[[link removed]]

WHAT THE FAILURE TO PROTECT ASSAD COULD MEAN FOR RUSSIA’S FUTURE  
[[link removed]]


 

Meduza
December 10, 2024
Meduza
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

_ The overthrow of Syrian dictator Assad has brought Putin’s image
as a provider of stability into question. “This is a sign of his
weakness. And no matter how you look at it, it’s a personal defeat
for him.” _

,

 

Early Sunday morning, Syrian rebels declared
[[link removed]] the
overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad, 24 years after he took power.
As the opposition celebrated its victory in Damascus, Assad and his
family flew to Moscow
[[link removed]],
where Vladimir Putin personally granted them asylum
[[link removed]].
The fall of the Assad regime marks an indisputable failure for the
Russian president, whose role in keeping Assad in power after
Syria’s civil war broke out in 2011 has long served as a cornerstone
of Russia’s image as a global power and granted it credibility as a
guarantor of stability to governments in regions ranging from Central
Asia to Africa. Meduza explores why Putin originally intervened in
Syria, why Moscow didn’t try harder to prevent the regime’s
collapse, and what Assad’s overthrow means for Russia’s future.

WHY DID PUTIN INTERVENE IN THE FIRST PLACE?

When Vladimir Putin sent Russian troops to Syria in 2015, analyst
Alexander Baunov writes in an essay
[[link removed]] for
Meduza and the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, his goals were
threefold.

Putin’s first aim was to “break out of the post-Crimean
isolation” and increase Russia’s global relevance. After Russia
annexed Crimea in 2014, Baunov explains, it faced unprecedented
isolation from Western nations, while countries in Asia and the Global
South “regarded it with cautious confusion.” Baunov points to
Putin’s early departure
[[link removed]] from
the G20 summit in Brisbane (he'd already been suspended
[[link removed]] from
the G8) as a turning point: 

It was then that Russian diplomacy first took on the task that would
later become its main focus: proving that Moscow was by no means
isolated, that no one had distanced themselves or recoiled from it,
and that everything was as it always had been, or even better.

Putin sought to prove Russia wasn’t isolated by “forcing the West
to confront the reality of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war
against a shared enemy,” Baunov writes, referring to terrorist
groups like ISIS. This “common enemy” framework had long been part
of Putin’s playbook — starting with his assistance to the U.S.
following the September 11 attacks. The approach allowed for
cooperation “not based on institutions or values but on shared
struggle,” similar to the partnership between the Western powers and
the USSR in World War II that “preceded the peak of Moscow’s
geopolitical strength.”

Secondly, Putin wanted to return Russia to the Middle East, where it
had lost influence after the Soviet Union’s collapse. This goal was
achieved: at the peak of its intervention, Russia had as many
as 6,000 fighters
[[link removed]] deployed
in Syria, including mercenary troops. Its intervention secured access
to the Khmeimim airbase and the Tartus naval base, which provided
logistical support for military operations far beyond Russia’s
borders.

Finally, Putin hoped to “put Russia on the world map as a power
capable of halting regime change and supporting an ally anywhere in
the world,” Baunov writes. For years, this endeavor was a success:
The survival of the Assad regime, supported by Russia and Iran,
granted Moscow credibility as a guarantor of security to regimes in
countries like Mali and the Central African Republic, as well as among
its allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Putin’s decision to support Assad was also influenced by the
outcomes of two other leaders’ downfalls: former Ukrainian President
Viktor Yanukovych, who fled to Moscow
[[link removed]] after
his ouster during Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan Revolution, and former
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who was captured and killed by rebels
in 2011.In Putin’s view, Middle East expert Ruslan Suleimanov
explained on Meduza’s daily Russian-language news podcast
[[link removed]],
“Western intelligence agencies instigated the Arab Spring, and
Russia responded with its own ‘no,’ attempting to build a
multipolar world because it disapproved of what happened with
Gaddafi.”

After all, Suleimanov noted, Gaddafi had previously “moved toward
cooperation with the West,” including agreeing to abandon his
nuclear project, only to be killed ultimately by NATO-supported
rebels. “You could imagine a caricature of Putin cynically
lamenting, ‘They tricked him,’” Suleimanov said.

With Assad in Moscow and armed rebels taking control of Latakia
governorate, what will become of Russia’s military bases in Syria?
[[link removed]]

Baunov echoes this point: “In Russia, the Arab Spring was portrayed
as a continuation of Kyiv’s Maidan Revolution — a rehearsal for
regime change in Moscow itself. Halting the Arab Spring by force was
framed as a way to thwart such scenarios at distant front lines,” he
writes.

According to Baunov, Putin’s meetings with Assad always appeared
cold from the outside, even compared to his meetings with Western
leaders. Moscow’s support of the Assad regime was not “assistance
to a personal friend” but rather “pure geopolitical business: an
attempt to halt the wave of regime changes supported by the West,
prevent Syria from becoming another Libya, and settle scores for
Gaddafi — and, a bit later, Yanukovych.”

WHY DIDN’T RUSSIA TRY HARDER TO SAVE ASSAD?

Putin is laser-focused on winning the war in Ukraine, and Russia’s
activities in Syria weren’t helping with this goal.

“The Kremlin clearly realized the futility and impossibility of
continuing to support Assad,” Suleimanov told Meduza. “The Russian
authorities were likely prepared for Assad’s regime to fall within
days or even hours. But this is also driven by sheer self-interest.
Right now, the Kremlin is scrambling to patch holes on the Ukrainian
front, even resorting to recruiting soldiers from North Korea.”

Russian z-bloggers process their shock and outrage over Assad’s
overthrow in Syria
[[link removed]]

In Baunov’s view, Putin’s prioritization of Ukraine above all else
defies even self-interest.

“​​The current Putin is so focused on Ukraine that the loss of
his only military-political success far from Russia’s borders seems
to leave him indifferent,” he writes. “The locally rooted
Ukrainian conflict has pushed everything else aside and expanded to a
global scale. Syria is irrelevant; nothing matters because everything,
including the fate of Russia itself, is being decided in Kherson and
Vovchansk.”

In Putin’s conception, according to Baunov, a potential victory in
Ukraine represents a victory “in the global struggle of the majority
against the Old World Elite.” If Russia wins in Ukraine, according
to this view, it can achieve victory in “Syria, Georgia, and
wherever else it wants.” But the collapse of the Assad regime only
adds to the pressure on Moscow to achieve a victory in Ukraine:
“[T]here’s nothing left but to win. So the retreat from Syria is
unlikely to bring direct relief for Ukraine.”

WHAT DOES ASSAD’S FALL MEAN FOR MOSCOW?

Russia’s intervention in Syria highlighted a major issue in
Moscow’s relations with the Global South, according to Baunov, given
that security is practically the only thing Russia has to offer.

“The first successful projection of power beyond its region since
the end of the Soviet era did not go unnoticed in the Global South,”
he wrote. “​​Russia still did not appear particularly convincing
as an investor or exporter of production and technology […], but it
significantly positioned itself as an exporter of security — both
officially, through its military presence, and unofficially, through
the provision of mercenary services.”

While Russia “can regain territories to the military and political
control of a friendly regime, it cannot breathe life and development
into them,” Baunov explains:

In the regions reclaimed by Iran and Russia, nothing occurred that
would make the local population rejoice at Damascus’s control. The
restoration of government and certain public buildings and military
bases did not change the overall picture of life for millions of
people on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe under the pressure
of all-powerful, corrupt security forces.

Even worse for Russia, the Assad regime’s collapse shows that even
the security Moscow can provide its partners abroad is limited.

“It’s an image blow,” Suleimanov said. “If Putin had the means
[to stop the Assad government’s collapse], he would have gotten
involved. And even if it required a huge amount of money and
resources, I’m sure he would have supported Assad. After 2015, many
in the Middle East started to respect Putin because he didn’t
abandon his own, because he fulfilled his commitments.”

However, the events of last week have brought Putin’s image as a
provider of stability into question. “Putin today is not the same as
he was in 2015–2016,” Suleimanov said. “This is a sign of his
weakness. And no matter how you look at it, it’s a personal defeat
for him.”

Baunov notes that the questions raised by Russia’s failure in Syria
pertain to its international capabilities as well as its internal
stability:

Professional observers [of Russia] abroad and members of the domestic
elite will notice yet another failure of Russia’s intelligence
services. First, they were caught off guard by Ukraine’s willingness
to fight back; then came the Prigozhin-led mutiny
[[link removed]],
followed by the incursion in the Kursk region
[[link removed]], and now
— the swift loss of Syria. And today’s Russia is governed
[[link removed]] in
many areas with direct involvement from the intelligence services.
What if they’re just as ineffective there?

* Russia
[[link removed]]
* Syria
[[link removed]]
* Bashar al-Assad
[[link removed]]
* Vladimir Putin
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

INTERPRET THE WORLD AND CHANGE IT

 

 

Submit via web
[[link removed]]

Submit via email
Frequently asked questions
[[link removed]]
Manage subscription
[[link removed]]
Visit xxxxxx.org
[[link removed]]

Twitter [[link removed]]

Facebook [[link removed]]

 




[link removed]

To unsubscribe, click the following link:
[link removed]