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The day before the recent presidential election, Foreign Affairs published an essay [ [link removed] ] by Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Affairs, proposing a temporary, but potentially long-term, ceasefire and partition of Ukraine, to be followed by talks among the parties. This proposal would be somewhat similar to the agreements that ended the fighting in the Korean War in 1953 and in Cyprus in 1974. And it seems to be at least roughly in line with the thinking of the election’s winner, Donald Trump, and more explicitly of his [ [link removed] ] vice president, J.D. Vance.
In fact, this notion has been in [ [link removed] ] the [ [link removed] ] air [ [link removed] ] for some time, but it has regularly been derided as “defeatism,” “appeasement” or even “surrender.” However, it should be more openly debated and ultimately pursued. Although there are no guarantees, a partition and ceasefire could lead to the end of an infinitely stupid war that promises years (or even decades) of fruitless and essentially winnerless destruction of depopulated Ukrainian territory.
A ceasefire under the current boundaries would require Ukraine to give up about 18% of its pre-2014 territory, at least for the time being. However, it would essentially leave the country free to cure its internal ills, such as corruption, which currently hamper both its economic growth and its drive to join the West. At the same time, it would give the war’s author, Vladimir Putin, a face-saving way to exit his foolish adventure, which has cost his country dearly and earned widespread global condemnation.
Moreover, if the ceasefire leads to decades of peace, it seems possible that Ukraine and Russia, as they continue uneasily to negotiate the partition issue, could gradually establish a relatively comfortable co-existence resembling the ones embraced by the U.S. and Canada or by Germany and Austria—examples Putin put forward [ [link removed] ] as models a few months before the war. Even in Korea, where intensely hostile local regimes have glowered at each other for decades, there have been occasional periods of “sunshine.”
Advantages to Ukraine
Beyond halting the killing and destruction, a ceasefire would offer at least two advantages to Ukraine.
First, from an economic perspective, Ukraine is likely better off without the areas currently occupied by Russia. Crimea [ [link removed] ] and the Donbas [ [link removed] ] area were a drain on Kyiv even before the Russian incursions, and the situation in Crimea is probably even worse now than it was in 2014 because it no longer appeals to well-heeled tourists from Europe. And much of the rest of the territory captured by Russia, from which over half the population has fled, is something of a rubble heap.
In addition, a lingering ceasefire would give the bulk of Ukraine a chance (and a spur) to work quietly on its problems of corruption and economic stagnation that currently hamper [ [link removed] ] its efforts to join the West. Moreover, dealing [ [link removed] ] with these pathologies is likely to be helpful and perhaps necessary to persuade many of those who have fled [ [link removed] ] to the West to return.
Ukraine enjoys many advantages, such as a rich history, a well-educated workforce and abundant natural resources, including some of the best farmland on the planet. Nevertheless, among the 25 post-communist countries, it has been last [ [link removed] ] in economic growth over the past three decades. In 1991 its GDP per capita was about the same as that of Poland, but by 2015, it was between roughly a quarter and a third [ [link removed] ] of Poland’s. Indeed, by 2019 (before COVID and before the Russian invasion), Ukraine had managed to become the poorest [ [link removed] ] country in Europe. But with the debilitating war halted, perhaps Ukraine could begin to address its economic problems.
The Putin Factor
Although Putin has expressed of late a willingness to negotiate (though often with spoiler [ [link removed] ] conditions), there is considerable and understandable, if often underexplained, concern that he cannot be trusted to abide by a ceasefire. Part of this concern arises because he may actually have, or might later develop, broader goals, perhaps to attack the rest of Ukraine or other countries in the neighborhood, such as Poland.
Any agreement on partition would substantially gamble on the prospect that Putin does not have, or at any rate will not act on, such ambitions. And since this war is arguably a sequel to Putin’s previous invasion of Crimea in 2014, the gamble could indeed be a significant one. It is true that Putin once said [ [link removed] ], “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” But he followed it up with, “Whoever wants it back has no brain.” And, given the military problems that followed his 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it seems unlikely [ [link removed] ] that he will mount similar ventures in places where defenders would be better prepared. His pre-war boast [ [link removed] ] that his soldiers “could be in Kyiv in two days” has, to say the least, proved to be hollow.
In addition, it seems clear that, as Putin biographer Philip Short [ [link removed] ] and other analysts [ [link removed] ] strongly stress, Ukraine is viewed as a special case by Russians, not a stepping stone to wider adventures.
Putin, then, may not have designs on provinces he does not currently control, and he may be willing to accept and abide by a Korea-like partition. However, even if Ukraine does not formally join NATO (which several members have opposed [ [link removed] ] anyway due to the country’s corruption and other ills), the alliance can still supply something of a security guarantee by credibly pledging arms and other assistance to Ukraine should Putin break the ceasefire. They would be much better prepared to do so than they were in 2022.
In all, getting the costly mess of a war out of the way with some sort of dignity would likely appeal greatly to Putin, and it certainly would to the Russian people. Estimates [ [link removed] ] indicate that Russia is already shelling out some $11 billion per year in the occupied territories, while it also has to pay subsidies [ [link removed] ] for its citizens to move there to compensate for the labor shortage the war has created. If Russia advances, however gradually, its costs will only increase.
To gild the pill, Ukraine could drop the (mindless) laws that have sought to demote the Russian language, such as the one that requires [ [link removed] ] shopkeepers to greet all customers in Ukrainian. The underproductive sanctions on Russia could also be reduced or dropped.
Putin’s Spin
Putin’s war will likely go down in history [ [link removed] ] as a fiasco [ [link removed] ]—which means he has already lost. Ukraine will continue to move out of his orbit and turn toward the West. Ukrainian nationalism and hostility to Russia have greatly intensified, and the use of the Russian language there continues to decline. Meanwhile, the NATO alliance has been expanded and strengthened, and the huge Western market for Russian oil has largely been obliterated. Even before the war, economists were finding [ [link removed] ] the prospect for substantial Russian economic growth over the next decade in Putin’s economically declining kleptocracy to be “dim.” And his war has likely alienated prospective buyers and investors for a long time.
Nonetheless, Putin will likely be able to spin a partition agreement as a victory—something that might make it easier for him to accept. To begin with, he would be able to claim that he now controls a land bridge to beleaguered Russians in Crimea, though that was not one of his demands when he started his war.
More importantly, he will be able to claim success because, as he fantasized [ [link removed] ] when launching the war, Russia’s invasion was designed to undercut NATO’s military buildup in Ukraine, which would eventually have led the alliance to invade Russia the way Germany did in 1941. That bizarre argument seems to have sold well in Russia—as usual [ [link removed] ], people believe what they want to believe. (For example, many Americans expressed the belief that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was “personally involved” in 9/11, long after that idea had ceased to be official doctrine.)
If Putin insists on getting some sort of guarantee that his fantasy will not become a reality, it must be possible for the West to satisfactorily promise in a partition agreement that it will not do what it doesn’t want (and has never wanted) to do anyway.
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