran will gain traction or fade remains to be seen. But the four-decade-old debate on relocating Iran’s seat of power is once again a topic of debate, raising questions about feasibility, political will, environmental impact, and the government’s capacity to implement sweeping reforms under current conditions.

In Memory of Reza Raeis-Toosi: A Life of Activism and Scholarship [[link removed]]
Reza Raeis-Toosi, a retired professor in the International Relations Department at the Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, passed away on Friday night. Though his name had not been widely recognized in recent years, news of his passing prompted immediate reactions from students—who spoke of his unpretentious scholarly demeanor—and from veteran political activists—who recalled his role among the earliest members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) in the turbulent years leading up to the 1979 Revolution.

Born into the world of political struggle, Raeis-Toosi initially joined the Islamic Association of National Front Students . When Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Mahmud Taleghani, and Yadollah Sahabi established the Freedom Movement of Iran, he became a member and devoted himself to opposing the Pahlavi regime. After the mass arrests of 1962–63, he was drawn to the newly formed MEK, eventually traveling abroad for further engagement.

In his recollections, Raeis-Toosi noted that he underwent covert-organizing and military training in Egypt, while maintaining educational and political ties with Mohammad Hanifnejad . Under Raeis-Toosi’s direction, the first pamphlets on covert organizing and military instruction were compiled, then surreptitiously transferred into Iran. Together with Hamid Nouhi and Hossein Rafiei, he was also active in Muslim student associations across Europe and the United States, working to recruit new members and gather resources in support of the broader political struggle.

When Taghi Shahram and Bahram Aram introduced Marxism into the MEK in 1975, Raeis-Toosi strongly opposed the ideological shift. Along with Nouhi and Rafiei, he published a formal response to the new MEK positions from abroad. Although he maintained official membership in the MEK until 1979, he objected to Massoud Rajavi’s leadership style and finally, on July 2, 1980, joined Nouhi and Rafiei in publicly resigning from the organization. They explained their rationale in “Ravand-e Jodaei” (“The Course of Separation”), marking one of the first major splits from the MEK after the Revolution. He continued to sharply criticize the organization he had once been a part of after his break from the group.

Outside of direct political organizing work, Raeis-Toosi remained intellectually active. He authored several notable works, including Oil and the Energy Crisis , Zamin-e Sookhteh: Britain’s Diplomacy in Sistan , and The Decline of the Social Order and the Collapse of the Qajar State: Based on Documents in the British Foreign Office Archive . In his writings, he quoted Lord Curzon to criticize the concession granted by Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar to Baron de Reuter, describing it as “the most complete and astonishing relinquishment of a country’s natural and industrial resources to a foreign individual.” Raeis-Toosi used these historical analyses to shed light on the factors that led to the Constitutional Revolution in Iran.

Throughout his life, Raeis-Toosi strove to champion justice and freedom in society. He will be remembered not only for his political activism and organizational leadership but also for his academic contributions and devotion to public welfare. The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) offers its deepest condolences to Dr. Raeis-Toosi’s family, friends, colleagues, and former students. May his enduring commitment to scholarship and societal progress continue to inspire future generations.

Iraqi Prime Minister’s Visit to Tehran Amid Heightened Regional Tensions [[link removed]]
Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the Prime Minister of Iraq, arrived in Tehran, where he was first welcomed by Abdolnaser Hemmati, Iran’s Minister of Economy, and then received by President Masoud Pezeshkian. The stated goals of al-Sudani’s visit include strengthening Iran-Iraq relations and discussing regional issues. Earlier this year, Pezeshkian made his own first official foreign trip to Iraq on September 12, visiting Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Basra, and the Kurdistan Region during a three-day stay.

Al-Sudani’s trip to Iran has prompted various domestic reactions and speculation about its underlying purpose. Some analysts believe the visit may carry special messages for Tehran, while others think it might focus on security matters and regional developments, particularly regarding Syria.

During a joint press conference with al-Sudani, President Pezeshkian underlined the importance of Iran-Iraq cooperation in confronting regional challenges and fighting terrorism. He emphasized both nations’ shared concerns about stability and territorial integrity in Syria and the necessity of ending Israel’s occupation of Syrian territories. Pezeshkian warned about the potential resurgence of terrorist cells in the region, stressing that vigilance and close cooperation between Iran and Iraq are essential. He also highlighted the bilateral security agreement as a key step toward safeguarding regional security and stability.

On the economic and infrastructure front, Pezeshkian referred to the Shalamcheh-Basra railway as a priority project, commending al-Sudani for working to implement it. Both sides also emphasized the need to address religious concerns and protect Shiite holy sites, expressing hope that strategic cooperation between Tehran and Baghdad will exert a positive influence on wider regional affairs.

Meanwhile, media speculation about the trip’s broader implications has included rumors that al-Sudani might act as an intermediary between Iran and Syria, whose relations reportedly cooled following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Another outlet, Shafaq News, has claimed that President Trump used Baghdad to send a message to Iran, urging constraints on militias operating outside the Iraqi government’s framework, cessation of activities by Iran-linked groups, non-intervention in Syrian affairs, and support for forming a new Syrian government.

Although there is no confirmation that Trump has in fact delivered such a message, the United States and Israel remain concerned about Iran’s allied forces in Iraq and may use every opportunity to curb them. In this sense, al-Sudani’s trip may partly relate to these pressures. Simultaneously, certain Iraqi sources report that the prime minister’s discussions in Tehran will include efforts to bridge positions between the Syrian interim government and Iran, U.S. demands for dismantling armed groups in Iraq, Iraq’s debts to Iran, and continuing gas exports from Iran to Iraqi power plants.

These reports suggest that al-Sudani’s one-day visit to Tehran is significant, portraying him as a potential messenger for various parties. On December 11, al-Sudani held a one-day meeting with King Abdullah II of Jordan in Amman, and on December 18, he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at his winter residence in al-Ula—both reportedly discussing Syria as a key item on the agenda.

Fifth Anniversary of the Downing of Flight PS752 and the Deaths of Its 176 Passengers [[link removed]]
On the fifth anniversary of the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752, which claimed the lives of 176 passengers on January 8, 2020 (18 Dey 1398 in the Iranian calendar) due to a missile strike by the IRGC, a ceremony was held in Shahid Shahr, Tehran Province. The ceremony, held where the tragic crash occurred, was attended by the victims’ families. As part of the commemoration, one minute of silence was observed in memory of those who lost their lives, and a small exhibition was organized featuring personal belongings of the victims, including books, suitcases, and dolls. According to reports, security forces installed new surveillance cameras in the area the day before the ceremony.

One attendee, Manzar Zarrabi, who lost four family members in the downed flight, stressed the importance of keeping the victims’ memories alive, stating: “This was not an accident; it was a crime committed by those who are supposed to protect people’s lives.” She vowed to continue seeking justice, underscoring the slogan “We neither forgive nor forget.” Meanwhile, Mahmoud Alizadeh Tabatabaei, a lawyer representing some of the victims’ families, revealed that the case against the government was returned to the military court by the Supreme Court with 12 formal objections, yet six months later, the court has still not resumed the proceedings.

Following the missile strike on the Ukrainian passenger plane, the Iranian authorities initially denied any responsibility for three days, disseminating false reports in an attempt to cover up the incident. Only after international organizations and other countries presented conclusive evidence did the Iranian government ultimately admit to shooting down the plane, calling it a “tragic mistake.” Lawyer Alizadeh Tabatabaei told the news outlet Didban Iran that if the investigation into the incident had been conducted fairly, there would have been no need for courts in other countries to intervene. However, the way Iran handled the case ultimately paved the way for foreign court involvement. While most of the victims were Iranian citizens, 85 of them also held Canadian permanent residency or citizenship, prompting Canadian courts to open cases in response to Iran’s perceived negligence.

Commenting on the three-day delay in acknowledging the truth, Hossein Salami, the commander of the IRGC, stated that the reason for denying the shoot-down was to “justify (the circumstances) to high-ranking officials,” who suspected a preplanned scenario . Some relatives of the victims, having lost hope in the possibility of transparent legal proceedings, have since ceased pursuing the case. In contrast, officials at Iran’s Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces claim the file is undergoing renewed examination to correct its deficiencies.

Marking the fifth anniversary of the downing of Flight PS752 by IRGC missiles, the Canadian government released a statement commemorating the victims and outlining specific steps it has taken over the past five years to try to hold the Islamic Republic of Iran accountable. Of the 176 passengers who died, 55 held Canadian citizenship and another 30 had permanent resident status in Canada. Along with Sweden, Ukraine, and Britain, which also lost citizens in the tragedy, Canada participates in the International Coordination and Response Group for the victims of Flight PS752. The group has formally demanded that Iran accept full responsibility for shooting down the plane and provide compensation for the damages.

According to the Canadian government’s statement, on January 8, Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly and Ralph Goodale, Canada’s High Commissioner in the UK and Northern Ireland, met with several family members of the victims. They reaffirmed Canada’s unwavering commitment to justice, accountability, transparency, and solidarity with the grieving families.

Controversy Surrounding Iranian Eulogists: Azerbaijan Summons Iranian Diplomat and Arrest of a Qom Eulogist [[link removed]]
On January 1, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan announced that it had summoned the Chargé d’Affaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Embassy in Baku . This came in response to what Azerbaijan called “offensive remarks” made by Hassan Ameli, the Supreme Leader’s representative and Friday prayer leader in Ardabil Province, during a ceremony on December 29 attended by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Portions of Ameli’s comments were broadcast on IRIB News.

The Azerbaijani government lodged a formal protest, calling Ameli’s statements “insulting,” particularly his references to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev . Ameli had asserted that descendants of Shah Ismail Safavi from Ardabil would one day raise the “banner of Imam Mahdi” in Baku and other territories that were part of Iran until around two centuries ago.

Meanwhile, another incident of insult by a Shiite eulogist emerged. Sunni Online, a website covering Iran’s Sunni community, reported widespread condemnation of a eulogist named Ali Rezaei, who disparaged the Makki Mosque in Zahedan and Molavi Abdolhamid, the prominent Sunni Friday prayer leader. In a video recorded at a gathering called “Ghamkhane-ye Bibi Sharifeh bint al-Hasan” in Qom, Rezaei declared that “earning one’s livelihood through Abdolhamid is unacceptable” and equated praying in Makki Mosque with “the sin of adultery.” He also likened Makki Mosque to “Masjid al-Dirar,” which the Prophet of Islam reportedly ordered demolished.

Sunni clerics, media figures, and parliamentarians—especially from predominantly Sunni regions—strongly condemned these statements. Molavi Abdolhamid responded that while insults and profanity might sometimes go unanswered, explicit disrespect would be addressed. Seeking to prevent potential protests by Iran’s Baluch and Sunni communities, the Islamic Republic swiftly intervened and arrested the Qom-based eulogist. On Sunday, January 5, Mehdi Shamsabadi, the Attorney General of Zahedan, announced that the “disturber of Shiite-Sunni unity” had been apprehended and would be transferred to Zahedan for legal proceedings.

Separately, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in a media interview, held Iran’s Supreme Leader responsible—though without naming him directly—for the Ardabil eulogist’s insults aimed at himself and Turkish President Erdoğan . Aliyev demanded an “official apology” from Iran, emphasizing that the provincial religious authority in Ardabil had been appointed by the Supreme Leader. He pointed out that this was not the first time the eulogist had insulted officials from Azerbaijan and Turkey, insisting that the individual be removed from his post and that Tehran apologize to Baku. Aliyev also referred to the armed attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran two years prior, accusing Iran of misleading Azerbaijani authorities about punishing the perpetrator and describing the incident as “organized.” Noting the lack of high-level contacts between the two countries’ leaders, Aliyev stated it was too early to predict the future of Iran-Azerbaijan relations, which have been strained in recent years over Baku’s close ties with Israel and other regional disputes.

In contrast to President Aliyev’s demand for formal repercussions, the office of Molavi Abdolhamid in Zahedan released a statement on January 9 (19 Dey) reiterating his stance on the Qom eulogist’s case. According to a report by Didban Iran, Abdolhamid waived all personal legal claims, stating that “reform is more important than retribution.” This underscores divergent responses—both within and beyond Iran—to inflammatory rhetoric involving religious figures and government authorities.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Highlights Surge in Executions in Iran, With Pakhshan Azizi’s Case Drawing Growing Concern [[link removed]]
According to a statement by Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at least 901 individuals were executed in Iran during 2024 . Speaking on Tuesday, January 7 (18 Dey), Türk noted that these figures represent a significant rise compared to the previous year and described the trend as deeply troubling. He added that, based on reports, 40 executions took place within a single week in December 2024, and stressed that it is time for Iran to “halt the wave of executions.” He also expressed particular alarm over a surge in female executions, revealing that 31 women were put to death in 2024.

Human rights groups report that drug-related offenses are the most common charges against those executed, though several political dissidents—including participants in the 2022–2023 nationwide protests—were also executed. The UN Human Rights Office asserts that, under international standards, drug-related crimes do not meet the threshold for the death penalty. Activists emphasize that many of those facing execution are from ethnic and religious minorities, such as Kurds and Baluchis, who are often subject to harsher punishments.

One especially concerning example involves Pakhshan Azizi, a Kurdish civil society activist whose death sentence was recently upheld by Branch 39 of Iran’s Supreme Court . Azizi was convicted of “rebellion against the state” (baghi) due to alleged membership in “opposition groups,” accusations her lawyers vigorously dispute. Amir Raeesian, one of Azizi’s attorneys, stated that the Supreme Court ignored “multiple flaws” in the case, including evidence that Azizi’s decade-long humanitarian work in northern Syria was peaceful and apolitical. She spent years assisting refugees fleeing the ISIS conflict, yet was arrested in August 2023—along with several family members in Tehran—and remains in custody. Her defense team points out that the court’s verdict merely cites vague claims about her supposed “armed travels in Iraq and Syria,” with no reference to any actual combat activity. They have filed an appeal and are concerned about the apparent lack of due process.

Liz Throssell , spokesperson for the UN Human Rights Office, confirmed that the organization relies on multiple credible sources—such as HRANA, Iran Human Rights (IHR), and Hengaw—to compile its data, and underscored the reliability of these reports. Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, have repeatedly urged Tehran to stop the executions, warning that they are incompatible with the fundamental right to life and create an “unacceptable risk” of executing innocent individuals.

In October 2024, Mai Sato, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, estimated that more than 500 people had been executed in Iran since the start of the year. Campaigns such as “Tuesdays Against the Death Penalty” continue within Iranian prisons, with inmates staging weekly hunger strikes to protest what activists call an alarming surge in executions—figures that some observers believe may exceed 1,000 for 2024.

Volker Türk and other UN officials have renewed calls for Iran to remove capital punishment from its laws, arguing that it runs counter to international human rights obligations. The sharp rise in 2024 executions, they warn, must be reversed immediately. The case of Pakhshan Azizi stands out as a troubling illustration of unfair trials, politically motivated charges, and the miscarriage of justice in the use of the death penalty in Iran.

Swiss Citizen Dies Under Suspicious Circumstances in Iranian Custody Amid Ongoing Foreign Detentions [[link removed]]
A Swiss citizen who was arrested in Semnan Province on charges of espionage has reportedly died by suicide in custody, according to the province’s chief justice . The incident occurred on Thursday, January 9, and the individual’s name has not been disclosed. In a statement, the Swiss Foreign Ministry confirmed the death and said that its embassy in Tehran is in contact with local authorities to clarify the circumstances surrounding the prisoner’s demise.

According to Mohammad Sadegh Akbari, the head of the Semnan Justice Department, initial evidence indicates that the incident was “based on suicide.” Speaking to the state-run Mizan news agency, Akbari explained that the Swiss national had been sharing a prison suite with another inmate. On the morning of the incident, the inmate left the room to buy food from the prison store at the detainee’s request; upon returning, he found that the Swiss individual had taken his own life.

Iranian authorities had not previously announced the arrest of this Swiss citizen, and the identity of the deceased has not been released. Over the past several years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has detained dozens of dual nationals and foreign citizens, largely on espionage and security-related charges.

Switzerland has historically acted as a mediator between the United States and Iran, serving as the Protecting Power for U.S. interests in Tehran and relaying messages between the two governments. The detention of foreign nationals in Iran—often journalists and reporters—has a long history of being used for diplomatic leverage, as seen in several high-profile cases including that of Roxana Saberi, an Iranian-American journalist imprisoned for around 100 days in 2009, and Jason Rezaian, a Washington Post reporter who spent more than 540 days in detention.

More recently, Cecilia Sala, an Italian journalist, was briefly detained in Iran and returned home just a few days ago amid reports of an intervention involving Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Several other European citizens remain in Iranian prisons, and in recent years, with the mediation of countries like Oman and Qatar, Iran has conducted prisoner swaps with Western nations.

Among those still held is Cécile Kohler, a French teacher, and her partner, Jacques Paris, who have been in detention since May 2022 (Spring 1401) after meeting with labor activists in Iran. They face accusations of “assembly and collusion with the intent to act against national security.” France has accused Iran of “hostage-taking and blackmail” and called for the immediate release of its citizens.
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