Welcome to The Corner. In this issue, we celebrate AAG Kanter’s record and the FTC’s restoration of the Robinson-Patman Antitrust law. We also explore how China is using its dominance of key minerals to challenge President-elect Trump’s policies even before he takes office.
Jonathan Kanter Leaves Greatest Antitrust Legacy in DOJ History Over the last 135 years, many antitrust heroes have worked in the U.S. Department of Justice. None served the American people better than Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter, who resigned this week. In barely three years in office, Kanter began to rebuild the digital economy on a democratic footing, with a victory over Google’s search monopoly, and a far-reaching case against Google’s control of online advertising. He blocked an attempt to monopolize the U.S. marketplace for books, protected America’s music lovers from theft and manipulation, and filed lawsuits against monopolists who gouge people struggling to feed and house their children and keep their families healthy. Kanter forced the department to focus — for the first time — on supply chain chokepoints, and worked with the U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai to bring trade and antitrust policy in smart alignment. Along with FTC Chair Khan, he rewrote the merger guidelines to eliminate Reagan-era pro-monopoly thinking and to ensure the law focuses always ultimately on human liberty and democracy. To learn more, read Kanter’s farewell speech. All of us look forward to working with Jonathan in the fights to come. The FTC’s Revolutionary Restoration of Robinson-Patman Antitrust Law Last week the Federal Trade Commission filed the first government lawsuit in decades based on the Robinson-Patman Antitrust statute. The case targets the nation’s largest alcohol distributor, Southern Glazer’s Wine and Spirits, for forcing “mom-and-pop” businesses to pay more than larger chains. The law, passed by Congress in 1936, requires dominant sellers and buyers to provide the same service at the same terms to all companies — no matter their size. For most of the 20th century RPA served as one of the most important foundations for U.S. democracy and prosperity, by preventing powerful actors from crushing innovative upstarts and independent businesses. But enforcement agencies largely abandoned the law after President Reagan imposed the pro-monopoly “Chicago School” ideology on antitrust enforcement in the early 1980s. The victory was especially gratifying for our Open Markets team. OMI launched efforts to restore RPA in 2006, and has pioneered the fight ever since. Key moments in OMI’s campaign include: + “Breaking the Chain: The Antitrust Case Against Walmart,” Harper’s, July 2006 + “Cornered: The New Monopoly Capitalism and the Economics of Destruction,” 2010 + “Goliath: The 100-Year War Between Monopoly Power and Democracy;” 2019; + “Everyday High Prices,” Washington Monthly, January 2023; + “Controlling Buyer and Seller Power: Reviving Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman,” December 2023; + “The Robinson-Patman Act as a Fair Competition Measure,” February 2024. + And see OMI’s statement on the FTC’s case here.
Incoming Trump Administration Must Address China’s Monopolization of Minerals Earlier this month, the Chinese government banned exports to the U.S. of four minerals (gallium, germanium, graphite, and antimony) that they claim have a dual military and civilian use, and for the first time prohibited foreign companies from passing restricted minerals acquired in China on to American companies. This is only the latest example of China using its near-total control over the mining and refining of many critical minerals as a form of geopolitical leverage during diplomatic and territorial disputes. The minerals are essential to the production of batteries, semiconductors, and a host of other advanced products and weapons. The export ban should serve as a warning to the incoming Trump administration that critical mineral and battery supply chains will be among the most fiercely disputed battlegrounds in the ongoing trade war with China. One of the first challenges Trump will face in his second term will therefore be to reconcile the contradictions between three of his signature policy positions: his desire to end American dependence on China for critical goods and technologies; his hostility towards projects designed to address climate change; and his plans to use higher tariffs to help pay for basic government operations. The world is dangerously dependent on China to develop the technologies integral to advanced manufacturing and the green transition. For instance, China controls over 70 percent of lithium-ion batteries used in electric vehicles among other applications and 90 percent of refined critical minerals. China’s dominance of critical minerals supply chains is no accident. The Chinese government long recognized dependence on foreign economies as a geopolitical risk, especially for sectors like energy or raw materials that underpin the rest of the economy. They therefore spent the last two decades encouraging Chinese mining companies to gain the rights to extract minerals from deposits located around the world, and to ship them to Chinese refineries. Meanwhile, the Chinese government subsidized the country’s domestic capabilities not only in mining and refining, but across the full green supply chain and for advanced manufacturing. Together, these policies ensured that Chinese minerals suppliers had a steady source of demand from domestic manufacturers, who in turn had a competitive advantage over foreign competitors given their access to cheap battery and mineral inputs. China’s increased willingness to weaponize their control over the mining and refining links in strategic supply chains has prompted a number of governments — including in Australia, Japan, and the European Union — to start building alternative sources of supply. In the United States, the Biden administration moved especially aggressively to lay the foundations for alternative battery and electronics supply chains that are less dependent on Chinese refineries and factories. The Biden administration increased demand for batteries and battery inputs produced outside of China through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) by subsidizing sales of EVs whose components were made in the U.S. or approved trade partners. The IRA also included tax credits for battery components and critical minerals produced in the U.S. The administration also started working with countries through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) to coordinate allies’ efforts, including debt financing and loan guarantees, to increase the reliability and sustainability of their minerals supply. Nevertheless, it takes years to negotiate new types of agreements, open new mines, and build new refining capacity, so many of these projects are not yet online. The incoming Trump administration, by contrast, appears intent on turning the Biden strategy squarely on its head. Rather than encouraging battery production by subsidizing EV demand (the incoming administration has promised to suspend all incentives for Americans to buy battery-powered cars), the transition team is proposing to support the mining and battery facilities at the other end of the supply chain through a mix of deregulation, subsidies, and tariff protections from Chinese competition. Thus far, there appears to be no plans to replicate the MSP’s efforts to help other countries to mine or refine the minerals that are not found in the U.S., or encourage them to voluntarily sell raw materials to America’s nascent facilities rather than China’s readily available manufacturers. It is a good sign that Trump claims to have recognized the national security implications of ceding the advantage in critical mineral and battery production to the Chinese. It is conceivable that the new administration’s tariff plans could force trade partners into opening their markets to U.S.-made EVs and batteries, substituting for the drop in domestic demand. But his team’s strategy appears so focused on the narrow slice of the minerals and battery supply chains that exist in the U.S. that it misses how this industry is, by its geologic nature, inherently global and thus collaborative. Should Trump fail to square the circle of his own policy promises, he will find himself responsible for ceding the advantage to China in one of the most critical industries of the global economy. 📝 WHAT WE'VE BEEN UP TO:
🔊 ANTI-MONOPOLY RISING:
We appreciate your readership. Please consider making a contribution to support the continued publication of this newsletter. 📈 VITAL STAT:More than 20The number of price-comparison websites in Europe who criticized Google's proposed changes to its search results, saying they still fail to comply with the EU’s Digital Markets Act. Google has been in discussion with the comparison sites, hotels, airlines, restaurants and retailers for more than a year now on how to comply with the DMA, which prohibits it from favoring its products and services on its platform. (Reuters) 📚 WHAT WE'RE READING:
Order Sandeep Vaheesan’s forthcoming book: Sandeep Vaheesan, the legal director at the Open Markets Institute, will publish his first book Democracy in Power: A History of Electrification in the United States on December 3. Vaheesan examines the history—and presents a possible future—of the people of the United States wresting control of the power sector from Wall Street, including through institutions like the Tennessee Valley Authority and rural electric cooperatives. 🔎 TIPS? COMMENTS? SUGGESTIONS? We would love to hear from you—just reply to this e-mail and drop us a line. Give us your feedback, alert us to competition policy news, or let us know your favorite story from this issue. |