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November 20, 2024

This month’s newsletter features a report about the drone plant in
Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which manufactures
Iranian-designed Shahed-136 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for use in
Russia’s war against Ukraine. The report examines the web of relationships
enabling the operation of the plant despite heavy sanctions. Key to the
plant’s success are the government-to-government relationship between
Moscow and Tehran, the connections between the Alabuga SEZ and other
Russian companies, and those companies’ relationships with suppliers
abroad.

The newsletter also includes profiles of companies that have supplied
resins and other composite materials to Iran’s nuclear program, as well as
news about Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, an Israeli
strike on an Iranian facility reportedly involved in nuclear
weapons-related research, and Iranian satellites launched by Russia.
Additions to the Iran Watch library include European sanctions on Iran’s
national airline and maritime carrier and U.S. efforts to disrupt Iranian
oil sales.

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your inbox, or [3]view the newsletter in your browser.

PUBLICATIONS

[4]

A map of Russia and Iran indicating the location of the Alabuga SEZ and
several of the entities that support its drone production. (Credit:
Wisconsin Project)

Articles and Reports | [5]Alabuga Drone Plant: A Case Study of Key
Relationships Enabling Iranian Support for Russian Military Production

The Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ), an entity overseeing an industrial
campus in Russia’s Tatarstan region, operates a drone plant under contract
with the Russian military to manufacture Iranian-designed Shahed-136
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Although heavily sanctioned, the Alabuga SEZ has established and expanded
production by functioning as the central node connecting various entities
in Russia, Iran, and overseas, with the support of the Russian government.
Disrupting the operation of the Alabuga SEZ and other Russian efforts to
establish new UAV production lines requires carefully tracing networks of
company-to-company and company-to-government relationships.

[6]READ THE REPORT

ENTITIES OF CONCERN

In March, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned multiple companies
and individuals for supplying resins and other composite materials to
[7]Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA) and other entities involved in
Iran’s nuclear and military programs.

[8]Pishro Mobtaker Peyvand

An Iran-based company active in the composites industry; has worked with
[9]Rostam Shahmari Ghojeh Biklo to obtain accelerator, hardener, and resin
for TESA and resin for [10]Kalaye Electric Company (KEC).

[11]LEARN MORE

[12]Mitra Inanlu

An Iran-based businesswoman and beneficial owner of [13]Alborz Organic
Materials Engineering Company; active in the composites industry; involved
in the procurement of proliferation-sensitive material..

[14]LEARN MORE

[15]Hidayet Kanoglu

A Turkey-based procurement agent; has procured hardener and resin for
[16]Sazeh Morakab Co. Ltd for use by TESA.

[17]LEARN MORE

IN THE NEWS

[18]

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visits uranium enrichment facility at
Natanz. (Credit: Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency)

[19]Iran Offers to Cap Sensitive Uranium Stock as IAEA Resolution Looms |
Reuters

November 20, 2024: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported
that Iran has continued to expand its uranium enrichment activities,
increasing its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent by more than 17
kg, to a total of 182.3 kg. According to the report, during a recent visit
to Iran by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, Iran offered to cap its
stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, but that offer is reportedly
conditional on an IAEA board censure resolution failing to pass..

[20]Israel Destroyed Active Nuclear Weapons Research Facility in Iran,
Officials Say | Axios

November 15, 2024: Israel’s attack on Iran on October 26 destroyed an
active Iranian nuclear weapons research facility in the Parchin military
complex, according to U.S. and Israeli officials. The facility, known as
Taleghan 2, contained equipment for designing the shaped plastic explosives
used to detonate a nuclear weapon and is part of a recent effort by the
Iranian government to conduct research that could be used to develop
nuclear weapons. The facility was part of the Amad Plan, a pre-2004 Iranian
program to develop nuclear weapons..

[21]Russia Launches Rocket Carrying Two Satellites From Iran | Reuters

November 5, 2024: Russia launched two Iranian satellites into orbit aboard
a Soyuz rocket: the Kowsar (a high-resolution imaging satellite) and Hodhod
(a small communications satellite). The Iranian satellites were among 53
small satellites launched by the rocket, according to Russia’s space
agency, Roscosmos.

FROM THE LIBRARY

Iran’s continued military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine prompted the
European Union and the United Kingdom to announce new sanctions measures
against Iran.
* The European Union [22]prohibited the export to Iran of components used
in the manufacture of missiles and UAVs and designated Iran’s national
maritime carrier, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and
three Russian shipping companies for their involvement in the transfer of
Iranian UAVs and missiles to Russia – November 18.
* The United Kingdom [23]sanctioned IRISL and Iran’s national airline,
Iran Air, for transferring ballistic missiles to Russia – November 18.



The United States announced sanctions targeting Iran’s ability to generate
revenue through oil sales.
* The U.S. Department of the Treasury [24]sanctioned a Syria-based
conglomerate involved in generating hundreds of millions of dollars in
revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and
the Houthis through the sale of Iranian oil to Syria and China – November
14.

Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization
that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting
strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

Copyright © 2024 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

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