[1]

December 18, 2024

This month’s newsletter features an update to a report estimating how
quickly Iran could enrich enough uranium to fuel a small nuclear arsenal.
The update reflects data from the most recent International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) reports, which indicate that Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched
uranium is sufficient to fuel five nuclear weapons if enriched further to
weapons-grade. Iran’s installed centrifuges could achieve the required
enrichment in less than a week.

The newsletter also includes profiles of companies and individuals that
have carried out procurement in China for Iran’s ballistic missile program,
as well as news about the IAEA’s censure of Iran for failing to cooperate
with the Agency’s nuclear safeguards investigation, Iran’s response to the
censure, and an Iraqi fuel smuggling network that brings in $1 billion in
annual revenue for Iran and its proxies. Additions to the Iran Watch
library include reports related to the IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting,
new U.S. sanctions and export enforcement actions, and U.S. and Iranian
reactions to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.

Was this email forwarded to you? [2]Sign up to receive the newsletter in
your inbox, or [3]view the newsletter in your browser.

PUBLICATIONS

[4]

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi delivers opening remarks at the IAEA
Board of Governors meeting. (Credit: Dean Calma / IAEA)

Articles and Reports | [5]Iran’s Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential

The latest reports from the IAEA indicate that Iran has stockpiled enough
uranium enriched to 60% purity to fuel five nuclear weapons if enriched
further to weapons-grade. Iran’s [6]installed centrifuges at Natanz could
achieve the required enrichment in less than one week. For that uranium to
be usable in a nuclear weapons arsenal, however, the other components of
the weapons would have to be ready to receive it. Weaponization activities
could take anywhere from several months to a year or more, although the
timeframe is uncertain.

[7]READ THE REPORT

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

Iran’s [8]Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) carries
out procurement for its ballistic missile program using companies and
individuals based in China.

[9]Saeed Hamidi Javar

An Iranian procurement agent; leads a network that has facilitated the
acquisition of accelerometers and gyroscopes for [10]Beijing Shiny Nights
Technology Development Co., Ltd. (Beijing SNTD), a China-based MODAFL front
company.

[11]LEARN MORE

[12]Buy Best Electronic Pars Company

An electronics importer with offices in China, Iran, and Turkey; under the
supervision of Saeed Hamidi Javar, has procured items for Iran's
[13]Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO); has a Turkey-based affiliate,
[14]Buybest Elektronik Ithalat Ihracat Limited Sirketi.

[15]LEARN MORE

[16]Sayyed Ali Seraj Hashemi

An employee of Beijing SNTD; has coordinated with Saeed Hamidi Javar to
procure goods sought by Iran for its ballistic missile program.

[17]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[18]

Iran launches a Simorgh satellite. (Credit: Tasnim News Agency)

[19]Iran Successfully Launches Fakhr-1 Satellite into Orbit | Tasnim News
Agency

December 6, 2024: Iran’s regular army launched a Fakhr-1 nanosatellite, a
Saman-1 orbital transfer vehicle, and a research payload into low-Earth
orbit using a Simorgh carrier rocket. The Fakhr-1 satellite was designed
and built by the Iranian Army, SA Iran Corporation, and Malek Ashtar
University of Technology. The 300 kg payload was the heaviest yet delivered
to orbit by Iran's space program.

[20]Fuel Oil Smuggling Network Rakes in $1 Billion for Iran and Its Proxies
| Reuters

December 3, 2024: A fuel oil smuggling network operating in Iraq has been
generating at least $1 billion a year for Iran and its proxies since 2022
by diverting oil allocated to asphalt plants at subsidized prices. Between
3.4 and 5 million barrels of heavy fuel oil is illicitly exported from the
plants every month, mostly to Asia. The illicit exports benefit the Iraqi
paramilitary force and political party Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), which is
supported by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Kataib
Hezbollah, another IRGC-backed Iraqi group, also controls some plants
involved in the diversion scheme. Some of the exported fuel oil is blended
with Iranian oil to help Iran evade sanctions.

[21]Iran Plans New Uranium-Enrichment Expansion, IAEA Report Says | Reuters

November 28, 2024: According to a confidential International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) report, Iran plans to install more than 6,000 additional
centrifuges at its Natanz and Fordow uranium enrichment plants. The
decision is a response to a recent censure of Iran by the IAEA board. The
centrifuges will be installed in 32 cascades of more than 160 machines each
and will include a large cascade of 1,152 advanced IR-6 centrifuges in the
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz.

FROM THE LIBRARY

The IAEA’s latest reports on Iran’s nuclear program prompted a resolution
to censure Iran at the Agency’s Board of Governors meeting.
* Ahead of the meeting, the Agency circulated its quarterly reports on
[22]verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program and the
country’s [23]implementation of NPT safeguards – November 19.
* In response to Iran’s [24]ongoing failure to cooperate with the IAEA’s
safeguards investigations, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States [25]introduced a [26]censure resolution against Iran, which
was adopted in a 19-3 vote – November 21.
* Two days following the resolution, Iran [27]announced that it would
expand its uranium enrichment capacity by installing new centrifuges –
November 23.
* In early December, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom [28]sent a
letter to the U.N. Secretary General stating that they would “use all
diplomatic tools to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,”
including triggering the snapback of U.N. sanctions if necessary – December
6.

The United States took measures to combat Iranian sanctions evasion
efforts.
* The U.S. Department of the Treasury [29]sanctioned 35 ship management
companies and vessels associated with various countries for transporting
Iranian oil to foreign markets – December 3.
* The U.S. Department of Justice [30]arrested and indicted a U.S.-Iranian
dual national on charges of illicitly exporting U.S.-origin electronics to
Iran for use in military drones, including drones used in a lethal attack
on U.S. servicemembers in Jordan – December 16.
* The United States [31]then sanctioned four entities involved in the
illicit export scheme outlined in the indictment – December 18.

The rapid collapse of the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria elicited
reactions from Iran and the United States.
* The United States [32]hailed Assad’s downfall and called on rebel
leaders to carry out a peaceful transfer of power to an accountable and
inclusive government – December 8.
* Iran, which had long supported Assad, [33]similarly called for an
inclusive government in Syria and said that it expects the Iran-Syria
relationship to continue – December 8.

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2024 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

[34]HOME

[35]ABOUT

[36]CONTACT US

[37]Twitter [38]LinkedIn [39]Facebook

References

1. [link removed]
2. [link removed]
3. [link removed]
4. [link removed]
5. [link removed]
6. [link removed]
7. [link removed]
8. [link removed]
9. [link removed]
10. [link removed]
11. [link removed]
12. [link removed]
13. [link removed]
14. [link removed]
15. [link removed]
16. [link removed]
17. [link removed]
18. [link removed]
19. [link removed]
20. [link removed]
21. [link removed]
22. [link removed]
23. [link removed]
24. [link removed]
25. [link removed]
26. [link removed]
27. [link removed]
28. [link removed]
29. [link removed]
30. [link removed]
31. [link removed]
32. [link removed]
33. [link removed]
34. [link removed]
35. [link removed]
36. [link removed]
37. [link removed]
38. [link removed]
39. [link removed]
Manage Your Subscription:
[link removed]
This message was sent to [email protected] from [email protected]

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
Iran Watch
1701 K Street NW Suite 805
Washington, DC 20006
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

iContact - Engage, WOW, and grow your audience: [link removed]