Following is the September 2024 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. All previous 2024 monthly installments can be found here, as
well as a review of developments throughout 2023, 2022, and 2021. A full
background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be explored here, here, and
here.



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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2024


Read ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2024 by clicking
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ISIS Redux: The Central Syria Insurgency In September 2024

By Gregory Waters



Following is the September 2024 installment of “ISIS Redux: The Central Syria
Insurgency,” a monthly chronicle of attacks by the terrorist group ISIS in
central Syria. All previous 2024 monthly installments can be foundhere
<[link removed]>, as well as a
review of developments throughout2023
<[link removed]>,
2022
<[link removed]>
, and2021
<[link removed]>.
A full background and analysis of ISIS’s resurgence in Syria, including the
methodology used to collect this data, can also be exploredhere
<[link removed]>, here
<[link removed]>
, andhere
<[link removed]>
.



ISIS carried out at least 16 confirmed attacks in September in the Aleppo,
Homs, Hama, Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor governorates. These attacks killed at least
32 pro-Assad regime soldiers and one civilian and wounded at least 21 others.
There were also five high quality* attacks carried out during the month. The
frequency of ISIS attacks in September was roughly consistent with the number
in August. However, unlike in August, September attacks were much deadlier and
overwhelmingly focused on security forces, with only one documented attack
against civilians.



September’s activity generally continued August’s trend of more frequent,
deadly, and sophisticated attacks, as opposed to July, when ISIS activity
dropped to near record low levels. ISIS cells continue to operate aggressively
in southern Raqqa while also reviving activity in the Kawm and Ithriya regions
of Homs and Hama, respectively. ISIS appeared to have largely abandoned both of
these regions in recent months following regime operations. Throughout
September, the Russian Air Force continued its high-tempo aerial campaign
against suspected ISIS positions in the desert. For example, on September 30,
Russian-commanded units of the Syrian 25th Division again conducted
wide-ranging anti-ISIS operations across eastern Homs and western Deir Ez Zor.
These units wereaccompanied
<[link removed]> by members of the
Russian Bear Brigade, a Private military company (PMC) under the command of the
Russian Ministry of Defense,formed
<[link removed]>
in March 2023 for operations in Ukraine and Africa.





*Indicates attacks in Damascus City claimed by ISIS. Additional IED attacks
occurred in Homs City in June 2023 and in Damascus in March 2024 and May 2024
that went unclaimed but were suspected to be conducted by ISIS.





Confirmed ISIS attacks remained steady in Raqqa (4), increased slightly Aleppo
(1) and Hama (1), and decreased in Homs (5) and Deir Ez Zor (4).


Deir Ez Zor



ISIS expanded its low-level insurgency within the urban belt of Deir Ez Zor in
January, when it conducted three assassinations of local security forces.
Sleeper cells continued this trend through April, conducting nine urban
assassinations inside Mayadin City. In May, regime security forces captured a
small four-man ISIS cell inside Mayadin. According to local journalist Zain
al-Abidin, three of the detained men were serving in the pro-regime National
Defense Forces (NDF) and their leader had entered Mayadin from northeast Syria
during the regime’s 2022 reconciliation initiative – a security risk this
author had highlighted at the time. Between June and August, ISIS assailants
conducted an IED and three small arms attacks across Deir Ez Zor City,
Shamitiyah, and Mayadeen City. There were no documented urban attacks in Deir
Ez Zor in September, however on September 28,video
<[link removed]> taken from across the
Euphrates River appears to show Russian airstrikes in the area around
Shamitiyah, possibly indicating an attempted ISIS attack.



On September 4, a soldier from the 10th Border Guards Regiment was killed in
the Boukamal countryside, and a militia fighter was killed in an unspecified
location in the governorate. On September 7, ISIS militants attacked a 17th
Division position east of Shoula, though no casualties were reported. On
September 27, two 5th Corps soldiers were wounded in an ISIS attack on their
position northwest of Shoula. On September 30, a vehicle carrying members of
the Iranian-backed Liwa Imam al-Baqir militia was hit by a mine or improvised
explosive device (IED) outside Sahiliyah, killing one and wounding two. A
similar attack occurred in this area on August 30.



In Raqqa, ISIS activity in May dropped back down to more typical levels
following two months of heightened activity. Since then, the group has
maintained a low-level but robust insurgency in the desert between Resafa and
Jabal Bishri. This trend continued in July and August. In September, ISIS
attacks in southern Raqqa became deadlier and also moved eastward, occurring
more frequently in the countryside south of Tabqa.



On September 3, ISIS militants attacked a small convoy of oil trucks traveling
the Tabqa-Ithriya road, causing some material damage. On September 4, six
Republican Guard soldiers were killed in an attack on a security checkpoint
near Ja’adin, northwest of Resafa. The next day, ISIS fighters attacked a group
of shepherds near Sabkha, killing one man and dozens of sheep. On September 8,
two soldiers were killed in fighting northwest of Resafa. On September 18,
militants conducted another attack on oil trucks traveling the Resafa road,
damaging two of the tankers.



 


Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in Dier Ez Zor (top) and Raqqa
(bottom) in September 2024 alongside all other attacks in 2024. Note that one
attack in Deir Ez Zor could not be mapped.



Homs



ISIS activity in eastern Homs decreased in December 2023, but remained focused
around the Doubayat Oil Field, which the group had temporarily captured in
November. January 2024 likewise saw most ISIS activity concentrated in this
area, though the group also expanded operations west into the desert just south
of Palmyra and Arak. In February, ISIS largely abandoned the southern Palmyra
front, likely because of pro-regime ground and air operations, and shifted its
focus to the Taybeh sector north of Sukhnah and the Jubb Jarah mountains north
of Palmyra. This focus continued into March, with activity remaining
concentrated in the Sukhnah-Taybeh-Kawm axis in both April and May. However,
security forces continued to largely stand their ground and June saw ISIS once
again shift its attacks to the Jubb Jarah and southern Wadi Doubayat-Palmyra
region, seemingly abandoning the Taybeh-Kawm front. The deployment of
significant numbers of Russian-backed 25th Division fighters in early June and
those subsequent battles appear to have resulted in ISIS largely abandoning all
eastern Homs fronts in July. In August, ISIS renewed its violent activity in
eastern Homs, but largely avoided the core Palmyra-Sukhnah region, likely now
too heavily fortified for the group to risk attacking.



In September, ISIS activity returned to the Taybeh region for the first time
since June. On September 6, ISIS militants attacked a regime barracks west of
Taybeh, wounding four soldiers. On September 7, ISIS conducted a large attack
on a regime position outside the Tuwaynan Oil Fields. According to ISIS’s
official claim of the attack, eight soldiers were killed, three trucks were
destroyed, arms and supplies were seized. Regime social media also reported on
the attack, announcing the death of an oil engineer working in the field. On
September 21, skirmishes west of Taybeh left one Liwa al-Quds fighter killed
and six injured. The next day, regime pages claimed a soldier was killed
somewhere in the Palmyra countryside. On September 30, two high ranking
officers – a lieutenant colonel and a major – were killed and six others
injured by a mine or an improvised explosive device (IED) while driving in the
Jubb Hamad region west of Palmyra. The officers were from the 11th Division and
were likely on their way to participate in the new anti-ISIS operation in
eastern Homs.





Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Homs (highlighted) in September 2024
alongside all other attacks in 2024.



Hama and Aleppo



Significant ISIS activity returned to east Hama in January, when the group
conducted five attacks, three being high quality. Likewise, ISIS conducted
three high quality attacks in eastern Hama in February. This was the first time
eastern Hama had witnessed back-to-back months of three or more high quality
attacks since spring 2021. In March, there were five high quality and 12 total
attacks, almost all against security forces. However, activity fell
significantly in April and May, and June had only two documented attacks.
July’s activity was likewise limited and in August, no attacks occurred.
September witnessed the slight return of ISIS activity, with one documented
attack occurring on September 4, when ISIS targeted two positions in the
Ithriyah region and killed four soldiers.



Likewise, there was one attack in southern Aleppo in September. On September
14, ISIS fighters killed five members of the pro-regime “Popular Front for the
Liberation of Iskenderun District” militia, including the commander of the
Safira region center. The attack occurred on the Khanasir-Ithriyah road.





Map of locatable ISIS attacks in Hama and Aleppo (highlighted) in September
2024 alongside all other attacks in 2024.



Looking Ahead



July marked the end of what can be categorized as ISIS’s first sustained Badia
campaign since 2020. Beginning with a localized but significant escalation in
October 2023 and culminating in a sustained region-wide series of campaigns
throughout much of 2024, ISIS showed a renewed energy and strength after years
of concentrated regime operations. Still, the regime and its Russian and
Iranian allies were able to effectively secure all the critical sites across
the region, preventing ISIS from making any permanent gains. Key to this
success was the deployment of core regime units that had never before
participated in the counter-insurgency campaign.



However, the much-reduced ISIS activity in July did not last long. While
August and September were by no means record-setting months, ISIS has shown
clear signs of a rapid and sustained partial regeneration in the Badia. The
group continues to demonstrate a level of resiliency not seen since 2020. As in
August, violent activity in September consisted of a small number of localized
attacks – again suggesting the possibility that just a few active cells are
responsible for much of the ongoing violence.



Notably, Coalition forces conducted an extremely rare airstrike against ISIS
in central Syria in September – the first sinceOctober 2020
<[link removed]>. On September 16, Coalition
aircraftstruck
<[link removed]>
an “ISIS training camp” somewhere in the Badia, reportedly killing 28
militants and “at least four senior leaders.” It remains to be seen what long
term impact this strike will have, but at the very least, it inflicted a degree
of casualties rarely, if ever, experienced by Badia cells.





Map of locatable ISIS attacks (highlighted) in September 2024 alongside all
other attacks in 2024. Not mapped is one attack which occurred somewhere in the
Deir Ez Zor countryside. To view an interactive version of this map, please
clickhere
<[link removed]>
.



*High quality attacks are defined as attacks behind frontlines, attacks that
result in seized positions, target regime officers, or involve coordinated
attacks on multiple positions, “flying checkpoints” (temporary roadblocks ISIS
fighters establish in order to stop and extort or ambush a few cars), ambushes
on military convoys, or attacks on checkpoints that kill at least three
soldiers or lead to POWs.



###



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