No images? Click here [link removed]

A Russian Tupolev Tu-214ON jet aircraft equipped for participation in the Open Skies Treaty monitoring missions. (Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

As the US announced its decision this week to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, Hudson hosted Special Presidential Envoy Marshall Billingslea for his first public remarks. In his discussion with Hudson Senior Fellow Tim Morrison [[link removed]], Ambassador Billingslea outlined Russia’s continuing history of treaty-violating weapons development, the importance of bringing China to the table for trilateral negotiations, and why the US is pursuing a new arms control regime aimed at effective, verifiable objectives that hold treaty partners to account.

See below for key takeaways from Amb. Billingslea, and be sure to read Morrison's op-ed in [[link removed]] The New York Times [[link removed]] on how the Open Skies Treaty overflights have been abused by Russia to target critical US infrastructure. Next week, join us for a conversation with USAID Deputy Administrator Bonnie Glick [[link removed]]on the role of U.S. foreign assistance in great power competition.

Watch the Event with Amb. Billingslea [[link removed]] Read the Transcript [[link removed]]

Key Takeaways [[link removed]] from Amb. Billingslea [[link removed]]

Highlighted remarks by Special Presidential Envoy Marshall Billingslea from his Hudson event [[link removed]] on May 21.

1. Today's three-way arms race:

We must confront the reality that countries such as Russia and China are, simply put, arms racing. The United States is modernizing our forces without significantly increasing our overall number of nuclear weapons. The same cannot be said of Russia's and China's projected upward trajectories.

Instead of lessening their reliance on nuclear weapons, the Russians have increased it. Russia is modernizing an unconstrained arsenal of thousands of so-called “non-strategic” nuclear weapons that fall well outside the boundaries of the New START treaty, they're giving them greater accuracy, longer ranges, lower yields, all to fill various war fighting roles.

2. Russia’s development and use of treaty-violating missiles:

We cannot forget the fact that Russia was for years clandestinely cheating on the INF treaty, producing, testing, and deploying an intermediate range, nuclear tipped cruise missile in secret, and the Russian military now deploys multiple battalions of the SSC-8 missile, which presumably are targeted at US forces in Europe and against our NATO allies. The United States fields no similar system. Zero.

Unlike Russia, we steadfastly complied with our international obligation not to have these types of weapons. We did so for 33 years. Why would President Putin not implement the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the PNI pledges, that were issued by his predecessors? For our part, we did. Fully and completely.

Why does Russia feel the need to routinely conduct exercises that involve the simulated use of these shorter-range nuclear weapons against NATO, against their neighbors, and the United States? We need to address Russia's buildup with an unconstrained nuclear warhead stockpile.

3. China’s ambitions to expand its nuclear stockpile:

Like the US, China is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Unlike the US, whose stockpile number has gone way down, Beijing is in the midst of a sizeable buildup. Just a few days ago, the editor-in-chief of China's Global Times wrote that China should expand its stockpile to a thousand warheads on at least a hundred DF-41 strategic missiles. There is no way that such a statement would be made without the approval, tacit or otherwise, of senior communist party officials.

Our intelligence community has been clear about China's plans. I recall that last May, the DIA Director warned, and I quote, "China will likely at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history.”

4. The risk of a China-Russia escalation:

We're very much focused on a trilateral arrangement. Because the Chinese are, in fact, doing certain things that are focused on the Russians, and the Russians are probably looking at that thinking, "Hmm, how are we going to deal with this?"

They can get into a dynamic between the two of them, which then might precipitate us, necessitate us, having to take certain actions and you can see how that kind of unpredictable arrangement is precisely what the president wants to avoid.

Frankly, why go down this path of an unnecessary and expensive buildup in a three-way arms racing context? We know how to win these races. And we know how to spend the adversary into oblivion. If we have to, we will, but we sure would like to avoid it. And so, that's why this three-way arms control agreement to forestall a three-way race is so essential.

5. Moving beyond China's "great wall of secrecy" on its nuclear programs:

The most dangerous aspect of China's nuclear program is the secretive and nontransparent way the regime approaches dialogue with the international community. Beijing has stubbornly refused to share any significant information about its plans, its capabilities, its intentions, regarding its move to a triad of delivery vehicles, a launch on warning posture, and exploration of low-yield nuclear weapons for decades. They've steadfastly refused our entreaties at every turn.

Why does China refuse to engage in such a dialogue? What exactly is Beijing seeking to hide? A responsible power, committed to principles of fairness and reciprocity, should welcome any opportunity to engage in good faith negotiation on these most important topics.

Instead, the world is presented with a great wall of secrecy while Beijing relies on selective shows of force and disturbing insinuations in state-controlled media. If China wants to be a great power, and we know it has that self-image, it needs to behave like one.

Quotes have been edited for length and clarity

Download the Transcript [[link removed]]

Go Deeper: Hudson on Nuclear Arms Control

Read [[link removed]]

Russia Flouts Another Threat. So We're Leaving It. [[link removed]]

Hudson Senior Fellow Tim Morrison examines Russia's history of noncompliance in the Open Skies Treaty, arguing that Russia has never truly honored the Treaty's commitments of transparency and mutual security.

Listen [[link removed]]

Defense 2020: Nuclear Issues to Watch [[link removed]]

Hudson Senior Fellow Rebeccah Heinrichs joins the Defense 2020 podcast to discuss nuclear security in light of the upcoming elections and whether the strategic/non-strategic distinction should still be upheld in the current arms control environment.

Read [[link removed]]

Keeping an Eye on the Nuclear Ball [[link removed]]

As the coronavirus pandemic results in the cancellation of important treaty review conferences, Hudson's Director for the Center on Political-Military Analysis Richard Weitz argues that we should keep our eye on the nuclear ball. With the New START treaty expiring in ten months, it's time to renew our focus on global arms control.

Hudson Institute

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Fourth Floor

Washington, D.C. 20004 Share [link removed] Tweet [link removed] Forward [link removed] Preferences [link removed] | Unsubscribe [link removed]