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OUR MARGIN OF EFFORT: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING AHEAD  
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Max Elbaum
December 12, 2024
Convergence Magazine
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_ A broad swath of the progressive movement “left it all on the
field” in 2024. Some sobering lessons about progressive strength,
Establishment myopia and the challenges of democratic organizing in
increasingly oligarchical society. _

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The bulk of US progressives and radicals went into the 2024
presidential race clear-eyed about how catastrophic a second Trump
term could be. Organizations ranging from the Working Families Party
[[link removed]] to the national community organizing
networks, from UNITE-HERE [[link removed]], other combative
unions and Working America [[link removed]] to hundreds
of local and state-based power-building groups, from Black Voters
Matter [[link removed]] and SURJ
[[link removed]] to Seed the Vote [[link removed]],
went all out. They pushed to their maximum “margin of effort”
[[link removed]] to
block MAGA’s bid for power in a way that would build their own
strength.

Anticipating a close race, most hoped it would be enough while
recognizing that we could lose. But what appeared to be the scale of
Trump’s victory on election night delivered a gut-punch both
politically and emotionally.

As the days went by and millions of votes not counted by November 5-6
were tallied, a fuller picture of the outcome emerged. As it turned
out, the popular vote total was in fact very close, with
Trump failing to reach 50%
[[link removed]] and
only beating Harris by 1.5% (49.9% to 48.4%)
[[link removed]].
Far more significant than the switch of some Biden 2020 voters to
Trump in 2024 was the fact that millions of voters in constituencies
that tend to vote Democratic stayed home. And even in states that
voted for Trump, ballot propositions on abortion, raising the minimum
wage and other issues
[[link removed]] mostly
resulted in progressive wins.

And the big effort put in by social justice organizations did make a
difference. In several battleground states and swing congressional
districts, Democratic Senate and House candidates who had been major
beneficiaries of progressive canvassing
[[link removed]] and
other efforts out-performed Harris and prevailed.

Still, the MAGA-controlled GOP won control of the White House and the
Senate while maintaining their (narrow) majority in the House and
trifectas in 23 state governments. Trump’s own statements, and the
roster of hatemongers and thugs he has nominated for Cabinet posts,
indicate that those levers of power will be used to impose
MAGA’s Project 2025
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Esther
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As we adjust “block the right/build independent progressive power
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strategies to meet the grave dangers ahead, the lessons we draw from
the 2024 campaign can help us both resist and keep our eyes on the
prize of transformative change.

Factors in Trump’s victory

A host of valuable assessments
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election turned out the way it did have been published since Nov. 5 in
the radical and mainstream media. Generally, analysts have sorted the
key factors shaping the outcome into three different categories: the
context in which the election took place; the problems of the Harris
campaign; and what progressives could and couldn’t bring to the
fight.

The context element that was cited most often and given most
importance was mass sentiment, especially in the working class, that
the Biden administration had done nothing to better people’s
difficult economic situations, and more specifically to address
inflation. Inflation has been a post-pandemic feature worldwide
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and it has contributed to incumbent parties of all political
tendencies being ousted from power in recent elections. Popular anger
over inflation intersects with a growing popular dissatisfaction with
everything from job insecurity and problems getting health care to
forever wars and “the status quo” in general.  

Other “context” factors include:

* Persistent racism and sexism
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the US electorate. Though the GOP made gains among voters of color
compared to 2020, the biggest division in voting patterns remains that
of race, especially the division between Black and white voters.
While 80-85% of African American voters chose Harris, at least 55% of
whites
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for Trump.
* The scale and effectiveness of the lavishly funded and
long-built-up right wing information/disinformation machine
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Fox News remains at its core, but Fox is now flanked by an expanding
network of podcasters and social media influencers that has made major
inroads among youth. The deep investment in MAGA politics by tech
billionaires
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companies control our social media feeds and crypto ponzi-scheme
hustlers
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exploded into view in this cycle.
* The mainstream media’s addiction to covering elections and
politics in general as a partisan horse race in which objectivity
means giving equal weight to both sides. Even media that editorializes
that Trump, MAGA and the GOP are existential threats to democracy
practices “both-sides-ism”
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Biden-Harris: myopia and worse

Some observers have argued that this context all but guaranteed that
Harris (or Biden if he hadn’t withdrawn) would lose in 2024 no
matter what they did. Whether or not that’s the case, it’s
impossible ignore a whole series of Democratic leadership decisions
that—even beyond being terrible from a progressive point of
view—damaged if not doomed their party’s campaign. These include:

* In his 2020 campaign and early in his term, Biden had spoken of
being a “‘transitional” one-term President. But he didn’t
withdraw early enough for there to be a contested primary which would
have allowed candidates to test voters’ preferences. A contested
primary would have opened the door for someone to play the role Bernie
did in 2020, energizing people with anti-corporate sentiments and
affecting the character of the 2024 general election campaign whoever
won the nomination.
* Under pressure from Bernie’s 2020 campaign, Biden did accomplish
some important things in the first year or two, such as taking steps
toward a “Bidenomics/Build Back Better” break with neoliberalism
and appointing the most pro-labor NLRB in decades. But he never
popularized a compelling narrative explaining how his program would
benefit the working class and why tangible results would take some
time to appear, and clearly identifying MAGA and GOP billionaires as
opponents of pro-worker, pro-poor people economic reforms. Democratic
claims that they stewarded the economy well only seemed tone-deaf to
people who were struggling.
* When Biden finally did drop out and there was a burst of
enthusiasm for the far more energetic Kamala Harris, the Harris team
seemed to conclude that the only problem the Democrats had in 2024 was
Biden’s age. Having dispensed with that problem, Harris refused to
distance herself from administration policy on Gaza or its immigration
crackdown. And on economics, where she did put some daylight between
herself and Biden, it was to move further _away _from pro-worker
economic populism
[[link removed]].
Despite a good start in choosing Tim Walz as her running mate, Harris
prioritized going after lukewarm-on-Trump Republicans over aggressive
efforts to court workers, Latinos, African Americans, young voters,
and peace voters, appearing more often with Liz Cheney than, say,
trade union leaders.

Progressives not yet at sufficient scale

The progressive ecosystem had more unity and sophistication than we
did in 2020 and deployed everything we could to beat MAGA. We leaned
into this effort even though most of us were furious at—and
constantly protesting
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the Biden administration and the Harris campaign for enabling genocide
in Gaza and going backward on immigrant rights.

But even with highly motivated canvassers and phone bankers, financial
support for many groups from the increasingly sophisticated Movement
Voter Project [[link removed]], and major efforts by electeds
like Bernie and AOC, the social justice camp lacked the sheer numbers
and media reach to compensate for an unfavorable context and
out-of-touch Democratic Party campaign. And though most of our work
stressed both the ‘block MAGA” and “build toward a better
future” components of progressive politics, it is likely we
overestimated the impact of “block MAGA” side on an electorate
deeply dissatisfied with a status quo with which Harris was
identified.  

And it is not just a problem of size, money, and some ineffective
messaging. With a few exceptions—mainly in the labor
movement—progressives are not embedded enough in large
organizations of working-class people that are membership-driven
[[link removed]] and
tap into the energy and creativity of those who are exploited and
oppressed. But for building durable power, there is no substitute for
a political culture where radicals who are embedded in the workplaces,
neighborhoods, and cultural and religious institutions of
working-class life act as catalysts
[[link removed]] to
unleash the energy, combativity, and all-around political leadership
potential of their co-workers, neighbors, and others with whom they
share the same conditions of life. 

A measure of left consensus

Different analysts weigh the factors listed above and others
differently. And current opinions are likely to be modified as more
data from exit polls and other sources comes in. But on a few key
points, there is a measure of emerging consensus on the broad Left.

First is that a significant majority of the US population (including
but not only those registered to vote) believes the country’s
current political and economic arrangement is not working for them and
wants major change. Electoral campaigns that do not offer a big-change
program but rely mainly on hammering the opponents will not excite
large numbers and are unlikely to succeed. A step-back look at the
2024 election indicates that a majority of people do not support
MAGA’s agenda. But all the factors above combined to make the 2024
election more of a referendum on the status quo than on the specific
kind of change MAGA offered. The candidate identified most with the
status quo —Harris—lost. Trump’s narrow victory does not confer
a mandate for the MAGA agenda. But turning broad anti-MAGA sentiment
into effective resistance when MAGA holds so many levers of political
power is going to be a huge challenge.

Second is that social justice partisans will not be able to stop MAGA
from doing tremendous damage to the global majority and the planet
itself unless we are rooted in the working class and project a vision
for change that reaches and attracts the majority of workers. Indeed,
the “we must organize in and win support from the working class”
perspective is becoming all but universal on the broad Left
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(in a different form) among some mainstream Democrats. This is a good
thing, although it is important to note that some versions of this
view downplay
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outright run away from
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fights for full equality for all specially oppressed groups, deploying
the term “identity politics” as an epithet and justification. But
a version of working-class politics that does not stand for “an
injury to one is an injury to all” (and/or does not apply that
standard internationally) is a dead end. 

Third is that there is a lot at stake in the current contention
between progressives’ diagnosis of why Harris lost in 2024 and the
stance of most current Democratic Party leaders who blame everything
and everyone but themselves. While a bold program of electoral reform
(end voter suppression and gerrymandering, abolish the electoral
college, explore ideas like ranked choice voting and multi-member
House districts) must be part of our agenda, for the near future we
are still stuck with the two-party system. Even as we unite with all
forces willing to resist MAGA, contention within the block-MAGA front
is likely to sharpen between progressives and centrist and
pro-corporate Democrats. Building our independent strength
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navigating that terrain.

Stepping back further, and looking ahead

Beyond those points, the election brought into sharp focus the extent
to which US democracy has been undermined since the passage of the
Voting Rights Act in 1965, and the degree to which wealth inequality
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the expansion of the billionaire class
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has grown since the 1970s—and the deep interconnection between these
two developments. The Federalist Society’s capture of the Supreme
Court enabled voter suppression, gerrymandering, and with the Citizens
United decision, a green light for big money to flow into electoral
campaigns. These changes—essentially a shift in class
power—facilitated de-regulation, changes in tax laws and other
measures that favored the rich. In short, the system is more
structurally biased against democracy and equality than it has been at
any time since the end of Jim Crow.

Put bluntly, the system is rigged
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it an oligarchy is gaining traction
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beyond the Far Left. Every democratic right we have on paper—to
vote, to protest, to organize a union, to receive equal treatment
under the law— had to be won with blood, sweat and tears because
ruling elites knew they were weapons that could be used to undermine
their power, and every one has been weakened by decades of assault.
Now an intensified assault on the remnants looms. Stressing the vital
connection between defense and expansion of democratic space and the
material conditions of life for the vast majority
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the connection real in the lives of the majority—is crucial for
putting resistance to Trump 2.0 on a firm foundation. And, if and when
we succeed in ousting MAGA from power, it will be central to
formulating a path to deep structural change.

And though the conversation about what happened in the election will
continue, the focus now shifts to resistance strategies for the next
difficult stage. Preparing for future elections will be part of the
mix, but the focus for the next year at least will be on non-electoral
action, including showing our commitment to resist by going into the
streets in large numbers.

For specific strategies and tactics, we will draw on the expertise of
those who have participated in and/or studied the experience of
movements against authoritarianism here and in other countries. (Among
other resources, you can check out materials like this
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the Horizons Project [[link removed]] or follow
the Anti-Authoritarian
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& Build
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from _Convergence_.)  And leadership in mass action in defense of
targeted constituencies will largely come from organizations with
experience and expertise fighting on the battlefronts that MAGA is
promising to prioritize— immigrant rights
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rights [[link removed]], voting rights
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US backing for Israeli genocide
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empire-building [[link removed]] in general.

It will be a difficult time. But partisans of peace, equality and
justice in this country have fought authoritarianism before. The
abolitionist movement, general strike of the enslaved, and a Union
Army combined to defeat the Slave Power. After the overthrow of the
post-Civil War Reconstruction governments (which W.E.B. DuBois called
“abolition democracy
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our political forbears faced 80 years of Jim Crow—US-style fascism.
Then the Black-led Civil Rights Movement took off and produced a
second Reconstruction, breaking the white monopoly on political power
and sparking the host of 1960s movements that brought the US closer to
a one-person, one-vote democracy than it had ever been.

Now it’s our turn to resist with a renewed margin of effort—and
prevail.

_Max Elbaum is a member of the Convergence Magazine editorial board
and the author of Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to
Lenin, Mao and Che 
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Books, Third Edition, 2018), a history of the 1970s-‘80s ‘New
Communist Movement’ in which he was an active participant. He is
also a co-editor, with Linda Burnham and María Poblet, of Power
Concedes Nothing: How Grassroots Organizing Wins Elections 
[[link removed]](OR Books, 2022)._

_Convergence [[link removed]] is a magazine for
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