Expanded Targeting Options for Ukraine Are Too Little, Too Late

On Nov. 17, the Biden administration reversed a long-standing policy and authorized Ukraine to use U.S.-made guided artillery missiles on Russian territory. NATO allies U.K. and France are expected to follow suit with the strike weapons they supply. Previously, Ukraine was only allowed to use such weapons on its own territory that was occupied by Russian forces. Could this new freedom enable Ukraine to break Russia's initiative and stall its slow but steady advance? Unfortunately, the answer is no.

It must be said that while Ukraine is being given more leeway in how it uses the NATO weapons it receives, their employment is still effectively being heavily micromanaged by Washington. Last summer, soon after Ukrainian troops entered the Kursk region in Russia, the United States allowed the use of its supplied weapons on Russian soil, but only against military targets in the area of fighting. Under the new policy—although the details have not been made public—the restriction has been lifted everywhere as far as pure military targets are concerned. In other words, the weapons can be used against any military target with their reach, anywhere in Russia. Still, Ukraine's leaders remain frustrated that they can't strike out at any targets anywhere within range of these weapons, including economic ones and infrastructure.

In our February 2024 evaluation of Ukraine entering its third year of war, we offered the following conclusion:

Any chance for achieving Ukrainian victory—or at least staving off defeat until Russian losses cause it to reevaluate its goals—will come with more advanced weapons and training for Ukraine, not less. In addition to providing more of what Ukraine already has, the West must give the country long-range weapons to enable it to strike Russia directly and formidably. As with shipments of heavy weapons in 2023, sooner is better than later.

This was a military assessment, not a political one. Ukraine was at a crossroads with two terrible choices: fight on and likely eventually lose, or seek a negotiated settlement that President Vladimir Putin would just break when it suited him. The first option seemed the less terrible. Yet any success or at least advantage that might come from fighting was contingent on Ukraine having the means to hit Russia hard and often inside its own territory.

Lost Opportunity

From a military point of view, a major opportunity has already been squandered. When Ukraine began using the U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in 2023, Russia soon withdrew all its planes to the areas the U.S. forbade Ukraine to attack with these missiles. Now Russian fighters operate from remote airbases. Providing Ukraine with ATACMS without a public announcement and with no strings attached last year might have produced excellent tactical results. Surprise attacks against airbases would have been very effective because fighters are difficult to replace due to their low rate of production.

After Biden's announcement, Ukraine wasted little time in striking out into Russian territory. Reportedly, the first strike using ATACMS targeted an arsenal in Karachev, near Bryansk, which is near Kursk but not in the region. The big ammunition depot managed by Russia’s artillery and missile forces blew up. Well done. However, the number of such ammunition storage facilities and smaller depots is so large and the number of U.S.-supplied missiles is so small that there is no prospect of paralyzing the supply of ammunition to Russian forces at the front.

Ukraine manufactures its own long-range strike weapons in the form of battlefield ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones, the latter of which are essentially a class of less sophisticated cruise missile. It is free to hit enemy targets deep inside Russia with its domestically produced weapons, and has done so, sometimes with remarkable success.

However, as military journalist and blogger David Axe has noted, Ukraine is still struggling to mass-produce such weapons. “While the Ukrainian intelligence directorate has overseen development of a wide array of improvised strike drones—including modified sport planes that range as far as 1,100 miles and have struck Russian air bases as far away as the Russian Arctic—these drones are boutique products,” Axe wrote in his Trench Art Substack in September. “They’ve proved difficult to produce at scale, which is why the deepest strikes … are rare, occurring no more frequently than every few weeks.”

Infrequent, pinprick attacks—even when they score—do not produce war-winning results. A much smaller Ukraine has suffered under a significantly more sustained and damaging aerial bombardment by Russian ballistic and cruise missiles and air-launched glide bombs, and it is still functioning and fighting. Only a continuous pipeline of weapons used as part of an extended campaign can hope to change the course of the war.

Biden's belated authorization on ATACMS use does not provide for this.

Arms Tied

Ukraine has been using ATACMS to good effect since 2023, but only against targets in Crimea and other Russian-occupied regions. Likewise, Ukraine has been using air-launched cruise missiles supplied by the U.K. and France (Storm Shadow and SCALP, respectively; essentially two versions of the same missile) under the same restrictions. It is possible that London and Paris will give Ukraine more freedom to strike different types of targets than Washington has, but unlikely.

In the end, Biden’s authorization to somewhat broaden the geographic scope of allowable strikes smacks of President Lyndon Johnson's control of allowable targets for air attack during the Vietnam War. Micromanagement of Ukraine also has echoes of the administration’s attempts to exert control over Israel’s war against Iran and its proxies in response to Hamas’ Oct. 7 raid last year.

Unfortunately, the use of long-range precision weapons against Russian targets will not change the overall strategic situation for Ukraine. It might slightly improve the tactical situation in certain areas for a certain period of time, but overall, it is too little and too late. The best we can hope for is that NATO and America will learn the lessons about hitting rear areas early, often and everywhere—and building enough ordnance to do so, since war with Russia or China will present more battlefield and rear area targets than we currently have ammunition for.

The best Ukraine can hope for is that inflicting a little more pain on Russia will help it get a good deal under the incoming Trump administration.