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Weekend Reads

Nuclear Escalation and Winning the New Cold War [[link removed]]

China, Russia, and North Korea do not have to attack the United States or its allies directly to topple the US-led order. Instead, these adversaries can threaten uncontrolled escalation to convince America not to support its allies.

In a new essay compilation [[link removed]] edited by Rebeccah L. Heinrichs [[link removed]], nuclear policy experts explain how Washington can adapt its strategic posture and composition to meet this threat. The contributors will also sit down for a panel discussion [[link removed]] on the compilation’s findings this Monday, October 21, at 9:30 a.m. Tune in here. [[link removed]]

Read the full compilation here. [[link removed]]

Key Insights

1. US officials should recognize the perils of unilateral restraint and the value of tailored strike options.

The action-reaction myth, the idea that expanding the US nuclear arsenal will ignite a destabilizing arms race, clouds the debate over Washington’s future nuclear posture. But America’s rivals are unlikely to share the same deterrence logic. Expanding one’s nuclear arsenal will not invariably lead to an unconstrained arms race ending in a catastrophic nuclear war. Policymakers should thus view blanket calls for restraint with suspicion. Given the enduring fundamentals of deterrence, US officials should attune themselves to the perils of unilateral restraint and the value of tailored strike options. To do otherwise would be to ignore the hard-earned experience of their Cold War forerunners.

Read Kyle Balzer’s essay “Arms Racing and Reality: Why the Action-Reaction Phenomenon Is a Myth.” [[link removed]]

2. America needs to field more theater-range nuclear options to bolster the credibility of regional deterrence.

Having nuclear capabilities with diverse yields, ranges, flight patterns, and basing modes would support US deterrence by demonstrating America’s political will and giving the president a tailored set of options to convey any intended deterrent threat. The US reportedly has only a few hundred B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe, and the nascent nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) program is not planned to arrive until 2034. Other selective nuclear employment options, like bombers carrying cruise missiles, might be insufficient for an opportunistic or coordinated aggression scenario when the demand for US aerial refueling capabilities will reach its maximum in both Europe and Asia. In this context, and given US allies’ rising demands for improved extended deterrence, Washington should prioritize acquiring SLCM-N sooner and developing regional ground-based nuclear-armed systems that it can deploy in theater if needed.

Read Matthew R. Costlow’s essay “Deterring and Responding to Escalation: What the US Needs and Why.” [[link removed]]

3. The US and its allies need to examine their deterrence failures in Ukraine and remember it is always cheaper to deter a conflict than to fight one.

The Biden administration’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 dealt a severe blow to American credibility and resolve on the world stage. The rapid collapse of the US-backed Afghan government and America’s chaotic evacuation from Kabul projected weakness and unreliability to both allies and adversaries. Then, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, US policies have prolonged the fighting and potentially emboldened further Russian aggression. The Biden administration’s acute fear of conflict with nuclear-armed Russia has allowed Moscow to almost completely control the pace of escalation. To prevent the next war, Western nations need to heed these lessons and increase investments in necessary weapon systems; double down on coproduction and co-development; renew their industrial bases; and add capabilities and warheads to their nuclear deterrent.

Quotes may be edited for clarity and length.

Read Ryan Tully’s essay “What the Russia-Ukraine War Teaches about Deterrence Failure and Escalation.” [[link removed]]

Go Deeper

Seven Things Pacific Prioritizers Get Wrong about Aid to Ukraine [[link removed]]

Daniel Kochis [[link removed]] tackles the falsehoods upon which proponents of an Asia-first American military posture rely and explains why a siloed approach to Chinese and Russian threats weakens deterrence in the Pacific.

Read here. [[link removed]]

Duty to Deter: American Nuclear Deterrence and the Just War Doctrine [[link removed]]

To discuss her new book Duty to Deter: American Nuclear Deterrence and the Just War Doctrine, Rebeccah L. Heinrichs [[link removed]] will sit down with Jeremy Hunt [[link removed]] on Tuesday, October 22, at 10:00 a.m.

Watch here. [[link removed]]

The Future of US and Allied Hypersonic Missile Programs [[link removed]]

Congressional, government, and industry officials discussed the future of the American hypersonic missile program [[link removed]] as adversaries threaten to surpass US capabilities and to hold American citizens at risk.

Watch the event, read the transcript, or listen here. [[link removed]]

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