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TRUMP CONFRONTS A RISING CHINA  
[[link removed]]


 

Michael Klare
December 17, 2024
TomDispatch
[[link removed]]


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_ Can He Manage U.S.-China Relations Without Precipitating World War
III? _

Donald Trump, Gage Skidmore from Peoria, AZ, United States of
America, CC BY-SA 2.0

 

Gaza, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, and
Venezuela: President-elect Donald Trump will face no shortage of
foreign-policy challenges when he assumes office in January. None,
however, comes close to China in scope, scale, or complexity. No other
country has the capacity to resist his predictable antagonism with the
same degree of strength and tenacity, and none arouses more hostility
and outrage among MAGA Republicans. In short, China is guaranteed to
put President Trump in a difficult bind the second time around: he can
either choose to cut deals with Beijing and risk being branded an
appeaser by the China hawks in his party, or he can punish and further
encircle Beijing, risking a potentially violent clash and possibly
even nuclear escalation. How he chooses to resolve this quandary will
surely prove the most important foreign test of his second term in
office.

Make no mistake: China truly is considered The Big One by those in
Trump’s entourage responsible for devising foreign policy. While
they imagine many international challenges to their “America
First” strategy, only China, they believe, poses a true threat to
the continued global dominance of this country.

“I feel strongly that the Chinese Communist Party has entered into a
Cold War with the United States and is explicit in its aim to replace
the liberal, Western-led world order that has been in place since
World War II,” Representative Michael Waltz, Trump’s choice as
national security adviser, declared
[[link removed]] at
a 2023 event hosted by the Atlantic Council. “We’re in a global
arms race with an adversary that, unlike any in American history, has
the economic and the military capability to truly supplant and replace
us.”

As Waltz and others around Trump see it, China poses
a multi-dimensional threat
[[link removed]] to
this country’s global supremacy. In the military domain, by building
up its air force and navy, installing military bases on reclaimed
islands in the South China Sea, and challenging Taiwan through
increasingly aggressive air and naval maneuvers, it is challenging
[[link removed]] continued
American dominance of the Western Pacific. Diplomatically, it’s now
bolstering or repairing ties with key U.S. allies, including India,
Indonesia, Japan, and the members of NATO. Meanwhile, it’s already
close to replicating this country’s most advanced technologies,
especially its ability to produce advanced microchips. And despite
Washington’s efforts to diminish a U.S. reliance on vital Chinese
goods, including critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, it remains a
primary supplier of just such products to this country.

FIGHT OR STRIKE BARGAINS?

For many in the Trumpian inner circle, the only correct, patriotic
response to the China challenge is to fight back hard. Both
Representative Waltz, Trump’s pick as national security adviser, and
Senator Marco Rubio, his choice as secretary of state, have sponsored
or supported legislation to curb what they view as “malign”
Chinese endeavors in the United States and abroad.

Waltz, for example, introduced the American Critical Mineral
Exploration and Innovation Act of 2020, which was intended, as
he explained
[[link removed]],
“to reduce America’s dependence on foreign sources of critical
minerals and bring the U.S. supply chain from China back to
America.” Senator Rubio has been equally combative in the
legislative arena. In 2021, he authored
[[link removed]] the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act, which banned goods produced in forced
labor encampments in Xinjiang Province from entering the United
States. He also sponsored several pieces of legislation aimed at
curbing Chinese access to U.S. technology. Although these, as well as
similar measures introduced by Waltz, haven’t always obtained the
necessary congressional approval, they have sometimes been
successfully bundled into other legislation.

In short, Trump will enter office in January with a toolkit of
punitive measures for fighting China ready to roll along with strong
support among his appointees for making them the law of the land. But
of course, we’re talking about _Donald Trump_, so nothing is a
given. Some analysts believe that his penchant for deal-making and
his professed admiration
[[link removed]] for
Chinese strongman President Xi Jinping may lead him to pursue a far
more transactional approach, increasing economic and military pressure
on Beijing to produce concessions on, for example, curbing the export
of fentanyl precursors to Mexico, but when he gets what he wants
letting them lapse. Howard Lutnick, the billionaire investor from
Cantor Fitzgerald whom he chose as Commerce secretary, claims
[[link removed]] that
Trump actually “wants to make a deal with China,” and will use the
imposition of tariffs selectively as a bargaining tool to do so.

What such a deal might look like is anyone’s guess, but it’s hard
to see how Trump could win significant concessions from Beijing
without abandoning some of the punitive measures advocated by the
China hawks in his entourage. Count on one thing: this complicated and
confusing dynamic will play out in each of the major problem areas in
U.S.-China relations, forcing Trump to make critical choices between
his transactional instincts and the harsh ideological bent of his
advisers.

TRUMP, CHINA, AND TAIWAN

Of all the China-related issues in his second term in office, none is
likely to prove more challenging or consequential than the future
status of the island of Taiwan. At issue are Taiwan’s gradual moves
toward full independence and the risk that China will invade the
island to prevent such an outcome, possibly triggering U.S. military
intervention as well. Of all the potential crises facing Trump, this
is the one that could most easily lead to a great-power conflict with
nuclear undertones.

When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it
“acknowledged
[[link removed]]” that
Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the
two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to
cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military
presence there. However, under the Taiwan Relations Act
[[link removed]] of
1979, Washington was also empowered to cooperate with a
quasi-governmental Taiwanese diplomatic agency, the Taipei Economic
and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and provide
Taiwan with the weapons needed for its defense. Moreover, in what came
to be known as “strategic ambiguity,” U.S. officials insisted that
any effort by China to alter Taiwan’s status by force would
constitute “a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area” and would be viewed as a matter “of grave concern to
the United States,” although not necessarily one requiring a
military response.

Buy the Book
[[link removed]]

For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one
China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful
weaponry. For their part, Chinese officials repeatedly declared
[[link removed]] that
Taiwan was a renegade province that should be reunited with the
mainland, preferably by peaceful means. The Taiwanese, however, have
never expressed a desire for reunification and instead have moved
steadily towards a declaration of independence, which Beijing has
insisted would justify armed intervention.

As such threats became more frequent and menacing, leaders in
Washington continued to debate the validity of “strategic
ambiguity,” with some insisting it should be replaced by a policy of
“strategic clarity
[[link removed]]”
involving an ironclad commitment to assist Taiwan should it be invaded
by China. President Biden seemed to embrace this view, repeatedly
affirming
[[link removed]] that
the U.S. was obligated to defend Taiwan under such circumstances.
However, each time he said so, his aides walked back his words
[[link removed]],
insisting the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so.

The Biden administration also boosted its military support for the
island while increasing American air and naval patrols in the area,
which only heightened the possibility of a future U.S. intervention
should China invade. Some of these moves, including expedited arms
transfers to Taiwan, were adopted in response to prodding from China
hawks in Congress. All, however, fit with an overarching
administration strategy
[[link removed]] of
encircling China with a constellation of American military
installations and U.S.-armed allies and partners.

From Beijing’s perspective, then, Washington is already putting
extreme military and geopolitical pressure on China. The question is:
Will the Trump administration increase or decrease those pressures,
especially when it comes to Taiwan?

That Trump will approve increased arms sales to and military
cooperation with Taiwan essentially goes without saying (as much, at
least, as anything involving him does). The Chinese have experienced
upticks in U.S. aid to Taiwan before and can probably live through
another round of the same. But that leaves far more volatile issues up
for grabs: Will he embrace “strategic clarity,” guaranteeing
Washington’s automatic intervention should China invade Taiwan, and
will he approve a substantial expansion of the American military
presence in the region? Both moves have been advocated by some of the
China hawks in Trump’s entourage, and both are certain to provoke
fierce, hard-to-predict responses from Beijing.

Many of Trump’s closest advisers have, in fact, insisted on
“strategic clarity” and increased military cooperation with
Taiwan. Michael Waltz, for example, has asserted
[[link removed]] that
the U.S. must “be clear we’ll defend Taiwan as a deterrent
measure.” He has also called for an increased military presence in
the Western Pacific. Similarly, last June, Robert C. O’Brien,
Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, wrote
[[link removed]] that
the U.S. “should make clear” its “commitment” to “help
defend” Taiwan, while expanding military cooperation with the
island.

Trump himself has made no such commitments, suggesting instead a more
ambivalent stance. In his typical fashion, in fact, he’s called on
Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and expressed anger at the
concentration of advanced chip-making on the island, claiming
[[link removed]] that
the Taiwanese “did take about 100% of our chip business.” But
he’s also warned of harsh economic measures were China to impose a
blockade of the island, telling
[[link removed]] the editorial board
of the _Wall Street Journal_, “I would say [to President Xi]: if
you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at
150% to 200%.” He wouldn’t need to threaten the use of force to
prevent a blockade, he added, because President Xi “respects me and
he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.”

Such comments reveal the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in
when it comes to Taiwan this time around. He could, of course, try to
persuade Beijing to throttle back its military pressure on the island
in return for a reduction in U.S. tariffs — a move that would reduce
the risk of war in the Pacific but leave China in a stronger economic
position and disappoint many of his top advisers. If, however, he
chooses to act “crazy” by embracing “strategic clarity” and
stepping up military pressure on China, he would likely receive
accolades from many of his supporters, while provoking a (potentially
nuclear) war with China.

TRADE WAR OR ECONOMIC COEXISTENCE?

The question of tariffs represents another way in which Trump will
face a crucial choice between punitive action and transactional
options in his second term — or, to be more precise, in deciding how
severe to make those tariffs and other economic hardships he will try
to impose on China.

In January 2018, the first Trump administration imposed
[[link removed]] tariffs
of 30% on imported solar panels and 20%-50% on imported washing
machines, many sourced from China. Two months later, the
administration added
[[link removed]] tariffs
on imported steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), again aimed above all at
China. And despite his many criticisms of Trump’s foreign and
economic policies, President Biden chose
[[link removed]] to
retain those tariffs, even adding new ones, notably on electric cars
and other high-tech products. The Biden administration has
also banned
[[link removed]] the
export of advanced computer chips and chip-making technology to China
in a bid to slow that country’s technological progress.

Accordingly, when Trump reassumes office on January 20th, China will
already be under stringent economic pressures from Washington. But he
and his associates insist that those won’t be faintly enough to
constrain China’s rise. The president-elect has said that, on day
one of his new term, he will impose a 10% tariff on _all _Chinese
imports and follow that with other harsh measures. Among such moves,
the Trump team has announced plans to raise tariffs
[[link removed]] on
Chinese imports to 60%, revoke
[[link removed]] China’s
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (also known as “most favored
nation”) status, and ban the transshipment of Chinese imports
through third countries.

Most of Trump’s advisers have espoused such measures strongly.
“Trump Is Right: We Should Raise Tariffs on China,” Marco
Rubio wrote
[[link removed]] last
May. “China’s anticompetitive tactics,” he argued, “give
Chinese companies an unfair cost advantage over American companies…
Tariffs that respond to these tactics prevent or reverse offshoring,
preserving America’s economic might and promoting domestic
investment.”

But Trump will also face possible pushback from other advisers who are
warning of severe economic perturbations if such measures were to be
enacted. China, they suggest, has tools of its own to use in any trade
war with the U.S., including tariffs on American imports and
restrictions on American firms doing business in China, including Elon
Musk’s Tesla, which produces
[[link removed]] half
of its cars there. For these and other reasons, the U.S.-China
Business Council has warned
[[link removed]] that
additional tariffs and other trade restrictions could prove
disastrous, inviting “retaliatory measures from China, causing
additional U.S. jobs and output losses.”

As in the case of Taiwan, Trump will face some genuinely daunting
decisions when it comes to economic relations with China. If, in fact,
he follows the advice of the ideologues in his circle and pursues a
strategy of maximum pressure on Beijing, specifically designed to
hobble China’s growth and curb its geopolitical ambitions, he could
precipitate nothing short of a global economic meltdown that would
negatively affect the lives of so many of his supporters, while
significantly diminishing America’s own geopolitical clout. He might
therefore follow the inclinations of certain of his key economic
advisers like transition leader Howard Lutnick, who favor
[[link removed]] a
more pragmatic, businesslike relationship with China. How Trump
chooses to address this issue will likely determine whether the future
involves increasing economic tumult and uncertainty or relative
stability. And it’s always important to remember that a decision to
play hardball with China on the economic front could also increase the
risk of a military confrontation leading to full-scale war, even to
World War III.

And while Taiwan and trade are undoubtedly the most obvious and
challenging issues Trump will face in managing (mismanaging?)
U.S.-China relations in the years ahead, they are by no means the only
ones. He will also have to decide how to deal with increasing Chinese
assertiveness in the South China Sea, continued Chinese economic and
military-technological support for Russia in its war against Ukraine,
and growing Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America, and
elsewhere.

In these, and other aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry, Trump will be
pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more
pragmatic, transactional approach. During the campaign, he backed each
approach, sometimes in the very same verbal outburst. Once in power,
however, he will have to choose between them — and his decisions
will have a profound impact on this country, China, and everyone
living on this planet.

Copyright 2024 Michael Klare

Tomgram [[link removed]]

Michael Klare, Can Trump Trump China (or Vice Versa)?

Posted on December 17, 2024

[NOTE FOR TOMDISPATCH READERS:_ A few days ago, I posted my yearly
winter plea
[[link removed]] for money.
It’s that end-of-the-year moment again when I ask all of you for
contributions to keep this website afloat. Ever
since _TomDispatch_ lost a significant chunk of its yearly income
after a beloved funder died, I’ve needed you so much more — and
you’ve always come through! As you know so well, this isn’t how I
like to spend my time (or yours), but your contributions truly do keep
us going. I hope that, if the mood strikes you, you’ll visit
the _TD
[[link removed]]_ donation
page_
[[link removed]]_ and
contribute something to help send this website, now in its 24th year,
into 2025. I can’t begin to tell you what your donations — which
arrive from all over this divided and beleaguered country and planet
of ours — mean to me. A million thanks in advance! Tom_]

Honestly, here’s my best guess: we’re simply on the wrong planet.
After all, as _TomDispatch_ regular
[[link removed]] Michael Klare makes
clear today, in the next set of Trump years, the U.S. and China are
likely to face off in a major way — just how major, given the
unpredictability of You Know Who, remains to be seen. One thing,
however, is bizarrely clear: on a planet that’s heating up
[[link removed]] and drying
out
[[link removed]] in
a record fashion, the two greatest greenhouse gas producers
[[link removed]] —
the U.S. is historically the all-time greatest emitter and China the
largest of this moment — could have ever less (at least in any
positive sense) to do with each other when the man who continues to
say
[[link removed]] that,
on day one back in the White House, he’ll “drill, baby, drill”
returns to power. He may pardon
[[link removed]] most
of the imprisoned January 6th rioters on that very same day, but count
on this: he won’t pardon the rest of us or our children and
grandchildren.

What he and Chinese President Xi Jinping have in common, in fact, is
that both of them are going to preside over countries playing the
leading roles in heating this world to the boiling point. China at
least is installing staggering amounts
[[link removed]] of new
green energy (more than the rest of the world combined!) and
producing stunning numbers
[[link removed]] of
electric vehicles. Still, both seem remarkably intent on leaving a
hell on Earth behind for those who follow. With that in mind, let
Klare, the author of _All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s
Perspective on Climate Change_
[[link removed]],
consider how Donald Trump might “solve” (and yes, that word needs
to be in quotation marks) the present climate nightmare by dealing
with China in a way that could leave us all in the midst of World War
III and so with other things to worry about than how bloody warm this
planet is getting. _Tom_

Trump Confronts a Rising China

Can He Manage U.S.-China Relations Without Precipitating World War
III?

By Michael Klare [[link removed]]

Gaza, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, and
Venezuela: President-elect Donald Trump will face no shortage of
foreign-policy challenges when he assumes office in January. None,
however, comes close to China in scope, scale, or complexity. No other
country has the capacity to resist his predictable antagonism with the
same degree of strength and tenacity, and none arouses more hostility
and outrage among MAGA Republicans. In short, China is guaranteed to
put President Trump in a difficult bind the second time around: he can
either choose to cut deals with Beijing and risk being branded an
appeaser by the China hawks in his party, or he can punish and further
encircle Beijing, risking a potentially violent clash and possibly
even nuclear escalation. How he chooses to resolve this quandary will
surely prove the most important foreign test of his second term in
office.

Make no mistake: China truly is considered The Big One by those in
Trump’s entourage responsible for devising foreign policy. While
they imagine many international challenges to their “America
First” strategy, only China, they believe, poses a true threat to
the continued global dominance of this country.

“I feel strongly that the Chinese Communist Party has entered into a
Cold War with the United States and is explicit in its aim to replace
the liberal, Western-led world order that has been in place since
World War II,” Representative Michael Waltz, Trump’s choice as
national security adviser, declared
[[link removed]] at
a 2023 event hosted by the Atlantic Council. “We’re in a global
arms race with an adversary that, unlike any in American history, has
the economic and the military capability to truly supplant and replace
us.”

As Waltz and others around Trump see it, China poses
a multi-dimensional threat
[[link removed]] to
this country’s global supremacy. In the military domain, by building
up its air force and navy, installing military bases on reclaimed
islands in the South China Sea, and challenging Taiwan through
increasingly aggressive air and naval maneuvers, it is challenging
[[link removed]] continued
American dominance of the Western Pacific. Diplomatically, it’s now
bolstering or repairing ties with key U.S. allies, including India,
Indonesia, Japan, and the members of NATO. Meanwhile, it’s already
close to replicating this country’s most advanced technologies,
especially its ability to produce advanced microchips. And despite
Washington’s efforts to diminish a U.S. reliance on vital Chinese
goods, including critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, it remains a
primary supplier of just such products to this country.

FIGHT OR STRIKE BARGAINS?

For many in the Trumpian inner circle, the only correct, patriotic
response to the China challenge is to fight back hard. Both
Representative Waltz, Trump’s pick as national security adviser, and
Senator Marco Rubio, his choice as secretary of state, have sponsored
or supported legislation to curb what they view as “malign”
Chinese endeavors in the United States and abroad.

Waltz, for example, introduced the American Critical Mineral
Exploration and Innovation Act of 2020, which was intended, as
he explained
[[link removed]],
“to reduce America’s dependence on foreign sources of critical
minerals and bring the U.S. supply chain from China back to
America.” Senator Rubio has been equally combative in the
legislative arena. In 2021, he authored
[[link removed]] the Uyghur
Forced Labor Prevention Act, which banned goods produced in forced
labor encampments in Xinjiang Province from entering the United
States. He also sponsored several pieces of legislation aimed at
curbing Chinese access to U.S. technology. Although these, as well as
similar measures introduced by Waltz, haven’t always obtained the
necessary congressional approval, they have sometimes been
successfully bundled into other legislation.

In short, Trump will enter office in January with a toolkit of
punitive measures for fighting China ready to roll along with strong
support among his appointees for making them the law of the land. But
of course, we’re talking about _Donald Trump_, so nothing is a
given. Some analysts believe that his penchant for deal-making and
his professed admiration
[[link removed]] for
Chinese strongman President Xi Jinping may lead him to pursue a far
more transactional approach, increasing economic and military pressure
on Beijing to produce concessions on, for example, curbing the export
of fentanyl precursors to Mexico, but when he gets what he wants
letting them lapse. Howard Lutnick, the billionaire investor from
Cantor Fitzgerald whom he chose as Commerce secretary, claims
[[link removed]] that
Trump actually “wants to make a deal with China,” and will use the
imposition of tariffs selectively as a bargaining tool to do so.

What such a deal might look like is anyone’s guess, but it’s hard
to see how Trump could win significant concessions from Beijing
without abandoning some of the punitive measures advocated by the
China hawks in his entourage. Count on one thing: this complicated and
confusing dynamic will play out in each of the major problem areas in
U.S.-China relations, forcing Trump to make critical choices between
his transactional instincts and the harsh ideological bent of his
advisers.

TRUMP, CHINA, AND TAIWAN

Of all the China-related issues in his second term in office, none is
likely to prove more challenging or consequential than the future
status of the island of Taiwan. At issue are Taiwan’s gradual moves
toward full independence and the risk that China will invade the
island to prevent such an outcome, possibly triggering U.S. military
intervention as well. Of all the potential crises facing Trump, this
is the one that could most easily lead to a great-power conflict with
nuclear undertones.

When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it
“acknowledged
[[link removed]]” that
Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the
two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to
cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military
presence there. However, under the Taiwan Relations Act
[[link removed]] of
1979, Washington was also empowered to cooperate with a
quasi-governmental Taiwanese diplomatic agency, the Taipei Economic
and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and provide
Taiwan with the weapons needed for its defense. Moreover, in what came
to be known as “strategic ambiguity,” U.S. officials insisted that
any effort by China to alter Taiwan’s status by force would
constitute “a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area” and would be viewed as a matter “of grave concern to
the United States,” although not necessarily one requiring a
military response.

[[link removed]]

Buy the Book
[[link removed]]

For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one
China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful
weaponry. For their part, Chinese officials repeatedly declared
[[link removed]] that
Taiwan was a renegade province that should be reunited with the
mainland, preferably by peaceful means. The Taiwanese, however, have
never expressed a desire for reunification and instead have moved
steadily towards a declaration of independence, which Beijing has
insisted would justify armed intervention.

As such threats became more frequent and menacing, leaders in
Washington continued to debate the validity of “strategic
ambiguity,” with some insisting it should be replaced by a policy of
“strategic clarity
[[link removed]]”
involving an ironclad commitment to assist Taiwan should it be invaded
by China. President Biden seemed to embrace this view, repeatedly
affirming
[[link removed]] that
the U.S. was obligated to defend Taiwan under such circumstances.
However, each time he said so, his aides walked back his words
[[link removed]],
insisting the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so.

The Biden administration also boosted its military support for the
island while increasing American air and naval patrols in the area,
which only heightened the possibility of a future U.S. intervention
should China invade. Some of these moves, including expedited arms
transfers to Taiwan, were adopted in response to prodding from China
hawks in Congress. All, however, fit with an overarching
administration strategy
[[link removed]] of
encircling China with a constellation of American military
installations and U.S.-armed allies and partners.

From Beijing’s perspective, then, Washington is already putting
extreme military and geopolitical pressure on China. The question is:
Will the Trump administration increase or decrease those pressures,
especially when it comes to Taiwan?

That Trump will approve increased arms sales to and military
cooperation with Taiwan essentially goes without saying (as much, at
least, as anything involving him does). The Chinese have experienced
upticks in U.S. aid to Taiwan before and can probably live through
another round of the same. But that leaves far more volatile issues up
for grabs: Will he embrace “strategic clarity,” guaranteeing
Washington’s automatic intervention should China invade Taiwan, and
will he approve a substantial expansion of the American military
presence in the region? Both moves have been advocated by some of the
China hawks in Trump’s entourage, and both are certain to provoke
fierce, hard-to-predict responses from Beijing.

Many of Trump’s closest advisers have, in fact, insisted on
“strategic clarity” and increased military cooperation with
Taiwan. Michael Waltz, for example, has asserted
[[link removed]] that
the U.S. must “be clear we’ll defend Taiwan as a deterrent
measure.” He has also called for an increased military presence in
the Western Pacific. Similarly, last June, Robert C. O’Brien,
Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, wrote
[[link removed]] that
the U.S. “should make clear” its “commitment” to “help
defend” Taiwan, while expanding military cooperation with the
island.

Trump himself has made no such commitments, suggesting instead a more
ambivalent stance. In his typical fashion, in fact, he’s called on
Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and expressed anger at the
concentration of advanced chip-making on the island, claiming
[[link removed]] that
the Taiwanese “did take about 100% of our chip business.” But
he’s also warned of harsh economic measures were China to impose a
blockade of the island, telling
[[link removed]] the editorial board
of the _Wall Street Journal_, “I would say [to President Xi]: if
you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at
150% to 200%.” He wouldn’t need to threaten the use of force to
prevent a blockade, he added, because President Xi “respects me and
he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.”

Such comments reveal the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in
when it comes to Taiwan this time around. He could, of course, try to
persuade Beijing to throttle back its military pressure on the island
in return for a reduction in U.S. tariffs — a move that would reduce
the risk of war in the Pacific but leave China in a stronger economic
position and disappoint many of his top advisers. If, however, he
chooses to act “crazy” by embracing “strategic clarity” and
stepping up military pressure on China, he would likely receive
accolades from many of his supporters, while provoking a (potentially
nuclear) war with China.

TRADE WAR OR ECONOMIC COEXISTENCE?

The question of tariffs represents another way in which Trump will
face a crucial choice between punitive action and transactional
options in his second term — or, to be more precise, in deciding how
severe to make those tariffs and other economic hardships he will try
to impose on China.

In January 2018, the first Trump administration imposed
[[link removed]] tariffs
of 30% on imported solar panels and 20%-50% on imported washing
machines, many sourced from China. Two months later, the
administration added
[[link removed]] tariffs
on imported steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), again aimed above all at
China. And despite his many criticisms of Trump’s foreign and
economic policies, President Biden chose
[[link removed]] to
retain those tariffs, even adding new ones, notably on electric cars
and other high-tech products. The Biden administration has
also banned
[[link removed]] the
export of advanced computer chips and chip-making technology to China
in a bid to slow that country’s technological progress.

Accordingly, when Trump reassumes office on January 20th, China will
already be under stringent economic pressures from Washington. But he
and his associates insist that those won’t be faintly enough to
constrain China’s rise. The president-elect has said that, on day
one of his new term, he will impose a 10% tariff on _all _Chinese
imports and follow that with other harsh measures. Among such moves,
the Trump team has announced plans to raise tariffs
[[link removed]] on
Chinese imports to 60%, revoke
[[link removed]] China’s
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (also known as “most favored
nation”) status, and ban the transshipment of Chinese imports
through third countries.

Most of Trump’s advisers have espoused such measures strongly.
“Trump Is Right: We Should Raise Tariffs on China,” Marco
Rubio wrote
[[link removed]] last
May. “China’s anticompetitive tactics,” he argued, “give
Chinese companies an unfair cost advantage over American companies…
Tariffs that respond to these tactics prevent or reverse offshoring,
preserving America’s economic might and promoting domestic
investment.”

But Trump will also face possible pushback from other advisers who are
warning of severe economic perturbations if such measures were to be
enacted. China, they suggest, has tools of its own to use in any trade
war with the U.S., including tariffs on American imports and
restrictions on American firms doing business in China, including Elon
Musk’s Tesla, which produces
[[link removed]] half
of its cars there. For these and other reasons, the U.S.-China
Business Council has warned
[[link removed]] that
additional tariffs and other trade restrictions could prove
disastrous, inviting “retaliatory measures from China, causing
additional U.S. jobs and output losses.”

As in the case of Taiwan, Trump will face some genuinely daunting
decisions when it comes to economic relations with China. If, in fact,
he follows the advice of the ideologues in his circle and pursues a
strategy of maximum pressure on Beijing, specifically designed to
hobble China’s growth and curb its geopolitical ambitions, he could
precipitate nothing short of a global economic meltdown that would
negatively affect the lives of so many of his supporters, while
significantly diminishing America’s own geopolitical clout. He might
therefore follow the inclinations of certain of his key economic
advisers like transition leader Howard Lutnick, who favor
[[link removed]] a
more pragmatic, businesslike relationship with China. How Trump
chooses to address this issue will likely determine whether the future
involves increasing economic tumult and uncertainty or relative
stability. And it’s always important to remember that a decision to
play hardball with China on the economic front could also increase the
risk of a military confrontation leading to full-scale war, even to
World War III.

And while Taiwan and trade are undoubtedly the most obvious and
challenging issues Trump will face in managing (mismanaging?)
U.S.-China relations in the years ahead, they are by no means the only
ones. He will also have to decide how to deal with increasing Chinese
assertiveness in the South China Sea, continued Chinese economic and
military-technological support for Russia in its war against Ukraine,
and growing Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America, and
elsewhere.

In these, and other aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry, Trump will be
pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more
pragmatic, transactional approach. During the campaign, he backed each
approach, sometimes in the very same verbal outburst. Once in power,
however, he will have to choose between them — and his decisions
will have a profound impact on this country, China, and everyone
living on this planet.

Copyright 2024 Michael Klare

_MICHAEL T. KLARE, a TomDispatch regular
[[link removed]],
is the five-college professor emeritus of peace and world security
studies at Hampshire College and a senior visiting fellow at the Arms
Control Association. He is the author of 15 books, the latest of which
is All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate
Change
[[link removed]]._

_Follow TOMDISPATCH on Twitter
[[link removed]] and join us on Facebook
[[link removed]]. Check out the newest Dispatch
Books, John Feffer’s new dystopian novel, Songlands
[[link removed]] (the
final one in his Splinterlands series), Beverly Gologorsky’s
novel Every Body Has a Story
[[link removed]], and
Tom Engelhardt’s A Nation Unmade by War
[[link removed]],
as well as Alfred McCoy’s In the Shadows of the American Century:
The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power
[[link removed]], John
Dower’s The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World
War II
[[link removed]], and
Ann Jones’s They Were Soldiers: How the Wounded Return from
America’s Wars: The Untold Story
[[link removed]]._

* Donald Trump
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* China
[[link removed]]
* foreign policy
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